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Kandula Ramayya v. Bangaru Rangaraju And Ors.

Madras High Court
Dec 7, 1936
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Factual and Procedural Background

This batch of revision petitions challenges an order for rateable distribution of sale proceeds realised in execution of a decree in O.S. No. 23 of 1931 passed by the Subordinate Judge of Narasapur. The petitioner (the decree-holder in O.S. No. 23 of 1931) contends that the sale proceeds are not liable to be distributed because a compromise decree created a charge on two immovable properties (a house at Palakole and 2 acres 4 cents of land at Palakole) as security for repayment of Rs. 9,192-9-0 due on a promissory note.

Procedural facts: The petitioner sued Chunduri Panakala Rao (the father) and his three sons (defendants 2–4) in O.S. No. 23 of 1931 to recover the sum due on the promissory note. The suit alleged the debt was contracted by the father for a necessary purpose and therefore binding on the sons; it prayed for a decree against the father personally and against the joint family properties in the hands of the other defendants. The suit was compromised and a decree in terms of the compromise was passed on 5 February 1932, creating the aforementioned charge as security. The charged property was attached and sold in July 1933, and sale proceeds were deposited into Court on 5 and 17 July 1933. Several other decree-holders (some holding decrees against the father alone; some against the father and sons) applied for rateable distribution of the proceeds. The Subordinate Judge held that because the compromise decree had not been registered as required by Section 17, Clause 2(6) of the Registration Act, the charge could not prevail. The petitioner impugns that order by way of revision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the compromise decree in O.S. No. 23 of 1931, which created a charge on specific immovable properties, was required to be registered under Section 17, Clause 2(6) of the Registration Act (i.e., whether the charged immovable properties were the "subject-matter of the suit" so as to fall outside the registration exemption).
  2. Whether decree-holders who have decrees against the father alone can be treated as holders of decrees against the same judgment-debtors as those holding decrees against the father and sons for the purposes of Section 73, Civil Procedure Code (i.e., whether they are to be treated as claiming under the same judgment-debtors for rateable distribution).
  3. Whether an application for rateable distribution made after the sale proceeds were deposited disentitles a decree-holder to rateable distribution (in the specific context of three decrees where timing of the application relative to the deposit was in dispute).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as summarized in the opinion)

  • The sale proceeds are not liable to rateable distribution because a charge was created in favour of the petitioner by the compromise decree in O.S. No. 23 of 1931 over two specified immovable properties.
  • The compromise decree creating this charge need not be registered (or should prevail) because, according to authorities relied upon by counsel, such decrees or decrees passed on compromise may bind the immovable property even if registration formalities were not complied with.
  • Seven decree-holders held decrees against the father alone; because the petitioner's decree was against the father and sons, those decrees cannot be treated as decrees against the same judgment-debtors within Section 73, Civil Procedure Code.
  • In relation to three specific decrees, the application for rateable distribution was made after the entire sale proceeds were deposited, and therefore those holders should not be entitled to rateable distribution.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamindari Co. (1919) 37 M.L.J. 525; L.R. 46 I.A. 240; I.L.R. 47 Cal. 485 (P.C.) Held that a decree incorporating an agreement of compromise could be admissible in evidence in regard to lands outside the suit without the bar of registration (i.e., earlier approach to decrees on compromise affecting immovable property outside the suit). The Court observed the 1929 amendment (Transfer of Property (Amendment) Supplementary Act, 1929, s.10) superseded the decision in this case; the Court therefore treats that Privy Council decision as overridden by statute for the present issue.
Ram Dhun Dhur v. Mohesh Chunder Chowdhary (1882) I.L.RR. 9 Cal. 406 Illustrates that a decree against representatives of a deceased (de bonis testatoris) is in effect a money decree (a personal decree) and does not create a charge upon the property. The Court cites Wilson, J.'s explanation to support the proposition that a decree directing satisfaction out of assets is still essentially a personal money decree and does not of itself create a charge over specific immovable property.
Narayanan Chetti v. Veerappa Chetti (1916) 31 M.L.J. 386; I.L.R. 40 Mad. 581 Explains the purpose of joinder of the son with the father in suits to enforce payment of father's debt (to enable enforcement against joint family property and to prevent son from contesting in execution). The Court relied on this explanation to hold that joinder of sons does not make the joint family immovable property the subject-matter of the suit; impleading sons aims at enabling enforcement, not asserting title to specific immovables.
Ramaswami Pillai v. T.C.C. Bank, Ltd. (1935) 69 M.L.J. 447 Distinguishes when the doctrine of lis pendens applies: if properties are unspecified or merely enumerated to fix quantum, lis pendens does not apply; if property is sufficiently designated and directly the subject-matter, lis pendens applies. The Court adopted the principle to support the view that immovable property must be sufficiently designated in the pleadings to be the subject-matter of the suit; absent that, lis pendens and related consequences do not follow.
Municipal Council, Karaikudi v. Thirumalai Aiyangar (1935) 69 M.L.J. 221 Indicates that immovable property must be sufficiently designated to form the subject-matter of litigation. The Court cited this authority to reinforce its conclusion that unspecified general claims against a person or family do not make particular immovable properties the subject-matter of the suit.
Seetharamanujacharyulu v. Venkatasubbamma (1930) 59 M.L.J. 485; I.L.R. 54 Mad. 132 at 149 Where no charge is claimed on any specific immovable property (only a general claim), a decree creating a charge on a specific immovable would ordinarily take effect only from the date of the decree; differs where plaint claims charge on specific property. The Court used this distinction to show that a general money claim / claim against the family estate does not make specific immovable property subject-matter of the suit for purposes of creating an earlier charge.
Bazayet Hossein v. Dooli Chund (1878) L.R. 5 I.A. 211; I.L.R. 4 Cal. 402 (P.C.) Held that a mortgage executed during pendency of litigation could be subject to lis pendens where the estate was the subject-matter of the litigation (facts involved widow suing to set aside instrument, claiming possession and dower to be paid out of estate). The Court distinguished this decision on its facts and held it cannot be taken as authority for the proposition that every decree against assets of a deceased person or joint family property automatically makes subsequent alienations subject to lis pendens.
Ramanathan Chettiar v. Subramania Sastrial (1902) 12 M.L.J. 276; I.L.R. 26 Mad. 179 Held that where there is a decree against the father and a decree against the father and sons and the property sold is joint family property, the judgment-debtors must be held to be the same for the purpose of Section 73, Civil Procedure Code. The Court relied on this authority (and subsequent followings) to hold that decree-holders against the father alone and those against the father and sons are to be treated as holding decrees against the same judgment-debtors for Sec. 73 CPC purposes.
Pappu Reddiar v. Pichu Aiyar (1935) 42 L.W. 435 (Full Bench) Followed the view that decrees against father alone and against father and sons may be treated as against same judgment-debtors where property is joint family property. The Court cited it as following Ramanathan Chettiar and as supporting the holding on Section 73 CPC.
Swaminatha Aiyar v. Saivu Rowthan (1935) 43 L.W. 624 Adopted a similar view on the identity of judgment-debtors in the joint-family context (cited by the Court). The Court recorded that it had taken the same view in that reported case, applying it to the present Section 73 issue.
Palaniappa Chettiar v. Palani Goundan (1936) 71 M.L.J. 541 Illustrative of the same line of authority treating decrees against father alone and against father and sons as relating to same judgment-debtors where joint family property is concerned. The Court cited this decision as one that follows the same principle and as part of the supporting authorities for the Section 73 conclusion.
Arunachellam Chettiar v. Kalayappa Chettiar (1937) 1 M.L.J. 180 (C.R.P. No. 1343 of 1934) A decision (Horwill, J.) cited as indicating a contrary view—that a decree against the father alone might not be treated as a decree obtained against the father for a debt binding on the son. The Court acknowledged this contrary view but rejected it as determinative, holding instead that so long as the decree stands and the sold property is joint family property, the identity of judgment-debtors is to be recognized for Sec. 73.
Muthiah Chetty v. Alagappa Chetty (1918) M.W.N. 520 Referenced on the question of the timing of an application for rateable distribution and whether it was made before or after deposit of sale proceeds. The Court cited this authority to support the proposition that it is a factual question whether an application was made prior to deposit and accordingly remanded the question for determination as to three specific decrees.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court approached the primary question—whether the compromise decree's charge could prevail despite non-registration—by interpreting Section 17, Clause 2(6) of the Registration Act and the phrase "subject-matter of the suit." The Court observed that Clause 2(6) exempts decrees and orders of Court from registration except where the decree or order is expressed to be made on a compromise and comprises immovable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding. The relevant amendment introducing this exception was noted as Section 10 of the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Supplementary Act, 1929.

The Court reasoned that the clause contemplates specific immovable property being the subject-matter of litigation. That is, for an immovable to be treated as the subject-matter there must be a claim or right in the specific immovable property asserted in the litigation and relief sought in respect of that property. A mere money claim or a claim to have a liability satisfied out of the general estate does not render specific immovable property the subject-matter of the suit.

Applying this principle to the facts, the Court concluded the plaint in O.S. No. 23 of 1931 did not seek title to any immovable property nor enforcement of any lien, nor did it describe any particular property in the plaint; rather, the subject-matter was the money claim on the promissory note. The joinder of the sons with the father was characterized as a procedural device (to enable enforcement against joint family property and prevent the sons from disputing in execution) and did not transform the character of the claim into one that directly concerned specific immovable properties.

In support of this analytical framework the Court relied on authorities distinguishing between (a) suits that plead and seek charges over specifically described immovables (where lis pendens and other consequences follow), and (b) suits that merely pray for satisfaction from the general estate without specifying property (where those consequences do not follow). The Court rejected reliance on the earlier Privy Council authority (Hemanta Kumari Debi) to the extent it conflicted, noting the 1929 statutory amendment superseded that decision.

Consequently, because the charged immovable properties were not the subject-matter of the original suit, the Court held the decree required registration under Section 17, Clause 2(6) and therefore the unregistered charge could not prevail.

On the Section 73, Civil Procedure Code point, the Court analysed the identity of judgment-debtors. It held that where some decrees are against the father alone and others are against the father and sons, and it is admitted the property sold was joint family property of which the father and sons were undivided members, the judgment-debtors must be treated as the same for the purposes of Section 73 CPC. The Court relied on established authority to conclude the creditors with decrees against the father alone could enforce against joint family property (including sons' shares) until the sons take exception.

Finally, as to three specific decrees, the Court found that the factual determination of whether the application for rateable distribution was made before or after deposit of sale proceeds was unresolved. The lower Judge had assumed the application preceded the deposit; the Court held there was no warrant for that assumption and remanded the question for fact-finding and appropriate disposal.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

  • The compromise decree's charge on the two immovable properties cannot prevail because the immovable properties charged were not the subject-matter of the suit, and therefore the decree required registration under Section 17, Clause 2(6) of the Registration Act.
  • Decree-holders with decrees against the father alone are to be treated as holding decrees against the same judgment-debtors as those holding decrees against the father and sons for the purpose of Section 73, Civil Procedure Code, where the property sold is admitted to be joint family property.
  • The order of the Subordinate Judge is confirmed except insofar as it relates to three specific decrees as to which the matter is remanded for factual determination whether the application for rateable distribution was made before deposit of sale proceeds.
  • Accordingly, the revision petitions (except C.R.P. Nos. 815 of 1934, 816 of 1934 and 818 of 1934) fail and are dismissed. The petitioner is ordered to pay Rs. 20 as advocate's fees in each dismissed petition. In C.R.P. Nos. 815 of 1934, 816 of 1934 and 818 of 1934 no order as to costs is made.

Implications:

Direct consequence for the parties: the petitioner's claim to a prior charge over the sale proceeds is defeated because registration was required and not done; therefore the sale proceeds are subject to rateable distribution among decree-holders as determined by the Court, subject to the remanded factual inquiry in respect of three applications. The Court did not purport to create a new general rule beyond applying statutory interpretation and existing authorities; its conclusions rest on statutory construction of Section 17(2)(6) and application of prior case law to the facts.

This summary is compiled exclusively from the provided opinion. No information beyond that opinion has been added.

Show all summary ...

1. This batch of revision petitions arises out of an order for rateable distribution of the sale proceeds of property realised in execution of a decree in O.S. No. 23 of 1931 passed by the Subordinate Judge of Narasapur. This order is impeached by the petitioner the decree-holder in the said suit, on the ground that the sale proceeds are not liable to be distributed. To appreciate the contentions raised on his behalf by his learned Counsel Mr. Suryanarayana, a few facts may be necessary. The petitioner filed the said O.S. No. 23 of 1931 against one Chunduri Panakala Rao and his three sons to recover a sum of Rs. 9,192-9-0 on foot of a promissory note executed by the said Chunduri Panakala Rao in his favour. It is admitted that the said Chunduri Panakala Rao and his three sons who are defendants 2 to 4 in that suit form members of an undivided Hindu family. The allegation in the plaint is that the debt was contracted by the father for a necessary purpose and therefore the debt is binding on the sons. The prayer in the plaint is that a decree may be passed against the first defendant, the father personally and against the joint family properties in the hands of the other defendants. This suit was compromised and a decree was passed in terms of the said compromise on the 5th February, 1932. In and by the said decree the defendants were directed to pay the amount decreed in two instalments and as security for the due re-payment of the said sum a charge was created oh two items of immovable property specified in the schedule thereto, namely, a house in Palakole and 2 acres and 4 cents of land in the same place. On the 5th July, 1933, the said property was attached and brought to sale and one-fourth of the sale proceeds were deposited on the 5th July and the remaining sale proceeds were deposited on the 17th July, 1933. Several decree-holders, some of whom obtained decrees against the father alone and some of whom obtained decrees against the father and the sons, filed applications for rateable distribution of the said sale proceeds. The petitioner contended that no question of rateable distribution arose in view of the fact that a charge was created in his favour in and by virtue of the said decree in O.S. No. 23 of 1931. This contention is pressed before me by his learned Counsel. This contention was negatived by the Subordinate Judge on the ground that the said decree not having been registered as required by Section 17, Clause 2(6) of the Registration Act, the charge cannot prevail. The question is whether this view is sound. Section 17, Clause 2(6) of the Registration Act exempts some documents from registration among others decrees and orders of Court and the clause relating to the same runs thus:

Any decree or order of a Court (except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immovable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding).

2. It will be seen that while the clause exempts decrees and orders of Court from registration it provides an exception so far as decrees or orders passed on a compromise and comprising immovable property which is not the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding which has been compromised. This exception, it may be noticed, was introduced in 1929 by Section 10 of the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Supplementary Act, 1929. Before the amendment, the Privy Council in Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamindari Co. (1919) 37 M.L.J. 525 : L.R. 46 I.A. 240 : I.L.R. 47 Cal. 485 (P.C.) observed that where an agreement of compromise comprised lands not included in the suit and a decree was passed in accordance therewith incorporating the whole agreement, the decree will be admissible in evidence in regard to lands outside the purview of suit without the bar of registration. The effect of the amendment is to supersede the decision in the said case. The question therefore is whether the two items of immovable property which have been charged by the compromise decree in O.S. No. 23 of 1931 can be said to be the subject-matter of the said suit. The expression 'subject-matter of the suit' is not defined in the Registration Act. It seems to me that what the clause contemplates is that specific immovable property must be the subject-matter of litigation. There must be a claim or right in or to the specific immovable property asserted in the litigation and relief sought in respect thereof in order to make the said property the subject-matter of a suit. A claim to have a liability satisfied out of the general estate of a person is not enough; in such a case it cannot be said that all the movable and immovable property belonging to him forms the subject of litigation and therefore the subject-matter of a suit. In Ram Dhun Dhur v. Mohesh Chunder Chowdhary (1882) I.L.RR. 9 Cal. 406 a testator by his will directed payment of all his debts, and subject thereto devised his property to his heirs. One of the debts specified in the will was due to one Ram Jibun. Ram Jibun obtained a decree against the heirs in their representative capacity as heirs of the testator which by its terms was to be satisfied out of the assets left by him. One of the heirs subsequent to the decree executed a mortgage of his share of property. The question was whether the mortgage was subject to the decree. Wilson, J., holding it was not, thus explains the nature of the decree:

The decree which was against the representatives of the original owner of the property in question declares that the property of the original owner is liable. But the decree is in the ordinary form of a decree made in a suit against the representative of a deceased person. It is a decree which is known to English lawyers as de bonis testatoris, a decree which by its terms is to be satisfied out of the assets left by the deceased person. It appears thus that it has no other effect than as a mere money decree, and has not the effect of creating a charge upon the property.

3. Where a claim is made against a legal representative of a deceased on a promissory note executed by him the claim is really one in personam though the decree is sought against the assets left by the deceased. It is really a personal decree against the legal representatives but the extent of his liability is defined by the decree directing that it is limited to the assets of the deceased person and recoverable only from such assets. A claim in personam does not necessarily mean that the claim should be enforced by the arrest of the person. A claim which can be satisfied out of the general estate of a person is nevertheless a claim in personam. Where therefore a claim is made on a pronote executed by the father and the sons are impleaded as parties the character of the claim is not changed. The object of impleading the sons is to have it declared that in respect of the claim sued on they are under a pious obligation to discharge the same. If that declaration is obtained by the creditor he would be entitled to proceed against the entire joint family property in the hands of the father. Hindu law annexes the liability in consequence of the declaration made by the decree that the sons are liable for the debt. In fact the decree does not determine whether joint family property exists or not and if any property is joint family property or not. In Narayanan Chetti v. Veerappa Chetti (1916) 31 M.L.J. 386 : I.L.R. 40 Mad. 581, Ayling and Srinivasa Aiyangar, JJ., thus explain the principle underlying the joinder of the son:

The joinder of the son with the father in a suit to enforce payment of the father's debt is for the purpose of enabling the Court to exercise the power which the father had of selling family property including his son's share, to pay his own private debts provided they were not illegal or immoral, and to prevent the son from questioning the nature of the debt, in execution, in the event of the decree against the father being executed by attachment and sale of the family property including the son's share.

4. Therefore the prayer in O.S. No. 23 of 1931 which seeks to enforce the liability of the father against the sons by a decree against the assets of the family does not make the immovable property of the joint family, the subject-matter of the suit. No title to the immovable property is claimed in the suit, nor the enforcement of any lien in regard thereto and no particular property is described in the suit and therefore can be said to have been made the subject-matter of the litigation. The subject-matter of the suit is the claim on the pronote, that is, a money claim. A number of cases have been relied on by Mr. Suryanarayana. They are mostly cases relating to maintenance claims by Hindu widows. In such cases questions have often arisen whether an alienation pendente lite will be subject to the ultimate decree in the suit charging specific immovable property. Distinction is drawn between cases where the plaint specifies all the property and prays that a charge may be created over the whole or a part thereof and where the plaint does not specify any property and simply prays that the amount fixed by the decree may be made payable from and out of the joint family property of the persons against whom the relief is claimed. Where the plaint prays to have a charge declared it has been held that alienations pending the suit will be subject to the doctrine of lis pendens. But where no such relief is sought there is no question of lis pendens. In a recent decision in Ramaswami Pillai v. T.C.C. Bank, Ltd. (1935) 69 M.L.J. 447, Ramesam and Venkatasubba Rao, JJ., put the principle thus:

If the properties are not specified or if they are enumerated merely for enabling the Court to fix the quantum of maintenance, in either case the doctrine will have no application, but if the property is sufficiently designated so as to make it directly and specifically the subject-matter of the litigation the fact that the charge is claimed over all the properties of the family; can make no difference.

5. Thus it will be seen that before immovable property can form the subject of a litigation, it must be sufficiently designated Vide Municipal Council, Karaikudi v. Thirumalai Aiyangar (1935) 69 M.L.J. 221. Else no question of lis pendens will arise. The same view is indicated in Seetharamanujacharyulu v. Venkatasubbamma (1930) 59 M.L.J. 485 : I.L.R. 54 Mad. 132 at 149:

Where no charge is claimed on any specific immovable property, but only a general claim is made against the defendant (manager) and the joint family property generally, without specifying in the plaint any property, then, in such cases, a decree creating a charge on any specific immovable property would take effect ordinarily only from the date of the decree; but the case would be different when the plaint claims a charge on specific immovable property and the decree also grants such a prayer and charges such specific property.

6. Considerable reliance was placed on the decision of the Privy Council in Bazayet Hossein v. Dooli Chund (1878) L.R. 5 I.A. 211 : I.L.R. 4 Cal. 402 (P.C.). In that case a widow sued for dower against one of the heirs of her husband and a decree was passed in her favour directing the same to be paid out of the estate of her husband. The Judicial Committee held in that case that a mortgage executed during the pendency of that litigation would be subject to the doctrine of lis pendens but the decision must be considered with reference to the facts of the particular case. The suit was filed by the widow against the son who claimed exclusive title to the whole estate under a mokurrari alleged to have been executed by the husband of the widow and the father of the defendant. The widow there sued to set aside the mokurrari under which the son claimed to be entitled to the whole estate from his father, to declare that he was a mere stranger and they also prayed for an order that possession of the estate should be recovered by them and that the dower which they claimed should be paid out of the estate. Though the other prayers were negatived, the last prayer was given. In such circumstances their Lordships held that the doctrine of lis pendens will apply thereby indicating that the estate of the husband was the subject-matter of the litigation and therefore there was a right to specific immovable property in question in the suit. It is also clear from their approval of the observations of Phear, J., in the lower Court in that case:

I need hardly say that a decree of this kind directing the person in whose hands the property was to account for it in order that it might be applied for the purpose of discharging the debts due from Koreshed Ali, was a decree against that property, and operative to bind it in the hands of Najmoodin, and therefore of any other person who took from Najmoodin with notice of the decree or under such circumstances as to make him affected by the doctrine of lis pendens.

7. The decision of the Judicial Committee cannot be taken as an authority for the position that whenever a decree is asked for against the assets of a deceased person or joint family property in the hands of the junior members of the family or of the sons on a personal claim against the father as manager without claiming any specific lien thereon, any alienation made during the pendency of the suit will be subject to the doctrine of lis pendens. I am therefore of the opinion that as the immovable property which was charged in O.S. No. 23 of 1931 was not the subject-matter of the suit, the decree requires registration under Section 17, Clause 2(6) and the charge therefore cannot prevail. I therefore overrule this contention of Mr. Suryanarayana on behalf of the petitioner.

8. The next contention advanced by Mr. Suryanarayana is that so far as seven decrees are concerned, they were only against the father whereas the decree of the petitioner is against the father and sons and therefore the decree-holders against the father alone cannot be treated as persons holding decrees against the same judgment-debtors within the meaning of Section 73, Civil Procedure Code. It seems to me that this contention is untenable and is concluded by authority. Where there is a decree against the father and there is also a decree against the father and sons and where it is admitted that the property from which the assets are realised by the sale was the property of the joint family of which the father and sons are undivided members, the judgment-debtors must be held to be the same for the purpose of Section 73, Civil Procedure Code. This was the view taken in Ramanathan Chettiar v. Subramania Sastrial (1902) 12 M.L.J. 276 : I.L.R. 26 Mad. 179, which has since been followed by the Full Bench in Pappu Reddiar v. Pichu Aiyar (1935) 42 L.W. 435. I have since taken the same view in a case reported in Swaminatha Aiyar v. Saivu Rowthan (1935) 43 L.W. 624 and also in C.R.P. No. 1356 of 1935 since reported in Palaniappa Chettiar v. Palani Goundan (1936) 71 M.L.J. 541. A decision of Horwill, J., in Arunachellam Chettiar v. Kalayappa Chettiar (1937) 1 M.L.J. 180 C.R.P. No. 1343 of 1934 has been cited to me as indicating a contrary view. The learned Judge seems to be of the opinion that where there is a decree against the father alone it cannot be said that the decree was obtained against the father for a debt binding on the son. It may be so. But once there is a decree against the father the creditor is entitled to enforce the said decree against all the joint family property including the shares of the sons until the sons choose to take exception to it either in execution or by way of a suit that the said debt is one which they are not liable to pay under the Hindu law. So long as the decree stands and the property sold is joint family property, no question as to the binding nature of the debt arises in the consideration of the question whether the judgment-debtors are the same. I therefore hold that the contention of Mr. Suryanarayana is not tenable.

9.. Another point is raised by Mr. Suryanarayana in connection with three of the decrees, namely, that the application for rateable distribution was made after the entire sale proceeds were deposited and therefore the holder of the said decrees is not entitled to get rateable distribution. The fact is that the application for rateable distribution was made on the very same day as when the sale proceeds were deposited into Court. The learned Judge assumed that the application must have been made prior to the deposit. There is no warrant for such an assumption. It must be found as a fact whether the application was made prior or later. Vide Muthiah Chetty v. Alagappa Chetty (1918) M.W.N. 520. I have therefore to set aside the order of the learned Judge so far as the said decrees are concerned and remand the matter for disposal for the determination of the said question and giving the relief accordingly. Subject to this modification the order of the lower Court is confirmed and the revision petitions except C.R.P. Nos. 815 of 1934, 816 of 1934 and 818 of 1934 fail and are dismissed. The petitioner will pay Rs. 20 as and for advocate's fees in each of the petitions dismissed. In the C.R.P. Nos. 815 of 1934, 816 of 1934 and 818 of 1934, I make no order as to costs.