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Sudhirendra Nath Mitter v. Arunendra Nath Mitter

Calcutta High Court
Sep 22, 1948
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application under clause 13 of the Letters Patent for transfer of a contested probate suit (O.S. No. 44 of 1948) from the District Court of Alipore to the Calcutta High Court, Original Side (exercise of Extraordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction). The decedent, Barendra Nath Mitter, died on or about February 27, 1948, leaving movable and immovable property located partly within and partly outside the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the High Court.

The principal persons and proceedings are: Sudhirendra (son) is the plaintiff in the probate proceeding in Alipore; defendants in that proceeding include the widow Haribhabini and three grandsons (Arunendra, Atinendra and Asokendra). The three grandsons are the petitioners seeking transfer of the probate suit to the High Court. Separately, the petitioners instituted a partition suit in the High Court (suit No. 1464 of 1948) against Sudhirendra and Haribhabini, alleging intestacy and claiming shares in the estate. Interim directions and a limited stay were granted in the partition suit, and applications for inventory and appointment of an administrator pendente lite are pending in Alipore.

Procedurally: a Rule to show cause for transfer was issued on August 2, 1948. The petitioners rely on cl. 13 of the Letters Patent. The matter was argued and the judge disposed the Rule by ordering transfer of the probate case to the High Court. Costs were reserved and a partial disallowance of costs was made in respect of prolix documents.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the probate case (O.S. No. 44 of 1948) pending in the District Court of Alipore should be transferred to the Calcutta High Court, Original Side under clause 13 of the Letters Patent.
  2. Whether the grounds relied on by the petitioners—(a) complicated questions of law and fact in the probate case and (b) the balance of convenience—are sufficient to justify transfer.
  3. Whether the plaintiff's (Sudhirendra's) choice of forum was made for a legitimate advantage or for purposes foreign to legitimate forum-selection, such that the court should exercise its power to transfer.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The probate case involves complicated questions of fact and law (e.g., genuineness of the Will, testamentary capacity, undue influence) which, it is argued, should be tried in the Original Side of the High Court.
  • The balance of convenience favors trial in the Calcutta High Court because witnesses are in Calcutta, the bulk of the property is within the High Court’s Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction, a partition suit involving the same matters is pending in this Court, and continuation in Alipore would protract proceedings and hold up the partition suit.

Respondent(s)' Arguments (as represented by the Advocate-General and counsel for Haribhabini)

  • The plaintiff (Sudhirendra) has a right to choose his forum (arbiter litis), and he purportedly chose the Alipore Court in good faith and because trial there would be cheaper.
  • The plaintiff's forum choice ought to be respected unless legitimate grounds for transfer exist under clause 13 of the Letters Patent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In re: Norton's Settlement Norton v. Norton The judgment is cited for the proposition that where a plaintiff's choice of forum is not made to obtain any legitimate advantage but for purposes foreign to that legitimate purpose, the court has jurisdiction—and a duty—to transfer the proceedings. The court relied on this principle to assess Sudhirendra's motives in choosing the Alipore forum and concluded that his choice was made for purposes foreign to legitimate forum-selection, supporting transfer of the probate case to the High Court.
Harendra v. Sarvamangala (Ameer Ali, J., 1896) Observation quoted: that expenses in the Calcutta High Court are not necessarily greater than expenses in the Mofussil; specifically, "I am surprised at the statement that the expenses here will be greater than in the Mofussil. This is obviously contrary to the ordinary experience." The judge cited this observation to challenge the contention that trial in Alipore would be cheaper; the court concluded that trial expenses in the Calcutta High Court would not, in the circumstances, be greater than in Alipore.
Egbert v. Short (Warrington, J.) Principle that the jurisdiction to transfer should be exercised with extreme caution and not if it will cause injustice to the plaintiff; the court must weigh whether refusing transfer would prevent a grievous injustice to the plaintiff. The court acknowledged and quoted this cautionary principle but determined, on the facts, that transfer would not cause injustice to the plaintiff and proceeded to order removal of the suit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in stages, addressing the petitioners' two primary grounds for transfer and then applying an overall principal concerning improper motive in forum selection.

1. On the petitioners' first ground—complicated questions of law and fact—the judge observed that issues such as genuineness of a Will, testamentary capacity and undue influence commonly arise in probate matters and are routinely tried by District Judges. The court rejected the contention that the presence of such issues alone justifies transfer, noting that to accept it would lead to practically all probate cases in the Mofussil being removed to the High Court.

2. On the balance of convenience, the judge accepted that there was "some force" in the petitioners' contention (witnesses in Calcutta, property located in the High Court's jurisdiction, partition suit pending in the High Court), but explained the legal standard: mere balance of convenience in favor of the High Court is usually insufficient; the court must be satisfied that expense or difficulties of trial in the Alipore Court would be so great that injustice would result—i.e., it would be very difficult or practically impossible for the petitioners to obtain justice in Alipore. The judge therefore did not rest the decision solely on balance of convenience.

3. The court then applied a separate and decisive principle (cited from Norton v. Norton): if the plaintiff's choice of forum is not motivated by any legitimate advantage but by purposes foreign to legitimate forum-selection, the court not only has jurisdiction but the duty to transfer. The judge tested the facts against this principle.

4. The factual testing focused on Sudhirendra's conduct and timing: he did not apply for probate until May 19, 1948 (despite saying in open court on May 18, 1948, through counsel, that he had already applied); he had lodged caveats only late April; his explanation for delay (negotiations for a family arrangement to avoid ad valorem duty) was vague and lacked particulars; his in-court statement that probate had already been applied for was untrue and his explanation for the discrepancy was not accepted by the judge. The judge found that Sudhirendra was experienced in litigation and ought to have ascertained the facts before making the statement; the timing and circumstances suggested a tactical motive (for example, to influence the Receiver application).

5. The court concluded it could not credit Sudhirendra's assertions that he honestly chose Alipore as the proper or cheaper forum. The judge formed the view that the Alipore forum was chosen for a purpose foreign to legitimate forum-selection.

6. Weighing other practical factors: witnesses were available in Calcutta; the partition suit addressing the same main issue (testacy vs intestacy) was already pending in the High Court; and the court accepted that, in the circumstances, expenses would not be greater if tried in the High Court. The judge therefore found no injustice would be caused to the plaintiff by transfer (noting the caution from Egbert v. Short), and that transfer was appropriate on the grounds of improper forum selection supplemented by the convenience factors.

7. Ancillary: the judge criticized prolixity in the petition and affidavit in reply and ordered that not more than half the costs of preparation of those two documents be allowed on taxation.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court ordered that the probate suit (O.S. No. 44 of 1948) be removed from the District Court of Alipore to the Calcutta High Court, Original Side, to be tried and determined there in the exercise of its Extraordinary Original Jurisdiction.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The probate proceeding will proceed for trial in the Calcutta High Court rather than in the Alipore District Court.
  • The judge reserved the costs of all parties but made a specific cost-direction reducing the allowable preparation costs for the petition and affidavit in reply to not more than half, on taxation, as a mark of disapproval for prolixity.
  • The court emphasized that the transfer was ordered because the plaintiff's forum choice appeared to be motivated by purposes foreign to legitimate forum-selection and that, on the facts, transfer would not cause injustice to the plaintiff; no broader legal rule was newly created beyond applying established principles (as cited) to the facts of this case.

This summary is restricted to and based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion. No information outside the opinion has been added.

Show all summary ...

Banerjee, J.:— This is an application under cl. 13 of the Letters Patent for transfer of a suit to this Court. The suit is now pending in the District Court of Alipore. It is a contested probate proceeding and is numbered O.S No. 44 of 1948.

2. The Rule was obtained from Majumdar, J., on August 2, 1948. By that Rule the plaintiff has been called upon to show cause why the said probate case should not be removed to this Court to be tried and determined in this Court in the exercise of its Extraordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction. The Rule is now before me for final disposal. The facts relating to the application are shortly these: Barendra Nath Mitter died on or about February 27, 1948. He was a wealthy man and possessed of considerable property, movable and immovable, situated partly within and partly outside the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of this Court.

3. He left surviving him a widow Haribhabini, a son Sudhirendra and three grandsons, Arunendra, Atinendra and Asokendra by a predeceased son Saratendra.

4. Sudhirendra is the Plaintiff in the said probate case, O.S No. 44 of 1948. Arunendra, Atinendra, Asokendra and Haribhabini are the Defendants.

5. The Petitioners in the application are the said Arunendra, Atinendra and Asokendra.

6. In April last two separate caveats were lodged by Sudhirendra in the goods of Barendra Nath Mitter. One of the caveats was lodged in the High Court, Original Side. The other was lodged in the District Court of 24-Parganas.

7. On or about May 3, 1948, a suit for partition was instituted in this Court. This suit is numbered 1464 of 1948. The Plaintiffs in the suit are the said Arunendra, Atinendra and Asokendra. The Defendants are the said Sudhirendra and Haribhabini.

8. In the plaint in the partition suit the Plaintiffs allege that Barendra died intestate, and on the basis of intestacy they have claimed a share in the estate left by the deceased. They have also claimed other reliefs in the plaint, which are not material now to be mentioned.

9. It is alleged that there was a talk of compromise. It has failed.

10. The Plaintiffs in the partition suit made an application on May 13, 1948, for the appointment of a Receiver of the estate left by the deceased and for other reliefs. On the same day an interim order of injunction was made by Majumdar, J. The order, leaving out the portion not material, is in these terms:—

“It is further ordered that the defendant?, their servants and agents be and they are hereby prohibited and restrained until the disposal of the application or until further order of this court from alienating or disposing of the movable property including the jewellery lying deposited with the Lloyds Bank Ltd. Calcutta, belonging to the estate of Barendra Nath Mitter since deceased in the petition mentioned.”

11. The application was finally heard by Sinha, J., on May 18, 1948. The learned Judge refused to appoint a Receiver, but gave certain directions for the protection of the interests of the parties.

12. In the course of the hearing of that application on May 18, 1948, Sudhirendra stated in open Court through his Counsel that his father had died leaving a Will and that he had already applied for probate of the Will in the Court of the District Judge, Alipore.

13. In fact, however, there was no application made on that date, for we find that the application was made on May 19, 1948.

14. The Petitioners are contesting the said application for probate. The proceeding has been marked as a contested suit and numbered, as I have said before, O.S No. 44 of 1948, which is sought to be removed to this Court.

15. A copy of the order-sheet in the probate case has been annexed to the affidavit of Sudhirendra affirmed on August 21, 1948, and filed as of records in these proceedings. It appears from the order-sheet that the parties are keenly contesting the probate case as one would naturally expect. The main parties are near relations. It is a fight between an uncle and a nephew. The estate left by the testator is large. The parties are well equipped. Therefore, the contest is likely to be very keen.

16. The Petitioners' case is that there was no Will. They have obtained a photographic copy of the said alleged Will, which was placed before me during the hearing of this application.

17. On June 24, 1948, a notice of motion was taken out in the partition suit on behalf of Sudhirendra for stay of the partition suit until the disposal of the probate case in Alipore, and for extension of time for filing written statement in the partition suit. This application for stay was heard by Das, J. His Lordship made the following order, as appears from a copy of the Court minutes which has been handed over to me. The order is this:—

“There will be a stay of all further proceedings In the suit, but this stay is limited to the proceedings in inspection and hearing of the suit only. Written statements to be filed by both the defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 3 by Monday week. All affidavits of documents to be filed within a week thereafter, and there will be no inspection at this stage except under further orders of this court. Costs of the application will be costs in the cause. This order will not affect the order of Sinha, J.”

18. The Defendants Sm. Haribhabini and Sudhirendra have filed separate written statements. In their written statements they both say that Barendra died leaving a Will, dated June 22, 1947, and that Sudhirendra has been appointed the sole executor.

19. It appears from the pleadings in the partition suit that the main issue in the suit is as to whether the deceased died testate or intestate.

20. There are two applications pending in the District Court, Alipore, one for making an inventory in respect of the property left by the deceased, and the other for the appointment of an administrator pendente lite.

21. The learned District Judge by an order dated July 19, 1948, ordered that the two applications might be taken up together. He fixed August 14, 1948, for the hearing of the two applications. In the mean-time the Petitioners made an application for transfer of the suit and as I have said before, obtained a Rule on August 2, 1948.

22. On behalf of the Petitioners, it is urged that the probate case should be transferred to this Court. As grounds the learned Counsel who appears for the Petitioners, urges (1) that complicated questions of law and fact are involved in the probate case and (2) that the balance of convenience is in favour of proceedings in the Calcutta High Court.

23. Under the first head, learned Counsel on behalf of the Petitioners says that the Will is not genuine, that the testator had no testamentary capacity, that the Will has been procured by undue influence. Learned Counsel contends that these are complicated questions of fact and law which should be tried in the Original Side of the High Court. I do not accept this contention. In almost all probate cases, these questions of fact or law are involved. Hundreds of them are tried by District Judges, and if I may say so with respect, tried with great ability and fairness. If 1 accede to the prayer of the Petitioners on this ground it would logically follow that practically all probate cases pending in the Mofussil would have to be removed to this Court.

24. Under the second head, learned Counsel says that the witnesses are in Calcutta, that the bulk of the property left by the deceased is situated within the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of this Court, that there is a partition suit pending in this Court, that if the probate case is allowed to proceed in the Court of the District Judge of Alipore, the proceedings would be protracted and the partition suit held up. He sums up by saying that the balance of convenience is in favour of the proceedings in the Calcutta High Court. There is undoubtedly some force in this contention. But the law on this point is this that in order to justify a transfer on this ground it is as a rule necessary that something more should exist than a mere balance of convenience in favour of proceedings in this Court. The Court must be satisfied that either the expense or the difficulties of trial in the Alipore Court would be so great that injustice would be done—in this sense that it would be very difficult, or practically impossible, for the Petitioners, who are applying for transfer, to get justice in the Alipore Court.

25. In re: Norton's Settlement Norton v. Norton(1).

26. It is not necessary for me to deal in detail with the question of the relative expense and convenience of proceedings in this Court and in the Alipore Court, because in my opinion there is in this case involved another principle on which the application may be disposed of. This I shall deal with later on in my judgment.

27. The learned Advocate-General appears for Sudhirendra and opposes the application. He is supported by learned Counsel Mr. B.N Ghose, who appears for Sm. Haribhahini. Along with other grounds which I have already decided in his favour he urges that the suit should not be transferred because the Plaintiff has a right to choose his own forum. He is the arbiter litis. He can choose any forum the law allows him. The Advocate-General continues that Sudhirendra has chosen his own forum in the honest belief that it is the proper forum and that the trial in the Alipore Court would be cheaper than the proceedings here. I do not believe Sudhirendra when he says that one of the considerations which moved him to choose the Alipore Court for the case, is cheapness of the proceedings there, for I find that Sudhirendra took an Advocate of the eminence of Dr. Sen Gupta to the Alipore Court to argue on his behalf an application made by the Petitioners for inventory. There is no dearth of able lawyers in the Alipore Court. Sudhirendra has been able to secure the services of some of them. If cheapness of trial was his consideration why did he take Dr. Sen Gupta to argue his case in an application of this type? As I have already said the parties are rich, the contest is going to be keen. I can very well surmise that if the trial of the probate case proceeds in the Alipore Court the parties will take eminent Advocates from the High Court to fight their respective cases. The cost in that event will be more than a trial in the Calcutta High Court. It will not be out of place in this connection to quote an observation made by Ameer Ali, J., as long ago as 1896. His Lordship observed, “I am surprised at the statement that the expenses here will be greater than in the Mofussil. This is obviously contrary to the ordinary experience.” Harendra v. Sarvamangala(2). Whether that observation applies in all cases is a matter of opinion. (But I have po doubt that the observation does apply to a case of the type under consideration. In a case of this type, the observation applies with full force now as it did in 1896.

28. I fully agree with the learned Advocate-General, if I may say so with respect that the Plaintiff is the arbiter litis. He has the right to choose his own forum. But this right is subject to control under cl. 13 of the Letters Patent. If the Court feels that for purposes of justice a suit should be transferred, the Court must do it.

29. Apart from balance of convenience there is another principle which is to be borne ir mind. If the Court, taking all the facts into consideration, comes to the conclusion that the Plaintiff in commencing an action in a particular Court has not done so on recount of any legitimate advantage which a trial in that Court will give him but for purposes entirely foreign to that legitimate purpose then apart from any question as to expense or inconvenience not only has the Court jurisdiction but it is the duty to transfer the proceedings.

30. In re: Norton's Settlement Norton v. Norton.

31. Now, let us test the fact of this case in the light of this principle. Sudhirendra knew that his father had left a Will. He on his own admission has been appointed the sole executor. In an estate of this extent one would expect Sudhirendra to act more promptly than he has done to obtain a representation to the estate of the deceased particularly when there are so many suits and proceedings pending concerning the estate.

32. Sudhirendra does not make any application for probate till May 19, 1948. What is his explanation? It is this. He says after the sradh ceremony of the deceased he was arranging to apply for probate of the Will, when a suggestion was made to him by a relation of the Petitioners, that heavy ad valorem duty payable for probate of the Will could be avoided if all parties concerned would execute a deed of trust by way of family arrangement incorporating in substance the provisions of the Will of the deceased. No particulars have been given as to when the suggestion was made or when negotiation for the family arrangement, if any, terminated. In any event we find that Sudhirendra files caveats towards the end of April, 1948. He does rot make his application for probate of the Will in the Alipore Court which according to him is the proper forum for that purpose. I am not satisfied with the explanation given by Sudhirendra as to the cause of his delay in applying for probate. Then again as I have already said, he makes an incorrect statement in Court on May 18, 1948. Sudhirendra as I have already said during the hearing of the application before Sinha, J., stated through his Counsel in Court that he had already applied for probate of the Will in the Alipore Court. But that statement is not correct. He applied for probate on May 19, 1948. He seeks to explain the discrepancy by swearing as follows:—

“I say that on the morning of the 18th May all necessary papers for the application for the probate were ready and made over by me to my pleader for filing and when the application was called on before his Lordship the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sinha, I was under the impression that the application had already been filed.”

33. I cannot accept this explanation of Sudhirendra. He is a man of experience. He has experience in litigations. It is impossible to believe that he did not know that making over of papers to a pleader floes not necessarily mean that the pleader would take or has taken a particular step. In any event Sudhirendra before he made such an incorrect statement in Court ought to have ascertained the correct facts. The circumstances in which Sudhirendra made the statement are also significant. The application for Receiver was pending in Court and in fact it had come up for hearing before Sinha, J. Sudhirendra had everything to lose if a Receiver was appointed, for the estate is admittedly in his possession. I apprehend Sudhirendra made that incorrect statement in Court in the belief that it would have some effect on the fate of the application favourable to him. I need not say anything more on this part of the case.

34. I have carefully considered the facts of this case. I am unable to give credit to Sudhirendra when he says that he chose the Alipore Court for the probate case in the honest belief that it was the proper forum or that a trial in the Alipore Court would be cheaper than in the Original Side of the High Court. On the other hand, I have come to the conclusion that the Alipore Court was not chosen for the purpose of any legitimate advantage which Sudhirendra might gain by so doing, but for a, purpose entirely foreign to it. Reaching that conclusion, I must grant the prayer for removal of the probate case to the High Court. I am not unmindful of the observations of Warrington, J., in a case of this type. In Egbert v. Short(3) his Lordship said:—

“The jurisdiction which I am asked to exercise is one which as has been frequently said is to be exercised by the court with extreme caution; and further it is one which the court ought not to exercise if by so doing an injustice will be caused to the plaintiff; and the real question which I have to decide is whether by preventing what, in my judgment, is a grievous injustice to the plaintiff. If I should he doing so then I think it would be my duty to refuse this application.”

35. In this case, taking all the facts into consideration, I am convinced that by making the order which I am going to make, I would not be doing any injustice to the Plaintiff in the probate case. The witnesses would be available in Calcutta. It does not make much difference if they are examined in Alipore or in Calcutta.

36. The partition suit is pending in the High Court, Original Side, where the main issue is the only issue in the probate case. The expenses of the trial in the Calcutta High Court, in the circumstances of the case would not be greater than the trial if it tikes place in the Alipore Court.

37. Before I conclude, I must mention one matter. The learned Advocate-General has commented on the prolixity of the petition and the affidavit in reply. I entirely agree with what he has said. To mark my disapproval of the two documents, I disallow a portion of the costs for their preparation. I direct that not more than half the costs of preparation of the two documents will be allowed to the party concerned on taxation be it attorney and client taxation or party and party taxation. This, however, does not make any difference to the ultimate fate of the application.

38. I, therefore, order that the suit be removed to this Court and be tried find determined in this Court in the exercise of its Extra-Ordinary Original Jurisdiction.

39. I reserve the costs of all parties.