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Dhanukdhari Singh And Others v. Ramratan Singh And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Agarwala, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an appeal by judgment-debtors against an order fixing instalments under Section 11 of the Bihar Money-lenders Act. The opposite party (decree-holder) had obtained a decree against the appellants for Rs. 5,470-2-0. On the appellants' application under Section 11 the executing Court fixed instalments as follows: Rs. 200 within a week; Rs. 1,000 on 1 January 1940; and Rs. 1,000 on 1 January of each succeeding year until the debt with interest was repaid. The judgment-debtors failed to pay the initial Rs. 200 within the time allowed; the Court extended time by three weeks, and later Rs. 150 was deposited as part of that initial sum. No part of the instalment due on 1 January 1940 was paid. The judgment-debtors contended they could pay only Rs. 300 per annum and appealed on the ground that the instalments fixed were too high.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an order under Section 11 of the Bihar Money-lenders Act fixing instalments is appealable (i.e., whether an appeal lies against such an order).
- If appealability arises, whether the order as made (the levels and timing of instalments) was erroneous as a matter of discretion — though the decisive preliminary question addressed by the Court was the first: maintainability of the appeal.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The order under Section 11 of the Bihar Money-lenders Act is an order within Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) and therefore falls within the definition of "decree" under Section 2(2) of the CPC, making it appealable under Section 96 CPC.
- Analogy was drawn to Order 20, Rule 11 of the CPC (especially the distinction between sub-rule (1) and sub-rule (2)), and the appellants relied on the view that execution-related orders affecting payment by instalments can be appealable.
Respondents' Arguments
- A preliminary objection: no appeal lies from an order under Section 11. The respondents relied on prior orders and decisions, notably civil Revision No. 366 of 1939 (Wort J., 19 Dec 1939) and the miscellaneous appeal of Sia Ram v. Sanjib (disposed 4 Mar 1940 by a Division Bench), which were said to hold that no appeal lay from an order under Section 11 of the Money-lenders Act.
- Wort J.'s reasoning emphasised that the right of appeal is statutory and, because the Money-lenders Act did not expressly confer a right of appeal from orders under Section 11 (whereas it did in relation to Section 13), no appeal lay.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| civil Revision No. 366 of 1939 (Wort J., 19th December 1939) | Held that no appeal lay against an order under Section 11 of the Bihar Money-lenders Act; reliance on absence of express statutory right of appeal. | The Court noted this decision as the primary authority relied on by respondents and accepted its conclusion (upholding the preliminary objection) insofar as it aligns with the principle that the Act does not expressly provide an appeal from Section 11 orders. |
| Sia Ram v. Sanjib (miscellaneous appeal, disposed 4th March 1940) | Disposed in a matter concerning extension of time for filing an appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act; the Division Bench held that as no appeal lay from an order under s.11 the question of extending time did not arise. | The Court treated this outcome as corroborative of the Respondents' position that there is no appeal from an s.11 order; it was cited as supporting authority for non-appealability. |
| 4 RANG 247 (Rangoon case) | Held (Carr J.) that an order under Order 20, Rule 11(2) could be appealable (in that part of Burma the consent of the decree-holder was not necessary). | The Court described this Rangoon line of cases but distinguished it from the position under the applicable law here; it noted the Rangoon decisions and observed that they were not persuasive for the present conclusion that s.11 orders are appealable. |
| AIR 1929 RANG 1922 (Maung Ba J.) | Followed the decision in 4 RANG 247 that an order under O.20, R.11(2) could be appealable (as reported in the Rangoon series). | Noted as part of the Rangoon authorities that adopt an expansive view of appealability under O.20, R.11(2); the Court considered these authorities but did not accept them as controlling for the present issue. |
| AIR 1932 RANG 54 (Division Bench) | Followed Carr J.'s view that orders under O.20, R.11(2) may be appealable in Rangoon. | Also recorded and considered; the Court contrasted these Rangoon decisions with the prevailing view in other High Courts that restrict appealability to orders which finally determine rights. |
| 5 PAT LJ 2704 (as cited in the opinion) | Held that a decision under Section 47 is not a "decree" within the meaning of Section 2(2) CPC unless it in some way finally determines the rights of the parties with regard to matters in controversy. | The Court invoked this principle to support the conclusion that orders under s.11 (being discretionary and procedural) do not finally determine rights and therefore are not appealable as decrees under s.47 and s.2(2). |
| 16 CWN 1245 (as cited in the opinion) | Held that to be appealable as a decree an order must conclusively determine the rights of the parties; applied to refuse appealability for certain execution orders (e.g., valuation for sale). | The Court relied on this authority (treated as controlling in other High Courts and by this Court) to hold that an order fixing instalments under s.11 does not conclusively determine parties' rights and is therefore not appealable. |
| 21 PLT 255 | Related to whether a subordinate Court had power to pass an instalment decree under the Money-lenders Act; the Bench set aside the order below and directed disposal according to law. | The Court observed that 21 PLT 255 did not decide the specific question of the maintainability of an appeal under s.11 and therefore could not be treated as authority on the appealability issue. |
| 27 Mad 2597 (Madras High Court, as mentioned) | Referred to in Rowland, J.'s discussion as part of the body of authority limiting the scope of "decree" under Section 2(2) to orders that finally determine rights. | Used in the Court's reasoning (through Rowland, J.) to reinforce the restricted interpretation of "decree" and to support the conclusion that execution interlocutory orders are not, by that alone, appealable. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in the following steps:
- Identification of the preliminary question: the Court first addressed whether an appeal lies from an order made under Section 11 of the Bihar Money-lenders Act. The respondents raised a preliminary objection to maintainability of the appeal, relying on earlier decisions.
- Consideration of statutory scheme and relevant provisions of the CPC: the appellants argued Section 11 orders fall within Section 47 CPC and therefore within the definition of "decree" in Section 2(2) CPC, making them appealable under Section 96 CPC. The Court analysed the distinction between orders made at the time of passing a decree (Order 20, Rule 11(1) CPC) and orders made after the decree (Order 20, Rule 11(2) CPC), noting that the former is part of the decree whilst the latter generally requires consent of the decree-holder and (on that basis) is not appealable in ordinary practice.
- Review of supporting and conflicting authorities: the Court examined Rangoon authorities that had taken a broader view (holding certain orders under O.20, R.11(2) appealable where consent was not required locally) but contrasted those with decisions in other jurisdictions (notably authorities collected in "5 PAT LJ ..." and "16 CWN ...") which held that not every order in execution proceedings is a "decree" for purposes of appeal; rather, only orders that finally determine the rights of the parties fall within Section 2(2)'s meaning of "decree."
- Application of the "conclusive determination" principle: the Court applied the principle that an order under Section 47 CPC (and thus an execution order) is a "decree" only if it in some way finally determines the rights of the parties with regard to matters in controversy. The Court found that an order under Section 11 of the Money-lenders Act — which permits the executing Court to exercise discretion to permit payment by instalments — does not finally determine the substantive rights established by the decree. The decree itself has already fixed the rights (the decree-holder's entitlement to the decretal amount and the judgment-debtor's liability).
- Nature of Section 11 relief: the Court characterised the power under Section 11 as discretionary and procedural: it allows the executing Court to grant indulgence (postponement/instalments) in derogation of the decree-holder's immediate rights to execute, but the order is concerned with procedure rather than a final adjudication of rights. Section 12 (referred to by the Court) requires the executing Court to consider the judgment-debtor's circumstances, the amount of the decree and capacity to pay — considerations relevant to discretion but not equivalent to a conclusive determination of rights.
- Practical policy considerations: the Court accepted the reasoning that if every interlocutory execution order were treated as a decree, appeals could be multiplied (e.g., there might be appeals against valuation or many interim execution decisions), contrary to the intended scope of appellate rights under the Code of 1882. This reinforced the restricted construction of Section 2(2) and Section 47.
- Treatment of other authorities: the Court observed that 21 PLT 255 did not decide the appealability question and thus was not authoritative on that point. The Rangoon authorities were noted but not followed. The Court relied upon (and followed) the line of authority that requires an order to conclusively determine rights before it is appealable as a "decree."
- Conclusion: because an order under Section 11 does not finally determine the parties' substantive rights but only exercises a procedural discretion to grant indulgence, it is not an appealable "decree" under Section 2(2) read with Section 47 CPC. Consequently, the preliminary objection that no appeal lies was upheld.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the appeal with costs. The judges (Agarwala, J. and Rowland, J.) agreed that an order under Section 11 of the Bihar Money-lenders Act fixing instalments is not an appealable "decree" because it does not finally determine the rights of the parties; it is an interlocutory/execution discretion.
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the appellants' challenge to the instalment order under Section 11 was not maintainable by way of appeal and the appeal was dismissed with costs.
- The opinion follows and applies existing authorities that limit the definition of "decree" (for appeal purposes) to those execution orders which finally determine parties' rights; it emphasises that Section 11 relief is discretionary and procedural rather than constituting a final adjudication of rights.
- The Court treated prior decisions (including Rangoon authorities) as distinguishable and relied on the established view (cited authorities such as 5 PAT LJ... and 16 CWN...) restricting appealability; the opinion therefore did not announce a novel rule but applied existing principles to hold that s.11 orders are not appealable in the circumstances described.
Order: Appeal dismissed.
Note: This summary is prepared strictly from the provided opinion text and does not introduce material beyond what the opinion itself contains.
Agarwala, J.:— This is an appeal by the judgment-debtors. The opposite party obtained a decree against the appellants for Rs. 5470-2-0. On the application of the appellants under Section 11 of the Bihar Money-lenders Act, the Court fixed instalments for the payment of this decretal debt. The judgment-debtors were to pay Rs. 200 within a week, and Rs. 1000 on 1st January 1940, and on 1st January of each succeeding year until the debt with interest had been repaid. The judgment-debtors failed to pay the initial sum of Rs. 200 within the week allowed. The Court-then extended that time and gave them three weeks within which to make the payment. The payment however was not made within the extended time, although we are told Rs. 150 was deposited later as a part of the initial sum of Rs. 200. No part of the instalment which fell due on 1st January 1940, has been paid. The judgment-debtors attempted to persuade the Court that they were capable of paying only Rs. 300 per annum, and they now appeal against the decision of the Court below on the ground that the instalments fixed are too high.
2. A preliminary objection has been taken on behalf of the respondents that no appeal lies in this case. The respondents referred us to orders which have been passed in two similar cases. In civil Revision No. 366 of 1939 decided by Wort J., on 19th December 1939, it was held that no appeal lay against an order under Section 11 of the Bihar Money-lenders Act. The learned Judge relied on the fact that whereas an appeal against an order under S. 13 of the Act is expressly provided, there is no such provision with regard to an order under S. 11. The other case mentioned was the miscellaneous appeal of Sia Ram v. Sanjib, which was disposed of on 4th March 1940, by a Division Bench of this Court. The matter was before that Bench for the purpose of considering an application for extending the time for filing an appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
3. The Bench held that, as no appeal lay from an order under s. 11, the question of extending the time did not arise. Wort J., in the first of these cases, pointed out that the right of appeal from a decree is not a constitutional right but is the creature of statute, and as the Moneylenders Act did not confer a right of appeal from an order under s. 11, no right of appeal existed. No reference was made to the provisions of Section 96 of the CPC, which confers a right of appeal against a decree, and Section 2(2) of the CPC, which defines “decree” and includes within the definition an order passed by an executing Court under S. 47.
4. It has been contended before us on behalf of the appellants that an order under s. 11, Money-lenders Act, is an order within Section 47 of the CPC, and that it therefore falls within the definition of “decree” and is appealable. During the course of the argument reference has been made to O. 20, R. 11 of the CPC. Under sub-r.(1) of R. 11 of O. 20 the Court which passes a decree may, at time of passing a decree for money, make an order that payment of the decree shall be postponed, or shall be made by instalments, with or without interest, and sub-r. (2) of the same rule provides that, after the passing of a decree for payment of money, the Court may, on the application of the judgment-debtor and with the consent of the decree-holder order that payment of the amount decreed shall be postponed or shall be made by instalments. The order under sub-r. (1) is a part of the decree in the suit, and may be challenged in an appeal from the decree. The order under sub-r. (2) for payment by instalments, can be made only with the consent of the decree-holder. No appeal, therefore, can lie against an order passed with his consent. Nor, on the other hand, can an order refusing instalments under sub-r. (2) be appealed against, as the right to pay by instalments does not exist unless the decree-holder has consented to it. Three Rangoon cases with regard to sub-r. (2) have been brought to our notice.
5. It appears from the first of these, 4 RANG 247,1 that in Burma, or at least in that part of Burma from which the appeal arose, the consent of the decree-holder is not necessary for an order under sub-r. (2) of R. 11. Carr J., sitting singly in that case held that an order under sub-r. (2) is appealable. That decision was followed by Maung Ba J., sitting singly in AIR 1929 RANG 1922 and by a Division Bench in AIR 1932 RANG 54.3 In the first of the Rangoon cases, Carr J., observed that when a question arises whether an order under sub-r. (2) should be passed or not the question appeared to be one clearly between the parties to the suit and one relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, and that consequently it came within s. 47 of the Code and was appealable. The two other Rangoon cases followed the decision of Carr J., without further investigation into the matter. It has been conceded before us that it is not every order passed between the parties to a suit, in the course of execution proceedings, that falls within the definition of ‘decree’ so as to be appealable. In 5 PAT LJ 2704 it was held that a decision under S. 47 is not a decree within the meaning of S. 2(2) unless it in some way finally determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy.
6. The same view was taken in 16 CWN 1245 in which it was held that the order, to be appealable as a decree, must conclusively determine the rights of the parties, and that consequently no appeal lay against an order by which the value of the property directed to be sold under a decree has been assessed at a certain figure according to the statement of the decree-holder. The question therefore is whether an order determining instalments under s. 11, Money-lenders Act, is an order which conclusively determines the rights of the parties. The right of the decree-holder to be paid the decretal amount and the liability of the judgment-debtor are determined by the decree in the suit. The power conferred on the executing Court by s. 11, Money-lenders Act, is a discretion which the Court may exercise in derogation of the rights of the decree-holder to execute the whole of his decree immediately against the judgment-debtor. In deciding whether it shall or shall not exercise the discretion conferred upon it by this section the Court is not determining any question of the parties' rights, but merely whether an indulgence shall be shown to the judgment-debtor for the purpose of enabling him to meet the just demands of the decree-holder and at the same time avoid the forced sale of his own properties.
7. In deciding whether the circumstances justify the exercise of the discretion in favour of the judgment-debtor the Court is required by S. 12 to take into consideration the circumstances of the judgment-debtor, the amount of the decree and the capacity of the judgment-debtor to pay the instalments on due dates. From the discussions on this question, which are heard from time to time in this Court, it would appear as if the impression is that the only person whose difficulties are to be considered in the application of s. 11, Money-lenders Act, is the judgment-debtor, and that the difficulties of the judgment-creditor are not to be considered at all. It is true that the Court is required to take into consideration the capacity of the judgment-debtor to pay the instalments, but the Court is also required to take into consideration the amount of the decree and the circumstances of the judgment-debtor. To my mind, it appears that what the Legislature had in view was that if, taking into consideration the various circumstances mentioned, it appears to the Court that a judgment-debtor will be able to discharge his obligations to his creditor provided he is given a reasonable time, the Court is empowered to give that time by ordering instalments, but the Court is bound to consider whether the resources, of the judgment-debtor are such as to justify an expectation that the decree-holder's claim to his dues will not be defeated by allowing instalments. Where it is clear that the resources of the judgment-debtor are so meagre in relation to his liability that he is not likely to be able to discharge the decretal debt within a reasonable time, the Court would not be exercising a wise discretion in prolonging the execution proceedings by fixing instalments which would make but little impression on the possibility of the judgment-debtor discharging his indebtedness.
8. There is one other case of this Court to which reference was made, namely 21 PLT 255.6 In this case the Court below had held that it bad no power to pass an instalment decree under the Money-lenders Act. The Bench before which the appeal came did not consider the question whether an appeal from an order refusing to fix instalments lay or not, but holding that the Court had jurisdiction to pass an order for instalments, set aside the order of the Court below and directed it to dispose of the matter according to law. As the question of the maintainability of an appeal was not raised, and was not considered, this case cannot be looked upon as an authority on the question which we have to decide particularly in view of the fact that whether an appeal lay or not it was competent to the Bench in the exercise of its revisional powers to direct the Court to exercise the jurisdiction which the Court had mistakenly refused to exercise.
9. One other aspect of the matter must also be considered and that is the ground on which Wort J. decided civil Revision No. 366 of 1939 as that ground has been again urged before us. It has been pointed out that in the case of a mortgage suit by s. 10 of the Act the Court which passes a decree is empowered to fix instalments by which the decretal debt is to be paid and that an order passed by the Court which passed the decree and forming part of the decree may be challenged in am appeal from the decree. By S. 13 of the Act, the Court is directed to value the property of the judgment-debtor which is sought to be sold and to determine how much of it is necessary to sell in order to satisfy the decree. Prom the Court's decision in that matter there is an appeal expressly provided. It has been contended that the only reason why an appeal has not been expressly provied in S. 11 is because the Legislature contemplated that an order under s. 11 would be viewed as an appealable order under Section 47 of the CPC. As I have already shown, under the decisions of this and of the Calcutta High Court, it is clear that the only orders under S. 47 which are appealable are orders which finally determine the rights of the parties and that an order under s. 11 is not of that nature. I would therefore uphold the preliminary objection and dismiss this appeal with costs.
Rowland, J.:— I entirely agree. There was one line of authority in the Calcutta High Court favouring the view that as argued before us any order deciding a matter between the parties to the suit in the course of execution proceedings was to be regarded as a decree under s. 47 read with the definition of “decree” in Section 2, cl. (2) of the CPC, but the considered decision of that Court in 16 CWN 124 has since been regularly followed and if I may say so, treated as having settled the law. The order, which it was contended, in that case was appealable was an order fixing the valuation for the purpose of settling a sale proclamation. The Judges pointed out that if the contention of the appellant were to prevail whereas there would be only one appeal under the Code from a decision upon the question of valuation in the course of proceedings for reversal of the sale under R. 90 of O. 21, there would be a first and a second appeal against an order for assessment of valuation antecedent to the sale. This, they say, could hardly have been the intention of the Legislature. In this Court that decision was followed in 5 PAT LJ 270 in which after considering a number of authorities Dawson-Miller C.J, accepted the view of the Calcutta High Court as explained in the decision of the Madras High Court in 27 Mad 2597 and observed that an order to be a decree must conclusively determine the rights of the parties and that if any other view were adopted the result would be that an appeal might be preferred against every order in the course of execution proceedings and this could hardly have been contemplated by the framers of the Code of 1882. Dawson-Miller C.J thought that no wider interpretation was to be given to s. 2, sub-s. (2) which defines “decree” and states that it shall be deemed to include the determination of any question within S. 47. “These words,” he said, must be limited by the words which immediately precede and unless the decision appealed from is one which in some way determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit it cannot be included under the definition of decree, otherwise it would be merely an interlocutory order and although it may be true to say that the Judge acts judicially in coming to the conclusion, that does not in itself make his determination a decree within the meaning of the section. As my learned brother has pointed out, there was nothing for the Court to decide as to the rights of the parties in the suit, those rights having been conclusively determined by the judgment and decree in the suit itself. The point before the Subordinate Judge was a matter of procedure whether the judgment-debtor should be given time to pay and the decree-holder restrained from exercising the right which he had under the law to execute his decree at once. An order regulating the procedure in this matter was an interlocutory order, and so not appealable.
D.S/R.K
10. Appeal dismissed.
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