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Mohammad Ismail Khan v. Mithu Lal And Others.
Knox, J.:— This appeal arises out of a suit brought by one Haji Mohammad Ismail, who in his plaint describes himself as proprietor and lambardar of a certain mahal. He alleges in his plaint that one Lekhraj has been for more than 12 years cultivator of certain land assessed to certain rent, that three months ago Lekhraj died without leaving any heir and that in consequence of this he, as zamindar, became proprietor of the land, trees and pucka well standing thereon. The defendants, Nos. 1. and 2, according to him, allege that they have purchased the land, the trees and the well under a sale-deed executed by Lekhraj and are now obstructing plaintiff's possession. He prays that he may be declared to be in proprietary possession of the property, that the sale-deed be declared null and void as against himself and that a perpetual injunction issued restraining the defendants from offering any obstruction. The defendants, Nos. 1 and 2, admit that the plaintiff is proprietor and lambardar of the Mahal in question and that Lekhraj has been a cultivator of the land in dispute set out in the plaint. But, on the other hand, they say that the particular land was taken by Lekhraj assessed to rent, for the purpose of planting a grove and constructing a well, that the grove and well was constructed with the permission of the zamindar and that for more than 12 years Lekhraj has been exercising full proprietary powers in respect of the well and grove. The rights of Lekhraj were transferred to the defendants upon payment of consideration. This is how the plaintiff, now appellant, and the defendants, Nos. 1 and 2, now respondents, state their case. The claim of the plaintiff was dismissed by the court of first instance and the lower appellate court confirmed the decree of dismissal. The lower appellate court has found that the grove was planted by Lekhraj on the zamindar's land with his permission and that Lekhraj continued to pay the rent assessed and afterwards rent at an enhanced rate to the zamindar. The reason given by the lower appellate court for confirming the decree of dismissal is (1) that the plaintiff could not have ejected Lekhraj, if he wanted to do so and in support of this it relies upon the case of Haidar Ah Khan v. Gangu(1). And (2) that he could not have ejected the purchasers from Lekhraj and for this it relies upon a case decided by the Board of Revenue, Badri Prasad v. Pitam Singh(2). There is also a finding that no custom or contract to the contrary has been proved.
2. The plaintiff comes here in second appeal and puts forward the following pleas:— (1) that the transfer of a grove by a grove-holder is not allowed by law in the absence of any custom or contract to the contrary; (2) that the cases relied on by the lower appellate court have no bearing upon this case; and (3) that the transferee is a trespasser in the eye of the law and is liable to ejectment. The learned counsel for the appellant referred me to the case of Kasim Mian v. Banda Husain(3). The circumstances of that case are of a peculiar nature. Certain occupancy tenants, under the impression that they were tenants at fixed rates of the land, transferred a grove and the zamindars sued to have the sale set aside and to eject the vendee on the ground that the transfer of an occupancy holding was illegal under section 9 of Act No. XII of 1881. It was held in that case that the transfer of trees on a holding is no less invalid than the transfer of the holding itself, that the contract in both respects was equally void, the vendor having no transferable interest in either the land or the standing trees and therefore the transfer had altogether to be declared null and void. The case before me is not one in which the vendors are occupancy tenants and it is not one which falls under Act No. XII of 1881. The relationship between the parties is not one, which, as the law now stands, falls within the provisions of the Tenancy Act, No. II of 1901. The parties appear to have recognised this, for the plaintiff chose the forum of litigation as the Civil Court, and the defendant raised no objection. The position seems to me to fall rather within Chapter V of Act No. IV of 1882. A lease is there defined as the transfer of a right to enjoy immoveable property made for a certain time or in perpetuity in consideration of money &c., &c., to be rendered periodically to the transferor by the transferee. In the present case such a transfer was made and the consideration was the money to be rendered periodically. If it be contended that there is no certain time shown to have been stipulated between the parties, the answer seems to Metro rest upon the practice and custom of these provinces that a lease of grove land exists for such time as the trees stand on that land. No written instrument was necessary as the agreement was made long before 1904. Even if the contract between the parties be not one which strictly falls within Chapter V of Act No. IV of 1882, it comes so nearly within it that the incidents given for the one be fairly attached to the other. A lease falling within Chapter V of Act No. IV of 1882, is a contract whereby the lessee may transfer absolutely or by way of mortgage or sale, lease the whole or any part of his interest in the property and any transferee of such interest or part may again transfer it see clause (i) of section 108. Such a lease also determines upon the happening of events set out in section in. There being no contract proved to the contrary, Lekhraj was empowered to transfer his interest absolutely and the relationship between the two contracting parties has not been put an end to by any of the events set out in section 111. It was also contended on the part of the appellant that the landholder is the owner of the trees in a grove and in support of this I was referred to Kasim Mian v. Banda Husain and also to the decision by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Ruttonji Edulji Shet v. The Collector of Tanna. At page 313 their Lordships say that “the trees upon the land were part of the land and the right to cut down and sell those trees was incident to the proprietorship of the land”. cannot find that the land with reference to which this pronouncement of their Lordships was made in any way corresponds with what is known as grove land in these provinces. What I have said in this case is in no way intended to have any bearing on the right which landlords or tenants may or may not have in chance trees planted upon land. The case of Kasim Mian was, as I have already pointed out, the case of an occupancy tenant. The question is not an easy one to decide. But as matters stand and as the circumstances of this case stand, it seems to me that the proper order is to dismiss the appeal with costs.
3. On the case being heard by a bench of two Judges under section 10 of the Letters Patents, the following judgments were delivered.
4. Abdul Raoof, for the appellant.
5. Peary Lal Banerji, for the respondent.
Richards, C.J:— This appeal arises out of a suit in which the plaintiff sought a declaration of his title to a certain plot of land with the trees thereon and a pucca well. The defendants admitted the plaintiff's title as zamindar and it is quite clear that the issue between the parties was whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to oust the defendants from the possession of the grove and well. The facts are very clearly stated by the learned Judge of this Court, from whose judgment this Letters Patent appeal has been preferred. I will nevertheless state them very shortly. The zamindars agreed with one Lekhraj that he should plant the plot in question with fruit trees and should pay a yearly rent which was subsequently slightly enhanced. Lekhraj, in pursuance of the agreement, planted the grove and made the pucca well in question. Subsequently he sold the grove and well to the defendants and died without heirs. The plaintiff claims that, under these circumstances, the defendants have no rights and that he is entitled to take possession and enjoy the grove and well planted and made by Lekhraj.
7. It seems to me that this claim is not well founded. Prima facie every one is entitled to transfer any property or right he may possess. I think that Lekhraj had rights as the result of his having planted the grove and made the well in pursuance of his agreement with the zamindars. Indeed it was admitted that Lekhraj could hot himself have been dispossessed, nor could his heirs if he had left them. No doubt this prima facie right of transfer may be restricted by custom or by Act of the Legislature. As for example, tenants of a certain class of holdings are prohibited by the Tenancy Act from transferring their holdings. There is, in my opinion, however, nothing in the Tenancy Act to prevent a person possessed of such rights as Lekhraj had, from transferring such rights. Of course if I thought that the rights of Lekhraj were those of an occupancy or non-occupancy tenant, or that such rights were appurtenant to an occupancy or non-occupancy holding, I would hold that he had no right to transfer. It was, however, never alleged in the plaint nor apparently contended in either of the lower courts below or in the second appeal to this Court that Lekhraj was an occupancy or non-occupancy tenant of the grove and well, or that such rights as he possessed were appurtenant to such a tenancy. Furthermore I do not consider that such a contention could have been successfully put forward. Assuming that Lekhraj was a tenant of the land, his right to use it was limited to growing and maintaining the trees. He could not use the land for ordinary purposes of agriculture. His position was in fact that of a “grove holder”—a position well known and recognised.
8. I would dismiss the appeal and affirm the decision of the three courts by which the case has been already decided.
Banerji, J.:— I regret I am unable to take the same view as the learned Chief Justice as to the competency of a person who plants a grove with the permission of the landholder, upon an agreement to pay him rent, to transfer the grove, so as to confer on the purchaser a right to continue in possession of the grove against the wishes of the landholder. In my opinion such a person is a tenant as defined in the Agra Tenancy Act, section 4, being a person by whom rent is paid, and rent according to that Act means, among other things, payments made on account of a grove. As he is not a tenant of the classes of tenants whose interest is under the Act transferable (see section 20), he has no right, in the absence of a contract or custom to the contrary to transfer the grove. However, I do not desire to pursue the matter further, as it seems to me the question was practically decided in Mohammad Yasin v. Hahi Baksh, which was an appeal under the Letters Patent from one of my judgments. I am afraid I am bound by the ruling in that case. I therefore agree in dismissing this appeal.
10. By the Court:— The order of the Court is that the appeal is dismissed with costs.
11. Appeal dismissed.
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