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Kumarappan Chettiar v. Narayanan Chettiar

Madras High Court
Aug 20, 1915
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff is a puisne mortgagee under a hypothecation bond and sued for sale of the mortgaged property. The 1st defendant is the son and legal representative of the mortgagor. Other defendants (Nos. 2 to 5) claimed an interest by reason of a prior mortgage to them, who then created a sub-mortgage in favour of the 6th defendant. The 6th defendant brought a suit, obtained a decree and purchased the property at a court auction, took possession, and later sold privately to defendants Nos. 7 and 8. The plaintiff's suit was dismissed by both lower Courts on the ground that the plaintiff's mortgage was without consideration. The matter is before the High Court in a second appeal to determine (1) whether contesting defendants could raise the question of consideration; and (2) whether, when execution of the mortgage is proved and the deed contains a recital that consideration passed, the onus of proving want of consideration lies on those who attack its validity.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether any of the contesting defendants (including strangers in possession or subsequent purchasers) could raise the question of want of consideration for the plaintiff's mortgage.
  2. Whether, when the execution of the mortgage instrument is proved and it contains a recital that consideration passed, the onus of proving want of consideration lies on those who wish to attack its validity (i.e., whether the mortgagee or the attackers must prove want of consideration).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The defendants were not entitled to raise the question of want of consideration for the mortgage in his favour.
  • Even if defendants could raise the question, the onus was on them to show want of consideration; the plaintiff contended that proof of execution should entitle him to a decree when defendants failed to adduce evidence of want of consideration.
  • Reliance was placed on authorities (cited in the opinion) that, in cases of valid assignments or where the right of performance under a contract has been assigned, third parties cannot ordinarily call into question want of consideration for the assignment if the assignment is otherwise valid.

Respondents' / Defendants' Arguments and Position

  • Certain defendants (not parties to the mortgage transaction) claimed title to the property as prior mortgagees and/or as auction-purchasers in possession for over 12 years; they contested the plaintiff's claim by denying that any debt was due and asserting that the plaintiff's mortgage lacked consideration.
  • Defendants contended that, as strangers to the mortgage transaction and being in possession or claiming title, they were entitled to put the plaintiff to strict proof of both execution and consideration.
  • Lower Courts found (on the facts) that Exhibit A (the mortgage) was executed by the mortgagor but no consideration passed; the District Munsif and the Subordinate Judge expressed views suggesting the bond was colourable/nominal, although no specific issue on sham/collusion was framed at trial.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bamaswami Chettiar v. Sundara Reddiar, 23 Ind. Cas. 805 Rule: A mortgage without consideration is a nullity and creates no charge on the property as against a subsequent purchaser. The court adheres to this view and treats a mortgage without consideration as inoperative against subsequent purchasers or persons in possession.
Chinnan v. Ramachandra, 15 M. 54 Contains observations suggesting that if execution of a conveyance is proved, further evidence of consideration is not always necessary against third persons. The court notes these observations as not directly decisive here and points out they conflict with the Ramaswami Chettiar view; acknowledges the case may be relevant where a transfer is shown to be colourable.
Bisheswar Dayal v. Harbans Sahay, 6 C.L.J. 659 : 3 M.L.T. 38 Rule: When a mortgage is contested by a stranger who denies execution and asserts lack of consideration, the onus is on the plaintiff to prove his case; recitals of consideration are good evidence but not conclusive as against strangers. The court accepts and follows this view, citing it as consistent with Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act and as applicable where a stranger contests the mortgage.
Babu v. Sita Ram, 25 Ind. Cas. 426 : 36 A. 478 : 12 A.L.J. 806 Contains observations that are not easily reconciled with the view in Bisheswar Dayal; notes the peculiar position of a stranger purchaser without notice was not fully examined in that case. The court references it only to observe that its remarks are not decisive for the present situation regarding a stranger purchaser's position.
Janki Das v. Ahmad Husain Khan, 25 A. 159 : A.W.N. (1902) 218 Supports the view that where a mortgage is contested by a stranger asserting no consideration, the onus lies on the mortgagee/plaintiff. The court cites it as a similar authority consistent with the rule adopted in this opinion.
Saluk Singh v. Ajudhya Pershad, 15 Ind. Cas. 121 : 10 A.L.J. 108 Supports the position that onus lies on the mortgagee when a stranger contests want of consideration. Used as supporting authority for the court's acceptance of that rule.
Bhagwat Dayal Singh v. Debi Dayal Sahu, 33 C. 420 : 12 C.W.N. 393 : 10 Bom. L.R. 230 : 7 C.L.J. 335 : 5 A.L.J. 184 : 18 M.L.J. 100 : 3 M.L.T. 344 : 14 Bur. L.R. 49 (P.C.) Decides that where the right of performance under a contract has been validly assigned, a third party cannot call into question want of consideration for the assignment if the assignment is otherwise valid in law. The court regards this line of authority as distinguishable from the present case (which concerns a mortgage without consideration and strangers in possession) and does not treat it as controlling here.
Achal Ram v. Kazim Husain Khan, 27 A. 271 (P.C.) : 9 C.W.N. 477 : 8 O.C. 155 : 15 M.L.J. 197 : 32 I.A.13 : 8 Sar. P.C. J. 772 Addresses principles concerning assignments and rights of assignees vis-à-vis third parties (cited with other assignment cases). The court treats it as part of the body of assignment/transfer cases that are distinguishable from the present mortgage-without-consideration issue involving strangers.
Adaikulam Chetti v. Subban Chetti, 26 Ind. Cas. 35 : 27 M.L.J. 621 : (1914) M.W.N. 684 : 16 M.L.T. 279 Another authority concerning transfer/assignment principles and their effect on third parties. Regarded by the court as distinguishable and not controlling the present dispute.
Dowlat Rai v. Khub Lal Singh, 22 Ind. Cas. 645 Confirms the view that in assignments the non-payment of purchase-money does not, by itself, vitiate the transaction as against third parties when the transfer is otherwise valid. Used to distinguish assignment cases (where recitals of consideration may bind) from mortgage cases where lack of consideration may negate any charge.
Ismail Mussajee Mookerdam v. Hafiz Boo, 33 C. 773 : 10 C.W.N. 570 : 3 A.L.J. 353 : 3 C.L.J. 484 : 8 Bora. L.R. 370 : 16 M.L.J. 166 : 1 M.L.T. 137 : 33 I.A. 86 (P.C.) Holds that a transaction may be viewed as a gift with an imaginary consideration inserted where there was no intention to demand payment. The court cites it to show that non-receipt of consideration may indicate a gift and to support the principle that a mortgage is prima facie security for a debt and lacks force where no debt exists.
Ramaswami Chettiar (also cited as Ramaswami Ghettiar) v. Sundara Reddiar, 23 Ind. Cas. 805 Holds that the extent of the charge is prima facie measured by the actual consideration; where there is no consideration there is prima facie no charge. The court regards this as laying down the sounder rule and follows it: without consideration a mortgage prima facie creates no charge enforceable against persons in possession or subsequent purchasers.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by identifying two central questions: (1) whether contesting defendants (including strangers in possession and subsequent purchasers) could raise want of consideration; and (2) where execution of the mortgage is proved and the deed recites that consideration passed, on whom the onus of proving want of consideration rests.

On the first question the court held that it is open to third persons in possession of the property — who are sought to be deprived of possession by a mortgagee's suit for sale — to require the mortgagee to prove that any debt is due to him. The court reasoned that such third parties were not parties to the mortgage transaction, and any admission by the mortgagor, so far as they are concerned, is only a piece of evidence in favour of the mortgagee and not conclusive against third parties.

On the second question the court accepted the view expressed by Mookerjee, J., in Bisheswar Dayal v. Harbans Sahay: when a mortgage is contested by a stranger who denies execution or asserts that there was no consideration, the onus is on the plaintiff to prove execution and consideration. The court observed that recitals of consideration in a deed are good evidence and presumed true until rebutted as against the maker, but an execution purchaser or other stranger is entitled to call upon the plaintiff to prove both execution and that consideration passed. The court expressly invoked Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act in support of this approach (as cited in the opinion).

The court reviewed conflicting authorities. It adhered to the view (in Ramaswami/Bamaswami Chettiar v. Sundara Reddiar) that a mortgage without consideration is a nullity and creates no charge on the property as against a subsequent purchaser. It found other authorities concerning assignments and transfers (where non-payment of purchase-money may not vitiate the transfer as against strangers) distinguishable from the present mortgage context. The court also noted the Privy Council decision in Ismail Mussajee which illustrated that non-receipt of consideration may point to a gift; this supported the court's conclusion that a mortgage is prima facie security for a debt and cannot be enforced where no debt exists.

The court thus combined factual findings of the lower courts (that the mortgage was executed but no consideration passed) with the above legal principles to conclude that, where a puisne incumbrancer or person in possession shows there was no debt, the mortgagee cannot obtain an order for sale of the property.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The second appeal is DISMISSED and the judgment below is affirmed; costs were awarded against the appellant (the plaintiff).

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the plaintiff's claim for sale of the mortgaged property fails on the finding that the mortgage was without consideration; the lower Courts' rulings are upheld.
  • The court reaffirmed and applied established principles that (a) a mortgage without consideration is prima facie a nullity and creates no enforceable charge against subsequent purchasers or persons in possession, and (b) where a stranger contests a mortgage by denying execution or asserting want of consideration, the onus rests on the mortgagee/plaintiff to prove execution and that consideration passed (consistent with the court's reading of authorities and Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act).
  • The opinion distinguishes assignment/sale authorities (where non-payment of purchase-money does not necessarily vitiate a transfer as against third parties) from the mortgage context; it does not attempt to create a novel rule but applies and prefers existing authorities that treat no-consideration mortgages as inoperative against third parties.

This summary is drawn exclusively from the text of the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond what the opinion itself states.

Show all summary ...

1. The plaintiff is a puisne mortgagee under a hypothecation bond and he sued for sale of the mortgaged property. The 1st defendant is the son and legal representative of the mortgagor. The remaining defendants were impleaded as claiming an interest in the property by reason of a prior mortgage to defendants Nos. 2 to 5, a sub-mortgage by them to 6th defendant, a suit brought by 6th defendant followed by a decree and a sale of the mortgaged property in Court auction, and lastly a private sale by 6th defendant to defendants Nos. 7 and 8.

2. Both the lower Courts held that the plaintiff's mortgage was without consideration and dismissed his suit. The questions that arise in second appeal are (1) whether it was open to any of the contesting defendants to raise the question of consideration, (2) whether, when the execution of the mortgage instrument is proved and it contains a recital that consideration passed, the onus of proving want of consideration does not lie on the persons who wish to attack its validity.

3. From the District Munsif's remark, in paragraph 11 of his judgment, about the plaint bond being a colourable one and the Subordinate Judge's remark, in paragraph 6 of his judgment, about its being nominal and fraudulent, I am inclined to think that, if the issue had bean so worded, they would have declared the instrument to be a sham and collusive document; but as there was no issue on this point, we must see whether the plaintiff is entitled to succeed on the Subordinate Judge's finding that Exhibit A was indeed executed by 1st defendant's father but that no consideration passed.

4. I adhere to the view taken by Tyabji, J., and myself in Bamaswami Chettiar v. Sundara Reddiar 23 Ind. Cas. 805 that a mortgage without consideration is a nullity, and so inoperative, and that it creates no charge on the property as against a subsequent purchaser. Reliance is placed on certain observations in Chinnan v. Ramachandra 15 M. 54 for the contrary view. Even in that case when the mortgagor was made a party to that suit, as the mortgagor's legal representative is a party to this suit, and when it was found that it was not intended that the plaintiff should take any interest under his assignment, the suit failed. The point that arises here can hardly be said to have been directly decided in Chinnan v. Ramachandra 15 M. 54. The plaintiff in that suit was a sub-mortgagee and seems to have been treated on the footing of a bona fide transferee of the mortgage interest.

5.On the second point 1 agree with the view expressed by Mookerjee, J., in Bisheswar Dayal v. Harbans Sahay 6 C.L.J. 659 : 3 M.L.T. 38 that when a suit upon a mortgage is contested by a stranger, who denies that the bond was executed and also asserts that the mortgage was devoid of consideration, the onus is on the plaintiff to prove his case. His further observation, as regards the recitals in the deed, that consideration has been paid being good evidence and being presumed to be true, till the contrary is proved, as against the maker, but that an execution purchaser who knows nothing about it is entitled to call upon the plaintiff to prove not only its execution but that there was consideration for it, commends itself as just and in accordance with the provisions of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act.

6. In Babu v. Sita Ram 25 Ind Cas. 426 : 36 A. 478 : 12 A.L.J. 806 where some observations occur not easily to be reconciled with the above, the peculiar position of a stranger who purchases without notice has not been so carefully examined.

7. I dismiss this second appeal with costs.

Kumaraswami Sastri, J.

8. Plaintiff is the appellant. The 1st defendant's father, who was the owner of the suit property, mortgaged it to defendants Nos. 2 to 5 and they created a sub-mortgage in favour of the 6th defendant. The 6th defendant sued defendants Nos. 2 to 5 and 1st defendant's father and a decree was passed, in execution of which the decree-holder himself purchased the property; Although the suit was by a submortgagee, the mortgaged property seems to have been sold and not the mortgage interest of defendants Nos. 2 to 5. The 6th defendant, however, took possession of the property and has been in possession and enjoyment. The 7th and 8th defendants subsequently purchased the 6th defendant's interest. The plaintiff-appellant sues as the second mortgagee and his claim is resisted by the 7th and 8th defendants. Both the lower Courts found that the mortgage sued on was not supported by consideration.

9. It is argued for the appellant that it was not open to the defendants to raise the question as to want of consideration for the mortgage in his favour and, assuming that it was open, the onus is on them to show that there was want of consideration, the plaintiff being entitled to a decree on proof of execution, on the failure of defendants to adduce evidence as to want of consideration. It is to be remembered that in the preseut case the defendants claim to be prior mortgagees, and also claim title to the mortgaged property by virtue of the Court sale and possession for over 12 years as auction-purchasers. I am of opinion that it is open to third persons in possession of properties, which a e sought to be sold for non-satisfaction of an alleged mortgage, to put the plaintiff to the proof that any debt is due to him. They were not parties to the mortgage transaction and, even assuming that the mortgagor admits or does not dispute the claim, his admission so far as they are concerned, can only be treated as apiece of evidence in favour of the mortgagee, and not as conclusive against third parties. In Bisheswar Dayal v. Harbans Sahay 6 C.L.J. 659 : 3 M.L.T. 38 it was held that, where a mortgage is contested by a stranger who asserts that there was no consideration for it, the onus is on the mortgagee to prove his case. Mr. Justice Mookerjee observes as follows:

No doubt, if the suit is contested by the mortgagor and execution is admitted by or proved against him, the onus lies upon him to prove that the recitals as to the payment of consideration for the deed which he executed are untrue. When, however, the suit is contested by a stranger who denies that the bond was executed and also asserts that there was no consideration for the mortgage, the onus is elearly upon the plaintiff to prove hi case.

10. I entirely agree with Mr. Justice Mookerjee, A similar view was taken in Janki Das v. Ahmad Husain Khan 25 A. 159 : A.W.N. (1902) 218 and Saluk Singh v. Ajudhya Pershad 15 Ind. Cas. 121 : 10 A.L.J. 108. Reference has been made by the appellant's Vakil to Bhagwat Dayal Singh v. Debi Dayal Sahu 33 C. 420 : 12 C.W.N. 393 : 10 Bom. L.R. 230 : 7 C.L.J. 335 : 5 A.L.J. 184 : 18 M.L.J. 100 : 3 M.L.T. 344 : 14 Bur. L.R. 49 (P.C.); Achal Ram v. Kazim Husain Khan 27 A. 271 (P.C) : 9 C.W.N. 477 : 8 O.C. 155 : 15 M.L.J. 197 : 32 I.A.13 : 8 Sar. P.C. J. 772 and to Adaikulam Chetti v. Subban Chetti 26 Ind. Cas. 35 : 27 M.L.J. 621 : (1914) M.W.N. 684 : 16 M.L.T. 279. I think these cases are distinguishable from the present one. All that they decide is that, where the right of performance under a contract has been assigned, it is not open to the obligee to call into question want of consideration for the assignment, if the assignment is, in other respects, valid in law. This is the view taken in Dowlat Rai v. Khub Lal Singh 22 Ind. Cas. 645. It is well established that, in cases of sales and assignments, mere non-payment of purchase-money would not vitiate the transaction, and in such cases, as remarked by the Privy Council, so long as the deed stands, it is no concern of a person, who was no party to the transaction, to call in question the non-payment of consideration. Where the transfer itself is impeached, on the ground of its being a colourable transaction, or of its being otherwise invalid in law, different considerations will prevail and Chinnan v. Ramachandra 15 M. 54 and the other cases cited show, that want of consideration may be proved as part of other circumstances which go to show that the instrument is a colourable transaction and not intended to convey any interest to the ostensible purchaser or confer any title on him.

11. It is next contended for the appellant that, if there was no consideration for the mortgage sued on, the transaction would still hold good in the absence of any proof that it was a colourable or sham transaction. I am unable to accept this contention. In Ramaswami Chettiar v. Sundara Reddiar 23 Ind. Cas. 805 it was held by Spencer and Tyabji, JJ., that the extent of the charge on the property would prima facie be measured by the actual consideration for securing which the charge was created and, where there was no consideration, there was prima facie no charge. With these remarks I concur. In the case of sales, when there is an intention to pass property, the non-receipt of consideration does not hinder the vesting of property. Sagaji V. Namdev 23 B. 525 : 1 Bom. L.R. 5. Again, as pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Ismail Mussajee Mookerdam v. Hafiz Boo 33 C. 773 : 10 C.W.N. 570 : 3 A.L.J. 353 : 3 C.L.J. 484 : 8 Bora. L.R. 370 : 16 M.L.J. 166 : 1 M.L.T. 137 : 33 I.A. 86 (P.C) the transaction may be viewed as a gift with an imaginary consideration inserted when there was no intention of demanding payment. Reference has been made to the observations in Chinnan v. Ramachandra 15 M. 54 that if the execution of a mortgage or other conveyance is proved, further evidence is not necessary to show that the purchaser has taken the interest which the document purports to convey, and that it is not necessary for him to prove, as against a third person, that consideration passed. These observations are no doubt in conflict with the ruling of a Bench of this High Court above referred to, but with great deference I think that the decision in Ramaswami Ghettiar v. Sundara Reddiar 23 Ind. Cas. 805 lays down the sounder rule. A mortgage is prima facie security for a debt, and, where the debt does not exist, it is difficult to see how the security can be enforced. Where, therefore, a puisne incumbrancer or a person in possession of mortgaged property and claiming title there to, succeeds in showing that there was no debt, it is difficult to see how the property can be ordered to be sold. It may, perhaps, be open to the mortgagee to show that, though the consideration was recited in the document, the intention of the mortgagor was to benefit the mortgagee to the extent to which the fictitious consideration was recited, but that is not the case here, and if any such case is sought to be made out, the onus clearly is on the mortgagee.

12. I am of opinion that the decision of the lower Court is correct and dismiss the second appeal with costs.