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Uma Singh v. King Emperor
Opinion Summary: Scroope, J. (Revision Nos. 513/32 & 514/32)
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion arises from two revisional applications (No. 513/32 and No. 514/32) by four of five persons convicted after a trial before the 1st class Magistrate of Arrah. The accused were charged under sections 420 (cheating) and 120B (criminal conspiracy) of the Indian Penal Code. Sentences imposed varied: Uma Singh received 18 months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 300 (default six months' rigorous imprisonment) under section 420; Ratan Singh and Baijnath Lal received nine months' rigorous imprisonment and fines of Rs. 200 each (default six months); Damodar Singh was sentenced to six months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 100 (default three months). Concurrent sentences of six months under section 120B were also imposed. Rs. 200 of the fines were directed as compensation to the complainant.
On appeal, the Sessions Judge of Shahabad upheld the convictions and sentences under section 420 but set aside the conviction for conspiracy (section 120B). Separate revisional petitions were filed: No. 513/32 (Uma Singh, Ratan Singh and Baijnath Lal) and No. 514/32 (Damodar Singh).
The underlying facts as found by the prosecution are that the complainant, Sitaram Das (a sadhu), was induced to hand over notes purportedly to be “doubled” by the accused. A demonstration was given, the complainant eventually handed over notes and incidental sums, a packet later contained charred papers, threats were exchanged, a purported gold necklace later proved to be gilt, and the complainant reported the matter to police leading to trial and conviction.
Procedurally, the complainant lodged an information on 25 August 1931. The police submitted a final report under section 173 CrPC stating the case was true but evidence insufficient, and that a separate necklace case should be instituted. The complainant filed a protest petition; the Sub-divisional Magistrate initially declined to proceed on the police report in respect of the note-doubling allegations, recording "Enter true section 420, I.P.C." The Sessions Judge later allowed a petition by the complainant, directed the Magistrate to examine the complainant on oath, and the Magistrate then called for a charge-sheet (record G.R. 1147/31) that led to the trial now under revision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a Magistrate who has disposed of a police report under section 173 CrPC (by declining to take cognizance) can thereafter reopen the matter and call for a charge-sheet (i.e., whether the earlier administrative order is final and bars subsequent proceedings).
- Whether the Magistrate's requirement that accused deposit costs for certain defence witnesses (and thereby conditionally refusing to summon those witnesses unless costs were paid) deprived the accused of an adequate opportunity to present defence witnesses.
- Whether the portion of the sentence directing payment of compensation to the complainant should be sustained given the complainant's conduct as described in the record.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Yunus)
- It was submitted that once the Sub-divisional Magistrate disposed of the police report under section 173 CrPC and declined to take cognizance, he lacked power to reopen the file and call for a charge-sheet; such a re-opening would amount to permitting "autrefois acquit" to be circumvented and was impermissible.
- The petitioners further argued that the Magistrate improperly curtailed their right to summon witnesses by insisting on the deposit of witness expenses; they claimed they were thereby denied an adequate opportunity to have defence witnesses examined.
- Implicitly, the petitioners challenged the imposition of compensation to the complainant as part of the sentence.
The opinion does not contain a detailed, separate account of the prosecution's advocacy in response to these points; the narrative focuses on the petitioners' contentions and the court's analysis of the record and prior orders (including the Sessions Judge's direction).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ganga Ram v. Emperor (cited in the text) | Holds that a Magistrate can reopen a case by calling for a charge-sheet after disposing of a police report under section 173 by an administrative entry such as "Enter mistake of fact"; such disposals are administrative/ministerial rather than judicial and so can be revisited. | The court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that the Magistrate's earlier disposal of the police report under section 173 did not preclude him from subsequently calling for a charge-sheet and reopening the matter. |
| Shukadeva Sahay v. Hamid Mian (cited in the text) | Held (as described in the opinion) that a District Magistrate has no power to direct the police to submit a charge-sheet where a Sub-divisional Magistrate has declined to take cognizance under section 190(1)(b) after a recommendation under section 173 CrPC. | The court distinguished this authority from the present case, observed it was not fully on all fours, and expressly dissented from any broad proposition that administrative orders of this character cannot be re-opened; the court rejected the reliance on this case by the petitioners. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court addressed each principal contention in turn and anchored its reasoning tightly to the record and to procedural law as presented in the material.
1. Reopening after a section 173 disposal:
- The court characterized the Magistrate's earlier order disposing of the police report under section 173 as an administrative or ministerial act, not a judicial determination concluding the merits of the case. Because that earlier entry was administrative in nature, the doctrine of autrefois acquit did not apply to bar reopening the matter.
- The court relied on the authority in Ganga Ram to support the proposition that a Magistrate could call for a charge-sheet after such an administrative disposal. It rejected Mr. Yunus' contention that the Magistrate lacked power to reopen the case.
- The court considered and rejected the only authority cited by Mr. Yunus (Shukadeva Sahay v. Hamid Mian), finding it distinguishable and declining to follow it insofar as it could be read to prohibit reopening administrative disposals; the court expressly dissented from that broader reading.
- The court also observed that the Magistrate had fresh material before him at the time he called for the charge-sheet — namely, the charge-sheet in the separate necklace case and the Sessions Judge's order directing further enquiry and examining the complainant — and that the Sessions Judge's order required the Magistrate to examine the complainant and consider the matter on its merits, which was done in the subsequent trial.
2. Refusal to summon defence witnesses absent payment of costs:
- The court reviewed the record showing that when defence witness lists were filed the Magistrate, not satisfied that the witnesses were bona fide, required deposit of expenses for certain witnesses. The court noted the order was passed after consultation with the defence mukhtar, and the defence accepted the position at that time.
- The court found that the accused did not proceed to secure the deposits and that on the later date some accused accepted dasti summons for their witnesses; ultimately no defence witnesses were produced and no further application was made to the Magistrate.
- The court emphasized that the petitioners had not identified any particular witness or stated what relevant testimony such witnesses would have given. The Sessions Judge's judgment was silent on this point, and the revisional petition did not provide any factual basis to show prejudice. On these facts the court found no substance in the objection that the accused were deprived of an opportunity to have defence witnesses examined.
3. Compensation directed to the complainant:
- The court considered the facts showing the complainant had been deliberately deceived and that he had allowed himself to be fooled; on this basis the court concluded the complainant did not deserve sympathy and that the compensation portion of the order should be set aside.
The court therefore dismissed the revisional applications on the merits of the procedural and evidentiary objections, upheld the convictions and sentences, but set aside the compensation award.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE UPHELD. The revisional applications were dismissed. The convictions and sentences for cheating (section 420 IPC) were maintained, and the challenge to the Magistrate's reopening of the matter was rejected. The court set aside the portion of the order directing payment of compensation to the complainant.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The petitioners' convictions and sentences remain in force; the compensation payment ordered to the complainant has been set aside.
- On procedure, the court affirmed the proposition (as applied in this case) that an administrative disposal of a police report under section 173 CrPC may be reopened and a charge-sheet called for where the disposal was administrative/ministerial rather than a final judicial determination; the court relied on precedent to that effect and expressly disagreed with a contrary reading it found in Shukadeva Sahay v. Hamid Mian.
- The court found no merit in the contention that the Magistrate's conditional requirement of deposit for witnesses, as recorded and acted upon, deprived accused of an adequate opportunity to present defence witnesses where the accused neither pursued deposits nor identified particular missing-witness testimony in the record.
- No novel legal principle was laid down beyond the application of existing principles to the facts; the decision resolves the parties' rights in this case and does not purport to create a broad new precedent beyond the reasoning applied.
Conviction and sentence upheld.
Scroope, J. (with Courtney Terrell, C.J., concurring).
Scroope, J.:— In these two revisional applications there are four petitioners out of five convicted persons. No. 513/32 is the application of Uma Singh, Ratan Singh and Baijnath Lal and no. 514/32 is of Damodar Singh. The first-named three persons with Ramautar Singh and Damodar Singh were tried and charged under sections 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code by the 1st class Magistrate of Arrah. Uma Singh received a sentence of 18 months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 300, in default a further rigorous imprisonment of six months under section 420, Indian Penal Code. Ratan Singh and Baijnath Lal along with Ramautar Singh were sentenced to nine months' rigorous imprisonment each and a fine of Rs. 200 each, in default six months' rigorous imprisonment whilst Damodar was sentenced to six months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 100, in default a further period of rigorous imprisonment for three months under section 420. All these accused persons were also convicted under section 120B at the same trial and received sentences of six months each to run concurrently with the above-mentioned sentences, and out of the fines Rs. 200 was directed to be paid to the complainant as compensation. Damodar Singh has filed a separate revisional application no. 514 of 1932 against his conviction. The convictions and sentences under section 420. Indian Penal Code were upheld by the Sessions Judge of Shahabad but he set aside the conviction for conspiracy.
The prosecution case is shortly this: the complainant Sitaram Das is a Sadhu and lives at Morha Mathia in mouza Banwalia; petitioner Damodar Singh is one of his chelas and he came to him one day in Asarh before last and told him that he had four or five friends who knew how to double notes and that he could get the Sadhu's notes doubled if he gave him some. Then a practical demonstration was arranged and the four petitioners and Ramautar doubled currency notes of Rs. 10 each and thus gained the confidence of the complainant who then agreed to give them. Rs. 1,500 worth of notes to be doubled. At the same time the complainant also gave them about Rs. 175 for incidental expenses. To make a long story short, eventually one day the petitioners got Rs. 1,300 out of the complainant and pretended to start’ note doubling. They gave, the complainant a packet to carry home and told him that they would complete the operation on the following day, again taking incidental expenses from the complainant. On the following day then Damodar petitioner came to the complainant and told him that he could not trace the note doublers. The packet was opened and was found to contain charred papers. The complainant then threatened Damodar with a criminal prosecution and. Damodar similarly threatened the complainant. A few days later the complainant met Uma Singh at Arrah Railway Station and demanded back his money; the latter promised to pay it back. Then there was a panchayati over the affair and Damodar is alleged to have confessed his guilt and eventually offered complainant a gold necklace alleged to be worth Rs. 150. This when tested by a blacksmith turned out to be gilt. The patience of the complainant being thus at an end, he reported the matter to the police; and eventually these petitioners were put on trial on the charges mentioned above and were convicted.
The material facts for understanding the first contention urged by Mr. Yunus in this revisional application no. 513/32 are as follows: the complainant, as I have said, lodged his first information on the 25th August, 1931, charging the five petitioners with conspiracy and cheating and eventually a final report was submitted by the police under section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure, to the effect that the case was true but the evidence was insufficient. At the same time it was stated in the final report that a separate case would have to be instituted by the Sub-Inspector of Shahpur in respect of, what I may call, the necklace part of the incident, as the delivery of the necklace by Damodar Singh to the complainant constituted quite a separate offence of cheating by him. The informant Sitaram, however, filed a protest petition before the Sub-divisional Officer against the police report. The complainant was directed to appear in support of it on the 8th November, 1931, and on the 20th November, 1931 the Magistrate recorded the following order:
“I have heard the Mukhtear for the prosecution and considered the police report. As there is not sufficient (sic) against the accused, the police have not sent them up for trial. I also see no reason to call for charge sheet or to put them on trial. Enter true section 420, I.P.C”
This case, it is to be noted, bore G.R no. 865 of 1931.
On the 28th November, 1931, the Shahpur police-submitted charge sheet in the necklace case no. 1147/31 against Damodar Singh and Uma Singh and on the 12th January the complainant Sitaram Das moved the Sessions Judge against the order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate declining to proceed further with the note doubling case. That is the case no. 865 of 1931. The Sessions Judge allowed this application recording the following order:
“This application will have to be allowed, if only because to learned Magistrate failed to examine the applicant on oath on hit protest petition, although surely he should have known by now that he was bound to do so. The learned Magistrate should now examine the applicant accordingly and consider his case on its merits”.
Thereupon on the 22nd February the Sub-divisional Magistrate recorded the following order on the order-sheet of the necklace case: that is, case G.R No. 1147/31:
“Call on the police to submit charge sheet against the remaining three accused also for 4th March”,
and this resulted in the trial in question.
On the above facts Mr. Yunus contends that the whole trial in this note doubling case was illegal as the Magistrate, having declined to take cognizance on the original police report even after the complainant's protest petition, could not reopen the case and call for a charge sheet. There was some slight confusion in the matter as the learned Magistrate instead of recording his order for a charge sheet on the order-sheet of the note doubling case 845 did so on the order-sheet of the necklace case no. 1147 in which charge sheet had already been submitted against two persons. But it is clear enough that this order referred to the note doubling case, for he also directed that the record of the G.R case 865/31 is to be amalgamated with this case 1147/31 and that there is to be only one trial, though eventually the two cases had to be tried separately. This is really what has given rise to Mr. Yunus' contention and I see no force in it. It is unreasonable to contend, as Mr. Yunus does in effect, that a Magistrate, having once disposed of a police report under section 173 as here, has no power to revise his order and call for, a charge sheet. The Magistrate's order directing a case reported to him by the police under section 173 to be struck off, as in this case, is not a judicial order. In Ganga Ram… v. Emperor…Opposite Party. of this Court it was held that a Magistrate could reopen a case by calling for a charge sheet after disposing of a police report under section 173 with the order “Enter mistake of fact”. Such orders are purely administrative or ministerial and the principle “autrefois acquit”. which is really at the basis of Mr. Yunus' contention, cannot possibly apply to them. To accept this contention would mean, for instance, that if a Magistrate after disposing of a police report in this fashion, were to suspect or discover that the report was dishonest, his hands would be tied by his previous order. He can, for instance, reopen the case under section 190(1)(c). The only authority Mr. Yunus cites is Shukadeva Sahay v. Hamid Mian*(2), where it was held that, a District Magistrate has no power to direct the police to submit a, charge sheet where a Sub-divisional Magistrate has declined to take cognizance of an offence under section 190(1)(b), after recommendation to that effect has been submitted by the police to the Sub-divisional Magistrate under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. For one thing that case is not on all fours with the present case; and in the second place the decision does not take into account section 190(1)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and in so far as it can be taken to lay down that administrative order of this kind cannot be re-opened either by the Sub-divisional Magistrate or a District Magistrate, I must altogether dissent from it. Laws of procedure, as the Privy Council has laid down, are not meant to hamper the administration of justice. It is true that if a Magistrate takes cognizance under section 190(1)(c) he must give the accused the option of being tried by some other Magistrate; but that point does not arise here as the trying Magistrate was not the Magistrate who called for the charge sheet. Moreover, he had fresh material before him in the shape of charge sheet in the necklace case as well as in the Sessions Judge's order directing further enquiry. Mr. Yunus contends that so far as it relates to the Sessions Judge's order directing further enquiry, the Magistrate cannot fortify himself with it in respect of the order complained of because the Sessions Judge directed only that the complainant should be examined. But the Sessions Judge's order did not, in my opinion, debar the Magistrate from summoning the accused; it only directed the Magistrate to examine the complainant and consider the case on the merits. This order was complied with when the Magistrate examined the complainant in the actual trial after the charge sheet which he had called for had been submitted. In my opinion this contention must fail.
The second point was that the Magistrate did not give the petitioners opportunity of having their witnesses examined. When the defence filed their list of witnesses the Magistrate, as he was entitled to do, not being satisfied that they were bona fide witnesses insisted in the case of certain of these witnesses that their expenses should be deposited. That was on the 29th June. On the next day, 30th of June, we find the petitioners protested against this order and then the Magistrate recorded the following order:
“I have already passed orders after consultation with the defence mukhtar. If the accused want to summon those witnesses they must pay the cost by tomorrow the latest.”
It will be seen, therefore, that the order was passed after consultation with their legal advisor and the position was accepted by him. The accused took no steps in the matter of getting these witnesses summoned.
On the 11th July Ratan Singh then said that he was still unable to get the cost for his witnesses, However, he was offered and accepted what was known as dasti summons. The witnesses were to be produced by the 15th July and there the matter ended as no defence witnesses were produced and there was no further petition in the matter. This point evidently was not argued before the Sessions Judge at all; for his very exhaustive judgment is silent on the point. Above all before us and in the petition to this Court the petitioners do not refer to any particular witness, much less what he would prove in their favour. There is simply a general allegation that they did not get an adequate chance of summoning their witnesses; and I am satisfied that there is no substance in their objection. These are the points on which these two separate applications in revision were pressed and they must both fail.
As regards the compensation which was directed to be paid to the complainant, I do not consider that he deserves any compensation as he deliberately allowed himself to be fooled in this fashion, and he deserves no sympathy from a Court, and I would set that portion of the order aside.
Courtney Terrell, C.J:— I agree.
Conviction and sentence upheld.
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