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Secretary Of State For India In Council v. A.H. Forbes

Calcutta High Court
Jun 18, 1912
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

On 11 November 1878 the Collector of Monghyr granted a lease of homestead land to John Christian for a term of 27 years from 1 April 1876. The lease indicated it was a renewal following termination of a former settlement. The lessee transferred his interest in 1879 to Ambler, who in turn sold to Alexander John Forbes (the current respondent/defendant).

Upon expiry of the term the Collector offered a renewal to the defendant on terms set out in a draft; the defendant declined those proposed terms and claimed renewal on the same terms as the existing lease, subject to payment of fair rent. Negotiations failed. By notice dated 25 September 1906 the Collector required the defendant to quit the land from 1 April 1907 and remove house materials. The defendant ignored this demand.

On 7 September 1907 the Secretary of State commenced an action in ejectment, alleging trespass. The Subordinate Judge originally overruled the defendant's claim and decreed the suit. On appeal the District Judge reversed and dismissed the suit, holding that the defendant had practically a permanent interest because the lease contained a stipulation for renewal. The Secretary of State appealed to the court that issued the present opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the lease of 11 November 1878 contains a covenant for renewal (i.e., whether there is a covenant for renewal in the lease).
  2. If there is a renewal clause, whether the defendant was offered a renewal on proper (i.e., proper or substantially equivalent) terms.
  3. If the defendant is not at fault for any failure to obtain a formal renewal, whether he is protected from ejectment (i.e., whether equity treats him as if a proper renewal had been granted).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Secretary of State / Crown) Arguments

  • On termination of the lease the defendant ceased to have any interest in the land and is therefore liable to be ejected.
  • The clause relied on by the respondent should be construed merely as reserving to Government the liberty or power to re-settle the land on fair rent (i.e., it does not create a covenant for renewal in favour of the lessee).
  • Because the instrument does not prescribe the terms of renewal, the lessee cannot claim renewal on the same terms as before.
  • If the clause were a covenant for renewal, the lessee would practically have a permanent interest in the land, which the Crown says is inconsistent with other provisions (e.g., Collector's sanction to erection of buildings).

Respondent's Arguments

  • The lease contains a covenant for renewal entitling the lessee to renewal on the same terms as before, subject to payment of fair rent.
  • The defendant has always been ready and willing to accept a renewal on that footing and thus, in equity, is entitled to the same protection as if the lease had been properly renewed in his favour.
  • As a transferee of the original lessee, the defendant's right to renewal runs with the land and is enforceable by his representative interest.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chambers v. Gaussen (1844) 2 Jo. & La. To. 99; 7 Ir. Eq. R. 575 Shows that a lease may be construed (by reference to all terms) as renewable for ever; habendum may amount to covenant for perpetual renewal. Cited to support the proposition that an express covenant in technical terms is not essential and that overall drafting can amount to a covenant for renewal.
Taylor v. Pollard (1827) Lyne on Leases App. 62 Referenced as an authority taking a similar view to Chambers v. Gaussen about renewal by construction. Used as part of the authorities showing habitually that renewal can be inferred from drafting of lease.
Sheppard v. Doolari (1812) 3 Farr. & War. 1; 5 Ir. Eq. R. 6 Another authority where similar view (lease construed as renewing) was taken. Placed among the authorities supporting construction of a covenant for renewal from the instrument.
Moss v. Barton (1866) L.R. 1 Eq. 174; 35 Beav. 197; 13 L.T. 623 Illustrates that a lease for a term of years may nevertheless confer on the lessee an option of renewal. Relied on to show that the form of the original term does not preclude an option to renew being conferred.
Lewis v. Stephenson (1898) 67 L.J.Q.B. 296; 78 L.T. 165 Two propositions: (1) where option does not state by whom exercisable, it is exercisable by lessee only; (2) if option does not state terms of renewal, new lease will be for same period and on same terms except as to the renewal covenant itself. Cited to support that the option, if present, would belong to the lessee (or his representative) and that unspecified terms imply renewal on same essential terms subject to fair rent.
Buckland v. Papillon (1866) 2 Ch. App. 67; 36 L.J. Ch. 81; 12 Jur. (N.S.) 992; 15 L.T. 378; 15 W.R. 92 Holds that the option of renewal is exercisable by the lessee's representative-in-interest (for example a trustee in bankruptcy). Used to support the proposition that a transferee of the original lessee (as here) can exercise the renewal option.
Austin v. Newham (1906) 2 K.B. 167; 75 L.J.K.B. 563; 95 L.T. 490 Supports that if option does not state renewal terms, the new lease will be for same period and terms as original, except the renewal covenant. Relied on to support the court's construction that unspecified terms carry forward.
Price v. Assheton (1834) 1 Y. & C. 82; 11 R.R. 222; 4 L.J. (N.S.) Ex. Eq. 3 Authority cited for principle that unspecified renewal terms import continuation of essential existing terms. Part of the group of authorities the court relied on to conclude the lessee was entitled to renewal on same essential terms.
Richards v. Richards (1843) 2 Y. & C.C.C. 419 at p. 427; 7 Jur. 715 Another authority cited on the same point regarding terms of renewal. Supports the court's view about implied continuation of terms when renewal terms are unspecified.
Hyde v. Shinner (1723) 2 P.W. 196 (Lord Macclesfield) Observation that a lease to be made on the same covenants does not include covenant for renewing that new lease (otherwise lease would never end). Quoted to show the principle that renewal covenants are not to be read as perpetual unless clearly intended.
Tritton v. Foote (1789) 2 Brown C.C. 636; 2 Cox. 171 (Lord Thurlow) Similar observation on exclusivity of covenant to renew under same conditions. Used to reinforce caution against inferring perpetual renewal from ambiguous words.
Swinburne v. Milburn (1884) 9 App. Cas. 844 at p. 850; 54 L.J.Q.B. 6; 52 L.T. 222; 33 W.R. 325 (Lord Selborne) States there is no legal presumption against perpetual renewal but places burden of strict proof on anyone claiming such a right; authorities are against inferring it from equivocal expressions. Cited to underscore that perpetual renewal must be clearly shown and not inferred from ambiguous language.
Job v. Banister (1856) 2 Kay & J. 374; 110 R.R. 273 Illustrates that an agreement will be satisfied and exhausted by a single renewal unless clear intention otherwise. Used to show that a covenant will not be construed as for perpetual renewal unless clearly intended.
Hare v. Burges (1857) 4 Kay & J. 45; 27 L.J. Ch. 86; 3 Jur. (N.S.) 1294; 6 W.R. 144; 116 R.R. 255 Another authority cited on exhaustion by single renewal absent clear intention for perpetuity. Grouped with other authorities to support the requirement of clear intention for perpetual renewal.
Davis v. Taylor (1736) 3 Ridgeway P.C. 395 Historical authority cited among cases illustrating approach to renewal covenants. Included among the decisions showing the courts' approach to renewal clauses.
Moore v. Foley (1801) 6 Ves. 232; 5 R.R. 270 Cited as part of the body of authorities on renewal covenants. Used as supporting authority in discussion of renewal construction.
Iggulden v. May (1814) 9 Ves. 325; 7 East 237; 3 Smith 269; 8 R.R. 623; 2 Bos. & P. (N.R.) 449 Another authority forming part of the established line on renewal covenants. Relied upon collectively with others to explain how renewal covenants are construed.
Browne v. Tighe (1834) 2 Cal. & Fin. 396; 8 Bligh (N.S.) 272; 37 R.R. 150 Holds that a covenant to receive the construction of perpetual renewal must be plain and distinct and bear no other construction without force. Cited to support the proposition that perpetual renewal will not be inferred from equivocal expressions.
Simpson v. Clayton (1838) 4 Bingham (N.S.) 758; 44 R.R. 841; 6 Scott 469; 1 Arn. 299; 8 L.J., C.V. 59; 2 Jur. 892 Supports the proposition that a covenant for renewal runs with the land (i.e., binds successors/transferees). Cited to demonstrate that the defendant, as a transferee, could enforce the renewal covenant.
Roe v. Hayley; Brooke v. Bulkeley (1754) 2 Ves. Sen. 498 Another authority cited concerning the running of renewal covenants with the land. Grouped with Simpson v. Clayton to support that the covenant runs with the land.
Walsh v. Lomdale (1882) 21 Ch. D. 9; 52 L.J. Ch. 246; 46 L.T. 858; 31 W.R. 109 Holds that a lessee ready and willing to accept renewal on proper terms is in the same equitable position as if a proper lease had been granted (i.e., covenant specifically enforceable). Cited as authority for the court's conclusion that the defendant's equitable position was the same as if a proper renewal had been granted.
Bibi Jawahir Kumari v. Chatterput Singh, 2 C.L.J. 343 Indian authority cited in support of the equitable position when a renewal covenant exists and lessee is ready to accept proper renewal. Relied on as part of the local authorities showing equitable protection to lessee in similar circumstances.
Singhee Ram v. Bhagbat Chandar Nundi, 11 C.L.J. 543; 6 Ind. Cas. 632 Indian authority cited on similar equitable principles. Used to support the court's conclusion on equitable protection where lessee stands ready to accept renewal.
Sarat Chandra v. Sham Chand Singh, 16 C.L.J. 71; 39 C. 663; 14 Ind. Cas. 701 Indian authority cited alongside others to illustrate equitable enforcement of renewal covenants. Included among the authorities relied on to hold the defendant entitled in equity to protection from ejectment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in three analytical steps corresponding to the three questions framed by the parties.

First, the court construed the instrument of 11 November 1878. The lease recited prior settlements and stated that the lessee would peacefully dwell on the land on payment of assessed rent, might build with Collector's sanction, and that if rent was unpaid Government might take possession. Critically, the lease concluded that "after the expiry of the term, the Government would have power to re-settle the land with the lessee on a fair rent." The respondent construed this as a covenant for renewal; the Crown urged that it merely reserved power to re-settle (and prescribed no renewal terms).

On construction, the majority concluded that the clause was intended as a covenant for renewal. The court gave three principal reasons drawn from the text itself: (a) accepting the Crown's narrower construction would render the clause superfluous; (b) the presence of a renewal clause is consistent with the grant's purpose (a long-continued tenancy for dwelling that had been renewed before); and (c) the Collector's sanction regarding building is not necessarily inconsistent with a renewal covenant (it could be to secure suitable construction rather than to deny permanence).

Second, the court addressed whether the defendant was entitled to renewal on the same terms. The court relied on established authorities that a tenancy for years can confer an option of renewal (Moss v. Barton) and on authorities that where an option does not specify by whom it is exercisable it is enforceable by the lessee (Lewis v. Stephenson). The court further applied authorities showing that the option can be exercised by a transferee/representative-in-interest (Buckland v. Papillon) and that where the option does not state terms the new lease will be for the same period and on the same essential terms as the original (several authorities including Lewis v. Stephenson; Austin v. Newham; Price v. Assheton). The court therefore held that the defendant was entitled to a renewal on the same essential terms as the 1878 lease, subject to fair rent.

Third, the court examined whether the defendant was protected from ejectment if he had been always willing to accept a renewal on proper terms. Citing Walsh v. Lomdale and several Indian authorities, the court held that equity treats a lessee who is ready and willing to accept a proper renewal as if a proper lease had been granted; the covenant for renewal was specifically enforceable when the suit commenced. The court also found the renewal actually offered to the defendant imposed substantially different and prejudicial covenants (restraint on alienation except with permission and premium, forfeiture provisions for timber-felling and unauthorized alterations, etc.), so the defendant was entitled to refuse those conditions.

The court acknowledged that the lease's language was loosely worded and that translations might be imperfect (as noted by Beachcroft, J.), but concluded that ambiguities should be construed in favour of the grantee where possible and that the clause reasonably supported the existence of an option to the respondent.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court affirmed the decree of the District Judge and dismissed the appeal by the Secretary of State, with costs.

Immediate implications (direct effect on the parties):

  • The defendant (transferee of the original lessee) is treated in equity as if a proper renewal had been granted, because he had an enforceable covenant for renewal and had been ready and willing to accept renewal on proper terms.
  • The ejectment suit brought by the Secretary of State fails; the defendant is protected from ejectment on the basis stated in the opinion.

The opinion does not purport to create a new legal principle; it applies established authorities on construction of renewal covenants, the rights of transferees, and equitable protection where a lessee is willing to accept proper renewal. No express broader precedent-setting declaration is made in the text beyond the application of these authorities to the facts.


Prepared from the text of the provided opinion only. No information has been added beyond what appears in the opinion.

Show all summary ...

1. This is an appeal by the Secretary of State for India in Council against a decree of the District Judge in reversal of a decree of the Subordinate Judge, by which an action in ejectment commenced by him against the respondent has been dismissed. On the 11th November 1878, the Collector of Monghyr granted a lease to one John Christian in respect of a parcel of homestead land for a term of 27 years from the 1st April 1876. The lease shows, on the face of it, that this was not the commencement of the tenancy, and it is stated expressly that the grant was made upon the expiry of the term of the former settlement. In 1879, the lessee transferred his interest to one Ambler, who, in the same year, sold the property to Alexander John Forbes, now represented by the defendant. Upon the expiry of the term, the Collector made an offer to the defendant to renew the lease on certain terms specified in a draft. The defendant refused to accept a renewal on the terms proposed and claimed a renewal on the same terms as before, subject to the payment of fair rent. The result was that the negotiations terminated, and the Collector, by a notice served on the 25th September 1906, called upon the defendant to quit the land from the 1st April 1907, and to remove the materials of the house which had been erected thereon. The defendant ignored this demand for possession, and on the 7th September 1907, the Secretary of State commenced this action to eject him as a trespasser. The defendant resisted the claim substantially on the ground that he had acquired a permanent right in the disputed land and was not liable to be evicted therefrom. The Subordinate Judge overruled this contention and decreed the suit. Upon appeal, the District Judge has reversed that decision, and dismissed the suit on the ground that, the defendant had practically a permanent interest in the land as the lease contained a stipulation for renewal. In support of the present appeal, it has been argued on behalf of the Secretary of State that, upon the termination of the lease, the defendant ceased to have any interest in the land and is, consequently, liable to be ejected. On behalf of the respondent, it has been contended, in answer to this argument, that the lease contains a covenant for renewal, that he is entitled to renewal on the same terms as before, subject to the payment of fair rent, that he has always been ready and willing to accept a renewal on this footing, and that, consequently, he is in equity entitled to the same protection as if the lease had been properly renewed in his favour. The questions, therefore, which require consideration are, just, whether there is a covenant for renewal in the lease; secondly, if there is a renewal clause, was the defendant offered a renewal on proper terms; and, thirdly, if the defendant is not to blame, is he protected from ejectment.

2. In so far as the first of these questions is concerned, the answer must plainly depend upon a true construction of the instrument of the 11th November 1878. It recites, in the first place, the prior settlements upon the termination of the last of which the lease was renewed at enhanced rent. It then provides that the lessee would, upon payment of the rent assessed, peacefully dwell on the land, and if he stood in need of constructing any house, he could build on obtaining sanction therefor from the Collector. If the lessee failed to pay rent, the Government might realise the arrear under the laws in force, and further, take possession of the land. During the continuance of the term, the lessee, his heirs and representatives, would have the right to dwell on the land. After the expiry of the term, the Government would have power to re-settle the land with the lessee on a fair rent. The last clause has been construed by the respondent as a covenant for renewal. This has been repudiated on behalf of the Crown, and our attention has been drawn to the fact that no terms are prescribed on which the lease is to be renewed. It has also been suggested, on behalf of the Crown, that if the clause be interpreted as a covenant for renewal, the lessee would practically have a permanent interest in the land, which is inconsistent with the provision for sanction of the Collector, should the lessee build on the land. After careful consideration of all the terms of the lease, some of which are by no means happily worded, I have arrived at the conclusion that the clause in question was intended to be a covenant for renewal. It has not been explained why a contract of tenancy of this character, executed by one Englishman in favour of another, should have been written in what turns out to be a by no means intelligible Indian Vernacular; but this much is plain that, if we accept the construction suggested by the learned Government Pleader, viz., that the clause was intended merely to reserve liberty to the Collector to make a re-settlement with the lessee on fair rent, it would be entirely superfluous. On the other hand, as will presently appear, a renewal clause in a lease does not necessarily import permanency; but even if it did, the clause which requires sanction of the Collector to the erection of a building is not necessarily inconsistent with the theory of a permanent grant; the object of such sanction may be, not so much to prevent the erection of a building as to secure that the building should be of a suitable type from the sanitary or architectural or other similar point of view. It must again be remembered that the tenancy had apparently continued for many years, had been renewed from time to time, and was intended for dwelling purposes, which would necessarily imply the erection of structures of a more or less substantial character. Prom this point of view, the insertion of a renewal clause would be appropriate and in perfect harmony with the avowed object of the grant. The construction, therefore, suggested by the respondent is reasonable, and I do not hesitate to accept it, because it is well settled that an express covenant to renew in appropriate technical language is not essential, and the habendum may be so framed as to amount in substance to a covenant for even perpetual renewal. Thus in Chambers v. Gaussen (1844) 2 Jo. and La To. 99; 7 ir. eq. rule 575; Sir Edward Sugden then Lord Chancellor of Ireland, held, upon a construction of all the terms of a lease, that it was a lease for lives, renewable for ever. He referred to the cases of Taylor v. Pollard (1827) Lyne on Leases App. 62 and Sheppard v. Doolari (1812) 3 far. & War. 1; 5 Ir. Eq. Rule 6 where a similar view had been taken. I hold, therefore, that the clause in question embodies a covenant for renewal. In so far as the second question is concerned; it has been argued on behalf of the Crown that as the instrument does not specify the terms on which the lease was to be renewed, the lessee could not claim renewal on the same terms as before. This contention, in my opinion, is fallacious. In the first place, a lease which creates a tenancy for a term of years, as in the present case, may yet confer on the lessee an option of renewal: Moss v. Barton (1866) L.R. 1 Eq. 174 : 35 Beav. 197 : 13 L.T. 623. In the second place, if the lease does not state by whom the option is exercisable, it is exercisable by the lessee only; in other words, a covenant for renewal, if informally expressed, is enforced only in favour of the lessee: Lewis v. Stephenson (1898) 67 L.J.Q.B. 296 : 78 L.T. 165. In the third place, the option is exercisable not merely by the lessee personally, but also by his representative-in-interest, for example, his trustee in bankruptcy: Buckland v. Papillon (1866) 2 Ch. App. 67 : 36 L.J. Ch. 81 : 12 Jur. (N.S.) 992 : 15 L.T. 378 : 15 W.R. 92. In the fourth place, if the option does not state the terms of renewal, the new lease will be for the same period and on the same terms as the original lease, in respect of all the essential conditions thereof, except as to the covenant for renewal itself: Lewis v. Stephenson (1898) 67 L.J.Q.B. 296 : 78 L.T. 165; Austin v. Newham (1906) 2 K.B. 167 : 75 L.J.K.B. 563 : 95 L.T. 490; Price v. Assheton (1834) 1 Y. & C. 82 : 11 R.R. 222 : 4 L.J. (N.S.) Ex. Eq. 3; Richards v. Richards (1843) 2 Y. & C.C.C. 419 at p. 427 : 7 Jur. 715. The exception just mentioned is of some importance because it negatives the suggestion made on behalf of the Crown that a covenant for renewal practically implies a permanent lease. Lord Macclesfield said in Hyde v. Shinner (1723) 2 P.W. 196 that though the lease is to be made on the same covenants, yet that shall not take in a covenant for the renewing of this new lease, for as much as then the lease would never be at an end. To the same effect is the observation of Lord Thurlow in Tritton v. Foote (1789) 2 Brown C.C. 636 : 2 Cox. 171 that a covenant in a lease to renew under the same conditions is exclusive of the covenant of renewal. Similarly, Lord Selborne observed in Swinburne v. Milburn (1884) 9 App. Cas. 844 at p. 850 : 54 L.J.Q.B. 6 : 52 L.T. 222 : 33 W.R. 325 that though there is no sort of legal presumption against a right of perpetual renewal, yet the authorities certainly do impose upon any one claiming such a right the burden of strict proof and are strongly against inferring it from any equivocal expressions which may fairly be capable of being otherwise interpreted. The substance of the matter, therefore, is that the covenant will not be construed as a covenant for perpetual renewal, unless the intention in that behalf is clearly shown; for instance, when the covenant expressly states that the lease is to be renewed for ever; otherwise, the agreement is satisfied and exhausted by a single renewal: Job v. Banister (1856) 2 Kay & J. 374 : 110 R.R. 273; Hare v. Burges (1857) 4 Kay & J. 45 : 27 L.J. Ch. 86 : 3 Jur. (N.S.) 1294 : 6 W.R. 144 : 116 R.R. 255; Davis v. Taylor (1736) 3 Ridgeway P.C. 395; Moore v. Foley (1801) 6 Ves. 232 : 5 R.R. 270; Iggulden v. May (1814) 9 Ves. 325 : 7 East 237 : 3 Smith 269 : 8 R.R. 623 : 2 Bos. & P. (N.R.) 449. It has accordingly been held that a covenant to receive the construction of perpetual renewal must be plain and distinct and such as to bear no other construction without force and violence done to the words and the context: Browne v. Tighe (1834) 2 Cal. & Fin. 396 : 8 Bligh (N.S.) 272 : 37 R.R. 150. In the present case, therefore, the defendant was entitled to a renewal of the lease on the same terms as in the instrument of the 11th November 1878, subject to the payment of fair rent as expressly stated therein; and this right was not affected by the circumstance that he was a transferee from the original lessee, for, as already stated, a covenant for renewal runs with the land. Simpson v. Clayton (1838) 4 Bingham (N.S.) 758 : 44 R.R. 841 : 6 Scott 469 : 1 Arn. 299 : 8 L.J., C.V. 59 : 2 Jur. 892; Roe v. Hayley; Brooke v. Bulkeley (1754) 2 Ves. Sen. 498. The renewed lease offered to him, however, was on substantially different terms. Covenants had been inserted which involved restraint against alienation without the written permission of the Collector which could be obtained only upon payment of premium, forfeiture for felling timber without leave, forfeiture for addition to or alteration in building without assent of the Collector, and like clauses, more or less calculated to prejudice seriously the position of the lessee. The lessee was, therefore, clearly entitled to refuse to accept a renewal on conditions so essentially different from the terms of the original grant.

3. In so far as the third question is concerned, it cannot be seriously doubted that the position of the lessee who has been always ready and willing to accept a renewal on proper terms is the same in equity as if a proper lease has been granted. The covenant for renewal was still specifically enforceable at the commencement of the suit, and the position of the defendant in equity is the same as if it had been specifically enforced: Walsh v. Lomdale (1882) 21 Ch. D. 9 : 52 L.J. Ch. 2 46 L.T. 858 : 31 W.R. 109; Bibi Jawahir Kumari v. Chatterput Singh 2 C.L.J. 343; Singhee Ram v. Bhagbat Chandar Nundi 11 C.L.J. 543 : 6 Ind. Cas. 632 and Sarat Chandra v. Sham Chand Singh 16 C.L.J. 71: 39 C. 663 : 14 Ind. Cas. 701.

4. The result, therefore, is that although the reasons assigned by the District Judge may be open to criticism, his decree must be affirmed and this appeal dismissed with costs.

Beachcroft, J.

5. I agree and have little to add it is conceded that the determination of the question depends on the interpretation to be put on the clause, which has been translated, "after the expiry of the term put down in this deed, the Government shall have power to re-settle the land on a fair jamu." A more accurate translation of the concluding words would be the Government shall have the power to bring into operation a new settlement on a fair jama."

6. If this clause gives an option of renewal, the appellant is faced by this difficulty that the option must be taken to include a renewal of the lease on all the old terms, except such as are excluded other, of course, than the renewal clause itself. It is clear the words on a fair jama

" would be meanings less if applied to any person other than the respondent, for in a contract between A and B., it is of no concern to B. for A. to say, 'I shall have power to renew the contract with C. on a fair rent."

7. Any difficulty which there is in the case arises from the fact that the lease is loosely worded. It contains other provisions which are unnecessary, e.g., the passage which, after giving Government power to take seer possession in case of default of payment of rent, goes on to give Government authority to keep the property seer or to lease it to some one else. If the clause

"after the expiry of the term, Government shall have power to bring into operation a new lease on a fair jama,"
were merely a clause emphasizing the fact that the termination of the lease in 1902 was to end the contract between the parties, the appellant must succeed. But a meaning must be given to every clause where possible, and if there is ambiguity in a grant, it must be construed in favour of the grantee. Now, if the contract between the parties entirely terminated in 1902, it was quite unnecessary to reserve to Government the power to make a new settlement. Therefore, the reservation of that power to Government appears to indicate that it was considered that the respondent had some right which it was intended to qualify by this clause. And on the terms of the clause that right could only be a right to renewal. This view is borne out by the fact that previous renewals were recited in the patta. And the suggestion that Government had a right to settle the land with any one without giving to respondent the refusal of a lease does not appear to have been the suggestion, at any rate, in the Court of Appeal, for the judgment of the learned District Judge seems to proceed on the lines that then was an option of renewal and that the Government Pleader's contention was not that there was no option, but that the terms of the lease could be varied.

8. Therefore, we must take it that an option was reserved to the respondent. That being so, it must be taken that the terms not mentioned as liable to variation were to be renewed. Government was, therefore, entitled only to alter the rent on renewal.

9. I agree in dismissing the appeal with costs.