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Gopal Misser And Others v. Partap Mandal And Others

Patna High Court

Mar 8, 1923

Judgment

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Factual and Procedural Background

One Phekan Singh (defendant No. 12) was the raiyati tenant of a holding of 244 bighas at an annual rental of Rs. 41-12-0. The landlord obtained a rent decree against Phekan Singh and, in execution, the holding was sold; the ostensible auction purchaser was defendant No. 15 for Rs. 500. The plaintiffs allege that defendant No. 15 was their benamidar (i.e., holding title on their behalf), that the plaintiffs took delivery of possession on 13 December 1912, and that they were dispossessed by defendants Nos. 1 to 13 acting in collusion in April 1916.

The plaintiffs instituted the present suit seeking recovery of possession of lands specified as Schedule A and Schedule B and mesne profits. Defendants Nos. 1 to 11 asserted title to 30 bighas in Schedule A by a conveyance from Phekan Singh. Defendant No. 13 acquired Schedule A lands from defendants Nos. 1 to 11 by a conveyance dated 5 January 1918. Defendant No. 12 (Phekan Singh) claimed title to 15 bighas in Schedule B by a compromise in certain criminal proceedings. The defendants denied collusion in separate written statements and disclaimed interests in parts of the schedules as appropriate.

The learned Subordinate Judge found that the defendants did not act in collusion and disbelieved the plaintiffs' account that they took possession on 13 December 1912 and were dispossessed in April 1916; nonetheless he concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to possession of Schedule A lands and mesne profits against certain defendants (including defendant No. 13) but declined to grant the plaintiffs possession of Schedule B lands as against defendant No. 12. Defendants Nos. 1 to 11 appealed; the plaintiffs filed a cross-objection challenging the Subordinate Judge's finding on Schedule B.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the sale-certificate (auction sale certificate) conveyed title to the plaintiffs in respect of the lands described in Schedule A—specifically whether an area description (244 bighas and rental) or the subsequent boundary/descriptive words control.
Whether the suit could properly proceed after defendant No. 15 (the ostensible auction-purchaser) was struck off the record, i.e., whether non-joinder of defendant No. 15 rendered the suit not maintainable or required his presence for determination of others' liabilities.
Whether defendants Nos. 1 to 11 and/or defendant No. 13 are liable to the plaintiffs for mesne profits in respect of Schedule A lands.
Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to possession of Schedule B lands as against defendant No. 12 (Phekan Singh).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants / Defendants Nos. 1 to 11 (as advanced by Mr. Sushil Madhab Mullick)

Contended that, because defendant No. 15 (the ostensible auction purchaser) was dismissed from the record on the plaintiffs' petition (31 May 1920), the suit could not properly proceed and the appellants' liabilities (if any) should be determined in the presence of defendant No. 15.
Argued that the sale-certificate did not convey title in respect of Schedule A lands because the certificate's specific/detailed boundary description (listing dags and neighbours) did not include certain dags that the plaintiffs now claim; thus, the sale-certificate did not cover the disputed portions.

Plaintiffs

Asserted that defendant No. 15 was their benamidar and that the purchase at auction on behalf of the plaintiffs resulted in their beneficial title and possession (delivery said to have been on 13 December 1912).
Plead for recovery of possession of Schedule A and B lands and mesne profits after alleged dispossession in April 1916.

Defendant No. 15

Filed a written statement claiming a beneficial interest in the purchased property and denying that he acted as benamidar for the plaintiffs.
Subsequently, at the plaintiffs' petition, his name was struck off the record of the suit (31 May 1920).

Other relevant factual assertions in evidence

One plaintiff, Pratab Mandal, testified that though he took delivery of possession of the entire 244 bighas, the sale-certificate mentioned only three dags and did not expressly mention the other four dags (about 40–50 bighas) which formed part of the holding.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a sequence of legal analyses and factual findings, applying established principles of construction of conveyances and of civil liability for wrongful possession:

Non-joinder / striking off defendant No. 15:
The Court observed that the objection that the suit could not proceed in the absence of defendant No. 15 was not taken in the Court below. Because that point was not raised before the Subordinate Judge, the appellate Court declined to entertain it. The Court noted that, had the objection been raised below, the plaintiffs could have placed defendant No. 15 back on the record; failure to raise the point below barred raising it for the first time on appeal.
Construction of the sale-certificate (whether Schedule A lands were conveyed):
The sale-certificate described an "Inventory of 244 bighas 10 kathas jote" with an annual rental of Rs. 41-12-0, together with appurtenances, and then added a subsequent list of dags and adjacent boundaries. The Court treated these as two descriptions: (a) a general, area-based and rent-based description (first description) and (b) a subsidiary, particular boundary/dag description (second description).

The Court applied the rule governing conflicting descriptions: if the first description is sufficiently certain to identify the land, an inconsistent subsequent description should be rejected as a "false demonstration"; conversely, if the first description is insufficiently specific and the latter supplies necessary particularity, the latter would control and restrict the grant. The key factual question was whether the first description was sufficient to identify the land conveyed.

The Court concluded that the first description (area and rental) was sufficiently certain to identify the entire block held by Phekan Singh. Therefore the conflicting subsidiary description listing dags and boundaries was to be rejected as a false description rather than read as limiting the grant. On that basis, the sale-certificate did convey the Schedule A lands to the plaintiffs.
Liability for mesne profits:
The Court reviewed the findings of the Subordinate Judge who had disbelieved the plaintiffs' account of prior possession and dispossession. The Court accepted that defendants Nos. 1 to 11 had acquired a good title to Schedule A lands by their purchase, and there was no evidence that they were aware, before service of summons, that Phekan Singh's holding had been bought by the plaintiffs in execution. The Court held that, as to defendants Nos. 1 to 11, it was necessary for the plaintiffs to have given notice of their purchase before those defendants could be made liable for mesne profits; in the absence of such notice and given the appellants' title and lack of knowledge, defendants Nos. 1 to 11 were not liable for mesne profits.

By contrast, defendant No. 13 was in actual occupation when summons was served upon him; upon service he became a wrong-doer. Thus defendant No. 13 was liable for mesne profits from the date of service of summons upon him until he delivered quiet and peaceful possession to the plaintiffs.
Cross-objection on Schedule B:
The plaintiffs' cross-objection challenged the Subordinate Judge's finding regarding Schedule B lands as against defendant No. 12. The Court refused to entertain the cross-objection because the plaintiffs and defendant No. 12 were both in the category of respondents and it is unusual for one respondent to maintain a cross-objection against another respondent. The Court also noted that the plaintiffs were out of time to appeal against defendant No. 12 and had resorted to the cross-objection as a device to avoid limitation; the Court therefore refused the cross-objection.
Outcome and modification:
On the above bases, the appellate Court modified the Subordinate Judge's decree to the extent of its findings on mesne profits: it upheld plaintiffs' entitlement to possess Schedule A lands but limited mesne-profits liability to defendant No. 13 from service of summons until delivery of possession. The Court also refused the plaintiffs' cross-objection in respect of Schedule B lands. The Court ordered no costs in the appellate court.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING:

The plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for possession of Schedule A lands against defendants Nos. 1 to 11 and defendant No. 13.
Defendants Nos. 1 to 11 are not liable for mesne profits in respect of Schedule A lands (no mesne-profits liability was imposed on them).
Defendant No. 13 is liable for mesne profits in respect of Schedule A lands from the date when summons was served upon him up to the date when he delivers quiet and peaceful possession to the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs' cross-objection in respect of Schedule B lands (against defendant No. 12) is dismissed and the Subordinate Judge's finding in favor of defendant No. 12 as to Schedule B stands.
The decree of the Subordinate Judge is modified in accordance with the above adjustments; there will be no order as to costs in the appellate court.

Implications: The direct consequences for the parties are the restoration of possession of Schedule A lands to the plaintiffs and a limited award of mesne profits against defendant No. 13 only. The appellate Court's decision rests on principles of construction of conveyances (treating a sufficiently certain general description as controlling over a conflicting subsidiary description) and on ordinary rules as to notice and wrongful possession. The opinion does not purport to establish any broader legal precedent beyond the application of these principles to the facts of this case.

Show all summary ...

Das, J.:— One Phekan Singh, who has been cited as defendant No. 12 in this action, held a raiyati holding of 244 bighas on a rental of Rs. 41-12-0. The landlord instituted a rent-suit against Phekan Singh and recovered a decree as against him. In execution of that decree he caused the holding to be sold and it was, as a matter of fact, sold to defendant No. 15 for Rs. 500. On the 13th of December 1912, so it is alleged by the plaintiffs, defendant No. 15 obtained delivery of possession. The plaintiffs' case is that defendant No. 15 was their benamidar and that they obtained possession of Phekan Singh's holding on the 13th of December ??? and were dispossessed by defendants Nos. 1 to 13 acting in collusion with each other in April 1916. The suit, out of which the appeal arises, was thereupon instituted by the plaintiffs for recovery of possession of the disputed lands, which are specified in schedule A and B, and for mesne profits. The defendants Nos. 1 to 11 claimed to be in possession of 30 bighas of land set out in schedule A under a conveyance executed in their favour by Phekan Singh. Defendant No. 13, it appears, has taken a conveyance of schedule No. A lands from defendants Nos. 1 to 11 Their conveyance is dated the 5th of January 1918. Defendant No. 12 is the original tenant Phekan Singh, and he claims title to 15 bighas of land set out in schedule B ??? virtue of a compromise with the plaintiffs in a certain criminal proceedings. The defendants filed separate written statements in which they denied that they acted in collusion with each other. Defendants Nos. 1 to 11 disclaim all interests in schedule B lands, and defendant 12 disclaims all interests in Schedule A lands.

2. The learned Subordinate Judge in his judgment has recorded a finding to the effect that the defendants did not act in collusion with each other. He has also disbelieved the case of the plaintiffs that they obtained possession of the disputed land on the 13th of December 1912, and that they were dispossessed in April 1916 According to the learned Subordinate Judge the plaintiffs never at any time obtained possession of the disputed lands although in his view they are undoubtedly entitled to possession thereof. In the result he has given the plaintiffs a decree for possession of schedule A lands and for mesne profits as against defendants Nos. 1 to ??? and against defendant 13. In regard to schedule B lands he has come to the conclusion that the case of the defendant No. 12 is substantially correct. Accordingly, he declined to give the plaintiffs any decree for possession in respect of schedule B lands. Defendants Nos. 1 to 11 have appealed to this Court and the plaintiffs have presented a cross-objection as against the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge that the plaintiffs have failed to establish their case in regard to schedule B lands as against defendant No. 12. Mr. Sushil Madhab Mullick on behalf of the appellants takes the point that, in the circumstances to be at once mentioned, the plaintiffs' suit was not maintainable, and that it should have been dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge. I have already said that the ostensible auction purchaser was defendant No. 15. The case of the plaintiffs is that defendant No. 15 was their benamidar, and that the purchase was made by them, although in the name of defendant No. 15. In this view the plaintiffs cited the auction-purchaser as a defendant in the action. Defendant No. 15, however, filed a written statement in which he claimed a beneficial interest in the property purchased. In other words, he wholly denied the claim of the plaintiffs that in the matter of the auction-purchase he acted as the benamidar for the plaintiffs. Now, this was the position up to the 31st of May, 1920. On that date the plaintiffs presented a petition to the Court asking the Court to dismiss defendant No. 15 from the action. Thereupon, the Court directed that the name of defendant No. 15 should be struck off from the record of the suit. The contention of Mr. Sushil Madhab Mullick is that the suit could not proceed in the absence of defendant No. 15. He says that it is not right that he should be subjected to another action at the instance of defendant No. 15 and that it is only right and proper that his liability if any should be determined in the presence of both the plaintiffs and of the defendant No. 15. In my opinion, the objection is one that should have been taken in the Court below. It does not appear from the order sheet of the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge that it was ever contended before the Court below by the plaintiffs that the consequence of dismissing defendant No. 15 from the record of the suit was that the suit could not proceed. Had the defendants taken this point in the Court below, it would have been open to the plaintiffs to bring defendant No. 15 again on the record. That objection was not taken, and it is quite impossible for us in this Court to entertain an argument as to non-joinder of the parties. Mr. Sushil Madhab Mullick explains to us that his point is not that the suit should be dismissed, but that his liability should be determined in the presence of defendant No. 15. But as, for the reasons to be presently stated, we have come to the conclusion that the defendants Nos. 1 to 11 are not liable for mesne-profits it is wholly unnecessary to examine the contention of Mr. Sushil Madhab Mullick.

3. It is next urged by Mr. Mullick that the sale certificate which is the document of title of the plaintiffs has not given the plaintiffs any title to schedule A lands. The argument is founded upon the evidence of one of the plaintiffs to be found at page 21 of paper book. Pratab Mandal, one of the plaintiffs, giving evidence in the suit said as follows:

“The entire jote of Phekan, is in 7 dags. Only three big dags are in the sale-certificate but are in my possession. Those 4 dags. The other four dags are not in the sale-certificate; are 40 to 50 bighas in area. I took delivery of possession according to the sale-certificate. At the time of auction-sale, I did not know that there were 4 other dags besides 3 dags that were to be sold. It was at the time of taking delivery of possession I came to know of the other 4 dags.”

4. Now this evidence establishes that he took delivery of possession of the entire area, namely, 244 bighas; but that the sale-certificate mentioned only 3 dags, and does not-mention the other four dags which are undoubtedly included within this block of 244 bighas.

5. In order to succeed, Mr. Mullick must establish that the sale-certificate has not given the plaintiffs any title to schedule A lands. In my opinion, the contention is one which cannot for a moment be upheld. The argument must be based, if at all, upon the sale-certificate itself. In other words, we must decide, upon the construction of the sale-certificate, whether the Court conveyed schedule A lands to the plaintiff. The sale-certificate declares the title of the purchaser to the land specified at the foot of the certificate. It is necessary then to see what are the lands so specified. If Mr. Sushil Madhab Mullick is right in his contention, that the lands specified did not include the disputed lands then, of course, it will be impossible to hold that the plaintiffs have any title to the disputed lands. The specified lands are described in these words:—

“Inventory of 244 bighas 10 kathas jote lands at an annual rental of Rs. 41-12-0 besides cess, together with trees and clumps, houses, and bamboo (clumps) standing on the same, situate in Mauza Shankerpur. Parganah Haraut, Thana and Sub-Registry office Araria. The decree-holder is the 16 annas proprietor. The lands have not been subject to Survey operation.”

6. If the sale-certificate ended here, the argument which has in fact been advanced before us could not for a moment be entertained by this Court; but then there are these words which follow and the whole argument is based upon a description which, in my opinion, is a subsidiary description and a false description. The words are these:—

Kitas. North. South. East. West.

1. Charnan Ajab Sukan Samda Miser. Mandal. Gope. Ghat.

2. Gopal Padu Samda-Lacha-Miser. Singh, dhar. dhar.

3. Govt. Hiyalal Rupan Samda lands Miser. Mandal; dhar.

7. The question then is, was the land sold by the area which is to be found in the document, or, was it sold by the ??? undaries mentioned in the document. The question is essentially a question of fact; parcel or no parcel, that is how it has been described in the cases on the point. Now the rule is this:—

“When the premises is sufficiently described, as by giving the particular name of close, or otherwise, an erroneous additional description will be rejected as a ‘false demonstration’; but if there is not this certainty in the first description as if it is expressed in general terms and a particular description is added, the latter controls the former and limits the generality of the earlier description.”

8. There is undoubtedly a conflict between the two descriptions, and the question which we have to consider, is, whether the words constituting the second description should be rejected as a false description, or whether they should be read as words of restriction. The test, in my opinion, is this: if the first description is sufficient in itself to identify the land which is conveyed, then, if there is a conflict between the first description and the second description, the second description, ought to be rejected as a false description; but if the first description is not sufficient by itself to identify the lands intended to be sold, then the second description ought to be read as restricting the operation of the grant. The question then is this. Is the first description sufficient in itself to identify the lands in dispute? In my opinion, there can be no doubt that the words are quite sufficient to identify the disputed land. Not only is the area given but the annual rental is gives which is Rs. 41-12-0. The description is quite sufficient itself to identify the entire block of land which was held by Phekan Singh and for which he paid a rent of R. 41-12-0. That being so, the second description must be rejected as a false description.

9. It follows, therefore, from the finding that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover possession of schedule A lands. The next question is, whether the defendants or any of them are liable for mesne profits. Now on this point the learned Subordinate Judge has come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs' case as to possession and dispossession is wholly untrue. There is no evidence on the record that the defendants or any of them at any time before the summons was served on them were or was aware of the fact that Phekan Singh's holding had been purchased by the plaintiffs in execution of a rent-decree obtained against Phekan Singh. The defendants Nos. 1 to 11 had admittedly a good title to schedule A lands by their purchase. That being so, it was necessary for the plaintiffs to give them notice of their purchase before they could make the defendants liable: for mesne profits. Now, the defendants Nos. 1 to 11 sold the schedule A lands to defendant No. 13 long before the suit was actually instituted. In my opinion, defendants Nos. 1 to 11 are not liable for mesne profits.

10. Defendant No. 13 contends that the question as between him and defendants Nos. 1 to 11 should be left open. I am unable to agree with this contention. Defendant No. 13 was in actual occupation of the land when summons was served upon him. He should have delivered possession of the disputed land to the plaintiffs forthwith. From the time he received summons in the suit he became a wrong-doer. That being so, he is liable for mesne profits from the date when summons was actualy served upon him. We accordingly modify the decree passed by the Court below. The plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for possession as against defendants No. 1 to 11 and defendant No. 13 They are also entitled to a decree for mesne profits in respect of schedule A lands from defendant No. 13 from the date of the service of summons upon defendant No. 13 up to the date when defendant No. 13 makes over quiet and peaceful possession of the lands to the plaintiffs. There will be no order as to costs in this Court. There is a cross-objection by the plaintiffs against the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge in respect of schedule B lands. In my opinion, the cross-objection should not be entertained. The plaintiffs and defendants No. 12 are all in the category of respondents and it is unusual for one respondent to maintain cross-objection as against another respondent. It appears that the plaintiffs were out of time and they could not possibly have filed an appeal as against defendant No. 12. They, therefore, adopted this device to get rid of the question of limitation. That being so, we will not consider the cross-Objection of the plaintiffs which must be refused.

11. Kulwant Sahay, J.:— I agree.

12. Cross-objection dismissed.

13. Decree modified.