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Chandra Bhan v. Misrimal
Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a plaintiffs' second appeal in a suit for money. The defendants (respondents) are sons of one Chunnilal who had dealings with the plaintiffs. On 17-4-1950 Chunnilal entered accounts with the plaintiffs, struck a balance entry and executed a "Khata" in their favour. When the money due on the Khata was not paid, the plaintiffs initially sued Misrimal and Pukhraj (two sons of Chunnilal). Those defendants contended that two other sons, Paxasmal and Heerachand, were necessary parties and that the suit was not maintainable without them.
The plaintiffs amended the plaint to implead the other two sons. Defendant No. 4, Heerachand, was said to be a minor; the plaintiffs withdrew the suit against him and removed his name. The remaining defendants renewed the objection that the suit was bad for want of necessary parties. The trial court sustained that objection and dismissed the suit. The Civil Judge on first appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment and decree dated 29-3-52. The present appeal challenges whether the suit was maintainable in the absence of one of the sons of the deceased Chunnilal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a creditor's suit against some (but not all) sons of a deceased Hindu father is maintainable in law, or whether all sons (heirs) are necessary parties because their liability is joint and indivisible.
- Whether doctrines or rules such as Section 43 of the Indian Contract Act and Section 53 of the Code of Civil Procedure bear on the question of whether some co-heirs can be sued alone (as opposed to all heirs being necessary parties).
Arguments of the Parties
Respondents' Arguments
- The respondents consistently maintained that the liability of the sons of Chunnilal as his heirs was joint and indivisible — i.e., all sons inherited liability together — and therefore all sons were necessary parties to a suit for recovery of a debt due from the deceased; absence of any one son rendered the suit not maintainable.
- In support of that view, reliance was placed on authorities (for example, Shaik Sahed v. Krishna Mohan Basak) and on a passage from D.F. Mulla's Principles of Hindu Law that, according to respondents' counsel, indicated that sons succeeding to self-acquired property succeed as joint tenants with rights of survivorship — an argument pressed to show jointness of liability.
Plaintiffs' Arguments
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the plaintiffs' legal arguments beyond their procedural steps (amendment to implead additional sons, withdrawal as to the minor) and their contention implicit in filing the suit that the action against some sons was maintainable. Specific, itemized advocacy positions of the plaintiffs are not set out in the provided text.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Shaik Sahed … Defendant v. Krishna Mohan Basak … Plaintiff, AIR 1917 Cal 829 | Held that defendants (heirs) must be taken as one body (registered tenants holding single holding) and therefore all were necessary parties; Section 43 Contract Act was regarded inapplicable because the case involved joint interest by operation of law rather than a joint contract. | The court noted this authority had been relied on by respondents but described it as of doubtful weight, because a later full bench in the same High Court did not adopt its view. The opinion distinguished Shaik Sahed and did not follow it as authoritative for requiring all heirs as necessary parties in all cases. |
| Kailash Chandra Mitra v. B.K. Chakravarti, AIR 1925 Cal 1056 (Full Bench) | Majority held that heirs do not take the tenancy as an entire body (not a single corporate or partnership entity) but as tenants-in-common; liability inherited is not necessarily joint and indivisible. The court should ordinarily allow addition of missing parties under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC rather than dismiss the suit immediately. | The opinion treated this full-bench decision as authoritative against the view in Shaik Sahed. The judge relied on its reasoning to reject the categorical rule that all heirs must be joined and to hold that suits against some heirs need not fail automatically for non-joinder of others. |
| Hazara Singh v. Naranjan Singh, AIR 1929 Lah 783 | In a mortgage-recovery suit against four out of five sons, the plaintiff obtained a decree proportionate to the liability; the suit was not dismissed merely because one son was not impleaded. | The court regarded this authority as unfavorable to the respondents' position and used it to support the conclusion that a creditor's suit need not be thrown out where not all heirs are joined. |
| Mulchand v. Jairamdas, AIR 1935 Bom 287 | Under Mitakshara law a son's liability to pay his father's debts rests on a religious duty; such liability is not a strictly personal one and is limited to the assets received by the son from joint family property (i.e., liability limited to assets received). | The court relied on this precedent to explain the character and limits of the sons' liability — that each son has a duty to pay debts but his liability is measured by assets received, which supports the proposition that creditors may sue some heirs for recovery. |
| Mohanlal v. Bala Prasad, AIR 1922 All 310 | Where liability of a son exists under Hindu law to pay the debts of the deceased ancestor, ancestral property in the hands of the son is liable and the whole of ancestral property in his hands is liable (not merely the share of the deceased ancestor). | The court cited this case to demonstrate that ancestral property in the hands of a son can be proceeded against as assets of the deceased and that each son can be proceeded against in execution, supporting the view that the creditor may sue some heirs and still reach assets in their hands. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by sequentially examining the factual circumstances, the competing authorities, and applicable legal principles. The central analytical thrust was to determine whether the heirs' liability was inherently joint and indivisible such that the absence of any one son made a suit against some of them untenable.
1. The court reviewed the authorities relied on by the respondents. It characterized Shaik Sahed as of doubtful authority because a later full bench (Kailash Chandra Mitra) in the same High Court disagreed with the notion that heirs constitute a single indivisible body in all cases. The full bench held that heirs usually take as tenants-in-common (each entitled to possession of every part) rather than as a single corporate body, and thus the idea of an indivisible liability was a misconception.
2. The court analyzed the passage from Mulla relied upon by respondents and clarified what Mulla actually states: under the Mitakshara school, two or more sons inheriting self-acquired property of their paternal ancestor are an exception and take as joint tenants with rights of survivorship in that narrow context. The court emphasized that this particular rule concerns succession to self-acquired, undivided property and survivorship between brothers, and does not automatically convert the sons' liability for a father's debts into an indivisible obligation preventing suits against some heirs.
3. The court invoked the doctrine of pious obligation under Mitakshara law: a son's duty to pay the father's debts is a religious duty which subsists whether the father is alive or dead, but (according to case law cited) this liability is not strictly personal and is limited to assets received by the son from the family. This characterization implies that each son has a duty to pay (subject to limitations) and therefore a creditor may pursue some sons for recovery.
4. The court considered Section 43 of the Contract Act (which permits a promisee to compel any one or more joint promisors to perform the whole promise) and reasoned that, although some authorities treat it as inapplicable to co-heirs, the principle behind Section 43 is apt by analogy to co-heirs who have jointly succeeded to a liability. The court indicated there is no sound reason to deny co-heirs the same practical consequence as co-promisees.
5. The court further referred to Section 53 of the Code of Civil Procedure to show that property in the hands of a son that is liable for the payment of the deceased ancestor's debt is treated as property of the ancestor in the hands of the son. This supports the practical enforceability of a decree against assets held by a son even if all heirs were not parties to the suit.
6. Synthesizing the authority and statutory provisions, the court concluded that a necessary party is one indispensable to the constitution of the suit. The character of the liability (religious duty limited to assets received) and the operation of Section 53 CPC establish that all sons are not, as a rule, necessary parties to a creditor's suit against some of them. The court acknowledged that extraordinary circumstances (for example, an unpleaded contention that another son not on record has discharged the debt) could make joinder necessary, but no such circumstance existed in the present case.
7. On that basis the court held that the trial court and the appellate court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' suit for non-joinder of all sons. The court therefore allowed the appeal, set aside the judgments below and remanded the matter to the Munsiff Sirohi to be disposed of on the merits.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the courts below dismissing the plaintiffs' suit for non-joinder of all heirs are set aside and the case is remanded to the Munsiff Sirohi with a direction to decide the matter on its merits. The appellants were awarded their costs in this Court and in the court below; further costs were directed to abide the result.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The plaintiffs' suit against some (but not all) sons of the deceased Chunnilal is maintainable and should not have been dismissed solely because one or more sons were not impleaded. The case is remitted for trial on the merits.
- Practical enforcement consequence emphasized by the court: under Mitakshara doctrine and Section 53 CPC, ancestral property in the hands of a son is available for satisfaction of the deceased's debts and each son can be proceeded against in execution, supporting creditors' ability to sue some heirs.
- Scope and limits: The court acknowledged exceptions where omission of heirs might be fatal (e.g., where another non-joined heir has discharged the debt), but found no such exceptional circumstances here.
- Precedential note: The opinion reasons from existing authorities and statutory provisions to decline a per se rule of necessary joinder of all heirs; it sets out a legal position on maintainability in such cases within the facts of this appeal, but the text does not assert that it is laying down a novel or sweeping new principle beyond the reasoning applied to these facts.
V.R.B
Disposition: Appeal allowed.
1. This is a plaintiffs' second appeal in a suit for money. The defendants respondents are the sons of one Chunnilal who had dealings with the plaintiffs. Chunnilal went into accounts with the plaintiffs on 17-4-1950, struck a balance entry and executed a ‘Khata’ in their favour. As the defendants failed to pay the money due on the Khata, the plaintiffs brought this suit against Misrimal and Pukhraj, sons of Chunnilal, in the first instance. These defendants resisted the suit on the plea ‘inter alia’ that there were two other sons of Chunnilal, namely, Paxasmal and Heerachand who were necessary parties to the suit, and that it was not maintainable in their absence.
2. Thereupon the plaintiffs amended their plaint and impleaded the other two sons of Chunnilal as defendants also. Defendant No. 4 Heerachand contended that he was a minor whereupon the plaintiffs withdrew their suit against him and removed his name from the plaint. The remaining defendants again contended that the suit as framed was bad for want of necessary parties. The trial court upheld this objection and dismissed the suit. On appeal, the learned Civil Judge affirmed the decision of the trial court by his judgment & decree dated 29-3-52 from which the present appeal has been filed.
3. The sole question for determination in this appeal, in the circumstances narrated above, is whether the suit as brought by the plaintiffs was not maintainable in the absence of one of the sons of the deceased Chunnilal. The contention of the defendants respondents has throughout been and still is that the liability of the sons of Chunnilal as his heirs was a joint and indivisible one, and all his sons were necessary parties to the suit brought for the recovery of a debt due from the deceased, and the suit must fail in the absence of any one of them.
4. Reliance was placed in support of this view both in the court below and in this Court on — ‘Shaik Sahed…Defendant v. Krishna Mohan Basak…Plaintiff .’, AIR 1917 Cal 829 (A). That was a suit brought by a landlord against the heirs of a deceased tenant. The trial court dismissed the suit on more grounds than one; but on appeal the Subordinate Judge decreed it against one of the defendants who was the eldest son of the deceased tenant. On second appeal, it was held by the Calcutta High Court, that the defendants must be taken as one body of registered tenants holding one single holding and, therefore, they were all necessary parties to the suit.
5. It was held further that Section 43 of the Contract Act could not have any application, as there was no case of a joint contract but it was one where parties had become jointly interested by operation of law in a contract made by a single person. It is to be observed, however, that this case is one of doubtful authority, as the majority of the Judges of the same High Court who composed the full bench in — ‘Kailash Chandra Mitra v. B.K Chakravarti’, AIR 1925 Cal 1056 (FB) (B) did not adopt the view which was taken in the earlier case. B.B Ghose J. who delivered the judgment of the majority held that the argument, that the tenancy as well as the liability for payment or rent had been inherited by the representatives of the deceased tenant as one body and that body as a whole was liable for the rent, was grounded on a misconception.
6. The learned Judge proceeded to observe that, the heirs did not take the tenancy as an entire body forming as it were a partnership or a corporation but as tenants in common where each of them was entitled to possession of every part of the estate and as each had estate in the entire land, there was no reason why he should not the held liable for the entire rent. Mukherji J. who gave a dissenting opinion was also of the same view so far as this aspect of the matter was concerned; but he took a different view on the question of the frame of the suit, and expressed the opinion that the other heirs of the deceased tenant were necessary parties to determine whether the liability which was prima facie joint was also joint and several and for protecting the defendant from being made to pay what may have already been paid by others, and so on and so forth.
7. The learned Judge was further of the view, however, that the suit could not be dismissed on that ground forthwith and that the court must proceed under O. 1 R. 10 of the CPC to make an order for the addition of the parties as were not on the record, and that it was only in the event of the necessary amendments not being made that the suit was liable to be dismissed. In the event of the necessary amendments being made, however, the learned Judge was of the opinion that the suit would not fail because the plaintiff might have lost his remedy against the added defendants.
8. With great respect to the learned Judge, if the suit cannot fail in such circumstances, there can be little meaning in holding that the liability of all heirs of the deceased was joint and indivisible, and it would be, in my humble opinion, nearer the mark to say that all the heirs of the deceased are not necessary parties to a suit brought against some of them although they may be very proper parties to it.
9. Another case relied upon by learned counsel for the respondents is — ‘Hazara Singh v. Naranjan Singh’, AIR 1929 Lah 783 (C). In that case a mortgagee filed a suit for recovery of mortgage money against four out of five sons of the deceased mortgagor for his ⅔rds share of the entire mortgage (the ⅓rd share having already been redeemed). The trial court decreed the plaintiff's suit for 4/5ths of ⅔rds share of the mort-.gage money, and this decree was upheld by the High Court. It is true that in this case the plaintiff was not awarded a decree for the amount of the mortgage money debitable to the 5th son, but at the same time the plaintiff's suit was not thrown out on the ground that son was not made a party to the suit. This authority, in my opinion, affords no help to the respondents and seems to me to go against them.
10. Learned counsel for the respondents then invited my attention to paragraph 31 at page 23 of the Principles of Hindu Law by D.F Mulla, where the learned author states that two or more sons succeeding as heirs to the separate or selfacquired property of their paternal ancestor succeed him as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. It was argued that the sons of Chunilal took as joint tenants and not as tenants-in-com-mon, and, therefore, their liability was also joint and that the present suit could not proceed without all the sons of Chunilal being impleaded therein. This argument, in my opinion, is fallacious.
11. All that Mulla has laid down in para. 31 is that according to the Mitakshara school, two or moie persons inheriting jointly take as tenants-in-common except certain classes of heirs, and two or more sons are mentioned as one such class, when they succeed to the separate or self-acquired property of their paternal ancestor. In other words, when sons inherit as heirs to the self-ac quired property of their father, which property is undivided, then if one of then dies, his undivided interest must pass to his brother by survivorship, and his widow will not be entitled to inherit. This does not mean that the liability of the sons for the debts of the deceased father is one and indivisible and that a suit against some of them cannot at all proceed in the absence of others.
12. Now, the law is well settled that so far as the liability of a son to pay off the debts (other than those contracted for an immoral or illegal purpose) of his father is concerned, it rests on a religious duty under the Mitakshara Law to which the defendants and their father are admittedly subject in the present case, and such liability subsists whether the father is alive or dead. It is equally settled that this liability is not a personal one and must be limited to the assets received by the son from the joint family property (see — ‘Mulchand v. Jairamdas’, AIR 1935 Bom 287 (D).
13. It was argued by learned counsel for the respondents in this connection that the liability of a son was as much as and no more than that of any other heirs under the Hindu law as administered at this date and, therefore, there was no particular significance attachable to the so-called doctrine of pious obligation. It is true that the liability of a son under the pure Hindu law to pay off the debts of his father stood on a stricter footing and existed irrespective of the consideration whether he received any assets from his father or not; but the same rule no longer holds good, and he is now liable only to the extent the assets received by him from his ancestor.
14. Nevertheless the argument of learned counsel is not well founded because it is only on the basis of this doctrine that a son becomes liable to pay of the debts of his father as a surviving co-parcener in a joint Hindu family which responsibility would otherwise not have existed as in the case of other members unless the share of the deceased had been attached or sold in his lifetime. It seems to me that the character of the liability of the son to pay off the debts of his father is such that each son is under a religious duty to pay them off entirely, as much as any other son, subject to the qualifications that such debts are not tainted with immorality and to the extent of the assets received by him from the deceased.
15. From this it must follow that a creditor may bring his suit against some of the sons of a deceased Hindu father leaving aside the others and that if that is done, such a suit need not be necessarily held to be bad for want of the other sons on the record. A necessary party to a suit is one whose presence is indispensable to the very constitution of the suit and in whose absence the suit cannot proceed at all. To my mind, it cannot be postulated that a suit by a creditor against some of the sons of the deceased Hindu father cannot proceed in the absence of his other sons for the reasons stated above.
16. I may also refer in this connection to Section 43 of the Contract Act. The relevant portion of that section reads as follows:
“when two or more persons make a joint promise, the promisee may, in the absence of express agreement to the contrary, compel any one or more of such joint promisors to perform the whole of the promise.”
17. Now, it has been held in some cases that this section applies only to the case of joint promisees and not to the case of co-heirs. This is obviously so, as the section speaks of co-promisees only; but with great respect there appears to me to be no sound reason why the principle of this section should be held to be inapplicable to the case of heirs also who have jointly succeeded to the liability of their deceased ancestor.
18. So far as my humble judgment goes, the case of co-heirs cannot be placed on a better or higher footing than that of co-promisees on any principle. The English law on the point is undoubtedly different, but as the law of our own country has made a departure therefrom, I am inclined to the opinion that the rule embodied in Section 43 of the Contract Act may well be held applicable in principle to the case of co-heirs, and in any event, to the kind of heirs, who are sons in the present case.
19. A consideration of the principle behind Section 53 of the CPC also seems to me to lead to the conclusion that all the sons of a deceased Hindu father are not necessary parties to a suit brought by a creditor against some of them. Section 53 provides in effect that property which is in the hands of a son and which is liable for the payment of the debt of a deceased ancestor shall be deemed to be the property of the ancestor which has come to the hands of the son as his legal representative. It is, therefore, incontrovertible that ancestral property in the hands of a son can be proceeded against in execution as assets of the deceased in the hands of such descendants even where a claim is decreed against the deceased ancestor, and the sons are no party to the suit.
20. It may also be pointed out that debts incurred by a father before partition between the father and the sons can be enforced against property which falls to the share of the sons on partition even when a suit is brought after the partition has taken place because the property received by the sons at the partition is the property of the judgment-debtor within the meaning of Section 53 of the CPC. Again where the liability of a son exists under the Hindu law to pay the debt of the deceased ancestor, the whole of the ancestral property in his hands is liable and not merely the share of the deceased ancestor. See — ‘Mohanlal v. Bala Prasad’, AIR 1922 All 310 (E).
21. It seems to me to follow from all this that each son of a deceased father is responsible under the Mitakshara law to be proceeded against in execution even where the suit was brought against the deceased ancestor, and the sons were not a party thereto. Therefore, a son of such a deceased ancestor cannot be allowed, in my opinion, to defeat this liability by the plea in a suit brought against him that he alone is not the legal representative of his father and there are other sons who are also his legal representatives, and for that reason the suit brought against him to the exclusion of others is bad and unmaintainable.
22. If the creditor chooses to file his suit against some of such persons only and not against the other heirs, the persons sued have no reason to complain, as a rule, because their liability exists to the entire extent of the joint family property in their hands, and it seems to me that if such a creditor thinks that he will be able to obtain satisfaction of the debt by suing some of the deceased's legal representatives only, he is well within his rights to do so.
23. The result of the above discussion is that a creditor's suit need not be thrown out on the ground that all the heirs of the deceased father have not been joined in the suit brought against some of them, and that all the sons of the deceased father are not necessary parties to such a suit except under extraordinary circumstances, e.g, where the plea may have been raised that the debt had been discharged by another son who is not on record, but that evidently is not the case here. In this view of the matter I have come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs' suit against some of the heirs of the deceased Chunnilal only and not all of them is maintainable in law and should not have been dismissed. Consequently, I allow this appeal, set aside the judgments of the courts below and remand the case to the Munsiff Sirohi with a direction that he will dispose of the case on the merits. The appellants will be entitled to their costs incurred in this Court and the court below and further costs shall abide the result.
V.R.B
24. Appeal allowed.
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