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Gobordhan Das v. Suresh Chandra Mukherji And Others Opposite Party.
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion arises from a proceeding under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr PC) concerning 23 acres out of plot No. 2 in Khatian No. 2 (pradhani Khewat of mauza Keonla). The Sub-divisional Magistrate (Mr. Flack) declared the second party to be in possession of the disputed land. The first party challenged that order by moving the Sessions Judge in revision.
The Sessions Judge found multiple legal and factual errors in the Sub-divisional Magistrate's order. The record shows prior proceedings: a complaint dated 19 August 1940 against the second party and a further petition by the first party on 22 August alleging apprehension of a breach of the peace and initiating action under Section 144 Cr PC. On 4 October the predecessor Magistrate (Mr. Jha) drew up proceedings under Section 145, speaking of a land dispute which might lead to a breach of the peace. Mr. Flack proceeded with the S.145 proceedings but was found by the revising court to have erred in treating the absence of an apprehension of breach as not fatal to the S.145 proceedings.
Central factual disputes in the material include: - An allegation by the first party of forcible dispossession on 17 August 1940 (five days before the S.144 proceeding). - The record of rights showing that the Pradhan had a settlement of the land for cultivation dated 20 June 1940. - Whether the dispossession was wrongful and whether it was also forcible (the latter being the crucial point under the proviso to sub-section (4) of S.145).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether proceedings under Section 145 Cr PC can be validly initiated or continued in the absence of an apprehension of a breach of the peace.
- Whether, under the proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 145 Cr PC, the question of whether a party was forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months before the date of the order should be decided without reference to the merits of the parties' claims to possessory rights.
- How the two-month period mentioned in the first proviso to sub-section (4) of S.145 should be calculated where proceedings began under Section 144 and were later continued or transformed into proceedings under Section 145 (i.e., whether the period is to be counted from the date of the S.145 order or from the earlier S.144 proceeding).
- Whether the Sub-divisional Magistrate erred by deciding questions of title or the Pradhan's right to settle the land (merits) rather than limiting himself to possession as required by sub-s. (4) of S.145.
Arguments of the Parties
First Party (Applicant in the original S.144/S.145 proceedings)
- Alleged that he was forcibly dispossessed by the second party on 17 August 1940 (five days before the S.144 proceeding was drawn up).
- Moved the Magistrate under Section 144 Cr PC and later sought relief under S.145; complained of offences (noted in the record) such as under Ss. 448, 379, 143.
- Relied on the record of rights and a settlement by the Pradhan dated 20 June 1940 to support his case of prior possession and cultivation; the building of a hut on the land was presented as ancillary to cultivation.
Second Party (Opposite party; represented by Mr. De)
- Contended that the High Court in revision should not interfere with findings of fact or exercise wider powers than would be available in a second appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure; relied on established practice of High Courts to avoid going into evidence in revision unless special circumstances or an error of law require it.
- Relied on a judicial observation (attributed to Bankin, C.J.) that orders under Section 145 Cr PC are "police orders to be made by Magistrates to quiet disputes and which are in no way final," to argue against interference in revision.
- Argued that the two months referred to in the first proviso to sub-s. (4) of S.145 should be counted backwards from the date of the S.145 proceeding (and not from the date of the S.144 proceeding).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| 58 Cal. 10811 (Rankin, C.J.) | The established rule of practice that High Courts will not go into the evidence in criminal revision matters unless it is necessary by reason of special circumstances or because of the character of the error of law. | The court acknowledged this practice but held that the present order under S.145 contained such marked inconsistencies and errors of law that interference in revision was justified; thus the court did examine the record and set aside the Magistrate's order. |
| Observation attributed to Bankin, C.J. (as relied on by Mr. De) | That orders under Section 145 Cr PC are "merely 'police orders to be made by Magistrate to quiet disputes and which are in no way final'." (as quoted in the opinion) | The court considered this observation but held that it did not negate the High Court's power to interfere in revision in a suitable case; the court found the present order to be suitable for interference. |
| A.I.R. 1930 Pat. 5562 (James J.) | Holds that when a Magistrate begins with proceedings under Section 144 and later proceeds under Section 145, evidence cannot be given to show possession during the period in which the S.144 order was in force; the point of time for showing possession is the date when the S.144 proceeding started because the Magistrate's intervention is taken to suspend previous possession. | The court applied this principle to observe that where an S.145 proceeding is drawn up in continuation of an earlier S.144 proceeding, the two-month period in the proviso to sub-s. (4) should be assessed with regard to the date when the S.144 order was started; the court expressed concern that counting the period only from the S.145 date might cause manifest injustice to someone forcibly dispossessed during the S.144 interval. |
| 27 Cal. 785 | Described in the opinion as a case where proceedings began under S.144 and were subsequently followed by proceedings under S.145; used to support the same point about counting possession/time when S.144 intervenes. | Referred to as supporting authority for the proposition that the intervention of Magistrate under S.144 suspends prior possession and that possession for the purposes of the two-month proviso must be reckoned from the date when S.144 started in such cases. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeds in a series of linked legal and factual critiques of the Sub-divisional Magistrate's order:
- On the threshold legal requirement for S.145: The court found that Mr. Flack erred both in law and fact by proceeding under Section 145 without adequately appreciating that there was an apprehension of breach of the peace (which had been alleged and had been the basis for earlier S.144 action taken by his predecessor, Mr. Jha). The court emphasized that S.145 proceedings could not be validly initiated or continued in the absence of an apprehension of breach of the peace.
- On the Magistrate's findings about possession: The Magistrate accepted that the second party was in possession "at the time of making the order," but the date referenced was ambiguous. The Magistrate also stated that the first party's allegations about previous possession "appear to be true" yet refrained from granting relief because he treated the "crucial point" as being the question of rights of the Raja and Pradhan. The court held this was contrary to sub-section (4) of Section 145 which requires the decision to be arrived at without reference to the merits of the parties' claims to a right to possess.
- On the Pradhan's right and the record of rights: The court found that the record of rights in evidence showed clearly that the Pradhan alone had the right to settle the land in question for reclamation, and that such a settlement had been made on 20 June 1940 for cultivation. The Magistrate's contrary view (that the Pradhan had no right to settle the land) was erroneous and led him to conclude incorrectly that the first party had not been wrongfully dispossessed.
- On the question of forcible dispossession: The court noted that whether the dispossession was forcible (as well as wrongful) is the "point on which the decision of the case must turn" under the proviso to sub-s. (4). The Magistrate failed to decide this issue clearly, because his erroneous view on the Pradhan's rights made further consideration of forcible action "unnecessary" in his mind—an inappropriate shortcut according to the court.
- On the Magistrate's speculative inferences: The Magistrate regarded certain aspects as "peculiar" (e.g., that the first party filed under Section 144, that the police station was nearby but police aid was not sought, that the settlement bore the name of a student not living in the village) and concluded the settlement might be collusive. The court rejected these inferences as unsupported and illogical given the evidence and the Magistrate's own prior acceptance that the first party's allegations of prior possession "appear to be true."
- On the High Court's scope in revision: The court recognized the conventional practice (as stated by Rankin, C.J.) that High Courts should not ordinarily re-examine evidence in criminal revision, but clarified that this rule of practice does not prevent interference where there are special circumstances or errors of law—such as the present order, which the court described as unusually full of inconsistencies and legal error. The court therefore set aside the Magistrate's order.
- On the computation of the two-month period: The court dealt with Mr. De's contention that the two months in the proviso should be counted backwards from the date of the S.145 proceeding and not from the S.144 proceeding. The court observed that even if that contention were accepted, it would not help the second party on the facts of this case (the alleged dispossession was dated 17 August while S.145 was drawn up no later than 4 October). More fundamentally, the court referred to the principle (as applied by James J. and other reported cases) that where S.145 proceeds from an earlier S.144 intervention, the two-month period should, in effect, be treated with reference to the date when the S.144 proceedings began because the S.144 intervention suspends prior possession; otherwise manifest injustice may follow.
- On evidentiary weight of the record of rights: The court emphasized that the record of rights, though perhaps not a record under Section 132 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, is entitled to the presumption of correctness under Section 84 of that Act and should not be overlooked by the Magistrate.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate is set aside and the case is remanded for fresh disposal in accordance with law.
Immediate consequences for the parties:
- The matter is remitted to the Sub-divisional Magistrate for fresh findings and disposal. The Magistrate must:
- Make clear findings as to who was in possession on 22 August 1940 (the court noted there did not appear to have been a dispute that the second party was in possession on that date).
- Determine whether the first party had been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within the two months immediately before that date (and, if so, whether the first party should be treated under the proviso to sub-s. (4) as if he was in possession on 22 August and 4 October 1940).
- Not decide questions of title or the merits of the parties' claims to possessory rights (for those are matters for civil courts), but rather focus on possession and the factual issue of forcible dispossession as required by S.145(4).
- Give appropriate weight to the record of rights, which is entitled to the presumption of correctness under Section 84 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act.
- The court did not purport to lay down any novel legal rule; rather it applied established practice and precedent about the scope of High Court revision and about the effect of prior S.144 intervention on the computation of the two-month period under the proviso to sub-s. (4) of S.145.
R.K
Disposition: Case remanded for fresh disposal by the Sub-divisional Magistrate in accordance with the directions given above.
1. This rule must be made absolute. It arises out of a proceeding under Section 145 of the Cr PC, in which Mr. Flack, Sub-divisional Magistrate of Dhalbhum, declared the second party to be in possession of the disputed land 23 acres out of plot No. 2 in Khatian No. 2, coming under the pradhani Khewat of mauza Keonla. The first party moved the Sessions Judge in revision, and the learned Sessions Judge did not by any means overstate the case when he observed “It appears that the learned Magistrate did not write the judgment very care, fully, and the language of the judgment in some places supports the argument that there were contradictory findings on the question of possession.’ For, even before dealing with the evidence, the Sub-divisional Magistrate accepted the contention of the second party that the proceedings were had in law because there was no likelihood of a breach of the peace, but went on to add that he did not think this was an incurable defect in the proceedings. In this he erred both in law and in fact, as has been well shown in detail by the learned Sessions Judge. Mr. Jha, predecessor of Mr. Flack, had ample material before him in the complaint of 19th August 1940 against the second party and the further petition filed by the first party on 22nd for apprehending as he did a breach of the peace and first dealing with the matter under Section 144 of the Cr PC. On 4th October Mr. Jha drew up proceedings under S. 145, in which he spoke of a land dispute which may lead to a breach of the peace; and this was done after hearing the parties, out of whom the first party had in his application of 2nd September spoken of a serious likelihood of a breach of the peace. Mr. Flack erred in overlooking all this and was also clearly in error in thinking if he really did so that proceedings under S. 145 could be validly initiated or continued without an apprehension of a breach of the peace.
2. After dealing with the evidence adduced by the two parties the learned Magistrate refers to the admitted fact that the second party was in possession—rightly or wrongly—“at the time of making the order”—it is by no means dear whether he meant the order of 22nd August (which, as will be seen later, would have been correct) or that of 4th September. He then says:
“Only the question of possession is at issue, and the only point to be decided in this case is whether or no the first party was forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months before the date of the order (Section 145(4), Proviso of the Cr PC). The allegations of the first party that they previously exercised possession appear to be true.”
3. This would seem to imply an acceptance of the allegation of the first party that on 17th August 1940, that is to say, five days before the proceeding under S. 144 was drawn up, he was forcibly dispossessed by the second party. This allegation was apparently supported among other things by the evidence of a Deputy Magistrate, but the learned Magistrate has not clearly said that he accepted it. Though he considered the allegations of the first party as to previous possession to be true, he refrained from passing an order in his favour because he considered the “crucial point” to be “a question as to the rights of the Raja and the Pradhan,” which was plainly contrary to the requirement of sub-s. (4) that the decision is to be arrived at “without reference to the merits of the claims of any of the parties to a right to possess the subject of dispute.” After observing correctly that the question (of right) was properly a matter for the civil Court and that he had already given his reasons for thinking that the proceeding was bad in law, he turned to the Pradhan's right to settle the land in dispute and considered that he had no such right on the documents filed.
4. On his own showing, he should not have dealt with this matter at all; and he has further fallen into error when he speaks of the Pradhan's having the right to settle cultivated land and of neither party producing convincing evidence about the Pradhan's right to settle the land with which we are now concerned. It is not disputed before me that the record of rights which are in evidence show clearly that the Pradhan and the Pradhan alone had the right to settle the land in question with others for reclamation. Such a settlement was made by the Pradhan on 20th June 1940, and made for purposes of cultivation. The first party has, it is true, built a hut on the land, but this was ancillary to the purpose of cultivation. Because the learned Magistrate thought that the Pradhan had no right to settle the land in question, he proceeded to hold that the first party had not been wrongfully dispossessed. The dispossession was clearly wrongful, but the Magistrate's view to the contrary made it unnecessary for him to consider specifically whether or not it was also forcible, a point on which the decision of the case must turn.
5. The learned Magistrate next refers to what he calls three “peculiar points” which strike him, and then says “these and other similar aspects of the case make it seem probable that the contentions of the second party may be correct: that the settlement was a collusive one and the first party was merely trying to get an easy declaration of possession in the criminal Court.” This hardly looks like an introduction to a definite finding of possession in favour of the second party, as the learned Magistrate has in fact meant it to be. His reasoning here is also not very easy to follow. One of the three peculiar points which struck him is that the first party filed a Section 144 of the Cr PC, petition. Why this should be regarded as peculiar I am quite unable to imagine; parties in possession not infrequently move Magistrates under this section, and the first party had already complained of offences under Ss. 448, 379, 143, etc., against the second party. Another point that he refers to is that the police station is within a stone's throw of the land and that the first party did not seek police aid as one would have expected him to do. But there are numerous occasions on which parties prefer to go direct to the Magistrate. His only other point was that the settlement alleged by the first party was made in the name of a student who does not live in the village; but the student had an adult brother-in-law to attend to his cultivation. How considerations of this kind could in reason lead to the conclusion that the settlement was a collusive one it is impossible to understand; and the learned Magistrate, who had already said on the evidence that the allegations of the first party that they previously exercised possession appeared to be true, now finds the settlement of the first party to be a collusive one because this party though dispossessed, was not wrongfully dispossessed. If the first party did come into possession under the settlement from the Pradhan, it was plainly erroneous to ignore this on the ground that the settlement was “collusive,” whatever this epithet may have been intended to convey in the context.
6. Mr. De who appears for the second party, the opposite party before me, has argued that this Court does not interfere in revision with findings of fact or exercise any wider power than would be exercisable in a second appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure. The power of the High Court in criminal revision is, however, not restricted by statute in any manner. But for the reasons given by Rankin, C.J in 58 Cal. 10811 the High Courts have laid it down as a rule of practice that they will not go into the evidence in such matters unless it is necessary to do so by reason of special circumstances or by reason of the character of the error of law. Mr. De has laid stress on Bankin, C.J's observation that orders under Section 145 of the Cr PC, are merely “police orders to be made by Magistrate to quiet disputes and which are in no way final.” But this again was not intended to negative the power of the High Court to interfere in revision in a suitable case. I cannot recall any order under S. 145 so full of inconsistencies and errors as in the present case. The order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate must, therefore, be set aside.
7. Mr. De has further endeavoured to support the order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate by urging that the period of two months mentioned in the first proviso to sub-s. (4) of S. 145 is to be counted backwards from the date of the proceeding under S. 145 and not from that of the proceeding under S. 144. Asa matter of fact, this contention, even if accepted, will not help the second party for the dispossession is dated 17th August, while the proceeding under S. 145 was drawn up no later than 4th October. But even apart from this, the order-sheet of the Sub-divisional Magistrate shows that though the proceeding under S. 145 was drawn up on 4th October, it was drawn up on the same materials as (and in continuation of) the proceeding of 22nd August under S. 144, except, of course, that parties had been heard in the meanwhile. In the circumstances the Magistrate dealing with the proceeding under S. 145 would have been obliged to hold—as James J. put it in A.I.R 1930 Pat. 5562—that no evidence could be offered to show the possession of either party for the period during which the order under S. 144 was in force. The learned Judge referred to 27 Cal. 785,3 a case in which the Magistrate had begun with a proceeding under S. 144 which was afterwards followed by a proceeding under S. 145. Under the former proceeding both parties had been prevented from going upon the disputed property, and the learned Judges came to the conclusion, in counting the period of two months, that the intervention of the Magistrate in order to prevent a breach of the peace could not be allowed to operate to disturb lawful possession and that the point of time with reference to which the possession of either party was to be shown in that case was to be the date when the proceeding under S. 144 had been started, the Magistrate's intervention being taken to suspend the previous possession whatever it might be. In the present case the proceeding under S. 144 seems to have been intended to be no more than a forerunner of a proceeding under S. 145, and I am inclined to think that if the two months to be considered under the first proviso to sub-s. (4) should in such cases not be counted backwards from the date of the order under S. 144, manifest injustice might result to a party forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed in this period but more than two months before the date when the proceeding under S. 145 is actually drawn up.
8. The case must now go back to the Sub-divisional Magistrate for disposal in accordance with the law. He will endeavour to arrive at clear findings regarding not only who was in possession on 22nd August 1940 (as a matter of fact there does not seem to have been any dispute that it was the second party that was in possession on this date), but also whether the first party had within two months next before this date been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed, and whether in that event this party ought not to be treated under proviso (1) to sub-s. (4) of S. 145 as if he was in possession on 22nd August and 4th October 1940. The record of rights relating to this plot, though it may not be a record under Section 132 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, is a record entitled to the presumption of correctness under S. 84 of the Act and should not be overlooked.
R.K
9. Case remanded.
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