- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Thomman Parakkal v. Madhavan Arakkaparambil And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This second appeal arises from a suit for cancellation of a deed of assignment (Ext. XXVIII) and for recovery of possession of the property comprised therein with past and future mesne profits. The basic facts set out in the opinion are:
- P.W.1 (the father) executed a sale deed (Ext. IV) in the year 1100 in favour of his wife Thulasi and his three sons for the suit properties and certain other properties; the deed purported to give the properties to plaintiff 1 and defendants 2 and 3 and sons that might be born in future of P.W.1 and Thulasi.
- At a later date, after defendants 2 and 3 attained majority but while plaintiffs 1 and 2 were still minors, P.W.1, Thulasi and defendants 2 and 3 executed Ext. XXVIII (described as a deed of assignment or sale) in favour of defendant 1. Ext. XXVIII was executed on behalf of the minor plaintiffs by their mother Thulasi as their guardian.
- Plaintiffs 1 and 2 sued to cancel Ext. XXVIII so far as it affected their shares and to recover possession of their shares with mesne profits. They claimed a 2/4th (one-half) share in the suit property (later contested and adjusted by the courts) and fixed mesne profits at 40 paras of paddy per year for their shares.
- Defendant 1 contested the suit on multiple grounds including that Ext. XXVIII was invalid, that it had not been acted upon, that it was a gift to unborn donees, that it was supported by consideration and necessity, and that the suit was barred by limitation.
- The trial court found Ext. XXVIII had effect but that plaintiff 2, being unborn at execution, obtained no right; it held the sale was not supported by consideration and necessity binding on plaintiffs 1 and 2, found the price inadequate, and set aside Ext. XXVIII as to plaintiff 1's one-third share, awarding possession and mesne profits to plaintiff 1. Plaintiff 2 was held to have no right by the trial court.
- On appeal the District Court reversed the trial court on certain points: it held plaintiff 2 was entitled to a share, fixed each plaintiff's share at one-fourth, held Ext. XXVIII supported by consideration to the extent of Rs.110/-, and decreed mesne profits and costs with mutual set-off and directions concerning interest and satisfaction against defendant 1's half share. Both defendant 1 and plaintiff 2 (and plaintiff 1 by cross-appeal on costs) had appealed to the District Court; defendant 1 then filed this second appeal against the District Court's decree.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Ext. XXVIII was supported by necessity and consideration binding on plaintiffs 1 and 2.
- Whether plaintiff 2, being unborn at the time of execution of Ext. XXVIII, has any right to the plaint property.
- Whether plaintiff 1's right to set aside Ext. XXVIII is barred by limitation under Article 34, Cochin Limitation Act (corresponding to Article 44, Indian Limitation Act) — i.e., whether a suit by a ward who has attained majority to set aside a transfer by his guardian must be filed within three years of attaining majority where the transfer was made by the guardian.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- Plaintiffs contended they were entitled to 2/4th share in the suit property (later adjudicated by the courts as one-fourth each) and claimed mesne profits for their shares (40 paras of paddy per year claimed originally).
- They sought to set aside Ext. XXVIII on grounds that it was not supported by necessity or consideration binding on them, that it was not validly executed on their behalf by their legal guardian, that the sale price of Rs.444/- was grossly inadequate, and therefore the document was not binding on them.
Defendant 1's Arguments
- Ext. XXVIII was not acted upon and title and possession continued with P.W.1 even after its execution (argument that the document had not been effected in practice).
- The document was invalid in law as it was a gift and one of the donees (plaintiff 2) was unborn at the time of the gift.
- Ext. XXVIII was supported by consideration and necessity and the price paid was proper and fair.
- The suit was barred by limitation.
- The correctness of plaintiffs' claimed shares and mesne profits was disputed.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| 33 Cochin LR 79 (A) | Dictum relied upon by the lower appellate Court for the proposition that subsequent amendments in law made in British India allowing gifts in favour of unborn persons could be applied in Cochin on proof of their adoption by the concerned community. | The bench below relied on this dictum for allowing applicability of such amendments in Cochin; the present Court stated it was not necessary to decide the general question of applicability in this case and noted the lower Court's reliance on the dictum. |
| Narayanan Thimmulpad v. Kutty Moosa, 21 Cochin LR 413 (B) | Where a deed expressly recites that the mother was acting as guardian of the minors, the father cannot be deemed to have represented them; thus the document could be void as against the minors. | The Court applied the principle by observing that Ext. XXVIII recited Thulasi (the mother) as guardian; therefore Ext. XXVIII could not be taken as executed on behalf of the minors by their natural guardian (the father). |
| Ethilavuhi Animal v. Pethakkal, AIR 1930 Mad 390 (C) | In view of the Full Bench decision in Chennappa v. Onkarappa, Article 44, Indian Limitation Act has no application to a transfer of property of a Hindu minor by a de facto guardian. | The Court cited this authority (and the Full Bench in Chennappa) to hold that Article 44 does not apply to transfers made by a de facto guardian; this supported the conclusion that limitation under Article 44 did not bar the present suit. |
| Chennappa v. Onkarappa, AIR 1940 Mad 33 (D) (Full Bench) | Full Bench authority relied upon in Ethilavuhi Animal; used to construe the scope of Article 44 in relation to transfers by de facto guardians. | Referred to (through Ethilavuhi Animal) as part of the reasoning that Article 44 is inapplicable to de facto guardian transfers; the Court accepted the consequence that Article 44 did not govern the present suit. |
| Chitaley's Commentaries on Indian Limitation Act, Edn. 3 | Explains that a transfer by a de facto guardian, not supported by necessity, is only voidable at the ward's option and not binding until set aside; thus setting aside is not a condition precedent to the ward recovering the property; suits to recover are governed by other Articles (e.g., Article 142 or 144) rather than Article 44. | The Court relied on the commentary's explanation of legal effect of de facto guardian transfers to support its conclusion that Article 44 did not apply to the present suit and that the ward could sue for possession without first setting aside the transfer under Article 44's three-year rule. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in stages corresponding to the principal issues raised on this second appeal.
- On the question of consideration and necessity: the lower appellate Court had already found Ext. XXVIII was supported by consideration to the extent of Rs.110/-, and that the balance amount was not supported by consideration and necessity binding on plaintiffs 1 and 2. The present Court observed these were concurrent findings of fact and therefore it was not open to the Court in second appeal to re-examine the evidence on that question. The Court accepted that the lower Courts had duly considered the oral and documentary evidence and held those findings to be right and proper, noting no question of law arose on that point.
- On whether plaintiff 2 (unborn at execution) had any right: while the trial Court held plaintiff 2 obtained no right, the lower appellate Court found otherwise. The appellate Court's reasoning (cited by the present Court) included reliance on the doctrine that amendments in British India law might be applicable in Cochin if the concerned community adopted them (33 Cochin LR 79), but the present Court stated it was unnecessary to decide that larger question here. The Court emphasized that Ext. IV had taken effect and thereby plaintiff 1 and defendants 2 and 3 acquired the property; those persons could have given away whole or part of what they got. More specifically, the Court pointed to Exhibits V, VI and X (and other documents produced) executed by P.W.1, defendants 2 and 3 and Thulasi acknowledging or recognizing that plaintiff 2 was entitled to a share — documents which predated Ext. XXVIII. Ext. XXVIII itself also admitted plaintiff 2's right (it was executed on his behalf). Because these documents — which plaintiff 1 and defendants 2 and 3 did not impeach — recognized plaintiff 2's entitlement, the Court held plaintiff 2 was entitled to a share and that the lower appellate Court's decision awarding him one-fourth was correct.
- On limitation under Article 44 (Article 34, Cochin Limitation Act): the appellant contended that because Thulasi joined in Ext. XXVIII as guardian of the minors, the suit should have been filed within three years of the ward's attaining majority. The Court examined guardianship: the natural guardian of the minor plaintiffs at the time of Ext. XXVIII was P.W.1 (the father), and a father cannot substitute another person in his place during his lifetime. Because Ext. XXVIII recited that Thulasi (the mother) was acting as guardian, the document could not be regarded as executed on behalf of the minors by their natural guardian. Relying on Narayanan Thimmulpad v. Kutty Moosa, the Court accepted that such a recital precluded treating the father as having represented the minors. The appellant then argued the mother might be a de facto guardian and that Article 44 would apply to transfers by a de facto guardian. The Court reviewed authority (Ethilavuhi Animal and the Full Bench in Chennappa) and commentary (Chitaley) establishing that Article 44 does not apply to transfers by a de facto guardian because such transfers are not binding on the ward until ratified; rather, the ward may treat the transfer as null and sue for possession under other limitation provisions (Articles 142 or 144). On this basis the Court concluded Article 44 did not apply to the present suit.
- On the procedural posture the Court noted that since concurrent findings of fact existed on the issue of consideration and necessity, it was constrained from reappraising evidence in the second appeal; the courts below had considered the evidence sufficiently and their factual conclusions were affirmed.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The second appeal is dismissed with costs.
Direct consequences and implications as stated in the opinion:
- The decree of the lower appellate Court stands (the District Court had found that Ext. XXVIII was supported by consideration to the extent of Rs.110/-, that each plaintiff was entitled to one-fourth share in the plaint property, and issued directions regarding mesne profits, interest and costs with mutual set-off against defendant 1's share).
- The Court held that plaintiff 2 — though unborn at the time of Ext. XXVIII — is entitled to a share in the plaint property on the basis of prior instruments (Ext. IV; Exhibits V, VI and X and other documents) and the way the parties had treated those documents.
- The Court decided that Article 44 (Indian Limitation Act) / Article 34 (Cochin Limitation Act) does not apply to the present suit because Ext. XXVIII was not a transfer by the natural guardian and transfers by a de facto guardian are not governed by Article 44; therefore the appellant's limitation plea failed.
- No new legal principle was established beyond applying existing authorities and commentary to the facts of this case; the decision affirms concurrent factual findings of the courts below and resolves the limitation issue against the appellant in line with the authorities cited.
The Court expressly stated that it was unnecessary in this case to decide the broader question whether subsequent amendments to Hindu Law made in British India can be applied in Cochin on proof of adoption by concerned communities.
1. This second appeal arises out of a suit for cancellation of a deed of assignment of sale and recovery of possession of property comprised therein with past and future manse profits.
2. Plaintiffs 1 and 2 and defendants 2 and 3 are brothers; and P.W 1 is their father. They are governed by Hindu Law. In 1100, when plaintiff 2 was unborn and plaintiff 1 and defendants 2 and 3 were minors, P.W 1 executed Ext. IV sale deed in favour of his wife Thulasi and his three sons for the suit properties in this case and certain other properties. By the terms of the sale deed the properties were given to plaintiff 1 and defendants 1 and 3 and the sons that might be born in future of P.W 1 and his wife Thulasi. After defendants 2 and 3 attained majority and when plaintiffs 1 and 2 were still minors, P.W 1 and Thulasi and defendants 2 and 3 executed Ext. XXVIII, deed of assignment or sale, to defendant 1 for the plaint properties. The document was executed on behalf of plaintiffs 1 and 2 who were minors by their mother Thulasi as their guardian. The suit was filed by plaintiffs 1 and 2 for cancellation of Ext, XXVIII in so far as their share in the plaint property was concerned and for recovery of possession of the same with past and future mesne profits.
3. They claimed that they were entitled to 2/4th share in the suit property and that the mesne profits in respect of their shares would be 40-paras of paddy per year. Exhibit XXVIII was sought to be set aside on the ground that it was not supported by necessity and consideration binding on the plaintiffs, that it was not executed on their behalf by their legal guardian, that the price of Rs. 444/- for which the property was sold was grossly inadequate, and that the document was not therefore binding on them. Defendant 1 contested the suit.
4. He contended that Ext. XXVIII was not acted upon and the tide and possession of the plaint property continued with P.W 1 even after its execution, that the document was invalid in law as it was a gift and one of the donees was unborn at the time of the gift, that Ext. XXVIII was supported by consideration and necessity and the price paid thereunder was proper and fair, and drat the suit was also barred by limitation. The correctness of the shares and mesne profits claimed by the plaintiff were also disputed by him.
5. The original Court found that Ext. XXVIII had taken effect but plaintiff 2 had not obtained any right thereunder as he was unborn at the time of its execution, that the sale deed was not supported by consideration and necessity binding on plaintiffs 1 and 2, that the price for which the property was sold was very low, and that the sale deed was therefore liable to be set aside so far as plaintiff 1 was concerned. Since the original Court had found that plaintiff 2 had not obtained any right under Ext. XXVIII by reason of his having been unborn at the time of its execution, that Court also held that plaintiff 1's share was one-third of the plaint property.
6. Consequently it passed a decree setting aside Ext. XXVIII so far as plaintiff 1's one-third share was concerned and allowing him to recover possession of his share after partition by metes and bounds with mesne profits at the rate of 22½ paras of paddy, per year from 32-1-1120. Against this decree both defendant 1 and plaintiff 2 preferred appeals in the District Court of Anjikaimal and plaintiff 1 also filed a cross appeal in regard to the costs which he had been directed to bear. The District Court allowed in full the appeal filed by plaintiff 2 and the cross appeal filed by plaintiff 1, holding that plaintiff 2 was also entitled to a share in the plaint property, that each of the plaintiffs was entitled to one-fourth share in the property, and that the plaintiffs were also entitled to get their costs.
7. In the appeal filed by defendant I it was found that Ext. XXVIII was supported by consideration to the extent of Rs. 110/- and was not supported by consideration and necessity binding on the plaintiffs in regard to the balance amount thereunder. The District Court found against all the other contentions of defendant 1 and directed a decree to be passed in the following terms:
“There will be a decree in favour of the plaintiffs as sued for in their plaint, their claim for mesne profits being limited to 33 ¾ paras of paddy per annum from 32-1-1120, with costs both here and in the Court below with interest of 6 per cent, per annum from the date of this decree, against D1 and his half share in the suit property. D1 (the appellant in A.S 37/22) will similarly have a decree for Rs. 110,/- with interest at 6 per cent, per annum thereon from 32-1-1120 against the plaintiffs and their half share in the suit property.
Mutual set off is allowed. D1 will suffer his costs in both the appeals”.
8. This second appeal is filed by defendant 1 against the above decree.
9. Three points were urged here by the appellant's counsel: They were: (i) Ext. XXVIII was supported by necessity and consideration binding on plaintiffs 1 and 2; (ii) plaintiff 2 has no right to the plaint property as he was unborn at the time of the execution of Ext. XXVIII; and (iii) the right of plaintiff 1 to get Ext. XXVIII set aside is barred by limitation under Article 34, Cochin Limitation Act, corresponding to Article 44, Indian Limitation Act.
10. The lower appellate Court has found that Ext. XXVIII was supported by consideration to the extent of Rs. 110/-. Regarding the balance amount the Courts below concurrently found that the document was not supported by consideration and necessity binding on plaintiffs 1 and 2. The findings in regard to the balance were impeached in this Court on the ground that they were opposed to the weight of the evidence in the case. In view of the concurrent findings on a question of fact, it is not open to this Court to re-examine the evidence on the question of consideration and necessity in regard to the balance amount.
11. The Courts below have duly considered the oral and documentary evidence bearing on this question, and in my opinion their findings on the point are right and proper. No question of law is involved in the consideration of this matter.
12. On the second point urged in this Court, the decision of the trial Court was in favour of defendant 1 and that of the lower appellate Court was against him. The lower appellate Court decided the point against defendant 1 on the ground that the Acts passed in British India allowing gifts in favour of unborn persons by persons governed by Hindu Law have been adopted by the community of the plaintiffs and P.W 1. The dictum in 33 Cochin LR 79 (A) was relied upon by the lower appellate Court for holding that subsequent amendments in the law made in British India could be made applicable in Cochin on proof of their adoption by the concerned community.
13. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to decide the question whether subsequent amendments to Hindu Law passed by Legislatures in British India can be made applicable in Cochin on proof of their adoption by the concerned communities here. It has been found in this case that Ext. IV took effect, and so it cannot be denied that at any rate plaintiff 1 and defendants 2 and 3 got the plaint property thereunder. It was open to the persons who thus got the plaint property to give the whole of what they got or a part of it to any other person.
14. Exhibits V, VI and X are documents executed by P.W 1 and defendants 2 and 3 and Thulasi as guardian of the minor plaintiffs in regard to the plaint property and other items comprised in Ext. IV saying, or recognizing, that plaintiff 2 was also entitled to a share in those properties. Plaintiff 1 and defendants 2 and 3 do not impeach these documents, and have accepted them as binding on them. Other documents have also been produced in this case by witch defendants 2 and 3 and plaintiff 1 have, recognized that plaintiff 2 is also entitled to a share in the properties comprised in Ext IV.
15. Exhibits V, VI and X came into existence long before Ext. XXVIII. In Ext. XXVIII itself the right of plaintiff 2 to a share in the plaint property is admitted, for it is executed on his behalf also. In the circumstances I hold that plaintiff 2 is also entitled to a share in the plaint property and that the decision of the lower appellate Court that lie had one-forth share in the plaint item is correct.
16. As regards the plea of limitation, the appellant's case is that, since Thulasi had joined in the execution of Ext. XXVIII as the guardian of plaintiffs 1 and 2, the suit should have been filed within three years of the date of its execution. Under Article 44, Indian Limitation Act (Article 34, Cochin Limitation Act) a suit by a ward who has attained majority to set aside a transfer of property by his guardian has to be filed within three years of the time the ward attains majority.
17. It is contended that Thulasi was the guardian of plaintiffs 1 and 2 at the time of the execution of Ext. XXVIII and that, since plaintiff 1 was more than 21 years old at the time of the institution of the suit, the suit in so far as he is concerned is barred by limitation. The natural guardian of plaintiffs 1 and 2 at the time of the execution of Ext. XXVIII was their father, P.W 1. It is said at p. 289 of Edn. 11 of Mayne's Hindu Law that the father is the natural guardian of his children and that this guardianship is in the nature of a sacred trust and he cannot therefore during his lifetime substitute another person to be guardian in his place.
18. On account of the fact that P.W 1 and Thulasi had both joined in the execution of Ext. XXVIII it was contended that Ext. XXVIII must be taken to have been executed on behalf of plaintiffs 1 and 2 by their natural guardian. In — ‘Narayanan Thimmulpad v. Kutty Moosa’, 21 Cochin LR 413 (B), it was hold that, in view of the recital in the document that the mother was the person who was acting as the guardian of the minors, the father could not be deemed to have represented them and that therefore the document was void as against them.
19. In Ext. XXVIII also it is stated that Thulasi, the mother, was acting as guardian of the minors. Exhibit XXVIII cannot, therefore, be taken as a document executed on behalf of the minors by their natural guardian. The appellant's counsel contended that Ext. XXVIII was at any rate a document executed on behalf of the minors by their ‘de facto’ guardian and that plaintiff I was bound to institute the suit within three years of his attaining majority. It ‘Ethilavuhi Animal v. Pethakkal’, AIR 1930 Mad 390 (C) it was held that in view of the decision of the Full Bench in — ‘Chennappa v. Onkarappa, AIR 1940 Mad 33 (D). Article 44, Indian Limitation Act has no application to a transfer of property of a Hindu minor by a dc facto guardian.
20. The reason for this is said to be that the Article applies only to a transfer by the guardian which is binding on the ward till it is set aside whereas a transfer by a ‘de facto’ guardian of a Hindu minor is not such a transfer. In — ‘Chitaleys Commentaries on Indian Limitation Act, Edn. 3, it is said at pp. 1189 and 1190:
“No doubt that ‘de facto’ guardian of a Hindu minor is entitled to transfer the minor's property for a valid necessity. It has also been held that a transfer by the guardian without such necessity it not totally void but only voidable at the option of the ward. But, it would seem that this only means that a transfer by the guardian which is not supported by necessity is capable of ratification by the minor on attaining majority and not that it is binding on him until it is set aside.
Hence, the setting aside of the transaction is not a condition precedent to the ward recovering the property from the alienee. The ward can treat the alienation as a nullity and simply sue for possession of the property. Such a suit will be governed not by this Article but by Article 142 or Article 144.”
21. In the circumstances, 1 hold that Article 44 does not apply to the present suit. The second appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.
22. Appeal dismissed.
Alert