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Krishnan Nair v. Kambi .
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a suit in ejectment and for recovery of arrears of rent concerning four items of property belonging to a tarwad. The suit was originally instituted by Achutha Nair as manager of his tarwad. It was alleged that items 1–3 were leased to the defendant's father in Chingom (1908-1909) 1084 under a lease deed for a munpattom of Rs. 40 executed by the lessor in favour of Kunji Amma (then the senior female member) on behalf of the tarwad because the senior male member, Govinda Menon, was employed elsewhere. Item 4 was alleged to have been leased orally in 1086 to the defendant's father by Gopalan Nair, who was managing the tarwad on behalf of Govinda Menon.
Kunji Amma died before the suit. After the defendant's father died, the defendant remained in possession and refused to surrender possession or pay rent from 1104 to the plaintiff, prompting the suit. Achutha Nair died during the proceedings and Krishnan Nair (the next senior male member) was added as plaintiff 2.
The defendant's main defence was that the leases had been granted by Kunji Amma, that a custom vested the right of management in the senior-most female member (and that after Kunji Amma's death this right vested in Nanu Amma), and that the defendant had attorned to Nanu Amma and paid rent to her; accordingly, the defendant claimed to hold under Nanu Amma and refused to surrender possession to the plaintiff.
Both lower courts agreed that the leases were given by Kunji Amma, but they differed on whether a custom existed conferring management rights on the senior-most female member. The learned District Munsif found no such custom and decreed for the plaintiff. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the custom was established by long acquiescence in Kunji Amma's management and therefore held for the defendant on the title/management issue (while also finding that, if the plaintiff were the rightful manager, he would be entitled to possession of items 1–3). The matter proceeded to second appeal, where the appellate court reviewed these findings and other matters raised in the appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a custom existed in the tarwad vesting the right of management in the senior-most female member in preference to the senior-most male member.
- Whether documentary judgments delivered after the filing of a second appeal may be admitted in evidence in that appeal and, if admitted, whether they conclude the issue between the parties (i.e., the admissibility and effect of subsequent judgments).
- Whether a defendant who claims under a third party (here, Nanu Amma) is bound by earlier judgments adverse to that third party (issues of res judicata, estoppel by record, and privity/subordination between lessor and lessee).
- Whether the defendant is liable for arrears of rent when he has paid rent bona fide to a third party who is later adjudicated not to have the management/title claimed.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant / Plaintiff (as represented in the appeal)
- Contended that the deeds of partition (Ex. D dated about 12 July 1877) show that Govinda Menon, the senior-most male member, should be manager of the branch tarwad, which casts doubt on the existence of any custom giving management priority to a senior female.
- Applied to admit two judgments (A. Section Nos. 68 and 69 of 1934 on the file of the Sub-Court at Ottappalam) decided after the filing of the present appeal, which, it was submitted, finally decided in other proceedings that the right of management vests in the senior-most male and that no custom favouring the senior-most female existed.
- Argued that those subsequent judgments, if admitted, conclude the issue about Nanu Amma's title and should be treated as binding insofar as they determine the title to management.
Respondent / Defendant
- Main defence: the leases were granted by Kunji Amma and there is a custom vesting the management of the tarwad in the senior-most female member; after Kunji Amma the management vested in Nanu Amma, and the defendant attorned to and paid rent to Nanu Amma and thus held under her.
- Objected to reception of the subsequently-delivered judgments in the appeal, relying on the authority of Secy. of State v. Manjeshwar Krishnaya ((1908) 31 Mad 415) to argue that such documents should not be admitted in second appeal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Gaddam Paramasivudu v. Mulakala Subbanna, AIR 1919 Mad 17 | Authority for admitting a judgment in a second appeal where the judgment was delivered after filing of the appeal and is relevant to the issues before the appellate court. | The court followed this decision to admit the judgments (A. Section Nos. 68 and 69 of 1934) pronounced after filing of the appeal, treating them as admissible evidence that concluded the issue about Nanu Amma's title. |
| Secy. of State v. Manjeshwar Krishnaya, (1908) 31 Mad 415 | Authority relied on by respondent to object to admitting documents in second appeal; in that case the decision related to a question of fact and the documents were available at trial. | The court distinguished this authority on the basis that in Manjeshwar Krishnaya the documents related to facts available at trial, whereas here the judgments sought to be admitted were delivered after the appeal was filed; therefore the authority was held distinguishable and not applicable to bar admission. |
| Balkishen v. Kishan Lal, (1889) 11 All 148 at p.162 | Statement of principle that res judicata and the prohibition on retrial of an issue relate to the time when the Judge is called upon to decide the issue, not to the date when the litigation commenced; references to relevant Code of Civil Procedure sections. | The court cited this principle to support taking notice of the subsequent adjudications and to justify admitting the post-appeal judgments and treating them as conclusive on the question of Nanu Amma's title. |
| Rangaohariar v. Rangaswami Iyengar, AIR 1936 Mad 190 | Applied in a civil revision petition to similar effect regarding the admission or effect of subsequent judgments. | The court noted that this decision had recently applied the same principle, supporting the approach of admitting later judgments that bear on the issue. |
| Seshappaya v. Venkataramana Uppadya, (1910) 33 Mad 459 | Discusses whether a lessee is estopped by judgment against his lessor; the judges in that case noted no English authority supporting the view that a lessee is bound by a judgment against his lessor and left the question open for certain tenures. | The court relied on the distinctions drawn in that case to qualify when the principle that a lessee may be bound by a judgment against his lessor applies (not applying to permanent heritable tenures but suitable where tenancy is determinable or subordinate). |
| Secy. of State v. Syed Ahmed Badsha Sahib, AIR 1921 Mad 248 | Principle that a person who sets up the rights of a third party (jus tertii) must prove the third party's rights, and that it is open to the opponent to displace that title by showing the third party was party to litigation negating that title; estoppel by record or in pais applies equally. | The court invoked this principle to hold that the defendant, who relied on Nanu Amma's title, could be barred by judgments negating Nanu Amma's title; it also distinguished the authority on its facts where the Secretary of State's plea was not treated as jus tertii. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in two analytical strands.
First, as to the custom claimed by the defendant: the court examined the Subordinate Judge's finding that a custom existed by reason of approximately 40 years' management by Kunji Amma with male acquiescence. The appellate court found this view unsatisfactory. It noted that the tarwad at issue had separated from a main tarwad by a deed of partition (Ex. D, dated about 12 July 1877), which expressly provided that Govinda Menon, the senior-most male member, should be manager of the branch to which Kunji Amma belonged. The court observed that apart from the single instance of Kunji Amma's management there was no other instance of a female member's management, and emphasized that strong and cogent evidence is required to establish a custom that would displace the normal rule favouring the senior male for management. It concluded that the necessary elements of a valid custom had not been proved, and it would be unsafe to infer such a custom from the single instance of prolonged management by a woman.
Second, and dispositively, the court considered subsequent judgments (A. Section Nos. 68 and 69 of 1934) delivered after the filing of the appeal, which the plaintiff's representative produced and moved to have admitted. The defendant objected, citing Manjeshwar Krishnaya. The court distinguished that authority and followed Gaddam Paramasivudu v. Mulakala Subbanna (AIR 1919 Mad 17), holding that judgments delivered after an appeal is filed may be taken into account in the appeal where they conclusively decide the issue. The court relied on the doctrine stated in Balkishen v. Kishan Lal that the prohibition on retrial of an issue refers to the time when the Judge is called upon to decide the issue; procedural Code provisions were cited to support application of the rule in appellate proceedings.
The court then addressed whether the defendant (who had attorned to and paid rent to Nanu Amma) was bound by the judgments adverse to Nanu Amma. It surveyed doctrinal views: Dr. Bigelow's principle that a lessee is bound by a judgment against his lessor (absent fraud or collusion) because the lessee's subordinate interest is affected by deprivation of the landlord's estate; the Seshappaya decision's caution that the Bigelow principle does not comfortably extend to permanent heritable tenures but may apply where tenancy is subordinate or determinable. The court found that, on the facts and findings (specifically the finding that the defendant would have had to surrender possession if plaintiff were rightful manager), the defendant's interest was subordinate and therefore he was concluded by the judgment against Nanu Amma.
The court further reasoned that even if the defendant were not strictly claiming under Nanu Amma, because he made Nanu Amma's title an essential part of his defence (a jus tertii plea), the plaintiff was entitled to displace that title by showing that Nanu Amma had been a party to litigation which negatived her claimed title. The court relied on Secy. of State v. Syed Ahmed Badsha Sahib for the principle that a person asserting a third-party title is bound by whatever estops the third party.
Applying these legal principles to the admitted subsequent judgments, the appellate court concluded that those judgments conclusively negatived Nanu Amma's title to management and therefore defeated the defendant's defence based on her title. The court allowed the documents to be filed and took notice of them, treating them as conclusive on that issue.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The appellate court reversed the decree of the Subordinate Judge and directed delivery of possession of the suit properties to the plaintiff. The court also held that, because the defendant had paid rent bona fide to Nanu Amma, he would not be liable for any arrears of rent nor for rent paid subsequently up to the date; each party was directed to bear his own costs throughout, and leave was refused.
Implications (as reflected in the opinion):
- The court treated judgments delivered after the filing of an appeal as admissible and capable of concluding the issue in the appeal where they directly determine the title or rights in question (following Gaddam Paramasivudu and related authorities).
- The opinion applies and clarifies the principle that a defendant who rests his defence on the title of a third party (jus tertii) may be estopped by a judgment against that third party; the lessee/defendant may be bound by a prior adverse judgment against the asserted title-holder where the defendant's interest is subordinate to the third party's interest or where the defendant has made that third party's title essential to his defence.
- On the facts of this suit, the finding that management belonged to the senior-most male (as established by subsequent judgments) defeats the defendant's custom-based defence, and therefore the plaintiff is entitled to possession; the court did not find it necessary to base its decision solely on the absence of customary female management, but it did express skepticism about inferring such a custom from a single long instance of female management.
- The decision resolves the dispute between the parties but does not purport to create a novel rule beyond applying extant authority on admissibility of subsequent judgments, res judicata/privity and the effect of relying on a third party's title. The court distinguished conflicting authorities on narrow factual grounds rather than overruling them broadly.
Direct effects on the parties: possession awarded to the plaintiff; defendant not liable for arrears for payments made bona fide to Nanu Amma; each party to bear own costs; leave refused.
1. This is a suit in ejectment and for recovery of arrears of rent. It was instituted originally by one Achutha Nair as manager of his tarwad. The subject matter of the suit related to four Items of property. It was alleged that items 1 to 3 were leased to the defendant's father in Chingom (1908-1909) 1084 with a munpattom of Rs. 40 under a lease deed executed by him in favour of Kunji Amma, the then senior female member of the tarwad on behalf of the tarwad, as the senior male member Govinda Menon was then employed elsewhere. Item 4 was alleged to have been leased orally in 1086 also to the defendant's father by one Gopalan Nair who was then managing the tarwad on behalf of the said Govinda Menon. Kunji Amma died before suit. As the defendant who is in possession of the property after the death of his father refused to surrender possession or pay rent from 1104 to the plaintiff, this suit was instituted. The said Achuthan Nair died pending suit and the next senior male member Krishnan Nair was added as plaintiff 2 in the suit. The main defence is that the leases were granted by Kunji Amma who was the senior-most female member, that there is a custom in the tarwad under which the right of management vested in the senior-most female member, that after the death of Kunji Amma the right of management vested in Nanu Amma who is the senior most female member alive, that he has attorned to her and paid and has been paying rent to her and claimed to hold under her and therefore was not bound to surrender possession. The findings of both the Courts are that both the leases were given by Kunji Amma but in regard to the custom and the right to the management of the tarwad properties both the Courts differed.
2. The learned District Munsif found that there was no custom which entitles the senior-most female member of the tarwad to manage the property in preference to the senior-most male and gave a decree to the plaintiff as prayed for. The learned Subordinate Judge took a different view. He was of opinion that the custom has been made out. His reasoning is based on the fact that for a period of nearly 40 years Kunji Amma, the senior-most female member was allowed to manage the tarwad and such management was acquiesced in by the male members and that Nanu Amma was after her the manager in whom the tarwad property vested and the plaintiff had no title to maintain the suit, but he however found that if the plaintiff was the person entitled to the management of the tarwad properties he was entitled to possession of properties items 1 to 3. This finding of the learned Subordinate Judge as to custom is attacked in second appeal and it seems to me that the finding is unsatisfactory. The suit tarwad formed a branch of a main tarwad from which it separated by a deed of partition, Ex. D, in or about 12th July 1877. The said deed of partition distinctly provides that Govinda Menon, the senior-most male member, should be manager of the branch to which Kunji Amma belonged. But for some reason or other Kunji Amma was allowed to manage the tarwad. There is no other instance given of a female member managing the tarwad. Strong and cogent evidence must be given to establish a custom entitling the senior-most female member to manage in preference to the senior-most male. It would be unsafe to infer a custom from the single instance of a senior-most female having been allowed to manage the property for a considerable length of time. The elements which would be required to establish a valid custom cannot be said to have been established in this case. But I think it is unnecessary to rest my decision on this ground as the case can be satisfactorily disposed of on another ground.
3. It has been brought to my notice by Mr. Govinda Menon, who appears for plaintiff 2 (appellant), in this case that, since the filing of the present appeal, in two litigations to which Nanu Amma and the present plaintiff 2 were arrayed as plaintiff and defendant it was finally decided that the right of management vests only in the senior-most male member and that there was no custom established to entitle the senior-most female to manage in preference to the senior-most male and that plaintiff 2 was the rightful manager of the tarwad. Mr. Govinda Menon has made an application for the documents in support thereof being received in evidence. They are judgments in A. Section Nos. 68 and 69 of 1934 on the file of the Sub-Court at Ottappalam. Mr. Kutti Krishna Menon has objected to the reception of the said documents on the ground that in second appeal they cannot be admitted relying on the decision in Secy. of State v. Manjeshwar Krishnaya (1908) 31 Mad 415. It seems to me that the said decision is distinguishable and this case is governed by the ruling in Gaddam Paramasivudu v. Mulakala Subbanna AIR 1919 Mad 17 where under similar circumstances a judgment was admitted in second appeal. In Secy. of State v. Manjeshwar Krishnaya (1908) 31 Mad 415 the case related to a question of fact and further the documents were available in the trial Court unlike in this case where the judgments sought to be admitted were pronounced after the filing of the appeal in this Court. I must therefore take notice of the fact that there has been such an adjudication and mould the decision accordingly. Therefore following the said decision in Gaddam Paramasivudu v. Mulakala Subbanna AIR 1919 Mad 17, I allow the said documents to be filed. It seems to me that the said documents conclude the issue as to the title of Nanu Amma set up by the defendant. If Nanu Amma had been a party to this litigation there can be no question that the said judgments will operate as res judicata between her and plaintiff 2 and the fact that the said judgments were delivered since the filing of this appeal is immaterial. The principle applicable is thus stated by Mahmood, J. in Balkishen v. Kishan Lal (1889) 11 All 148 at p. 162:
The doctrine so far as it relates to prohibiting the retrial of an issue, must refer not to the date of the commencement of the litigation, but to the time when the Judge is called upon to decide the issue.... So far as the justification of this view from the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code is concerned, I may say that the rule contained in Section 13 is not limited to the Courts of first instance, that it applies equally to the procedure of the first and second appellate Courts by reason of Sections 582 and 587 respectively, and, indeed even to miscellaneous proceedings by reason of the general provisions of Section 647 of the Code.
4. This principle was accepted and applied in Gaddam Paramasivudu v. Mulakala Subbanna AIR 1919 Mad 17 in second appeal and recently by Varadachariar, J. in Rangaohariar v. Rangaswami Iyengar AIR 1936 Mad 190 in a civil revision petition. The question is, will the defendant, not being a party to the said judgments, be bound by them? The view of Dr. Bigelow is that a lessee would be bound by a judgment against his lessor in the absence of any fraud or collusion on his part. He explains the principle thus:
To make a man privy to an action he must have acquired an interest in the subject matter of the action either by inheritance, succession or purchase from a party subsequent to the action or he must hold the property subordinately.... The ease of privity by subordination may be illustrated... by the common law illustration feoffer and feoffee. That is Coke's illustration. A more familiar one to lawyers of the present time is afforded by the relation of landlord and,, tenant. A lawful judgment which deprives the landlord of the estate deprives the tenant of necessity of his subordinate right.
5. In Seshappaya v. Venkataramana Uppadya (1910) 33 Mad 459, Miller and Sankaran Nair, JJ. point out that there is no English authority in support of this view. They refer to the view of Hukumchand according to which a tenant of the defendant in ejectment, who acquired his lease before the commencement of a suit is not estopped as to his term by a judgment in the suit against his lessor.
6. But the learned Judges leave the question open as they were of opinion that Dr. Bigelow's principle would not apply to the case of a permanent heritable tenure. In such a case they thought that as the tenancy cannot be determined by notice nor will it be terminated by efflux of time, the interest of the lessee is not subordinate to that of the lessor. Where therefore there is no question of any outstanding term or where the term of lease has expired or where the tenancy is determinable at will and the lessee is bound to surrender possession when called upon to do so by the lessor or anyone who succeeds to him, there is no reason why the principle enunciated by Dr. Bigelow should not be applied. In this case the finding is, as already stated, the defendant was bound to surrender possession to plaintiff if he was the rightful manager. It seems to me therefore that the defendant is concluded by the judgment against Nanu Amma. Even if it be held that the defendant cannot be said to be claiming strictly under Nanu Amma, since he has chosen to rely on the title of Nanu Amma, and made it a part of his defence it would be open to the plaintiff to repudiate the said title. In a suit in ejectment where the defendant relies on title of a third party having no other title to rely on, it is open to the plaintiff to rely upon whatever would displace the title of the said third party and defeat the claim. In Secy. of State v. Syed Ahmed Badsha Sahib AIR 1921 Mad 248 at p. 801 Kumaraswamy Sastri, J. explained the principle applicable to a case of this description thus:
In all cases of jus tertii the person who sets up the rights of a third party is bound to prove that the third party has or had the rights alleged and it is always open to the other party to displace the title of the person so set up by showing that he was a party to the litigation which has negatived that title. Whatever would estop or bar the persons whose title is set up must also bar the person pleading jus tertii whether the estoppel is by record, deed or in pais.
7. Thus whatever would estop by record, deed or in pais Nanu Amma would estop equally the defendant. Mr. Kutti Krishna Menon relied strongly on the said decision in Secy. of State v. Syed Ahmed Badsha Sahib AIR 1921 Mad 248, itself as negativing this view. But in Secy. of State v. Syed Ahmed Badsha Sahib AIR 1921 Mad 248 the case was not viewed by the learned Judges therein as a case of a defendant setting up a jus iertii. The Secretary of State in that case was denying the title of the plaintiff and not making the title of the rival claimant to the office in question in that case as part of his title. The plea of the defendant in this case must therefore be negatived. Since the defendant has paid the rent bona fide to Nanu Amma, he will not be liable for any arrears of rent nor for any rent paid subsequently up to date. I reverse the decree of the lower Court and pass a decree directing delivery of possession of the suit properties to the plaintiff. In the circumstances of this case, I direct each party to bear his own costs throughout. Leave refused.
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