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Purna Chandra Mandal v. Radha Nath Dass

Calcutta High Court
Apr 11, 1906
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Rampini)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal from an order of the Additional District Judge, Jessore, made in an execution proceeding. The key factual and procedural events recited in the opinion are:

  • 7 September 1894 — Decree obtained by the respondents (a mortgage decree).
  • 23 May 1896 — The decree was made absolute.
  • 18 September 1896 — Decree-holders presented a petition for execution.
  • 19 January 1897 — The mortgaged properties were sold in execution.
  • 5 June 1897 — That sale was set aside.
  • 3 January 1899 — Decree-holders presented a second application for execution.
  • 14 April 1899 — An application was dismissed for default; on the same date the decree-holders applied for a personal (supplemental) decree under Section 90 of the Transfer of Property Act (this application was not prosecuted).
  • 4 October 1901 — Decree-holders made another application for a personal decree under Section 90.
  • 1 February 1902 — An ex parte decree under Section 90 was made.
  • 20 May 1902 — Decree-holders applied for execution of that ex parte Section 90 decree; the judgment-debtors applied under Section 103 CPC and the ex parte decree was set aside.
  • 17 June 1903 — Decree-holders made a third application under Section 90 and obtained an order; on appeal that Section 90 decree was set aside on 13 April 1904.
  • 15 November 1904 — Decree-holders initiated the present proceedings for execution of the original mortgage decree (this application was conceded to be out of time unless saved by earlier applications).
  • The courts below held the present execution application was not time-barred; the judgment-debtors appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the present application (15 November 1904) for execution of the mortgage decree of 7 September 1894 is barred by the statute of limitation.
  2. Whether applications made under Section 90 of the Transfer of Property Act operate as applications "in execution" of the original decree or as "applications in accordance with law" so as to stop or extend limitation under Article 179 of the Limitation Act.
  3. Whether an application to execute an ex parte supplemental decree under Section 90 (which was subsequently set aside) can be relied on to save the limitation period for executing the original mortgage decree.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants (Judgment-debtors)

  • The Additional District Judge erred: since the sale of the mortgaged property was set aside on 5 June 1897, the decree-holders were bound to proceed against the property in the first instance.
  • Applications under Section 90 are applications for supplemental decrees (not applications in execution) and therefore cannot save the present execution application from the bar of limitation.

Respondent (Decree-holders)

  • Contended that the execution application was saved by earlier applications under Section 90 of the Transfer of Property Act made on 3 January 1899, 4 December 1901 and 19 June 1903.
  • Argued that applications for decrees under Section 90 are applications in execution, relying on decisions of the Allahabad High Court (Durga Dai v. Bhagwat Prasad and Ramsrup v. Ghaurani).
  • The Additional District Judge (below) accepted that these Section 90 applications saved limitation, relying on Dina Nath Mitter v. Bejoy Krishna Das (1903) 7 C.W.N. 744.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in this Opinion
Dina Nath Mitter v. Bejoy Krishna Das (1903) 7 C.W.N. 744 Held (as relied upon by the Additional District Judge) that it is unnecessary to apply under Section 90 for a supplemental decree when the decree gives power to proceed against the person as well as the mortgaged property. The Additional District Judge relied on this ruling to hold Section 90 applications saved limitation; the present Court discusses it and notes its apparent conflict with earlier decisions but refers to it in weighing whether Section 90 applications were necessary or competent in this case.
Durga Dai v. Bhagwat Prasad (1891) I.L.R. 13 All. 356 Allahabad High Court authority relied upon to treat certain applications under transfer provisions as being in execution (as summarized in the opinion). The respondents relied on this Allahabad decision to support the contention that Section 90 applications are in execution; the present Court expressly disagreed with the Allahabad view.
Ramsrup v. Ghaurani (1899) I.L.R. 21 All. 453 (Ram Sarup v. Ghaurani) Held by Allahabad High Court that an application under Section 90 is an application in execution of the original decree (governed by Article 178 of the Limitation Act). The Court rejected this view and declined to follow the Allahabad High Court's conclusion, explaining why Section 90 applications are not applications in execution for the purposes of Article 179.
Lalla Tirhini Sahai v. Latta Hurruk Narain (1893) I.L.R. 21 Calc. 26 Decision of this Court holding that decrees under Section 90 are supplemental decrees, separate and distinct from the original decree. The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that applications under Section 90 are not applications in execution of the original decree.
Munawar Husain v. Jani Bijai Shankar (1905) I.L.R. 27 All. 619 Defines "applying in accordance with law" as applying to do something which the Court is competent to do; an application to do something the Court was incompetent to do does not satisfy the requirement. The Court invoked this authority to hold that the Section 90 applications made after the sale had already been set aside were not applications "in accordance with law" and therefore could not save limitation.
Miller v. Runga Nath Moulick (1885) I.L.R. 12 Calc. 389 Referenced for the position that in making a supplemental personal decree the Court considers limitation as at the date of institution of the suit. Used to support the view that Section 90 decrees are supplemental and their adjudication relates back to the institution of the suit; hence an application under Section 90 is not an execution step for Article 179 purposes.
Hamiduddin v. Kedar Nath (1898) I.L.R. 20 All. 386 Similar principle cited: supplemental decree under Section 90 is treated as part of the suit and limitation for the personal remedy is assessed as at institution of suit. Relied on to reinforce the Court's view that Section 90 applications are not steps in aid of execution of the decree for sale.
Chattar Mal v. Thakuri (1898) I.L.R. 20 All. 512 Supports the view that supplemental personal decrees under the Transfer of Property Act are addressed as part of the suit and limitation is to be considered with reference to the institution of the suit. Cited as authority for treating Section 90 decrees as supplemental decrees distinct from execution of the original decree.
Musaheb Zaman Khan v. Inayatullah (1892) I.L.R. 14 All. 513 Discussed in the context of earlier decisions where judges considered Sections 88 and 90 to contemplate distinct decrees made in the same suit. The opinion notes aspects of this decision that support the Court's view that Section 90 decrees are distinct supplemental decrees and not applications in execution of the sale decree.
Ramdoyal v. Mahomed Ghouse (1905) 1 Nag. L.R. 143 (Judicial Commissioner Ismay) Expressed that Section 90 read with preceding sections indicates two distinct decrees: one under Section 88 (sale) and another under Section 90 (supplemental personal decree). The Court cited this reasoning as harmonious with its conclusion that Section 90 proceedings are a continuation of the suit but constitute a distinct decree-making process.
Raj Singh v. Parmanand (1889) I.L.R. 11, 411, 486 The opinion cites this case as one in harmony with the view that Section 90 entails a distinct supplemental decree. Used to support the proposition that an application under Section 90 is essentially an application in the suit (for a supplemental decree) rather than an execution step.
Sonatun Shah v. Ali Newaz Khan (1889) I.L.R. 16 Calc. 423 Cited as authority with similar import on the character of Section 90 decrees (distinct supplemental decrees). Relied upon to reinforce the Court's characterization of Section 90 proceedings.
Mallikarjunadu Setti v. Lingamurti Pantulu (1902) I.L.R. 25 Mad. 244 Madras High Court decision that an application under Section 90 may be regarded as an application for execution (contrary view noted). The Court acknowledged this contrary view but expressly stated inability to assent to it for the reasons given in the opinion.
Rungiah Gounden & Co. v. Nanjappa Row (1903) I.L.R. 26 Mad. 780 Discusses whether Article 178 or Article 179 governs applications of certain kinds; indicates some nicety in particular cases. Cited to illustrate diversity of High Court views and to show the comparative treatment by other benches of similar procedural questions.
Bhagawan v. Ganu (1899) I.L.R. 23 Bom. 614 Bombay High Court's inclination that an application for an order absolute is an application for execution governed by Article 179. Noted as part of the broader survey of conflicting authorities; the opinion contrasts this with the Court's own approach.
Ajudhia Pershad v. Baldeo Singh (1894) I.L.R. 21 Calc. 818 Held in this Court that an application for an order absolute under Section 89 is an application in the suit and not for execution (so Article 179 cannot apply). Invoked to support the proposition that applications for orders absolute or supplemental decrees are applications in the suit rather than execution steps.
Akikunnissa Bibee v. Roop Lal Das (1897) I.L.R. 25 Calc. 133 Cited with similar import to Ajudhia Pershad regarding characterization of Section 89 applications. Used to buttress the Court's position on the nature of analogous applications under the Transfer of Property Act.
Pramatha Chandra Roy v. Khetra Mohan Ghose (1902) I.L.R. 29 Calc. 651 Another case indicating that an application for order absolute under Section 89 is an application in the suit and not an execution application. Reinforced the Court's reading that Section 90 supplemental applications are applications in the suit.
Singh v. Parsotein Proshad (1895) I.L.R. 22 Calc. 924 Mentioned in the context of whether Section 89 applications fall within the Code of Civil Procedure as execution applications. The opinion mentions this case in surveying conflicting authorities; no further specific rule beyond that survey is stated in the opinion.
Kedar Nath v. Lalji Sahai (1889) I.L.R. 12 All. 61 Allahabad decisions holding that application for an order absolute is an application for execution (contrasting view in this Court). Noted among the Allahabad authorities whose approach the Court rejects for present purposes.
Oudh Behari Lal v. Nageshar Lal (1890) I.L.R. 13 All. 278 Another Allahabad ruling on the character of order-absolute applications as execution steps. Referred to as part of the inconsistent array of authority; the Court declines to follow the Allahabad treatment in this matter.
Baldeo Prasad v. Ibn Haidar (1905) I.L.R. 27 All. 625 Allahabad authority further illustrating differing treatments of Article 178/179 applicability. Cited in the survey of conflicting High Court authorities; the Court notes divergence and insists on its own analysis.
Chunni Lal v. Harnam Das (1898) I.L.R. 20 All. 302 Part of the Allahabad line of cases demonstrating divergence on whether Article 178 or 179 governs certain applications. Mentioned to show inconsistency in Allahabad decisions; used to contextualize the Court's conclusion.
Parmeshri Lal v. Mohan Lal (1898) I.L.R. 20 All. 357 Another Allahabad decision contributing to the diverging positions on Articles 178 and 179. Referred to as part of the background of conflicting authority; no specific further principle extracted by this opinion beyond that fact.
AH Ahmad v. Naziran Bibi (1902) I.L.R. 24 All. 542 Indicates a view that Article 178 may apply in certain cases. Noted among the divergent authorities; the Court surveys such decisions while explaining why it reaches a contrary conclusion on Section 90 applications.
Puran Chand v. Roy Radha Kishen (1891) I.L.R. 19 Calc. 132 Used by way of analogy to distinguish execution of decrees for possession and separate decrees for mesne profits (supporting the supplemental-decree analogy). The Court invoked this case to illustrate the analogy that different remedial decrees may be treated distinctly for execution and limitation purposes.
Radha Prasad Singh v. Lal Sahab Rai (1890) I.L.R. 13 All. 53, 65; L.R. 17 I.A. 150 Part of the authority on the analogy between possession decrees and separate mesne profits decrees. Referenced to support the view that the supplemental decree stands on a different footing from the decree for sale as regards execution and limitation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The following synthesizes the step-by-step legal analysis as expressed in the opinion (Mookerjee, J. and the other judge).

  1. The primary statutory provision in issue is Article 179 of the Second Schedule to the Limitation Act. Article 179 permits an application for execution of a mortgage decree either within three years of the decree or within three years from the date of applying "in accordance with law" to the proper Court for execution or to take some step in aid of execution.
  2. It was conceded that the present execution application (15 November 1904) was made more than three years from the date of the decree (7 September 1894). Therefore, the respondents sought to rely on earlier applications (principally those under Section 90 of the Transfer of Property Act) as triggering the three-year period from their dates.
  3. The Court examined the legal character of applications under Section 90. It held, on the basis of this Court's prior decisions and reasoning, that:
    • Section 90 contemplates a supplemental money decree (a personal decree) which presupposes that the decree for sale (under Section 88) has been executed and proved insufficient to satisfy the mortgagee's claim.
    • An application under Section 90 is an application in the suit for a supplemental decree and is separate and distinct from the decree for sale: it is not an application for execution of the original decree nor an application inviting the Court to take some step in aid of execution of that sale-decree.
    • When the Court makes a supplemental decree under Section 90 it has to consider limitation for the personal remedy with reference to the date of institution of the suit (not the date of the Section 90 application).
  4. Because Section 90 applications rest on the assumption that the remedies under the sale-decree have been exhausted (i.e., the sale has been executed and its proceeds inadequate), an application for a Section 90 decree cannot reasonably be characterized as an application for execution of the sale-decree or as an application to take steps in aid of that execution.
  5. The Court considered and rejected the contrary position taken by the Allahabad High Court (which held Section 90 applications to be in execution), and it explained that a number of authorities (including cases in this Court and other benches) support the conclusion that Section 90 decrees are supplemental and distinct.
  6. The Court further held that, as the sale of the mortgaged property had been set aside on 5 June 1897, the later Section 90 applications were not competent or appropriate applications to the execution Court in the circumstances. Even if the decree-holders acted in good faith, those applications were made on a mistaken view of the facts, and thus they did not amount to applications "in accordance with law" to do something the Court was competent to do (relying on Munawar Husain v. Jani Bijai Shankar).
  7. The application to execute the ex parte Section 90 decree that was subsequently set aside was also held to be of no avail. Although that execution application was to the execution Court, it did not concern the decree now sought to be executed (the original mortgage decree) and therefore could not be relied upon to take the case out of the statute of limitation.
  8. The Court summarized an alternate vantage point: even if it were assumed that the original decree already entitled the decree-holders to proceed personally against the mortgagors (a proposition for which there is conflicting authority), the Section 90 applications in the circumstances were unnecessary and the Court was not competent to grant them; therefore they could not save limitation.
  9. On these bases the Court concluded that none of the Section 90 applications, nor the attempted execution of the subsequently set-aside ex parte decree, operated to save the present execution application from being time-barred.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; APPLICATION FOR EXECUTION DISMISSED

Direct effect on the parties:

  • The Court allowed the appeal of the judgment-debtors, discharged the order of the lower Court, and dismissed the decree-holder's application for execution as barred by limitation. Costs were awarded against the decree-holders in all Courts.

Broader implications as stated in the opinion:

  • The Court affirmed the view that decrees under Section 90 of the Transfer of Property Act are supplemental decrees distinct from the original decree for sale, and that applications under Section 90 are applications in the suit for such supplemental decrees and are not, in general, applications "in execution" of the original decree for the purposes of Article 179 of the Limitation Act.
  • The opinion expressly disagrees with certain decisions of the Allahabad High Court that treated Section 90 applications as applications in execution; it therefore contributes to the body of conflicting authorities on the point by adopting and explaining a contrary view.
  • If a Section 90 application is incompetent because the underlying factual premise (e.g., that the mortgaged property has passed free of incumbrances) is false or the Court lacked jurisdiction to make the supplemental order, such an application cannot be treated as an application "in accordance with law" to save limitation (per Munawar Husain v. Jani Bijai Shankar).

The opinion contains an extended survey of precedents and records the Court's substantive disagreement with some High Court authorities; the direct legal outcome in this appeal is limited to dismissal of the execution application as time-barred.

Show all summary ...

Rampini,

1. This is an appeal against an order of the Additional District Judge of Jessore, passed in an execution case.

2. He held that the decree-holder was entitled to execute a decree passed in his favour on the 7th September 1894. The decree-holder's application for execution was made on the 15th November 1904, i.e., admittedly out of time. But the decree-holder contended that execution of his decree, which was a mortgage decree, was saved from the bar of limitation by applications under Section 90 of the Transfer of Property Act made on the 3rd January 1899, 4th December 1901 and 19th June 1903. It is conceded that, if these applications do not save execution from being barred by limitation, the present application for execution is long out of time.

3. The Additional District Judge held that these applications do save execution from being barred, and he has done so on the authority of the ruling in Dina Nath Mitter v. Bejoy Krishna Das (1903) 7 C.W.N. 744, in which it has been laid down that it is unnecessary to apply under section. 90 for a supplemental decree when the decree as in this case gives power to proceed against the person of the mortgagor, as well as against the mortgaged property and that the decree-holder made these applications in good faith under the impression that the mortgaged property had been sold free of incumbrances and that these applications were necessary to protect his interests.

4. The judgment-debtors appeal. On their behalf it is contended that the Judge is wrong in this particular case, because the sale of the mortgaged property was set aside on the 5th June 1897, and so the decree-holder was bound to proceed against it in the first instance, and that whether supplementary decrees under Section 90 are required or not, applications for such decrees do not save limitation, not being applications in execution, but applications for supplemental decrees.

5. On behalf of the respondent it is, however, urged that applications for decrees under Section 90 are applications in execution. and the rulings of the Allahabad High Court in Durga Dai v. Bhaguat Prasad (1891) I.L.R. 13 All. 356, Ramsrup v. Ghaurani (1899) I.L.R. 21 All. 453 are relied on.

6. We are unable to agree with the views of the Allahabad High Court on this point. It is clear from the decisions of this Court in Lalla Tirhini Sahai v. Latta Hurruk Narain (1893) I.L.R. 21 Calc. 26 and Dina Nath Mitter v. Bejoy Krishna Das (1903) 7 C.W.N. 744 that decrees passed under Section 90 of the Transfer of Property Act, whether they may in any particular cases be required or not, are supplemental decrees and are separate and distinct from the original decree. On this view it is impossible to regard applications for decrees under Section 90 as applications in execution of the original decree.

7. Moreover, as the sale of the mortgaged property in this case had been set aside on the 5th June 1897, the decree-holder was not justified in subsequently applying for supplemental decrees under Section 90. He may have done so in good faith, but on a mistaken view of the facts. Hence on the authority of the ruling of the Allahabad High Court in Munawar Husain v. Jani Bijai Shankar (1905) I.L.R. 27 All. 619 they cannot be held to be applications in accordance with law to do something in aid of execution. In the judgment in that case it is said:

"Applying in accordance with law means applying to the Court to do something, which by law that Court was competent to do. It does not mean applying to the Court to do something which either to the decree-holder's direct knowledge of facts or his presumed knowledge of law he knew that the Court was incompetent to do."

8. Hence the application for execution of the decree in this case would seem to be time-barred. We accordingly decree this appeal with costs.

Mookerjee, J.

9. The substantial question of law which calls for decision in this appeal is whether the application presented by the respondents for execution of a decree is barred by limitation. The facts, so far as it is necessary to state them for the determination of this question, are not open to any doubt or dispute. On the 7th September 1894 the respondents obtained a decree in a mortgage suit, which was made absolute en the 23rd May 1896. On the 18th September 1896, the decree-holders presented a petition for execution, and in the course of the proceedings thus instituted, the mortgaged properties were sold on the 19th January 1897. The sale was, however, set aside on the 5th June 1897 for reasons, which it is unnecessary to state for the purposes of this appeal. On the 3rd January 1899 the decree-holders presented a second application for execution. Meanwhile, the mortgaged properties had apparently been sold in execution of a decree for arrears of rent due to the superior landlord. The mortgagees, decree-holders, assumed that the properties had passed freed from their lien and could not be followed. They allowed, therefore, their application for execution to be dismissed for default on the 14th April 1899, and on the same date made an application for a personal decree under Section 90 of the Transfer of Property Act. This application also does not appear to have been prosecuted. On the 4th October 1901, the decree-holders made a second application for a personal decree under Section 90. An ex-parte decree under that section was made on the 1st February 1902, and on the 20th May the decree-holders applied for execution of this decree. The judgment-debtors, however, made an application under Section 103 of the Civil Procedure Code and the ex-parte decree under Section 90 was set aside. On the 17th June 1903, the decree-holders made a third application for a personal decree under Section 90, and an order was made in their favour. Upon appeal, however, the decree under Section 90 was set aside on the 13th April 1904. On the 15th November 1904 the decree-holders initiated the present proceedings for execution of the original mortgage-decree apparently on the grounds that the sale in execution of the rent decree had not in any way affected their lien and that the mortgage decree also contained a clause which entitled them to proceed against properties of the judgment-debtors other than those included in the mortgage. The Judgment-debtors objected that the application was barred by limitation. The Courts below have concurrently held that the application is not so barred, and the correctness of this view is challenged before us on behalf of the judgment-debtors. In my opinion the contention advanced on behalf of the appellants is well founded and must prevail.

10. Under Article 179 of the second Schedule to the Limitation Act, any application for execution of the mortgage decree must be made within three years of the date of the decree or within three years from the date of applying in accordance with law to the proper Court for execution or to take some step in aid of execution of the decree. The present application for execution is admittedly made more than three years after the date of the decree. The question therefore arises whether it has been made within three years from some other application satisfying the requirements of the 4th clause of the third column. It is argued on behalf of the judgment-debtors respondents that the applications which satisfy these requirements are (1) the applications for a decree under Section 90 of the Transfer of Property Act, and (2) the application to execute the decree under Section 90 before such decree was set aside under Section 108 of the Civil Procedure Code. In my opinion none of these applications saves limitation. Clause 4 of Article 179 requires that the application, from which the extended time is to run, must be one in accordance with law to the proper Court for execution or to take some step in aid of the execution of the decree. Explanation 2 defines the phrase "proper Court" to mean the Court, whose 'duty it is to execute the decree. Now an application to the Court to make a decree under Section 90 is neither an application for execution nor one which invites the Court to take some step in aid of the execution of the decree. Section 90 clearly contemplates a decree for money supplemental to the decree for sale of the mortgaged properties. "When such a decree has been obtained, it may be executed as a decree for money; but I am unable to appreciate how an application to obtain such a supplemental decree may in any sense be regarded as an application for execution of the decree for sale or an application which invites the Court to take some step in aid of execution of the decree for sale. Section 90 proceeds upon the assumption that the decree for sale has been executed and that the proceeds of the sale held thereunder have proved insufficient to pay the amount due to the mortgagee. It cannot, therefore, be contended that an application to obtain the supplemental decree, founded on the assumption that the remedies of the mortgagee under the decree for sale have been exhausted and have proved insufficient to satisfy his demands can in any sense be regarded as an. application for execution of that decree or an invitation to the Court to take some step in aid of execution of that decree. Besides, an application under Section 90 is an application in the suit. The plaintiff in his Plaint prays for a decree for sale as also for a Personal decree. The Court in the first instance gives a decree for sale and then determines, if necessary, at a subsequent stage whether the plaintiff should have also a personal decree. In making this supplemental decree the Court has to consider, if any question of limitation arises, whether the personal remedy was barred at the date of the institution of tile suit, and not whether if would be barred at the date of the application under Section 90 Miller v. Runga Nath Moulick (1885) I.L.R. 12 Calc. 389, Hamiduddin v. Kedar Nath (1898) I.L.R. 20 All. 386, and Chattar Mal v. Thakuri (1898) I.L.R. 20 All. 512. I am not unmindful that the view I take is contrary to that taken by the Allahabad High Court in Ramsarup v. Ghaurani (1899) I.L.R. 21 All. 453 where the learned Judges held that an application under Section 90 is an application in the execution of the original decree and that it is governed by Article 178 of the Limitation Act. This view is based upon the opinion expressed in two earlier cases, Durga Dai y. Bhagwat Prasad (1891) I.L.R. 13 All. 356 and Musaheb Zaman Khan v. Inayatullah (1892) I.L.R. 14 All. 513. It appears to me, however, that some of the reasons given in the latter case go to support my view. The learned Judges assented to the view of Mr. Justice Straight that Sections 88 and 90 clearly contemplated two distinct decrees, although both of them are made in one and the same suit. They further held that, although the application for a decree under Section 90 is in one sense an application in execution, it cannot be regarded as an application in the execution of the decree for sale made under Section 88. If this view be sound, as I think it is, the conclusion seems to me to be irresistible that if a question of limitation arises in relation to the execution of the decree for sale, an application under Section 90 cannot rightly be regarded either is an application in execution of that decree or an application to the execution Court to take some step in aid of that execution. The same view was taken by Judicial Commissioner Ismay in Ramdoyal v. Mahomed Ghouse (1905) 1 Nag. L.R. 143 where he pointed out that Section 90 of the Transfer of Property Act, read in conjunction with the sections which precede it, indicate that there are two distinct decrees to be passed, one under Section 88 in the suit for sale, and the other a further decree in the same suit under Section 90, upon the application of the decree-holder in accordance with the terms of that particular section. This view is also in harmony with that taken in the cases of Raj Singh v. Parmanand (1889) I.L.R. 11, 411, 486, Musaheb Zaman Khan v. Inayaullah (1892) I.L.R. 14 All. 513, and Sonatun Shah v. Ali Newaz Khan (1889) I.L.R. 16 Calc. 423. It seems to be obvious that the object of Section 90 is to obviate the necessity for a fresh suit, possibly in a Court different from that which passed the decree for sale; the proceedings founded on an application under Section 90 are a continuation of the original suit; the relationship of decree-holder and judgment-debtor created by the decree for sale is no longer of any benefit to the decree-holder, and the parties are, therefore, again practically relegated to the position of plaintiff and defendant. With, all respect for the majority of the learned Judges of the Madras High Court, who decided the case of Mallikarjunadu Setti v. Lingamurti Pantuh (1902) I.L.R. 25 Mad. 244, I am unable to assent to the view, that an application under Section 90 may be regarded as an application (for execution of the mortgage decree; that view is hardly consistent with the position maintained by Mr. Justice Bhashyana Ayyangar, that the decree under section. 90 is a decree in the suit, and that the mortgagee has to make a separate application for execution of this fresh or supplemental decree. It may be observed that there is a considerable divergence of judicial opinion upon the question of the precise character of a decree nisi under Sections 86 and 83 of the Transfer of Property Act This Court has held that an application, for an order absolute under Section 89 is not an application for an execution, so that Article 179 cannot apply [Ajudhia Pcrshad v. Baldeo Singh (1894) I.L.R. 21 Calc. 818, Akikunnissa Bibee v. Roop Lal Das (1897) I.L.R. 25 Calc. 133, and Pramatha Chandra Roy v. Khetra Mohan Ghose (1902) I.L.R. 29 Calc. 651]; nor is the application one under the Code of Civil Procedure so as to make Article 178 applicable Tihick; Singh v. Parsotein Proshad (1895) I.L.R. 22 Calc. 924. The Allahabad High Court has, on the other hand, held that the application for an order absolute is an application for execution Kedar Nath v. Lalji Sahai (1889) I.L.R. 12 All. 61, Oudh Behari Lal v. Nageshar Lal (1890) I.L.R. 13 All 278, and Baldeo Prasad v. Ibn Haidar (1905) I.L.R. 27 All. 625 although there is some divergence of opinion as to whether Article 179 applies, as held in Chunni Lal v. Harnam Das (1898) I.L.R. 20 All. 302 and Parmeshri Lal v. Mohan Lal (1898) I.L.R. 20 All. 357 or whether Article 178 applies as indicated in AH Ahmad v. Naziran Bibi (1902) I.L.R. 24 All. 542. The Madras High Court has held that an application for an order absolute is an application for execution Mallikurjunnda Satti v. Lingamurt]i Pantulu (1902) I.L.R. 25 Mad. 244 although it may be a question of some nicety to determine, in each case, whether Article 178 or Article 179 would govern the application Rungiah Gounden & Co. v. Nanjappa Row (1903) I.L.R 26 Mad. 780. The Bombay High Court seems to favour the view that an application for an order absolute is an application for execution governed by Article 179 Bhagawan v. Ganu (1899) I.L.R. 23 Bom. 614. If we adopt the view which has prevailed in this Court, viz., that an application for an order absolute under Section 89 is an application in the suit and not an application for execution, it follows necessarily that an application under Section 90 for a supplemental decree is also an application in the suit. Even if, however, the view maintained in the other High Courts as to the true nature of an application under Section 89 were adopted, it seems to me that an application under Section 90 stands upon an entirely different footing. For the reasons already stated, I must respectfully dissent from the view taken by the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court in Ram Sarup v. Ghaurani (1899) I.L.R. 21 All. 453, and I must hold that the applications under Section 90, upon which the respondents place reliance, were not applications to the execution Court either for execution or for taking some step in aid of execution of the mortgage decree, and that consequently they are not sufficient to save the present application from the bar of limitation. It may be added that the view I have taken as to the relation between the decree for sale and the supplemental personal decree, may be supported to some extent by the analogy of the distinction, which has always been recognised between the execution of a decree for possession and a decree for mesne profits after the latter have been ascertained Puran Chand v. Roy Radha Kishen (1891) I.L.R. 19 Calc. 132 and Radha Prasad Singh v. Lal Sahab Rai (1890) I.L.R. 13 All. 53, 65 : L.R. 17 I.A. 150. This is of course subject to the observation that in the case of an application for ascertainment of mesne profits, it is expressly declared to be an application in execution under Section 244 of the Civil Procedure Code.

11. As regards the application, which was presented for execution, of the ex-parte supplemental decree subsequently set aside under Section 108 of the Civil Procedure Code, it is manifestly of no avail to the respondents. It was no doubt an application to the execution Court, but it was not an application with reference to the decree, which is now sought to be executed, and it cannot therefore be relied upon as taking the case out of the Statute of limitation.

12. There is another point of view from which the application of the respondents must be regarded as barred by limitation. They now seek to proceed upon the assumption that the original decree in the suit contained a direction for the sale of the mortgaged properties and also entitled them to proceed against the mortgagors personally without obtaining a decree under Section 90. It is not necessary to examine whether this view is well founded, but it may be added that it seems to be supported by the case of Dina Nath Mittcr v. Bejoy Krishna Das (1903) 7 C.W.N. 744 which is apparently in conflict with the earlier decision in Lall Tirhini Sahai v. Lalla Hurruk Narain (1893) I.L.R. 21 Calc. 26. Assuming, however, that this view of the decree-holders is well founded, the applications under Section 90 were not only unnecessary, but such as the Court was not competent to grant and, therefore, upon the authority of Munaicar Husain v. Jani Bijai Shankar (1905) I.L.R. 27 All. 619 could not save limitation. On the other hand, if we hold that a decree under Section 90 was necessary, as no such decree has been made, there is no personal decree capable of execution, and so far as the present application relates to the execution of the decree for sale, it is clearly barred, as no steps have been taken in respect thereof between the 3rd January 1899 and the 15th November 1904.

13. On these grounds, I agree with my learned brother that this appeal must be allowed. The order of the Court below is discharged and the application for execution dismissed with costs in all the Courts.