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Jagannatha Rao And Four Ors. v. Viswesam

Madras High Court
Feb 11, 1924
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff sued to recover two sums: (1) Rs. 2,500 deposited with the first defendant on 6 July 1917 and (2) Rs. 350 payable to the plaintiff for money paid for the first defendant. Defendants 2 to 5 were sons of the first defendant and members of a joint family until 1918. In 1918 the present second defendant filed a suit against his father and brothers for partition. No written statement was filed in that partition suit; the suit was compromised and a decree was passed on 23 January 1920. The compromise provided for payment of most debts contracted by the first defendant but did not provide for the plaintiff's debt; no specific properties were allotted to the first defendant and a maintenance of Rs. 30 per month was arranged for him.

The present suit was filed on 6 July 1920 seeking to make defendants 2 to 5 liable with reference to the shares they held that had previously been joint family property. The defendants denied the genuineness of the debts; the District Judge found the debts to be true, had doubts about the bona fides of the partition but nonetheless decreed the suit on the ground that the compromise in the partition provided that all the debts of the first defendant were to be paid by all defendants. All defendants appealed. The first defendant died during the appeal. The appellate court (the opinion under summary) disagreed with the District Judge's construction of the terms of the compromise.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether sons (defendants 2 to 5) are liable for debts of their father incurred before partition, particularly when the partition has taken place and the sons hold as their allotted shares property that had been joint.
  2. Whether the partition decree of 23 January 1920 was bona fide, and if it was mala fide such that the exception permitting action against the son's allotted share should apply.
  3. How earlier decisions (notably Peda Venkanna v. Sreenivasa Deekshatulu and Kani Venkatareddi v. Chelluri Suthyanarayanamoorthi) affect or control the present question of son's liability after partition, including the scope and correctness of those decisions.
  4. Whether a son in possession of property which had been joint and fell to his share in partition can be made liable in a suit brought after partition (when the son is impleaded) for the father's debts incurred before partition.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The appellants (the sons) did not dispute the correctness of the finding that the debts were genuine, nor did they contend the debts were illegal or immoral.
  • They contended that the sons are not liable for the father's debts (where those debts are not charged on the property) after a bona fide partition; they relied on Kani Venkatareddi v. Chelluri Suthyanarayanamoorthi, which followed Peda Venkanna v. Sreenivasa Deekshatulu.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent argued that the partition was not bona fide within the meaning of the exception recognized in the cited cases, and therefore the exception should apply.
  • Alternatively, if the partition were held bona fide, the respondent contended that Kani Venkatareddi was incorrectly decided; as to Peda Venkanna, he conceded that the decision was correct only insofar as it rested on the ground that the promissory note in that case had been renewed by the father after partition, and disputed any broader reading of that case.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lall (1874) 1 I.A. 321 Establishes principle that a son is not liable for the father's debts unless the property (ancestral or joint) has devolved upon the son; ancestral property descending to a father is not exempt from liability for his debts, and a son's duty to pay may be a pious duty. Cited as an authoritative starting point for limiting son's liability to circumstances where property has devolved on the son; used to show ancestral property can be liable for father's debts and to justify restricting son's liability to cases where the son's share has been allotted to him.
Hunoomanpersaud Panday v. Mussumat Babooee Munraj Koonweree (1856) 6 M I.A. 393 (Knight Bruce, L.J. quoted) Quotation used to explain the nature of pious duty and the relationship between ancestral estate and the duty of the son to pay father's debts. Quoted within the discussion of Girdharee Lall to support the point that ancestral property is liable to father's debts and that the son's freedom from obligation depends on nature of debt, not the estate.
Muddun Thakoor v. Kantoo Lall (1880) I.L.R. 5 Calc. 148 (P.C.) Applied the observations about ancestral property and liability in favour of a creditor in execution. Referred to in support of the proposition that ancestral estate can be sold to satisfy debts and that executing creditors may have equitable rights.
Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Persad Singh (1880) I.L.R. 5 Calc. 148 (P.C.) Applied similar reasoning to Muddun Thakoor in a Bengal context. Mentioned to show contrast in initial Madras reaction and to chart the spread of the principle.
Muttayan v. Zamindar of Sivagiri (1883) I.L.R. 6 Mad. 1 (P.C.) Privy Council pointed out no ground for not applying Girdharee Lall to Madras. Used to show that the Girdharee Lall principle should apply in Madras as well.
Ponnappa Filled v. Pappuvayyangar (1882) I.L.R. 4 Mad. 1 (F.B.) Full Bench held Girdharee Lall applied to Madras equally. Cited as part of the trajectory bringing Girdharee Lall's reasoning into Madras jurisprudence.
Appa v. Ranga (1883) I.L.R. 6 Mad. 71 Decision questioned (doubted) if it meant to decide that family continues joint where father relinquishes subject to maintenance. The court expressed doubt about this decision to the extent indicated in the opinion.
Ramaswami Nadan v. Ulaganatha Goundan (1899) I.L.R. 22 Mad. 40 (F.B.) Held that the liability of father and son was co-extensive and that cause of action against son arose simultaneously with that against father, though son could not be sued alone during father's life. Referred to in the chain of authorities showing various positions on co-extensive liability.
Krishnasami Konan v. Ramasami Ayyar (1899) I.L.R. 22 Mad. 51 Where partition preceded suit, the creditor must join those whose interests he wishes to bind; property taken by son in partition is the son's property and cannot be seized in execution of a decree against the father alone. Quoted and relied on for the proposition that a son's allotted share after partition cannot be seized on a decree against the father alone; used as part of the distinction between execution proceedings and suits impleading the son.
Ramachandra Padayachi v. Kondayya Chetti (1901) I.L.R. 24 Mad. 555 Held (where sons were parties to the suit) that the son was liable to the extent of the family property which had come to him under partition. Distinguished from Krishnasami Konan and relied on by the court as a precedent supporting liability of son when he is a party to the suit; the opinion follows this precedent.
Periasami Mudaliar v. Seetharama Chettiar (1904) I.L.R. 27 Mad. 243 (F.B.) Discussed co-extensive liability of father and son in relevant contexts. Referred to as part of the corpus of Madras decisions on father-son liability.
Kameswaramma v. Venkata Subba Row (1915) I.L.R. 38 Mad. 1120 Holds that a Hindu son is liable for the debt to the extent of the joint family property which came to his hands at partition. Described as conclusive against the appellants; the court treats its reasoning as supporting the rule that a son in possession of allotted share is liable when impleaded in suit after partition.
Lakshmana Chettiar v. Govindarajulu Naidu (1910) 8 M.L.T. 349 Applied similar view as Krishnasami Konan in related circumstances. Mentioned as holding the same view in similar circumstances; used to support the lineage of authority.
Rathna Naidu v. Aiyanachariar (1908) 18 M.L.J. 598 / 599 Discussed in relation to whether earlier cases followed Krishnasami Konan. Noted that Rathna Naidu cannot help the point in certain circumstances (e.g., father mortgaging son's share after partition).
Peda Venkanna v. Sreenivasa Deekshatulu (1918) I.L.R. 41 Mad. 136 Considered whether later Privy Council decisions changed the law on son's liability; the opinion concluded that Peda Venkanna was correctly decided insofar as it rested on renewal of the note by the father after partition. The court accepts Peda Venkanna to the limited extent that the note was renewed by the father after partition and rejects any broader overruling of the earlier cases by it.
Sahu Ram Chandra v. Bhup Singh (1917) I.L.R. 11 All. 437 (P.C.) Considered in the context of whether it effected change in law relating to son's liability. Held not to have effected such a change; the court notes that later Privy Council authority (Raja Brij Narain Rai) set the point at rest.
Raja Brij Narain Rai v. Mangla Prasad Rai (1924) 46 M.L.J. 23 (P.C.) Full Board Privy Council judgment clarifying that Sahu Ram Chandra did not change the law on son's liability. Referred to as authoritative and settling the question that Sahu Ram Chandra did not alter the pre-existing law.
Kani Venkatareddi v. Chelluri Suthyanarayanamoorthi / Chelluri Sathyanarayanamoorthi (1921) 40 M.L.J. 473 Relied upon by appellants as following Peda Venkanna; in that decision the court accepted a conclusion that limited son’s liability after partition. The present court declines to accept Kani Venkatareddi as binding because it rested solely on Peda Venkanna; the opinion says Kani cannot be followed as authoritative in the face of the earlier cases the court prefers.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the case in two linked parts: first the factual question whether the 1920 partition was bona fide and second the legal question of the effect of a bona fide partition on the sons' liability for the father's antecedent debts.

On the factual point the court held that the partition by the 1920 decree was bona fide in the sense that the intention was to really divide the status of the parties. The court observed it was "probably also bona fide" in the sense that there had been no unequal allotment of properties if one treats all the debts as the father's alone; the father's allotment (an annuity of Rs. 360) would have left him with less than what he had given up. The court nevertheless noted that the partition was not bona fide only in the sense that provision was not made in the compromise for all the father's debts. The court expressly recorded that it did not fully go into some aspects of the factual question but reached the overall conclusion of bona fides in the principal senses relied upon.

On the legal question, the court surveyed a long line of authorities to determine the established principle. It accepted the orthodox starting point that under earlier authorities a son is not liable for the father's debts except where the self-acquired property of the father or property which had been joint between them has devolved on the son. Girdharee Lall and related decisions were treated as laying down the foundational principle that ancestral or joint property is liable to the father's debts in certain circumstances and that the son's liability is linked to the devolution of property to him.

The court then distinguished matters of execution (attachment/seizure in execution of a decree obtained against the father alone) from suits brought against both father and son. Krishnasami Konan v. Ramasami Ayyar (where partition preceded suit) was read as holding that after separation the property is the son's property and could not be seized on execution against the father alone; but Ramachandra Padayachi v. Kondayya Chetti (where sons were parties) supported the proposition that when the son is a party he is liable to the extent of the family property allotted to him in the partition.

The court found Kameswaramma v. Venkata Subba Row to be conclusive against the appellants' argument: that decision expressly states that a Hindu son is liable for a debt to the extent of the joint family property which came to him at partition. The court reviewed Peda Venkanna and related authorities and concluded that Peda Venkanna is correctly decided only insofar as the promissory note in that case had been renewed by the father after partition; Peda Venkanna did not, in the court's view, overturn Ramachandra Padayachi or Kameswaramma in their narrower holdings.

Accordingly, the court held that the proper reading of the authorities is that a son in possession of property which had been joint and which fell to his share in partition is liable in a suit brought after partition (where the son is impleaded) for the father's debts incurred before partition. The court explicitly refused to follow Kani Venkatareddi as binding because that decision rested solely on Peda Venkanna (which the court limited).

The court emphasised the distinction between (a) execution proceedings (where, if partition preceded the suit, a son's allotted share may not be seized on a decree obtained against the father alone) and (b) suits where the son is made a party and judgment is sought against him directly for the father's antecedent debts.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The court dismissed the appeal with costs and held, following Ramachandra Padayachi v. Kondayya Chetti and Kameswaramma v. Venkata Subba Row, that a son who is in possession of property which had been joint and which fell to his share in partition is liable in a suit brought after partition (when the son is impleaded) for his father's debts incurred before the partition.

Implications:

  • The direct effect for the parties: the appeal was dismissed and the plaintiff's claim (as adjudicated) is sustained to the extent consistent with the court's ruling that sons who hold their allotted shares can be held liable in a suit brought after partition when they are impleaded.
  • The court limited Peda Venkanna to the extent that it rests on renewal of a promissory note by the father after partition, and declined to accept Kani Venkatareddi as binding where that case rested solely on Peda Venkanna.
  • The court emphasised that earlier decisions which drew a distinction between execution against a father's estate (when the son's allotted share may not be attachable) and a substantive suit including the son remain authoritative; the present decision follows established Madras precedents rather than creating a bright-line change.
  • The opinion does not purport to create a novel universal principle beyond the settled rule it follows; it applies and confirms prior decisions rather than announcing a new exception or overruling earlier cases.

This summary is strictly confined to the information and reasoning contained in the provided opinion. No facts, arguments or holdings have been added beyond those expressly contained in the opinion.

Show all summary ...

1. Suit by the plaintiff to recover (1) a sum of Rs. 2,500 deposited with first defendant on 6th July 1917 and (2) a sum of Rs. 350 payable to plaintiff for money paid for the first defendant. The defendants 2 to 5 are the sons of first defendant who formed with him members of a joint family up to 1918. In that year a suit was filed by the present second defendant against his father and brothers for partition. No written statement was filed and the suit was compromised and a decree was passed in terms of the compromise on 23rd January 1920. Under the compromise, provision was made for paying off most of the debts contracted by the first defendant but not the suit debt. No specific properties were allotted to the first defendant and it was arranged that a maintenance of Rs. 30 should be paid to him every month. The present suit was filed on 6th July 1920 and the defendants 2 to 5 are sought to be made liable with reference to the shares in their hands of what had been prior to 1920 joint family property. The defendants denied the genuineness of the debts. The District Judge found that the debts were true. He had doubts about the bona fides of the partition, but on the ground that under the compromise it was agreed that all the debts of the first defendant were agreed to be paid by all the defendants, decreed the suit. All the defendants appealed. The first defendant died during the pendency of the appeal. With the construction of the terras of the compromise by the District Judge, we are not able to agree.

2. The other appellants do not question the correctness of the finding that the debts are true. Nor do they say that the debts are illegal or immoral. They contend that the sons are not liable for the father's debt (not charged on the property) after partition and rely on Kani Venkatareddi v. Chelluri Suthyanarayanamoorthi (1321) 40 M.L.J. 473 following Peda Venkanna v. Sreenivasa Deekshatulu (1918) I.L.R. 41 Mad. 136, The respondent replies that the partition is not bona fide within the meaning of the exception recognized in these cases and if the partition is held bona fide, he contends that Kani Venkatareddi v. Chelluri Sathyanarayanamoorthi (1921) 40 M.L.J. 473 is incorrectly decided and as to Peda Venkanna v. Sreenivasa Deekshatulu (1918) I.L.R. 41 Mad. 136 while conceding that the actual decision is correct, in so far as it rests on any ground other than the ground that the pro-note in that case was renewed by the father after partition, such ground is not correctly decided.

3. We are of opinion that the partition by the decree of 1920 was bona fide in the sense that the intention was to really divide the status of the parties; it is probably also bona fide though the matter has not been fully gone into, in the sense that there has been no unequal allotment of properties if we regard all the debts as debts of first defendant only, i.e., that his share, minus all the debts would have been much less than what he actually got, viz., an annuity of Rs. 360 and we come to this conclusion in spite of the fact that there has been no division by metes and bounds and the decision in Appa v. Ranga (1883) I.L.R. 6 Mad. 71 is doubtful, if it meant to decide that the family continues joint in cases where there is a relinquishment by the father subject to a maintenance. It is not bona fide only in the sense that provision was not made for all the debts of first defendant, not illegal and immoral (Ghose's Hindu Law, Vol. 1, page 438) out of the whole joint family properties from which they would have been recoverable if there had been no partition and debts like the plaintiff's will be defeated if it is held that the defendants 2 to 5 are not liable. As it is doubtful whether the exception mentioned in the cases uses the expression "bona fide" in this sense, we had to consider the question of the correctness of the decisions relied on.

4. It may be that, under the primitive Hindu Law, a son is under a pious duty to discharge his father's debts irrespective of the devolution, on him, of any kind of property. But the decisions have established the principle that a son is not liable unless the self-acquired property of the father or property which had been joint between them has devolved upon the son. For the purposes of this case, it is not necessary to go further behind the case of Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lall (1874) 1 I.A. 321. At page 331 their Lordships quote from Knight Bruce, L.J., in Hunoomanpersaud Panday v. Mussumat Babooee Munraj Koonweree (1856) 6 M I.A. 393 Unless the debt was of such a nature that it was not the duty of the son to pay it, the discharge of it, even though it affected ancestral estate, would still be an act of pious duty in the son. By the Hindu Law the freedom of the son from the obligation to discharge the father's debt has respect to the nature of the debt and not to the nature of the estate whether ancestral or acquired by the creator of the debt and say:

That is an authority to show that ancestral property which descends to a father under the Mitakshara Law is not exempted from liability to pay his debts because a son is born to him. It would be a pious duty on the part of the son. to pay his father's debts and it being the pious duty of the son to pay his father's debts, the ancestral property, in which the son as the son of his father acquired an interest by birth, is liable to the father's debts.

5. At page 334, effect was given to these observations in Muddun Thakoor v. Kantoo Lall (1880) I.L.R. 5 Calc. 148 (P.C.) in favour of a creditor in execution. While the Calcutta High Court gave full effect in a case from Bengal in Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Persad Singh (1880) I.L.R. 5 Calc. 148 (P.C) the Madras High Court at first did not, on the ground that the decision in Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lall (1874) 1 I-A 321 cannot apply to Madras where a member of a joint family has a right to alienate his share (unlike Bengal) and there is no need for the equitable right, recognized in favour of the executing creditor in Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lall (1874) 1 I-A 321. The creditor carried the case to the Privy Council Muttayan v. Zamindar of Sivagiri (1883) I.L.R. 6 Mad. 1 (P.C.). Meanwhile a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Ponnappa Filled v. Pappuvayyangar (1882) I L.R. 4 Mad. I (F.B.) Muttuswami Ayyar, J., who decided the earlier case and Innes, J., dissenting) held that the decision in Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lall (1874) 1 I-A 321 applied to Madras equally. The Privy Council in Muttayan v. Zamindar of Sivagiri (1883) I.L.R. 6 Mad. 1 (P.C.) while deciding the case on another point, pointed out that there was no ground for not applying the decision in Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lall (1874) 1 I-A 321 to Madras. In Ramaswami Nadan v. Ulaganatha Goundan (1899) I.L.R. 22 Mad. 40 (F.B.) a Full Bench held that the liability of the father and son was co-extensive and the cause of action against the son arose simultaneously with that against the father though it must be added that the son cannot be sued alone during the father's life.--Periasami Mudaliar v. Seetharama Chettiar (1904) I.L.R. 27 Mad. 243 (F.B.). In Krishnasami. Konan v. Ramasami Ayyar (1899) I.L.R. 22 Mad. 519 the question arose whether in execution of a decree obtained against the father alone, the share of the son in the joint family property allotted to him in a partition, can be seized in execution. The District Judge (afterwards Miller, J.) held:

when the separation is before the suit as in this case, I think the creditor is bound to make parties all those whose interests he wishes to bind by his decree. The property is, from the date of separation, the son's property in which the father has no interest, and though the son may be liable to pay the debt, his liability must be enforced in a suit against himself.

6. Incidentally it may be observed that the son's share, even after partition, may be, and is spoken of in this and other cases as ancestral property and even joint property (in the sense that it. represents what had been joint property). It is indeed ancestral property in the hands of the son as against his own sons. The High Court said:

The principle upon which the son cannot object to ancestral property being seized in execution for an unsecured personal debt of the father is that the father, under the Hindu Law is entitled to sell on account, of such debt the whole of the ancestral estate. This necessarily implies that at the time the property is seized, it remains the undivided estate of the father and son Ergo, property taken by the son in partition cannot be seized on account of such unsecured personal debt of the father, even though the debt had been incurred before the partition. Of course if the partition had been made with a view to defraud or delay creditors it would be otherwise, but no such case is made out here.

7. This is the first case which considered the effect of a partition.

8. The whole decision and the exception in case of a mala fide, partition relate to the seizure in execution of a decree to which the son was not a party. In Ramachandra Padayachi v. Kondayya Chetti (1901) 1 L.R. 24 Mad. 555 the sons were parties to the suit and it was held (Bhashyam Ayyangar, J., being one of the Judges) that the son was liable to the extent of the family property which had come to him under the partition. Krishnasami Konan v. Ramasami A.yyar (1899) I.L.R. 22 Mad. 51 was thus distinguished at page 557:

In that case the suit was brought after partition against the father alone and the point decided was that property taken by a son under a partition effected before the suit could not be seized in execution of a decree obtained against the father only in such suit. The case turned on the plaintiff's rights in execution not as here on the question whether the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as against the son.

9. The next case is Kameswaramma v. Venkata Subba Row (1915) I.L.R. 38 Mad. 1120 (Wallis, C.J., and Oldfield, J.). In my opinion the reasoning in this case is conclusive against the appellants. The learned Judges say:

I think it is also clear that plaintiff as a Hindu son is liable for the debt to the extent of the joint family property which came to his hands at partition--Ramachandra Padayachi v. Kondayya Chetti (1901) I.L.R. 24 Mad. 555.

10. They quote the sentence I already quoted from Krishnasami Konan v. Ramasami Ayyar (1899) 1.L.R. 11. 22 Mad. 519 and say:

This necessarily implies that at the time the property is attached, it remains the undivided property of the father and son. The same view has been taken under very similar circumstances [(Miller and Krishnaswami Ayyar, JJ.) in Lakshmana Chettiar v. Govindarajulu Naidu 1910; 8 M.L.T. 349 see also Rathna Naidu v. Aiyanachariar (1908) 18 M.L.J. 599 . At the date of execution the property now in question had ceased to be joint family property and the cases referred to on the other side are cases in which the property remained joint and so subject to alienation by the father in satisfaction of the debt.

11. Incidentally it may be mentioned that the case in Rathna Naidu v. Aiyanachariar (1908) 18 M.L.J. 599 is one where the father mortgaged his son's share after partition. Obviously he has no such power and the case cannot help the point under discussion. Now comes the case in Peda Venkanna v. Sreenivasa Deekshatulu (1918) I.L.R. 41 Mad. 136. The point elaborately argued in that case and also elaborately discussed is whether Sahu Ram Chandra v. Bhup Singh (1917) I.L.R. 11.39 All. 437 (P.C.) effected any change in the law relating to the son's liability, a point which, after giving rise to Full Bench decisions in this Court, is set at rest by Lord DUNEDIN'S judgment in Raja Brij Narain Rai v. Mangla Prasad Rai (1924) 46 M.L.J. 23 (P.C.) (a judgment of a Full Board of the Privy Council). While deciding that it did not, Wallis, C.J., said:

This Court has held in a series of cases that as the effect of partition is to put an end to the father's right to sell the son's share for an antecedent debt, it also puts an end to the creditor's right to bring the son's share to sale during his lifetime, at any rate when the partition has not been effected to defeat and delay creditors: Krishnasami Konan v. Ramasami Ayyar (1899) I.L.R. 22 Mad. 519 and kameswaramma v. Venkata Subba Row (1910; 8 M.L.T. 349.

12. Having regard to the expression "to bring the son's share to sale" and to the fact that Kameswaramma v. Venkata Subba Row (1915) I.L.R. 38 Mad. 1120 was cited in support of his Lordship's proposition and without any qualification or disapproval, it is impossible to say, solely because, lower down the page, his Lordship used the expression "to say nothing of the further ground, etc." that his Lordship impliedly intended to overrule his own opinion in Kameswaramma v. Venkata Subba Row (1915) I.L.R. 38 Mad. 1120 following Ramachandra Padayachi v. Kondayya Chetti (1901) I.L.R. 24 Mad. 555. Kumaraswami Sastri, J., begins by saying he agrees with the judgment of the Chief Justice on the narrower ground:

that a son is not after partition liable to be proceeded against in respect of a personal debt incurred by the father before partition.

13. If "proceeded against" meant "proceeded against in execution" there is no difficulty in accepting the statement but if it meant, as it was intended to mean, "proceeded against in suit" it is not justified, I say with great deference to my learned brother, by Wallis, C.J.'S expression "to say nothing of the further ground" and by imputing to it a significance inconsistent with the earlier statement of the law following Kameswaramma v. Venkata Subba Row (1915) I.L.R. 38 Mad. 1120. His Lordship then reviews the cases at page 143. It is difficult to see how it can be said that Rathna Naidu v. Aiyanachariar (1908) 18 M.L.J. 598 followed Krishnasami Konan v. Ramasami Ayyar (1899) I.L.R. 22 Mad. 519. He then distinguishes Ramachandra Padayachi v. Kondayya Chetti (1901) I.L.R. 24 Mad. 555 by saying that:

the debt sued on arose out of a joint family business carried on by the father and son before partition and the liability of the son rested .... on contract entered into in respect of a joint family trade to the extent of the joint family assets, etc.

14. I am not able to follow the distinction. If the son was a party to the contract, he is liable not only as to the joint family property but even as to his self-acquired property and unless he is a minor, he is liable to be arrested. In other words, he is personally liable and there is no question of Hindu Law in the case. If he was not a party, his liability rests only on the Hindu Law relating to son's liability on the contracts of a father or manager. Suppose the family trade is not ancestral trade but a new trade started by the father and cannot therefore be said to be for justifiable necessity. Can it be said that Ramachandra Padayachi v. Kondayya Chetti (1901) I.L.R. 24 Mad. 555 does not apply to such a case. No such distinction was made in Kameswaramma v. Venkata Shatulu Row (1915) I.L.R. 38 Mad. 1120 which is not the case of a family trade. He then refers to the renewal of the note by the father. In my opinion the case in Peda Venkanna v. Sreenivasa Deckshatula (1918) I.L.R. 41 Mad. 136 is correctly decided so far as it rests on the ground that the note sued on was renewed by the father after partition. Wallis, C.J., did not intend to over rule Kameswaramma v. Venkata Subba Row (1915) J.L.R. 38 Mad. 1120 and Ramachandra Padayachi v. Kondayya Chetti (1901) I.L.R. 24 Mad. 555 or even to distinguish Ramachandra Padayachi v. Kondayya Chetti (1901) I.L.R. 24 Mad. 555 in the manner suggested by Kumaraswami Sastri, J. In these circumstances, we cannot accept the decision in Kani Venkatareddi v. Chelluri Sathyanarayanamoorthi (1921) 40 M.L.J. 473 as binding on us as it rests solely on the ground that the matter was concluded by Peda Venkanna v. Sreenivasa Deekshatulu (1920) I.L.R. 41 Mad. 136. Our brother Oldfield, J., who was also a party to Kameswaramma v. Venkata Subba Row (1915) J.L.R. 38 Mad. 1120 made no reference to it in the later case and gave no additional reasons. Abdur Rahim, J., simply said that all the cases were considered in Peda Venkanna, v. Sreenivasa Deekshatulu (1920) I.L.R. 41 Mad. 136. We are also referred to an unreported decision in A. 8. 419 of 1918 by Abdur Rahim arid Phillips, JJ. It purports to follow Peda Venkanna v. Sreenivasa Deekhatulu (1920) I.L.R. 41 Mad. 136 and concurs with Kumaraswami Sastri, J., in his distinction of Ramachandra Padayachi v. Kondayya Chetti (1901) I.L.R.24 Mad. 555. I have already dealt with this. This case does not add to the other cases. We are of opinion that Ramachandra Padayachi v. Kondayya Chetti (1901) I.L.R.24 Mad. 555 and Kameswaramma v. Venkata Subba Row (1915) J.L.R. 38 Mad. 1120 were not overruled and following them, we hold that a son in possession of property which had been joint and which fell to his share in partition is liable in a suit brought after partition (impleading the son also) for the father's debts incurred before the partition and not illegal and immoral (see also Strange's Hindu Law, Vol. I, page 191).

15. We do not think it necessary to refer the question to a Full Bench. On this ground, the appeal is dismissed with costs.

Jackson, J.

16. I agree. The point is correctly appreciated, in Dr. (Jour's Hindu Code, Section 118, paragraph 311, with reference to Ramachandra Padayachi v. Kondayya Chetti (1901) I.L.R. 24 Mad. 555 and Kameswaramma v. Venkata Subba Row (1915) I.L.R. 38 Mad. 1120: "On separation the son is liable for debts incurred before partition." Bat in Trevelyan's Hindu Law, 2nd Edition, page 308, the point is not stated so clearly. "A creditor cannot enforce the payment of the debt of the father against property which has been allotted on partition to the son." This would be correct if "enforce in execution" is meant and not correct if it also includes "enforce by suit."

17. In Mayne's Hindu Law, 9th Edition, page 411, it is stated:

Where the son is joined in a suit against the father this is for the purpose of enabling the Court to exercise the power of the father to sell family property in discharge of his debts not being illegal or Immoral, and to prevent the son from questioning the nature of the debt in execution proceedings against the property. After partition, of course, the son holds the share which is allotted to him free from any such liability.

18. If "any such liability" be taken to mean attachment in execution proceedings, the passage presents no difficulty, but if the words mean free from any liability for such debts the statement seems to go too far.