Munshi Lal v. Emperor Opposite Party.

Walsh, J.:— This is an application in revision against a conviction under section 60 of the U.P Excise Act, (No. 4 of 1902). I might say at once that in my opinion (subject to such authorities as may have been decided to the contrary which are binding upon me in particular illustrations), as a general rule a conviction under a section which provides a penalty for a variety of acts done in contravention of the Statute, is bad for duplicity where the section contains a variety of inconsistent alternatives. To take one simple example, in my opinion to convict a man simply of an offence under section 60(a) would be bad for duplicity, because it might mean a conviction either for importing or for exporting, and it is impossible for a man to do both in the same Act. Importing is defined by section 3 of the Act as bringing into the United Provinces and exporting is defined as taking out of the United Provinces, and it is a physical impossibility for any body to do these two things by the same act. I say nothing to discourage the view that a person who exports from outside the United Provinces to a warehouse inside the United Provinces of which he is really the proprietor or temporary possessor even under a false name, is in fact, committing an offence under the Act of importing into the United Provinces, although he is also the person who exported from outside. It is perfectly possible for me to send an article for myself from the High Court at Allahabad to my chambers in London, and if I did so with a dutiable article without declaration, I should be guilty of importing into England. But it is necessary that the conviction should state the act of which the accused is found guilty, and the particular breach of the act established against him by his act so found. I therefore think that the conviction by the Magistrate in the, first court was bad on the face of it. To book liquor from Jaipur does not constitute an offence defined in ‘any’ of the alternatives under section 60, and the Magistrate has carefully avoided considering the alternative which he thought was complied with. On this occassion I think the learned Sessions Judge has fallen in substance into the same trap. The sentence in which he upholds thy conviction runs as follows:—“The contention that the offence was committed at Jaipur if any where is unsound, for he importation was made to Muttra.” That is a contradiction in terms. You cannot import to a place unless you are the person taking delivery inside the area in respect of which the word ‘import’ is used. That is to say to import, to Muttra means that you are the person taking the goods in the United Provinces at Muttra or from some other place in the United Provinces to Muttra. Of course a person who sends goods, from a Native State is not doing anything of the kind. It matters nothing that the actual application before roe is against the order of the learned Sessions Judge. It is quite clear that on the facts found he ought to have quashed the original conviction, but I, in order to make the matter clear beyond doubt, amend the application so as to include an application against the original conviction which I direct to be quashed. I order the recognizance of Munshi Lal to be discharged.