King-Emperor v. Lachman Singh

Allanson, J.:— This appeal by the Crown against the orders of a Deputy Magistrate of Gaya acquitting Lachman Singh of an offence under section 182 of the Indian Penal Code has been heard by me under section 429 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the learned Judges of a Division Bench having been divided in opinion.

The facts have been stated in the judgment of Adami, J. The question for decision is whether a driver of a motor car driving without a license, who when asked for his name by the Superintendent of Police gave a wrong name, has committed an offence under section 182 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Deputy Magistrate acquitted the accused on the ground that the words “give information” in section 182 mean “volunteers information,” and are not intended to apply to a statement made in answer to a question put by a public servant. The learned Judges of the Division Bench were in agreement that such a restricted meaning should not be given to those words. This point was not argued before me and I adhere to the view expressed by me in Bishwanath Singh v. Emperor.

Section 182 runs as follows:

“Whoever gives to any public servant any information which he knows or believes to be false, intending thereby to cause or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause such public servant—

(a) to do or omit any tiling which such public servant ought not to do or omit if the true state of facts respecting which such information is given were known by him, or

(b) to use the lawful power of such public servant to the injury or annoyance of any person shall be punished, etc.”

Clause (b) has no application.

There can be no doubt that Lachman grave information to a public servant knowing it to be false. The question is whether he did it with the intention or with the knowledge of the probable result described in the section. The duty of the Superintendent of Police was, after such enquiry, if any, as he thought fit, to prosecute for an offence under the Motor Vehicles Act. He might as a, result of the false information given him have ordered a prosecution at once, in which case he would have done something which he ought not to have done, if the true state of facts were known to him. For a police officer ought not to prosecute a fictitious person. The Superintendent of Police, after ascertaining that a false name had been given him, might have been unable to discover who the driver was. He would then have had to omit prosecuting the real offender, which he would not have omitted had he known the true facts, namely, that the driver was Lachman. It actually happened in the present case that the police seized the driving license of another man who was found driving this car three days later. This man appeared with a petition before the Superintendent of Police to the effect that he was not the driver on that day and asked for his license to be returned. The Superintendent of Police was in a position to say that he was not the driver who was wanted.

It was conceded by the learned Advocate for Lachman that it is the duty of a police officer to put the law in motion if an offence is committed and that if the result of the false information was that he was induced to change his mind and not to prosecute, section 182 would apply. But he argued that, if the only effect of the false information was to put an obstacle in the way of the performance of his duty by the police officer, in other words if the performance of the duty was rendered more difficult, the giving of the false information would not come under section 182. I am unable to accept this argument. It is the intention in the mind of the informant and not its effect on the mind of the police officer that is important. To take a simple instance. A police officer is running after a, criminal who gives him the slip round a corner. A man on the road, who had seen the criminal run into a particular house, informs the police officer that he has gone into another house. In one sense no doubt he is obstructing the police officer in the performance of his duty, that duty being to arrest the criminal without delay. But he is also intending to cause or knowing it to be likely that he will cause the police officer to do what he ought not to do, if he knew the true facts, to go into the wrong house, with the result that the criminal may successfully abscond from justice. The officer might have reason to suspect the truth of the information and might ignore it. How can that affect the intention which is in the mind of the informant? The committing of the offence might then conclusively depend on the intelligence or energy of the police officer. One officer might change his mind or intention by reason of the false information received by him. Another officer might not do so. I cannot see how the completion of the offence can depend on what the public servant does or omits. The question is the state of the mind of the informant, whether he intended by his false information to cause, or knew he would be likely to cause, the public servant to do or omit anything which he ought not to do or omit, if the true state of facts were known to him. Lachman by giving a false name must have intended to cause, or have known he would be likely to cause, the Superintendent of Police to prosecute a fictitious person or to omit prosecuting the real offender. What in fact the Superintendent of Police actually did is immaterial. I am in agreement with the views of the learned Judges in Queen-Empress v. Budh Sen, which have been quoted by Adami, J., in his judgment.

It was also argued that the intention was not to prevent the police officer from taking action, but to put obstruction or difficulty in the way of his doing so. This argument seems to involve a confusion of the means with the end. The most usual means of preventing a person doing a thing is to place obstruction or difficulty in his way.

It was argued that the prosecution did not prove that Lachman knew that the person to whom he gave false information was a public servant. The answer to this argument has been given by Wort, J.

I allow this appeal, set aside the acquittal and, convict Lachman Singh of an offence under section 182 of the Indian Penal Code and sentence him to pay a fine of Rs. 25 or, in default, three days' rigorous imprisonment.