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Bhandi Singh v. Ramadhin Roy

Calcutta High Court
Jun 29, 1905
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (High Court

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion arises from a second appeal against the decision of the Judge of Bhagulpore that a suit previously decreed in the original Court was not maintainable. The underlying facts, as stated in the opinion, are:

  • Proceedings took place under the Land Acquisition Act. The Collector made an award that the Railway (for whom the land was acquired) should pay compensation of approximately Rs. 61 to the first Defendant.
  • Some of the Plaintiffs objected to the award insofar as it ordered payment to the first Defendant. The Collector referred the objection to the Civil Court under section 18 of the Act.
  • When the reference came before the Judge, the objection proceeding was struck off (dismissed) for non-appearance of the Plaintiffs. By that time the first Defendant had withdrawn the awarded compensation money.
  • The Plaintiffs then instituted a civil suit seeking (among other relief) a declaration of title and a decree for refund of Rs. 61 withdrawn by the first Defendant. The Munsif originally held the suit maintainable and decreed in favour of the Plaintiffs.
  • On appeal the District Judge dismissed the suit as not maintainable. The Plaintiffs appealed to the High Court. It was conceded (and appears in the record) that Plaintiffs Nos. 3 and 6 were not parties to the land-acquisition proceedings, while the other Plaintiffs were parties who obtained the reference but failed to appear and whose reference proceeding was dismissed for default on 10 August 1900.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the facts (reference under s.18, dismissal for non-appearance, and withdrawal of award money by the first Defendant) give the Plaintiffs any cause of action in a Civil Court.
  2. Whether the Plaintiffs' claim is res judicata or otherwise barred because of the prior reference to, and dismissal by, the Civil Court under the Land Acquisition Act procedures.
  3. Whether jurisdiction to adjudicate questions arising from a Collector's award under the Land Acquisition Act is exclusive to the special Land Acquisition Court (or judge) created by the Act, or whether ordinary Civil Courts retain concurrent jurisdiction in certain respects.
  4. Whether dismissal of a reference for non-appearance (i.e., struck off under the applicable Civil Procedure provisions) precludes the same litigant from subsequently suing in an ordinary Civil Court on the same subject-matter.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • The Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the land specified in the plaint was their khudkhast property and that the first Defendant (who claimed a raiyati right) had no valid title; they claimed refund of Rs. 61 withdrawn by the Defendant as compensation.
  • The principal point argued on appeal was that there was nothing in the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 which barred a suit of this description in an ordinary Civil Court.
  • The appellants further argued that the reference to the Civil Court under section 18 proved ineffectual because the proceedings were dismissed for want of prosecution and there was no adjudication on the merits, and therefore the dismissal should not preclude their subsequent suit.

Respondent's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • The first Defendant resisted the claim on the ground, among others, that the suit was not maintainable in a Civil Court and that the only remedy open to the Plaintiffs was that expressly prescribed in the Land Acquisition Act.
  • Implicitly, the defendant relied upon the statutory scheme (including sections making the Land Acquisition Judge and its procedure applicable and final subject to appeal) to contend that ordinary civil jurisdiction is ousted or limited.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sri Punnabati Dai v. Padmanund Singh (Punnabati Dai v. Pudmanund Singh) Recognises that persons who appeared before the Collector may bring an action in Civil Court to recover money awarded to another person; also supports right of persons not before the Collector to sue. Used to show that a person not before the Collector may nonetheless have a right to sue to recover compensation taken by another; relied on in assessing who may maintain a claim inter se.
Raja Nilmoni Singh v. Ram Bandhu (Raja Nilmoni Singh v. Ram Bandhu Rai) Holds that settlement of amount and distribution of compensation by a competent Court is final subject to appeal under the statutory scheme; supports that claims adjudicated under the Act should not be reopened in another suit. Relied upon to support the view that a litigant who availed himself of a reference under the statute cannot again litigate the same matter in an ordinary Court and that the decision on a reference is final (subject to appeal).
Hurmut Jan Bibi v. Padma Lochun (Hurmut Jan v. Padma Lochun) Used as supportive authority consistent with the view that reference proceedings under acquisition statutes are judicial and have finality in certain respects. Referenced to show consistency with holding that proceedings under the acquisition statute have the character of judicial proceedings and to support conclusions on where finality lies.
R. v. County Court Judge of Essex (per Lopes, L.J.) Principle of statutory construction: where an Act creates a new jurisdiction, procedure, forms or remedies, those prescribed by the Act must be followed and no others. Adopted as an elementary rule of construction supporting the proposition that when a statute prescribes a special mode of remedy, ordinary courts' jurisdiction is ousted to the extent the statute provides exclusive procedures.
Rama Chundra v. Secretary of State Affirms that when a statute points out the mode of redressing an injury resulting from the exercise of public power, the ordinary Courts' jurisdiction is ousted and the statutory remedy must be followed. Invoked to support the exclusive character of the special statutory remedy created by the Land Acquisition Act for certain disputes arising under it.
Governor v. Meredith; Stevens v. Jeacocke; West v. Downman Authorities cited in Rama Chundra as supporting the proposition that statutory remedies displace ordinary remedies. These decisions are cited (through Rama Chundra) as supporting authorities for the construction that statutory procedure should be followed where a statute provides a special remedy.
Brown v. Beatty Authority for the proposition that where a statute prescribes a particular form of proceeding and tribunal for compensation on compulsory acquisition, parties are confined to the remedy prescribed. Used to illustrate established authority that statutory modes of assessment/payment of compensation preclude separate suits for the same purpose.
London and North Western Railway Co. v. Bradley (referred in Brown v. Beatty) Referenced (via Brown v. Beatty) in support of the proposition about confinement to statutory remedies in compulsory acquisition contexts. Cited as part of the chain of authority reinforcing the Court's construction of exclusive statutory procedure in respect of certain questions under land acquisition statutes.
Hickox v. Cleveland; Aldrich v. Cheshire Authorities for the rule that where a Statute provides the mode of assessment and payment of compensation due to eminent domain, no separate suit can be maintained. Referred to corroborate the conclusion that statutory procedure governs and may preclude ordinary suit for the same subject-matter.
Punnabati v. Padmanund (referred again) Shows that where there has been no reference under the statute, an inter se suit among claimants may be maintainable because the Collector's award is final only as between the Collector and parties, not inter se. Applied to explain that in absence of a statutory reference, claimants can litigate inter se in ordinary Courts; but once a reference has been made and adjudicated (or dismissed under applicable procedure), the party who chose the reference is precluded from re-litigating.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion contains two written parts (Stephen, J. and Mookerjee, J.). Both judges address statutory construction of the Land Acquisition Act and application of Civil Procedure Code provisions to reference proceedings under section 18. The analysis below follows the reasoning expressed in the opinion.

Stephen, J. — Analysis

  1. He begins by identifying the legal effect of each step in the acquisition process: the Collector's award under section 11 settles questions between the Collector and persons interested by force of section 12.
  2. He notes that section 31 preserves a liability on any person who receives compensation to pay it to the person lawfully entitled to it; this means third-party suits to recover money awarded to another are possible (citing Punnabati Dai).
  3. He examines the nature of a reference to the Civil Court under section 18: the Act prescribes forms, attendance, advocates' rights, and that the Court makes an "award" and its decision a "determination"; further, section 53 makes the Code of Civil Procedure applicable and section 54 provides appeal rights.
  4. Stephen, J. considers whether the Court acts in its ordinary civil jurisdiction or as a creature of the Act. He concludes that the Court, when hearing a reference under section 18, acts judicially and in its ordinary capacity (i.e., the proceedings are judicial in character and the Code’s procedural provisions apply so far as relevant).
  5. Applying section 647 of the Code (which extends Code procedure to proceedings in courts of civil jurisdiction other than suits and appeals), he treats the reference as a proceeding to which the procedural rules of the Code — specifically sections 102 and 103 (failure to prosecute/dismissal for default and bar to subsequent suit) — are applicable.
  6. He holds that the non-appearance of the objectors justified the dismissal of the reference, and that dismissal operates to bar a subsequent suit by virtue of the Code provisions; thus those Plaintiffs who obtained the reference under section 18 are debarred from instituting the present suit.
  7. He identifies an evidentiary/procedural issue: uncertainty about which Plaintiffs actually made objections (Plaintiffs Nos. 3 and 6). He finds that the District Judge's factual presumptions regarding joint family status and party-ship were not legally supported and remands for determination of whether Nos. 3 and 6 were parties to the reference; if not, the Judge must hear the merits as to them.

Mookerjee, J. — Analysis

  1. He agrees with Stephen, J.'s conclusion to reverse the District Judge and remit the case for further consideration as indicated.
  2. He frames the legal question as one of statutory construction of the Land Acquisition Act. He reviews key statutory provisions: secs. 9, 11, 12, 18, 20–28, 30, 31(2) (third proviso), 53 and 54.
  3. From the statute he derives three propositions: (i) the Local Government has a statutory right to acquire land; (ii) private individuals have a corresponding right to compensation; (iii) the Act provides both summary determination by the Collector and a judicial determination by a special Civil Court for certain controversies.
  4. He asks whether jurisdiction conferred on the special Court is exclusive or concurrent with ordinary Courts. Applying elementary rules of statutory construction (citing authority), he holds that where a statute creates a special tribunal and procedure the statutory procedure must generally be followed and ordinary jurisdiction is ousted.
  5. He distinguishes between two categories of dispute arising from an award: (a) disputes as to measurement of land or amount of compensation; and (b) disputes as to the persons to whom compensation is payable or its apportionment among persons interested. He reads the third proviso to section 31(2) as preserving the personal liability of a person who received compensation to account to the person lawfully entitled to it.
  6. On this basis he concludes: disputes as to measurement or amount of compensation are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Land Acquisition reference (section 18) while disputes inter se as to entitlement or apportionment may be litigated either by reference under section 18 or by suit in an ordinary Civil Court (concurrent jurisdiction) because the Collector would not be a party or have interest in such inter se disputes.
  7. However, if a litigant chose the reference route under section 18 and the matter was dismissed for default (properly under Code procedure, i.e., section 102), section 103 precludes them from bringing a fresh suit on the same cause of action. He therefore holds that those Plaintiffs who obtained a reference under section 18 and did not appear are precluded from maintaining the present action; by contrast Plaintiffs Nos. 3 and 6 (who did not obtain a reference) are not so precluded and the appeal is allowed as to them and the matter remitted for further consideration.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is dismissed in respect of those Plaintiffs who obtained a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and failed to prosecute it (they are precluded from instituting the present suit); Plaintiffs Nos. 3 and 6—who were not parties to the reference—are not so precluded and the matter is remitted for further inquiry and hearing.

Immediate consequences for the parties (direct effects):

  • Those Plaintiffs who applied for and obtained the reference under section 18 but did not appear and thereby had the reference dismissed are debarred by application of the Code of Civil Procedure (secs. 102 and 103, read with sec. 647 CPC as made applicable by sec. 53 of the Act) from bringing the present suit; against them the appeal is dismissed (Stephen, J. pronounced dismissal with costs).
  • Plaintiffs Nos. 3 and 6 require a factual determination of whether they were parties to the reference; if they were not parties, the District Judge is to hear arguments on the merits as to them. Costs for their part are to abide the event pending that determination.
  • The District Judge's decree (to the extent it dismissed the suit as not maintainable against those who had obtained the reference) is upheld, but the case is remanded for further findings and hearing in respect of Plaintiffs Nos. 3 and 6 (per the concurrence of Mookerjee, J.).

Broader implications: The opinion construes the Land Acquisition Act to create a special statutory procedure for certain disputes and explains the interplay between exclusive statutory jurisdiction and concurrent jurisdiction in respect of inter se entitlement disputes. The opinion does not explicitly assert that it creates a novel precedent beyond applying and synthesising earlier authorities; it confines its direct consequence to barring re-litigation by parties who invoked the statutory reference and failed to prosecute it.

Show all summary ...

Stephen, J.:— This is a second appeal from the decision of the Judge of Bhagulpore, that a suit which had been decreed in the original Court was not maintainable, and this is the only issue that we have to decide.

The case arises out of proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act in which the Collector made an award that the Railway, for whom the land was acquired, should pay compensation of Rs. 61 odd to the first Defendant. Some of the Plaintiffs objecting to this award, so far as it ordered payment to the first Defendant, the Collector referred the matter to the Court under sec. 18 of the Act: and on the matter coming before the Judge in due course, it was struck off on the non-appearance of the Plaintiffs. The first Defendant had by that time withdrawn the money. Do these facts give the Plaintiffs any cause of action? and is their claim res judicata?

The simplest way to arrive at an answer to these questions is to consider what rights to a share in the compensation awarded were created at every step in the proceedings. Of these the first is the award under sec. 11. The effect of this is to settle all questions between the Collector and the parties interested, by force of sec. 12. As between parties having a right to a share in the compensation, the award does not, by force of sec. 31, affect the liability of any person who receives the whole or part of it, to pay it to the person lawfully entitled thereto. According to the judgment in Sri Punnabati Dai v. Padmanund Singh this leaves it open to any of the persons who appeared before the Collector to bring an action in the Civil Court to recover money awarded to any other person. We are not concerned with the effect of this decision in so far as it recognizes a right to sue in persons who were before the Collector; but it cannot be doubted that such a right exists in a person who was not, and who cannot be taken to have been, before him, as is fully borne out by the decision in the case we have just referred to and that in Raja Nilmoni Singh v. Ram Bandhu Rai.

We have next to consider the effect of the reference to the Court under sec. 18, and in particular in what capacity the Court acts in giving effect to the order. It is to be observed that the service of notices, and the appearance of advocates are regulated by secs. 20, 45 and 21 of the Act, which, when it is a question of the sufficiency of compensation that is referred, also lays down what matters the Court is to take into consideration, and what not. The decision of the Court is to be a “determination” [sec. 18(1)], and the Court makes an “award” [sec. 25(1)]. The Act also makes the Code of Civil Procedure generally applicable to the proceedings of the Court, (sec. 53); and gives a right of appeal from the Court to the High Court (sec. 54). Under these circumstances is the Court when dealing with such a reference acting in its ordinary jurisdiction as a Court of justice, or is it merely a creature of the Act appointed to perform some of the duties, which, except in cases of dispute, are more conveniently discharged by the Collector? The provisions I have referred to, with the exception of the last, seem to point to the second alternative. Why should it, for example, be necessary to say that the proceeding is to take place in open Court, and that the advocates entitled to practise in the Court shall be entitled to appear, if the Court is sitting in its usual capacity 1 On the other hand, the provisions made applicable to the hearing of the reference to the Court, do not seem applicable to a hearing of an appeal to the High Court. The language of the judgment in Raja Nilmoni Singh v. Ram Bandhu Rai (decided under the similar Statute, Act X of 1870) seems also to point in the same direction; for in the last paragraph the reference to the Court is referred to as a suit, and it is plainly laid down that the settlement of the amount and distribution of compensation by a competent Court is final, subject to the appeal as provided. This last feature alone seems to distinguish the proceedings of the Court from those of the Collector, and accepting the decision before referred to in Punnabati Dai v. Pudmanund Singh the difference on which the distinction is founded seems to be that the former are, and the latter are not, strictly judicial, a view which is at least consistent with the decision in Hurmut Jan Bibi v. Padma Lochun.

Taking it then that the Court acts judicially and in its ordinary capacity when hearing a reference under sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, I think it is plain that on the non-appearance of the objectors the Court did right to dismiss their objections and that this decision is final. Had the reference been a suit in which the objectors were Plaintiffs it is not denied that the dismissal would have properly taken place under sec. 102 of the Code, and that such dismissal would have been a bar to a subsequent suit in which the objector's right to the money awarded to the Defendant No. 1 was in issue; that is to this suit. The reference was not a suit, the objectors were not Plaintiffs and the present Defendants were not Defendants then. But sec. 647 seems to me exactly to meet the case. By it the procedure prescribed in the Code is to be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in any proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction other than suits and appeals. It is difficult to see how a reference under the Land Acquisition Act can fail to be a proceeding under this section, and I have held the Court to be a Court of civil jurisdiction in this case. It is ??? that the provisions of the Code ??? to be extended to meet certain cases not within the terms of the Act. It also seems to me that they ought to be extended so as to cover this case, treating the reference as a suit, the objector as a Plaintiff and Defendant No. 1 as a Defendant in that suit. The result of this is that I hold that by force of secs. 102 and 103 those of the Plaintiffs who made objection to the award of the Collector and who obtained a reference under sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act are debarred from instituting the present suit. Against them therefore this appeal is dismissed with costs.

A question has been raised as to how many of the Plaintiffs did make such objection. One of them (No. 3) is a minor: another (No. 6) is stated by the Munsif not to be a party. The learned Judge however held that all the Plaintiffs being members of one family may be presumed to be members of a joint family and that the uncle of the minor was kurta of the family. He was not however entitled as a matter of law to make either of these presumptions on the grounds on which he appears to have made them; and the other grounds stated for fixing Modun Prosad with liability as a party are not sufficient for that purpose. The case must therefore be remanded to the Judge for him to find on grounds other than those stated in the judgment whether the Plaintiffs Nos. 3 and 6 were parties to the reference; and if they were not, he must hear the arguments of the pleaders on the merits which we understand from the note appended to the judgment that he did not hear before. Costs in their case to abide the result.

Mookerjee, J.:— I agree with my learned brother that the decree made by the District Judge must be reversed and the case remitted to him for further consideration on the lines indicated in the judgment just delivered.

The Plaintiffs, Appellants, seek for a declaration that the land specified in the plaint is their khudkhast property, that the Defendant, first party, who claims to have acquired a raiyati right therein has no valid title to it, and they consequently ask for a decree against the Defendant for a refund of Rs. 61 which he has withdrawn from the Collectorate being the amount awarded as compensation for the land which has been acquired under Act I of 1894 for the purposes of a Railway. The Defendant resisted the claim on the ground amongst others that the suit was not maintainable in a Civil Court and that the only remedy open to the Plaintiff is what is prescribed in the Land Acquisition Act. The Munsif held that the suit was maintainable and upon the merits made a decree in favour of the Plaintiffs. Upon appeal the learned District Judge has dismissed the suit on the ground that it is not maintainable. The Plaintiffs have appealed to this Court, and the only point argued on their behalf is that there is nothing in the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 which bars a suit of this description. The question is one of great importance, but before I deal with it, it is necessary to refer to some facts about which there is no dispute. It is conceded that Plaintiffs Nos. 3 and 6 were not parties to the land acquisition proceedings, and that the other Plaintiffs who were parties and who were dissatisfied with the apportionment made by the Collector got the matter referred to the Civil Court, but as they did not appear at the hearing, the proceeding was dismissed for default on the 10th August 1900.

The decision of the question raised before us must depend upon the construction to be placed upon the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, the scope of which therefore necessarily requires careful examination. Sec. 9 provides for notice to persons interested in the land intended to be acquired and invites from such persons, claims to compensation. Sec. 11 then prescribes for an enquiry by the Collector and the award to be made by him, dealing with the area of the land, the compensation to be allowed therefor and the apportionment of such compensation among all persons known or believed to be interested in the land, of whom or of whose claims the Collector has information. Sec. 12, cl. (1), next lays down that the award shall be filed in the office of the Collector and unless challenged in the manner provided in the Act shall be final and conclusive evidence of the area and value of the land and of the apportionment of the compensation, with the important qualification that such finality is to be operative only as between the Collector and the persons interested. Sec. 18 deals with reference to Court at the instance of an objector, whether such reference is rendered necessary by reason of an objection to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the ??? among the persons interested. S. 30 similarly authorizes the Collector in the event of a dispute as to the apportionment to make a reference to the Civil Court of his own motion. Secs. 20-28 describe the form and nature of the proceeding before the Civil Court and manifestly show that there is to be a judicial investigation which culminates in an award. Sec. 53 makes the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure generally applicable to all proceedings before the Land Acquisition Judge under the Act and sec. 54 gives a right of appeal against the award. The only other section to which it is necessary to make specific reference is sec. 31, cl. (2), the third proviso to which lays down that nothing herein contained shall affect the liability of any person who may receive the whole or any part of any compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto. From this review of the principal provisions of the Act., three propositions are established beyond the possibility of dispute, namely, that the Statute creates a right in the Local Government to acquire land needed for public and other purposes, secondly, that it confers upon the private individual whose land is thus compulsorily acquired a corresponding right to receive compensation therefor, and, thirdly, while the Act provides for a summary determination by the Collector of the area and the value of the land and of the apportionment of the compensation, it also provides for a judicial determination by a special Civil Court of the measurement of the land, of the amount of the compensation, of the persons to whom it is payable, and of its apportionment among the persons interested. The question therefore arises whether under these circumstances, when statutory rights and liabilities have been created and jurisdiction has been conferred upon a special Court for the investigation of matters which may possibly be in controversy, is such jurisdiction exclusive or is it concurrent with that possessed by the ordinary Courts. In my opinion, such jurisdiction is exclusive and has to be exercised subject to the exception contained in the Statute itself; for it is an elementary rule of construction of Statutes, as stated by Lopes, L.J, in R. v. County Court Judge of Essex(4), that in the case of an Act which creates a new jurisdiction, a new procedure, new forms or new remedies, the procedure, forms or remedies there prescribed and no others must be followed. Substantially the same principle has been recognised in the case of Rama Chundra v. Secretary of State(5), where it was held upon the authority of Governor v. Meredith(6), Stevens v. Jeacocke(7), and West v. Downman(8), that when by an Act of the legislature, powers are given to any person for a public purpose from which an injury results to an individual, if the mode of redressing the injury is pointed out by the Statute, the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts is ousted and the party cannot proceed by action but must avail himself of the specific remedy provided by the Statute. This view is also supported to some extent by the decision of the Judicial Committee in Raja Nilmoni Singh v. Ram Bandhu, where it was held that it would not be reasonable to permit a person whose claim under the Land Acquisition Act of 1870, had been adjudicated on in the manner pointed out by the Act, to have that claim reopened and reheard in another suit. This position appears to me to be unquestionably right on principle; if it were not for the Statute, the Local Government would not have any authority to acquire private property for public purposes without the consent of the owners thereof, but it is a primary requisite in the appropriation of lands for public purposes, that compensation shall be made therefor and consequently it was inevitable that the Statute should provide for some tribunal for the assessment of the compensation; where such tribunal has been provided, upon what principle can it be contended that recourse need not be had to the Court invested with special jurisdiction, but that the rights which would be non-existent without the Statute may be litigated in the ordinary Courts. In my opinion the jurisdiction of the special Court ought to be regarded as exclusive; see Sedgwick on the Construction of Statutory Law, 2nd Edition, pp. 341, 464, where it is shown that this position is supported by high authority and reference is made to Brown v. Beatty(9), in which Smith, C.J, following the observations of Lord Truro, L.C, in London and N.W.R Go v. Bradley(10), held that where in cases of compulsory acquisition of land, a certain form of proceeding has been prescribed and a certain tribunal has been created for the determination of the right to and the award of the compensation the parties are confined to the remedy prescribed; to the same effect are the cases of Hickox v. Cleveland(11) and Aldrich v. Cheshire(12) which are authorities for the proposition that where the Statute itself provides the mode of assessment and payment of compensation due to the exercise of the right of eminent domain, no separate suit can be maintained for that purpose.

If now these principles be applied to the case before us the inference is obvious that any of the four questions which may be raised upon the award of the Collector under sec. 18, cl. (1), must be tried by the principal Civil 1 Court of Original Jurisdiction or by the special judicial officer possessing jurisdiction to deal with the reference made by the Collector. Here, however, a difference arises between the objection relating to the measurement of the land or the amount of the compensation and an objection relating to the person to whom the compensation is payable or its apportionment among the persons interested and this distinction is founded on the third proviso to sec. 31, cl. (2), which as I have already stated, saves the liability of a person who may have received the whole or any part of the compensation awarded under the Act, to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto. The effect of this proviso, to my mind is, that whereas an objection as to the measurement of the land or the amount of the compensation payable therefor must be determined exclusively by a reference to the Civil Court under sec. 18, cl. (1), a question relating to the persons to whom the compensation is payable or its apportionment among the persons interested may be determined either under a reference as contemplated by sec. 18, cl. (1), or by a suit at the instance of a person who may be lawfully entitled to it as against another, who has withdrawn the compensation money either without any right or in excess of his just dues. This distinction is based and may be justified upon a broad and intelligible principle. As regards a dispute relating to the measurement to the land and the amount of compensation to be paid therefor, the Collector, as representing the authority for whom the acquisition is made, would be the opposing party; his rights and liabilities are entirely statutory and he may justly claim that they should be determined in the forum specially created for the purpose. On the other hand, in the event of a dispute as to the persons to whom the compensation is payable or its apportionment amongst them proportionate to their respective interests the Collector would not have any concern whatsoever; and even without the Statute if, when land which belongs to A. and B. has been converted into money, A. takes more than his share of the proceeds, B. would be entitled according to the rule of justice, equity and good conscience to demand restitution from A. I must hold accordingly that in the case of a dispute as to the ??? sons among whom the compensation ??? to be apportioned, or the extent of heir interests, the Land Acquisition Judge and the ordinary Civil Court have practically concurrent jurisdiction, by reason of the third proviso to sec. 31, cl. (2), read with sec. 18 of the Act. This however necessarily leads to the position, that if a litigant has made his choice and availed himself of a reference to the Court under sec. 18, he cannot again ask for an opportunity to litigate the same matter in the ordinary Court; the decision of the Judicial Committee in Raja Nilmoni Singh v. Ram Bundhu, clearly supports this view. On the other hand, if there has been no reference to the Court under sec. 18, a suit would be maintainable for the adjudication of the rights of the claimants inter se, because sec. 12 to which I have already referred makes the award of the Collector final and conclusive only as between himself on the one hand and the persons interested on the other and not as between the claimants inter se. This view is in accordance with that taken by the Court in the case of Punnabati v. Padmanund, and is substantially in agreement with the decision in Hurmut Jan v. Padma Lochun which arose upon the construction of the provisions of secs. 39 and 40 of Act X of 1870. The learned vakil for the Appellant has, however, strenuously endeavoured to take the present case out of the principle deducible from the decisions just referred to, and he has principally relied upon the circumstance that in the present instance the reference to the Court under sec. 18 proved ineffectual, because the proceedings were dismissed for want of prosecution and there was no adjudication on the merits. This circumstance, however, appears to me to be wholly immaterial. Under sec. 53 of Act I of 1894 all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are made applicable to proceedings before the Court under the Act except in cases where there may be any inconsistency. It is clear, therefore, that sec. 647, C.P.C, is applicable to proceedings before the Land Acquisition Judge and consequently the provisions of secs. 102 and 103 are also applicable. It has been ingeniously suggested however by the learned vakil for the Appellant that sec. 102 by its very terms is inapplicable because it speaks of a suit in which there is a Plaintiff and a Defendant, whereas in a proceeding upon a reference to the Court under sec. 18 there is no Plaintiff or Defendant. This argument is obviously fallacious. The party at whose instance the reference is made under sec. 18 is virtually the Plaintiff and if the objection relates to the measurement of the land and the amount of the compensation, the Collector is the Defendant, whereas if the question is as to the persons to whom the compensation is payable or its apportionment, the person who disputes the claim of the Plaintiff substantially occupied the position of the Defendant. When therefore a reference was made under sec. 18 at the instance of some of the present Appellants and they did not not appear at the time the case was taken up for adjudication, it must be assumed to have been rightly dismissed under sec. 102, C.P.C, and they are precluded by sec. 103, C.P.C, from bringing a fresh suit upon the same cause of action. It follows therefore that such of the Plaintiffs as by written application to the Collector obtained a reference to the Court under sec. 18 of Act I of 1894, are not entitled to maintain the present action; so far as they are concerned the suit has been rightly dismissed and to this extent the decree of the District Judge must be upheld. In so far however as Plaintiffs Nos. 3 and 6 are concerned, there is nothing to show that they obtained a reference under sec. 18 and consequently, as regards them, the appeal must be allowed, the decree of the District Judge reversed and the case remitted to him for further consideration.

N.G
Case remanded.