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Bansidhar Dhandhania v. Kalroo Mandar And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a suit to enforce a mortgage executed by Tahur in 1927. In 1930, Tahur and two co-sharers sold their entire sixteen annas share to the appellant (defendant 2). The sale deed included an express covenant that the appellant would pay off two earlier mortgages executed in 1918 and 1919 by Tahur and another co-sharer, and one mortgage executed in 1924 by the third co-sharer. The 1927 mortgage executed by Tahur was not disclosed to the appellant. The appellant claimed entitlement to subrogation concerning the 1918 and 1919 mortgages. The trial court and the first appellate court accepted the principle of this contention but denied relief, holding that the appellant had not established the share of the burden on the property in suit. The learned Judge of this Court, on appeal, referred to the Judicial Committee’s decision in 36 CWN 41, holding that a purchaser bound by contract to discharge prior encumbrances is not entitled to subrogation as he merely performs his own obligation.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a purchaser of the equity of redemption who discharges prior mortgages pursuant to an express covenant is entitled to the equitable remedy of subrogation.
- Whether Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act, as amended in 1929, governs the appellant’s rights to subrogation in this transaction.
- Whether the absence of a registered instrument agreeing to subrogation precludes the appellant from claiming subrogation under Para. 3 of Section 92.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The transaction is governed by Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act (1929 amendment), a contention not opposed by the respondent.
- The appellant’s rights to subrogation arise under Para. 1 of Section 92, which would entitle a purchaser of the equity of redemption to subrogation if he redeems prior mortgages on his own account independently of any agreement with the mortgagor.
Respondent's Arguments
- The appellant is not entitled to subrogation because the payment of prior mortgages was made pursuant to an express covenant in the sale deed, thus excluding subrogation.
- The appellant’s payment was made with moneys advanced by the vendors, and in the absence of a registered instrument agreeing to subrogation as required by Para. 3 of Section 92, subrogation cannot be claimed.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| 36 CWN 41 (Judicial Committee) | A purchaser bound by covenant to discharge prior encumbrances is not entitled to subrogation as he performs his own obligation. | The Court relied on this principle to hold that “covenant excludes subrogation” and dismissed the appellant’s claim. |
| ILR 1937 All 8802 (Allahabad High Court, Full Bench) | Interpretation of Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act regarding subrogation and covenant. | The Court noted that this decision supported the view that subrogation does not arise where payment is made pursuant to a covenant without a registered agreement for subrogation. |
| 59 Mad 359 (Madras Full Bench) | Similar interpretation of Section 92 concerning subrogation and covenant. | The Court referenced this precedent as aligning with the principle that covenant excludes subrogation. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined the nature of the appellant’s payment of prior mortgages, emphasizing that the payment was made pursuant to an express covenant in the sale deed. It invoked the principle established by the Judicial Committee that where a purchaser performs an obligation he is contractually bound to perform, he cannot claim the equitable remedy of subrogation. The Court further analyzed Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act, noting the distinction between Para. 1, which applies to persons paying off mortgages on their own account without agreement with the mortgagor, and Para. 3, which allows subrogation only if there is a registered instrument agreeing to subrogation. Since the appellant paid the prior mortgages with moneys advanced by the vendors and there was no registered agreement for subrogation, the appellant was not entitled to the remedy. The Court found the learned Judge's interpretation correct and consistent with the prevailing judicial views in Allahabad and Madras.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED
The Court dismissed the appeal with costs, holding that the appellant is not entitled to subrogation because the payment of prior mortgages was made pursuant to an express covenant, and there was no registered instrument agreeing to subrogation as required under Section 92(3) of the Transfer of Property Act. The direct effect is that the appellant cannot claim equitable subrogation in these circumstances. No new precedent was established beyond affirming the existing principles that covenant excludes subrogation and that subrogation under Section 92 requires a registered agreement when payment is made with mortgagor’s funds.
1. This is an appeal under the Letters Patent from a decision of a single Judge of this Court. It arises out of a suit brought to enforce a mortgage executed by one Tahur in 1927. In 1930 Tahur and two co-sharers of his sold their entire sixteen annas share to defendant 2, the appellant before us. The consideration money for this sale was left with the appellant in accordance with all express covenant in the sale deed that the vendee would pay off two mortgages executed by Tahur and another co-sharer in 1918 and 1919 and one mortgage executed by the third co-sharer in 1924. The existence of the mortgage of 1927 executed by Tahur was not disclosed to the purchaser-appellant, who set up the defence that he was entitled to subrogation in respect of the mortgages of 1918 and 1919. The trial Court and the Court of first appeal accepted the contention in principle, but declined to give the appellant any relief on the ground that though the mortgages covered other properties the appellant had not established what share of the burden was to fall upon the property in suit. On appeal by defendant 2 to this Court the learned Judge of this Court held it settled by the decision of the Judicial Committee in 36 CWN 41 that a purchaser of the equity of redemption who discharges a prior encumbrance which he is by contract bound to discharge is not entitled to the benefit of the equitable rule of subrogation, for the simple reason that he merely performs his own obligation or covenant;
2. Or, to put it briefly, “covenant excludes subrogation”.
3. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the transaction is governed by Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act, as amended in 1929, and this contention is not opposed by the other side. It has further been contended on behalf of the appellant that his rights are determined by Para. 1 and not by Para. 3 of the Section. No decision of this Court on this point has been placed before us. Para. 1 of S. 92 would undoubtedly have entitled the appellant as purchaser of the equity of redemption to subrogation if he had redeemed the prior mortgages on his own account and independently of any agreement with the mortgagor who is specifically excluded in this paragraph; but, the appellant paid off the prior mortgagees with moneys that were left with him for the purpose by the vendors mortgagors. Para. 3 of the Section, which it is claimed by the respondent would apply to the appellant, provides that a person who has advanced to a mortgagor money with which a mortgage has been redeemed shall be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee whose mortgage has been redeemed, if the mortgagor has by a registered instrument agreed that such person shall be so subrogated.
4. The moneys with which the previous mortgages in this case were paid off were clearly moneys that had been advanced to the mortgagors by the appellant. That they were not paid into the hands of the mortgagors (is immaterial, for, it was by agreement with them (if not at their instance) and in pursuance of what the learned Judge of this Court has called an express covenant that the appellant actually paid them to the old mortgagees, though even in the absence of an express covenant the purchaser would be under an implied obligation to pay off the prior mortgages on the mortgagors' account if the consideration money were left with him for the purpose. In such a case Para. 3 only entitles the person who has advanced the money to subrogation “if the mortgagor has by a registered instrument agreed that such person shall be so subrogated”. There was no such agreement in the present case, and the appellant is therefore not entitled to subrogation. This view of the law as laid down in S. 92 is in accordance with the view that has ultimately prevailed in the Allahabad High Court as will be seen from the recent case in ILR 1937 All 8802 decided by a Full Bench of five Judges. Much the same view of Sec. 92 was taken by a Full Bench of three Judges in Madras: 59 Mad 359.3 The matter would scarcely have been open to argument if the decision of the Privy Council in the case in 36 CWN 4 referred to by the learned Judge of this Court had proceeded on the new Section. But the principle on; which that decision proceeded, namely that covenant excludes subrogation is clearly reflected in the new Section also which in Para. 1 deals with persons (other than the; mortgagor) paying off previous mortgages on their own account and in Para. 3 deals with subrogation by agreement with the mortgagor who raises moneys to pay off some previous mortgage. The view taken by the learned Judge of this Court is correct, and we must dismiss this appeal with costs.
D.S/R.K
5. Appeal dismissed.
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