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Gemalsingji Khumansingji v. Bai Fati

Bombay High Court
Aug 6, 1936
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The property in dispute originally belonged to Umar Asmal Gani, who died in 1915 leaving a widow (Bai Maula) and two daughters (Bai Fati, plaintiff 1, and Bai Mulag, who predeceased the suit). Umar had two brothers (Gori and Fuli, plaintiffs 3 and 4) and his father had four brothers (including plaintiffs 5 and 6). Umar made a will, and plaintiffs 5 and 6 (with others) brought Suit No. 163 of 1916 seeking a declaration that Umar's will was not binding on them, partition of the property and recovery of their shares. In 1917 a decree granted the plaintiffs a five-twenty-fourth share, Bai Maula a one-eighth share and her daughters a two-third share, and ordered partition and separate possession. Bai Maula later sold survey No. 218/1 in April 1918 to a purchaser (Bapu) and died in November 1918. By April 1919, through settlements and releases, the whole property (except survey No. 218/1, then in defendants' possession) became vested in plaintiffs 5 and 6; the earlier partition decree remained unexecuted.

In 1928 plaintiffs (the same parties seeking partition) sued the defendants (who claimed under an alienee of Bapu) for partition and separate possession, asserting plaintiffs were entitled to seven-eighths and defendants only to Bai Maula's one-eighth. The defendants pleaded various defences and, alternatively, contended that they were bona fide purchasers in possession of survey No. 218/1 since 1918 and were entitled, in effecting partition, to have that property allotted to them (or be compensated from other allotted properties if the item was of lesser value than Bai Maula's one-eighth share). The trial Court accepted that equitable plea and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. On appeal the Assistant Judge confirmed most points but rejected the defendants' equitable claim on the basis that they were remote alienees (relying on 44 Mad 167) and passed a decree in favour of the plaintiffs declaring seven-eighths to the plaintiffs and one-eighth to the defendants.

From the Assistant Judge's decree the present further appeal was taken; the central issue on this appeal is whether the equitable right claimed by the appellants (defendants below) can be given effect under the circumstances of the case.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an alienee (including a remote alienee, i.e., a vendee of a vendee) of a coparcener is entitled, in a partition suit between co-sharers, to an equitable right that the specific property in his possession be allotted to him (or compensated by equivalent property) so as not to prejudice a bona fide purchaser for value.
  2. Whether the rule stated in 44 Mad 167 — that a vendee from the first purchaser has no equity in his favour and must sue his vendor for damages — should be applied to deny equitable relief to a remote vendee in partition proceedings.
  3. Whether principles applicable to general partition decrees apply equally to suits for partial partition (i.e., where the co-sharers confine their suit to particular property in possession of an alienee), and the consequence of this for the equitable rights of an alienee.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs (as stated in the opinion)

  • Plaintiffs maintained that they were entitled to seven-eighths of the property and that the defendants were entitled only to the one-eighth share that belonged to Bai Maula.
  • The plaintiffs sought partition and separate possession of their shares, pressing that the alienations should not defeat their entitlement.

Defendants / Alienees (as stated in the opinion)

  • Defendants contended they were bona fide purchasers for value in possession of survey No. 218/1 since 1918 and, therefore, were entitled to have that property allotted to them in any partition (or be compensated by allotment of other property) — i.e., an equitable right to retain the specific alienated property if doing so did not prejudice other co-sharers.
  • They argued that if the specific property in their possession was of less value than the one-eighth share of Bai Maula, the deficiency should be made up by allotting other properties which would otherwise have fallen to Bai Maula's share.
  • The Assistant Judge rejected this equitable claim for the defendants on the ground that they were not immediate purchasers from Bai Maula but remote alienees (vendees of a vendee), relying on the precedent 44 Mad 167 to deny their equity.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
44 Mad 167 Held that a vendee from the first purchaser has no equity in his favour; if he suffers loss from a suit brought by co-sharers to set aside an alienation his remedy is to sue his vendor for damages (no equitable allotment in partition). The Assistant Judge relied on this decision to reject the defendants' equitable claim because they were alienees of an alienee. The present court, however, respectfully dissented from that authority, stating the reasoning ought to apply equally to immediate and remote vendees and that the precedent should not bar equitable relief to bona fide purchasers.
46 Mad 815 Held that an alienee need not be directed to institute a separate suit to work out his rights by partition; as defendant in a coparcener's suit he can obtain allotment of the item he purchased if consistent with other coparceners' rights; if the value of the item did not exceed the alienor's share at time of alienation the alienee could retain the entire property. The court relied on this decision as analogous and supportive: it found the present case difficult to distinguish and applied the same principle that the alienee could be allotted the specific property (or retain it) when consistent with other coparceners' rights.
Mulla, Hindu Law (Edn. 8), para 261(3) States that an alienee of a specific property or of an undivided interest has an equitable right on general partition to have that property assigned to him if it can be done without injustice to other coparceners; if not, the alienee may recover equivalent value from his alienor. Also notes authorities holding that purchaser at court-sale and (allegedly) a vendee from the first purchaser may have no such right. The court quoted and adopted the passage as correctly stating the equitable position; it used the text to support the proposition that a bona fide purchaser should not be prejudiced by subsequent partition suits and that the equitable rule ought to apply to remote vendees as well.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by analysing the competing authorities and the equitable principles applicable to partition between co-sharers where an alienee is in possession of a specific item of joint property.

  1. The court examined 44 Mad 167, which held that a vendee from the first purchaser has no equity and must sue his vendor for damages. The court respectfully dissented from this authority, reasoning that it is difficult in principle to distinguish between an immediate vendee and a subsequent vendee (a vendee of a vendee). The court emphasized that equity in partition should protect bona fide purchasers for value and that the same principle that protects an immediate vendee ought to protect a remote vendee.
  2. The court adopted the statement of principle set out in Mulla (para 261(3)) which recognises that an alienee of a specific property has an equitable right on partition to have that property assigned to him, if that can be done without injustice to other coparceners; otherwise the alienee is entitled to equivalent value from his alienor. The court noted the exception for purchasers at court sale (no warranty) but rejected a rigid rule excluding remote vendees.
  3. The court addressed the contention that the principle applies only to general partition. It rejected that contention, explaining that an alienee cannot ask for separate possession of joint property and that the general body of joint owners may confine a suit to the particular property in possession of the alienee. Therefore, the equitable principles that govern general partition apply equally to suits for partial partition of specific items.
  4. The court relied on 46 Mad 815 to support this approach: in that case an alienee participating as defendant in a coparcener's suit was entitled to have the specific item allotted to him if consistent with the rights of other coparceners, and could retain the property if its value did not exceed the alienor's share at the time of alienation.
  5. Applying these principles to the facts found by both lower Courts (that survey No. 218/1 was of much less value than Bai Maula's one-eighth share), the court concluded that the trial Court was correct in holding that the defendants were entitled to an equitable right to continue in possession of that property and that the plaintiffs' suit should be dismissed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was allowed; the decree of the Assistant Judge was set aside, and the suit was dismissed. The court made no order as to costs.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The direct effect of the decision is that the plaintiffs' claim for partition as decreed by the Assistant Judge is overturned and the defendants' equitable position (as holders of survey No. 218/1) is vindicated in this case because the item in their possession is of less value than the vendor's share.
  • The court expressly disagreed with the restrictive rule in 44 Mad 167 as applied to remote vendees, endorsing instead the broader equitable principle (as reflected in Mulla and applied in 46 Mad 815) that bona fide purchasers for value should not be prejudiced by subsequently instituted partition suits if their equities can be accommodated without injustice to other co-sharers.
  • No separate order as to costs was made. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new binding precedent beyond the reasoning expressed; it sets out the court's view of the correct application of established equitable principles to the facts before it.

Disposition: Appeal allowed. Decree of Assistant Judge set aside. Suit dismissed. No order as to costs.

This summary is strictly limited to the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

1. The facts which gave rise to the suit, out of which this appeal arises, are somewhat complicated, but for the purpose of elucidating the point which arises for decision in this appeal they may be briefly stated as follows: It appears from, the pedigree, which is set out at print page 2, that certain property, including the property in suit, belonged to one Umar Asmal Gani. He died in 1915 leaving a widow Bai Maula and two daughters, Bai Fati, plaintiff 1, and Bai Mulag, who died before the suit. He had two brothers, Gori and Fuli, who were plaintiffs 3 and 4. His father had four brothers, two of whom were plaintiff 5 and plaintiff 6. The other brothers were Vali and Abhram. The parties are Mahomedans. Prior to his death Umar had made a will. His uncles, plaintiff 5 and plaintiff 6 and Vali and Abhram, therefore brought a suit No. 163 of 1916 for a declaration that the will made by Umar was not binding on them, and for it partition of the property left by Umar and recovery of their shares therein. Bai Maula was defendant 1 to that suit, and her daughters were also joined as party defendants. The plaintiffs claimed five-twenty-fourth share in the whole property. In 1917 they obtained a decree. The decree provided that the plaintiffs were entitled to a five-twenty-fourth share, Bai Mania to a one-eighth share and her daughters to a two-third share, and directed partition and separate possession. Bai Mania died thereafter, and plaintiff 2 in the present suit is her husband. In April 1918, Bai Maula sold survey No. 218/1 to one Bapu, under whom the present defendants are claiming, and died thereafter in November 1918. In April 1919, as a result of the settlement of disputes between the parties and the heirs of the deceased parties and certain releases executed by the parties, it is common ground that the whole of the property was assigned to plaintiffs 5 and 6, and they became the owners of the whole of the property, excepting survey No. 218/1, which was in the possession of the defendants. In consequence of these transactions, and the settlement of disputes between the parties, no application for execution of the partition decree was made, and it is common ground that the partition decree remained unexecuted.

2. In 1928 the plaintiffs brought the present suit against the defendants, who had purchased survey No. 218/1 from an alienee from Bapu, for partition and separate possession of their, shares therein, claiming a seven-eighths share in the property. Their case was that the defendants were entitled only to a one-eighth share belonging to Bai Maula. Various defences were taken on behalf of the defendants, into which it is not necessary to enter. They however contended that if their other pleas were rejected and a partition was directed, then, in effecting partition, in any event, they were entitled to have this property allotted to them as they had been in possession of it as bona fide purchasers for value since 1918, and that if the value of that property was less than what was represented by the one-eighth share of Bai Maula, then the deficiency should be made good by allotting to them some other property which would have gone to the share of Bai Maula if a general partition had taken place. The trial Court accepted this plea and held that the entire property belonging to Umar consisted of seventy-six bighas, out of which nine and a half bighas represented the one-eighth share of Bai Maula, that survey No. 218/1 comprised a little more than six bighas, and therefore the defendants had an equitable right to continue in possession of that property and dismissed the suit. In appeal from this decree, the learned Assistant Judge confirmed the judgment of the trial Court on almost all the points but held that the defendants were not entitled to the equitable right claimed by them as they were not the immediate purchasers of any specific joint property from Bai Maula, but were alienees from an alienee from the original alienee from Bai Maula. Belying therefore on 44 Mad 167,1 he rejected the contention, that they were entitled to any equity, and in the result passed a decree for partition declaring that the plaintiffs were entitled to seven-eighth share in the property and that the defendants were entitled to one-eighth.

3. From that decree the present appeal is made; and the only question raised in the appeal is, whether the equitable right set up on behalf of the appellants can be given effect to under the circumstances of this case. Before doing that, I may refer to the decision in 44 Mad 167. It was held there that a vendee from the first purchaser has no equity in his favour, and that if there is any loss to him in the bargain by reason of any suit brought by other co-sharers to set aside the alienation, then his only remedy was to sue his own vendor (that is, the first purchaser), for damages for breach of warranty. The ratio decidendi is that to take any other view is to give such vendee property which he never bargained for. The learned author of Mulla's Hindu Law has adversely criticized this decision, and I have no hesitation in saying that I agree with him. In my opinion, in suits for partition between co-sharers to which an alienee from one of them is a party, it is difficult on principle to make any distinction between the case of an immediate vendee from one of the co-sharers and that, of a vendee from such vendee. It is well established that, in effecting partition of joint property between co-sharers and an alienee from one or some of them, equity requires that partition should be so effected as not to prejudice the latter. The principles which apply in cases of partition among Hindus also apply, according to our decisions, as observed by the learned appellate Judge, in the case of Mahomedans. The underlying principle is, that a bona fide purchaser for value should not be prejudiced by reason of any subsequent suit for partition brought on behalf of the other co-sharers, and that if, without doing injustice between the parties, the equities between the alienee and the other co-sharers can be so adjusted as to allow the purchaser the full fruit of his bargain for which he has paid full consideration, that ought to be done. It is therefore difficult to see what distinction exists between the case of an immediate vendee and that of a second vendee. The principle which applies in the case of an immediate vendee would and ought to apply in the case of a vendee from such vendee. What is said is that if a second vendee suffers any loss by any such transaction being set aside in toto and by his being deprived of the property of which he is in possession, he can go against his vendor, but that would apply equally in the case of an immediate vendee from an co-sharer. I must therefore respectfully dissent from that decision.

4. The position as to the equitable rights of purchasers on partition is set out, in my opinion, correctly in paragraph 261(3) of Mulla's Hindu Law (Edn. 8) at page 300 in these words:

The alienee of a specific property or of the undivided interest of a coparcener in such property has on a general partition an equitable right to have that property, or his alienor's share in that property, as the case may be, assigned to him if it could be done without injustice to the other coparceners. But there may be equities between the coparceners or liabilities attaching to the alienor's share which may render it inequitable or impracticable to do so. In such a case the alienee is entitled to recover from his alienor property of an equivalent value out of the properties allotted to the alienor for his share in substitution of the property alienated. But a purchaser at a court-sale has no such right, there being no warranty of title at such a sale. And it has been held that a vendee from the first purchaser also has no such eight, and that his only remedy is to sue his own vendor (that is, the first purchaser) for damages for breach of warranty, the reason given being that to hold otherwise would be to give to such vendee property which he never bargained for. But this argument, it is submitted, applies equally as between the alienor and the immediate purchaser from him.

5. It is argued that this principle would only apply in cases where there is general partition; but, in my opinion, that contention is not sound—and for this reason. It is well established that an alienee from a co-sharer cannot ask for separate possession of the property alienated to him if it forms part of the joint property.

6. His only right is to apply for a decree for joint possession, and such joint possession will be allowed to him along with the other members of the family. If they object to such joint possession, then their only remedy is to sue for partition and for separate possession. But, the general body of joint owners is not bound to bring a suit for general partition where there is an alienation of a specific joint property; they may well confine their suit to a partition of the particular property which is in possession of the alienee. In that case, it is difficult to see why the principles which apply in the case of partition decrees where the suit is; for a general partition cannot equally apply to a suit for partial partition. I am supported in the view which I am taking by the decision in 46 Mad 815.2 In my opinion, it is difficult to distinguish the present case from the facts of that case. There it was not necessary for the plaintiff to bring a suit for general partition as he was the last Surviving coparcener, and he therefore brought a suit for partition and separate possession of the particular property which had been alienated. Here the position is exactly the same. The several co-sharers ceased to exist as a result of the transaction to which, I have referred, and the rights of the general body of joint owners now vest, in plaintiffs 5 and 6. It is true that they have joined other co-sharers, but that is only for the sake of form, and they are formal parties. No question therefore of general partition arises, apart from the fact that a decree for general partition was made between the co-sharers. It was held in 46 Mad 815 that the alienee need not be directed to institute a separate suit to work out his rights by partition, but was entitled in the coparcener's suit as a defendant to get a decree for partition and claim to be allotted the item purchased by him in respect of his vendor's share if that was consistent with the rights of the other coparceners, and that if the value of the item did not exceed the value of the alienor's share in the entire family property at the time of the alienation, the alienee was entitled to retain the entire property sold to him. That exactly is the position here.

7. As it has been found by both the Courts that the value of Survey No. 218/1 is much less than what would have gone to the share of the vendor by alienation, the trial Court was right in dismissing the suit. That being the position, I think the appeal must be allowed, the decree made by the learned Assistant Judge set aside, and the suit dismissed. In the circumstances of this case, I make no order as to costs through out.

N.S/R.K

8. Appeal allowed.