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Beni Prasad Kuari v. Dharaka Rai
Judgment Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff, the Maharani of Dumraon, brought a suit for arrears of rent under section 93(a) of the North‑Western Provinces Rent Act (No. XII of 1881) against certain tenants. The principal defence asserted by the tenants was a local custom called "bal panchat" that, when part of holdings was un‑culturable because of submersion by water or covering by sand, entitled them to a proportionate reduction of rent for the affected year(s).
The plaintiff argued that this custom could not be given effect in the present suit without contravening the Rent Act and relied on the decision in Radha Prasad Singh v. Baldeo Misr. The lower courts decided in favour of the defendants on that point; the present appeal also raised a separate limitation question about whether part of the claim (notably the third instalment for 1302 Fasli due 10 April 1895) was time‑barred because the suit was instituted on 11 April 1898, the day the Court re‑opened after the last day of limitation (10 April) fell on a Sunday.
There was an uncertainty in the lower appellate Court's decree as to whether the fourth instalment for 1302F was held barred by limitation; if the Court so held in respect of that fourth instalment, that was admitted to be a mistake by the respondents. The appeal therefore turned on (i) the validity of the "bal panchat" defence in a Rent Act suit and (ii) whether the Limitation Act's section permitting institution on the day a Court re‑opens applied to suits under the Rent Act.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, in a suit for arrears of rent under section 93(a) of the North‑Western Provinces Rent Act, a local custom (bal panchat) permitting proportionate reduction of rent for unculturable land can be pleaded and given effect to without contravening the Rent Act.
- Whether a suit for arrears of rent is barred by limitation where the cause of action became due on 10 April 1895, the three‑year limitation expired on a day when the Court was closed (the last day being a Sunday), and the suit was instituted on the day the Court re‑opened (11 April 1898), having regard to section 5 of the Limitation Act and relevant provisions (including section 94 of the Rent Act and section 203 of the Rent Act).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments
- The plaintiff contended that the defendants' plea based on the local custom "bal panchat" could not be given effect in this suit without contravening the Rent Act, and relied upon the case Radha Prasad Singh v. Baldeo Misr in support of that contention.
- On limitation, the plaintiff relied on the first paragraph of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1877, which permits institution of a suit on the day the Court re‑opens where the period of limitation expires on a day when the Court is closed; accordingly the plaintiff argued the suit instituted on 11 April 1898 was not barred in respect of the instalment that fell due on 10 April 1895.
Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments
- The defendants relied on the local custom "bal panchat" to claim a proportionate reduction of rent for land un‑culturable due to submersion or sand, and the courts below had accepted this defence as valid.
- On the limitation point the defendants contended that section 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable to suits under the Rent Act. They relied on the Limitation Act provision which provides that where a special or local law prescribes a period of limitation, the Limitation Act does not affect or alter that period (the opinion discusses this provision and its numbering/context), and they also relied on section 203 of the Rent Act which provides a rule for deeming the day on which the Court re‑opens to be the last day for certain acts prescribed by the Rent Act.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Radha Prasad Singh v. Baldeo Misr | Relied on by the plaintiff to argue that the local custom (bal panchat) could not be given effect in a Rent Act suit. | The court noted that the plaintiff relied on this decision but concluded (in agreement with the courts below on this point) that the defendants' plea based on the custom was allowable in the present suit; as regards this issue the decisions of the courts below were right and the appeal fails on that point. |
| Veeramma v. Abbiah (judgment of Muttusami Ayyar, J.) | Explains that the Limitation Act applies to proceedings under special or local laws except insofar as it would affect or alter the periods prescribed by those laws, and that a special/local law which is not a complete code will generally be supplemented by the Limitation Act. | The court relied on Veeramma v. Abbiah to support the proposition that the Limitation Act (including its section 5) is applicable to suits under the Rent Act, subject to the qualifications described (i.e., not where the special law is a complete code or where provisions would affect/alter prescribed periods). |
| Muhammad Husen v. Muzaffar Husen (Aikman, J.) | Held by the learned judge that a suit under section 93(b) of the Rent Act, where the limitation expired on a Sunday, could not be instituted on the day the Court re‑opened (i.e., the plaintiff could not rely on section 5 of the Limitation Act). | The court expressly disagreed with Aikman's conclusion in that case, distinguished the wording differences between the Limitation Acts of 1871 and the present Act, and rejected the view that the Limitation Act's section 5 could not be invoked for a Rent Act suit instituted on the day the Court re‑opened. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court addressed the two central questions separately.
1. Local custom (bal panchat)
The court observed that the main defence was that tenants under a local custom could claim proportionate reduction of rent where part of holdings was unculturable. The plaintiff argued that the custom could not be recognized in a Rent Act suit, relying on Radha Prasad Singh v. Baldeo Misr. The courts below had decided in favour of the defendants on this point. The court indicated that for the reasons given in a judgment just delivered in second appeal No. 587 of 1899, the courts below were right on this point, and therefore, insofar as this issue is concerned, the appeal fails. The court therefore accepted the lower courts' treatment of the custom and its application to the facts (including the finding as to the actual extent of submerged or unculturable land, which the lower courts had determined).
2. Limitation question
The court carefully analysed the application of the Limitation Act to suits under the Rent Act.
Relevant statutory provisions and facts identified by the court:
- Section 94(1) of the Rent Act prescribes a three‑year period for suits for arrears of rent from the day the arrears became due.
- The third instalment for 1302 Fasli fell due on 10 April 1895; the suit was instituted on 11 April 1898, one day after the expiry of the three‑year period because the last day (10 April 1898) was a Sunday and the Court re‑opened on 11 April 1898.
- The plaintiff relied on the first paragraph of section 5 of the Limitation Act (1877), which allows institution/presentation when the prescribed period expires on a day the Court is closed and permits institution on the day the Court re‑opens.
- The defendants contended that the Limitation Act's section 5 did not apply to suits under the Rent Act because the Limitation Act does not affect or alter periods specially prescribed by special/local laws; they also relied on section 203 of the Rent Act, which deems the day the Court re‑opens to be the last day for presentation of appeals and for deposit/payment of money in certain cases under the Rent Act.
The court's legal analysis and conclusions:
- The court distinguished between (a) provisions which "affect or alter" a period of limitation prescribed by a special/local law and (b) provisions (like section 5 of the Limitation Act) that operate as an exception permitting a suit to be instituted on the day the Court re‑opens when the period would otherwise have expired on a day the Court was closed. Section 5 does not extend the prescribed period; it assumes the period has expired and provides a limited exception allowing institution on the re‑opening day.
- Relying on authorities collected in the note to section 6 in Starling's edition and on the reasoning in Veeramma v. Abbiah, the court held that the Limitation Act generally applies to proceedings under special/local laws except insofar as its application would alter periods specially prescribed or where the special/local law is a complete code that cannot be sensibly supplemented by the Limitation Act. The court found the Rent Act is not a complete code (it requires supplementation by the Code of Civil Procedure and is particularly incomplete on limitation), and so the Limitation Act's provisions remain applicable in the absence of a clear exclusion.
- The court rejected the argument that section 203 of the Rent Act (which addresses computation and deeming the day the Court re‑opens to be the last day for certain acts under the Rent Act) impliedly excludes the operation of section 5 of the Limitation Act for institution of suits. It explained that sections 202 and 203 of the Rent Act deal with computation of periods prescribed by the Rent Act (analogous to computation provisions in the Limitation Act) and concern making the re‑opening day part of the period prescribed by the Rent Act for appeals or similar acts; they do not operate as an exclusion of the Limitation Act's separate rule in section 5 which comes into play after the period has expired.
- The court considered and disagreed with the decision of Aikman, J. in Muhammad Husen v. Muzaffar Husen, which had held that a suit under section 93(b) where the period expired on a Sunday could not be instituted on the re‑opening day. The court explained that the earlier judge had overstated the effect of the Limitation Act provision he relied on and had overlooked differences in wording between the Limitation Act of 1871 and the later Act; this court found those differences material and declined to follow Aikman's conclusion.
- Applying this reasoning, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to institute the suit on 11 April 1898 in respect of the third instalment for 1302 Fasli which had fallen due on 10 April 1895, i.e., that part of the suit was not barred by limitation.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
(a) The courts below were correct in allowing the defendants to rely on the local custom "bal panchat" for proportionate reduction of rent where land was unculturable; on that point the appeal fails; and (b) The plaintiff was entitled under section 5 of the Limitation Act to institute the suit on 11 April 1898 in respect of the instalment that fell due on 10 April 1895, and no part of the suit is barred by limitation. The appeal is allowed in respect of the matters the lower appellate court erred on, the decree of the lower appellate court is set aside, and the decree of the Court of first instance is restored with costs. The appeal is decreed.
Practical consequences for the parties
- The defendants' defence based on the local custom was accepted by the courts below and affirmed in respect of that issue by this court; the appeal does not succeed on that point.
- The plaintiff succeeds on the limitation point: the claim in respect of the instalment due on 10 April 1895 is not time‑barred because the suit was properly instituted on the day the Court re‑opened (11 April 1898) under section 5 of the Limitation Act.
- Because of the court's findings and its adoption of the trial court's factual determination (as to extent of submerged or unculturable lands), the proper final order was to set aside the lower appellate court's decree and restore the decree of the Court of first instance with costs. The appeal was therefore decreed.
Implications for precedent and broader law
The opinion explains and applies the principle that the general Limitation Act applies to proceedings under special or local laws except where application would alter periods specifically prescribed by those laws or where the special law is a complete procedural code. The court rejected a prior contrary view in Muhammad Husen v. Muzaffar Husen and relied on reasoning exemplified in Veeramma v. Abbiah to support this approach. The opinion does not assert that it establishes a broader novel rule beyond applying those principles to the Rent Act and to the facts before the court; the direct practical effect is limited to the parties in this case.
Note: This summary is confined to the information and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences not present in that text.
Strachey, C.J and Banerji, J.:— This is an appeal in a suit for arrears of rent under section 93(a) of the North-Western Provinces Rent Act, No. XII of 1881, brought by the Maharani of Dumraon against certain tenants. The main defence was that by a local custom called bal panchat the tenants were entitled to a proportionate reduction of the rent for any year on account of any part of their holdings which was unoulturable by reason of being submerged by water or covered by sand. The plaintiff contended that this plea was one which could not be given effect to in such a suit as this without contravention of the provisions of the Rent Act, and relied on the decision in Radha Prasad Singh v. Baldeo Misr (2). Upon this point the Courts below decided in favour of the defendants. For the reasons given (3) in our judgment just delivered in second appeal No. 587 of 1899, we think that, as regards this point, the decisions of the Courts below were right, and that so far as this question is concerned this appeal must fail.
The only other question is whether a portion of the claim is barred by limitation. The suit for rent relates to the following years:—“(1) to the last two instalments of rent payable for 1302F, (2) for 1303F, (3) for 1304F, (4) for the first two instalments of 1305F. It is uncertain from the terms of the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court whether that Court meant to hold, that the suit was barred in respect of the fourth instalment for 1302F. If it did mean that, it was clearly mistaken, and that is admitted on behalf of the respondents. The question relates to the first instalment claimed in this suit, that is the third instalment for 1302F. That instalment fell due on the 10th April 1895. Section 94, paragraph 1, of the Rent Act provides that suits for arrears of rent or revenue, or for a share of the profits of a mahal, or of village expenses or other dues, shall not be brought after three years from the day on which the arrears, share, expenses or dues became due.” This suit was brought on the 11th of April, 1898, that is, one day after the period of three years had expired. The last day of the three years, the loth of April 1888, was a Sunday. The 11th of April 1898, the day when the suit was instituted, was the day when the Court re-opened. The plaintiff appellant relies on the first paragraph of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1877, which provides that “if the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the Court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted presented or made on the day that the Court re opens.” On this ground it is contended by the plaintiff that the suit is not barred by limitation. On behalf of the defendants, respondents, it is contended that section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to a suit for rent under the Rent Act, 1881, and reliance is placed on section 5 of the Limitation Act, which provides that “when by any special or local law now of hereafter in force in British India, a period of limitation is specially prescribed for any suit, appeal or application, nothing herein contained shall affect or alter the period so prescribed.” That section only shows that nothing in the Limitation Act is to effect or alter any period specially prescribed by a special or local law. But section 5 does not affect or alter the period of three years prescribed by the first paragraph of section 94 of the North-Western Provinces Bent Act. Section 5 does not extend any period of limitation. It assumes that the period prescribed for a suit has expired, and provides that nevertheless the suit may be instituted if the period expired on a day when the Court was closed. This construction of section 6 is in accordance with the cases which are collected in the note to section 6 in Mr. Starling's edition of the Limitation Act. The general effect of those cases is, that the provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable to proceedings under special or local laws, except so far as they affect or alter the periods prescribed by those special or local laws, unless the special or local law is a complete code by itself to which the general provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be applied without incongruity. This is very clearly explained by the judgment of Mr. Justice Muttusami Ayyar in Veeramma v. Abbiah . That, subject to these exceptions, the Limitation Act is applicable to suits and other proceedings under special laws, such as the Kent Act of 1881, clearly appears, we think, from the Act itself, which is a general law of limitation, and in particular from section 1, which expressly provides that certain portions of the Act are not applicable to suits under two special Acts named, the Indian Divorce Act and Madras Regulation VI of 1831. That, we think, greatly strengthens the inference that in regard to suits under other special or local Acts the provisions of the Limitation Act apply, subject, of course, to the qualifications already pointed out. It is, we think, impossible to hold that the Rent Act of 1881 constitutes by itself a complete code, to which, under the authorities already referred to, the provisions of the Limitation Act generally would not he applicable. It is clearly not complete as to procedure in general, for it has in a great variety of ways to be supplemented by the Code of Civil Procedure. It is particularly incomplete as regards provisions relating to limitation. So far, therefore, we can see nothing which would exclude the application of section 5, paragraph 1, of the Limitation Act to suits under the Rent Act. But in answer fo this, section 203 of the Rent Act has been relied on. Section 203 provides that “whenever a Court is closed on the last day of any period provided in this Act for the presentation of any memorandum of appeal, or for the deposit or payment of any money in or into Court, the day on which the Court re-opens shall be deemed to be such last day.” The contention is that, inasmuch as this section expressly embodies section 5, paragraph 1, of the Limitation Act, so far as that section relates to the presentation of an appeal, it impliedly excludes by its silence the application of section 5, paragraph 1, to the institution of suits. We do not think that this contention is correct. When sections 202 and 203 are carefully read, it is clear that they have reference exclusively to the computation of the periods of limitation prescribed by the Rent Act. In that respect they are of the same character as the provisions for computation of periods of limitation contained in fart lit of the Limitation Act. The effect of section 203 is to make the day on which the Court re-opens part of the period prescribed by the Act for the appeal Section 203 has nothing to do with the presentation of an appeal or the institution of any proceeding after the period prescribed has expired. On the other hand, section 5 of the Limitation Act has nothing to do with the computation of any period of limitation, but, as we have already pointed out, assumes that the period has expired. It is really an exception to, or qualification of, section 4, which requires, subject to the provisions contained in sections 5 to 25 inclusive, the dismissal of a suit, appeal or application brought after the period of limitation has expired. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Mr. Justice Aikman in Muhammad Husen v. Muzaffar Husen . The learned Judge there held that a suit under section 93(b) of the North-Western Provinces Rent Act, the period of limitation for filing which expired on a Sunday, could not be instituted on the day when the Court re-opened, but was time-barred. At page 24 of the report the learned Judge says, “the provisions of Act No. XV of 1877 do not affect special or local laws which specially prescribe periods of limitation; consequently the plaintiffs are not entitled to take advantage of the general provisions contained in section 5 of that Act.” We cannot agree with that view. Section 6 of the Act to which the learned Judge appear to refer does not say that “the provisions of the Act do not affect special or local laws which specially prescribe periods of limitation.” It says that they do not affect or alter the period so prescribed. The learned Judge, we think, overlooks the difference in wording between section 6 of the present Limitation Act and section 6 of the Limitation Act of 1871. As pointed out in several of the cases to which we have referred, under section 6 of the Act of 1871, where any other law specially prescribed a period of limitation differing from that prescribed by the Act “nothing herein contained shall affect such law.” In altering by section 6 of the present Act these words to “nothing herein contained shall affect or alter the period so prescribed,” we must presume that the Legislature intended to alter the rule contained in the Act of 1871. The learned Judge also we thick, overlooks the difference which we have pointed out between affecting or altering a prescribed period of limitation and allowing under the circumstance contemplated by section 5 a suit to be instituted after the prescribed period has expired. For these reasons we think that under section 5 of the Limitation Act, the plaintiff was entitled to institute on the 11th of April 1898, the suit in respect of the third instalment of rent for 1302, Fasli, and that no part of the suit is barred by limitation. As regards the rest of the case, the lower appellate Court in its judgment refers its judgment in appeal No. 19, to which second appeal No. 587 of 1899 before us relates, and says that the facts of this case are the same, and the questions involved are the same as those which he considered in his former judgment. In that former judgment the learned Judge upholds the decision of the Court of first instance as to the actual extent of the lands in question submerged or otherwise unculturable; and we think that in the present case therefore he similarly adopts as to this point the decision of the Court of first instance. Under these circumstances it is not necessary to remand the case to the lower appellate Court, and we think that the proper order is to allow, the appeal, set aside the decree of the lower appellate Court, and restore that of the Court of first instance with coats.
Appeal decried.
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