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Ammani Ammal v. Ramaswami Naidu

Madras High Court
Jan 10, 1919
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Judgment Summary — Sadasiva Aiyar, J. (Second Appeal)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff sued for possession of properties bequeathed to him by his elder brother Abboy Naidu under a will dated 4 August 1901. The plaintiff had been a minor at the time of the bequest. The plaintiff's mother asserted a title in herself, contending that the properties purchased in Abboy Naidu's name were really held by him as benamidar (nominee) for her. Acting on that asserted title she sold the properties to the 1st defendant (the appellant) in February 1904 under Exhibit VI for Rs. 3,400.

The plaintiff denied that Abboy Naidu was a benamidar for his mother, sued on the title he derived from Abboy Naidu, and prayed in his plaint that the deed of February 1904 be cancelled if necessary. The lower Appellate Court found for the plaintiff and decreed in his favour.

The 1st defendant appealed in a Second Appeal. The appellant contended (1) that the plaintiff should have been ordered to reimburse the 1st defendant for amounts she had paid in discharge of debts binding on Abboy Naidu (and therefore binding on the plaintiff as legatee); and (2) that as to mortgage debt paid by the 1st defendant she was entitled to be subrogated to the mortgagee's rights and the plaintiff should pay those amounts before recovering the properties.

The appellate court remitted a specific issue to the lower Appellate Court to determine whether the 1st defendant paid any sums to the mortgagee under the 1899 mortgage, and if so the amounts and dates. The lower court (Temporary Subordinate Judge, Tanjore) found that the 1st defendant paid Rs. 285 on 6 October 1905 to discharge the encumbrance; the mortgage carried interest at 9%. On final hearing after that finding, the higher court accepted the finding and modified the lower court's decree by directing that Rs. 285 and interest from date of plaint be set off against the supplemental decree for mesne profits. The appellant was ordered to pay respondents' costs of the Second Appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff must reimburse the purchaser (1st defendant) amounts of debts binding on the deceased owner (Abboy Naidu) that the purchaser paid as part of the purchase transaction;
  2. Whether the 1st defendant is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of a mortgagee in respect of sums she paid in good faith to discharge a mortgage encumbering the properties, and if so whether the plaintiff must pay those sums before recovering the properties;
  3. Whether any claim for compensation under Sections 39 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act (relating to cancellation of instruments and compensation when cancellation is ordered) arises in a suit by the true owner to recover possession when the adverse title was asserted by a stranger.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (1st defendant) — Main contentions

  • The 1st defendant, as a bona fide purchaser for value, should be entitled to treat the sale-deed executed by the plaintiff's mother as if it were executed by her in her capacity as the plaintiff's guardian; on that footing the plaintiff should be bound to reimburse so much of the purchase money as went to discharge debts binding on the plaintiff.
  • So far as mortgage debt is concerned, the 1st defendant contended she had paid the mortgagee and was entitled to be subrogated to the mortgagee's rights; the plaintiff ought to be made to pay such mortgage amounts by right of subrogation before recovering the properties.

Respondent (Plaintiff) — Main positions as recorded in the opinion

  • The plaintiff denied that Abboy Naidu was a benamidar for his mother and sued on the title derived from Abboy Naidu.
  • The plaintiff sought possession and additionally prayed for cancellation of the sale-deed executed by his mother only "if necessary".

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Balvant (Balwant) Singh v. R. Clancy (Privy Council) Held that where a person de jure manager purported to create obligations as if full owner, an alienee cannot claim reimbursement (by equity or under Specific Relief Act s.41) for portions of consideration that discharged debts binding on junior members of family. Used as direct authority to reject the appellant's contention that the purchaser could recover sums paid to discharge debts binding on the plaintiff; the Court concluded the 1st defendant had no right to recover such sums not charged on immoveable property.
Sabapathy Chetty v. Ponnusawmy Chetty Authority concerning alienations by a Hindu father who has powers amounting to full owner; courts inferred capacity beneficial to bona fide purchasers in those facts. Distinguished: the Court held those decisions turned on particular facts (father's special position) and could not be applied to the present case where the mother plainly asserted sole ownership and the alienation did not convey any part-ownership by her son.
Audimula Mudali v. Alamelammal Discussed the doctrine that courts should, if possible, treat transferor as having acted in capacity most beneficial to bona fide purchaser; applied in context of transfers by fathers with broad powers. Distinguished on facts: where transferor unequivocally claimed absolute ownership the doctrine could not be invoked to create ambiguity; not applicable here to treat mother as acting in guardianship capacity.
Bij Rajnopani v. Pura Sundari Dasee Where document executed by a full legal owner conveying intended full rights, an erroneous description of origin/incidents of title did not prevent alienee obtaining valid title. Held inapplicable: in the present case the sale-deed was a "mere waste paper" conveying no title or interest, unlike the Bij Rajnopani facts where the alienor was full legal owner intending to convey full rights.
Nathu v. Balwantrao (I.L.R., 27 Bom., 390; also cited earlier authority (1875) 2 I.A. 131) Direct authority that one who has benefited by another's money is not necessarily obliged to repay; a voluntary payment of another's debt does not create such an obligation unless express or implied obligation to repay exists. Followed respectfully to support the proposition that the 1st defendant could not recover sums she paid to discharge debts not charged on immoveable property; quoted to show requirement of an obligation to repay before granting relief.
Ram Tuhul Sing v. Bioseswar Lall Sahoo (Privy Council) Statement quoted: benefit alone does not create an obligation to repay; to support a suit there must be an obligation, express or implied. Quoted in support of the principle that mere benefit does not create a right to recover; used to reject equitable claims based solely on benefit to the plaintiff.
Syamalarayudu v. Subbarayudu Recognises a doctrine analogous to salvage: where a purchaser in good faith pays a mortgage to discharge an encumbrance, the purchaser becomes an equitable assignee of the mortgage to the extent of the payment. Relied upon to hold that if the 1st defendant in good faith paid the mortgagee to discharge the mortgage, she is entitled to be subrogated to the mortgagee's rights for the amounts so paid.
Chama Swami v. Padala Anandu Supports the doctrine that a purchaser who in good faith pays money to discharge a mortgage may become equitable assignee of the mortgagee's rights. Referred to jointly with Syamalarayudu as authority supporting subrogation where a purchaser paid mortgage sums in good faith; used to justify remitting the factual issue of payments for trial.
Mallacheruvu Raghavayya v. Mallacheruvu Subbayya (S.A. No. 803 of 1916) In that case the court found that a document from the true owner existed which on its face conveyed the property (minor's conveyance where majority was in question); applied Section 41 in context where cancellation was necessary to obtain legal remedy. Distinguished: the present case did not involve a document from the true owner that had to be set aside before legal remedy; therefore Mallacheruvu Raghavayya did not support appellant's use of Section 41 here.
Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose (Privy Council) Held that where legislature has declared a transaction void (e.g., minor's transaction) equity cannot compel payment for benefits received; applied both Specific Relief Act and equitable doctrines considerations. Quoted and applied to show that where a party seeks equity (e.g., cancellation) and the transaction is void by statute, courts will not ordinarily compel payment of money; used to reject broad equitable claims for compensation in the present facts.
Thurston v. Nottingham Permanent Benefit Building Society (Court of Appeal) Quoted for the proposition that a Court of Equity cannot compel payment of moneys in respect of a transaction which the legislature has declared to be void. Quoted in Mohori Bibee context to support refusal to impose equitable compensation where the transaction is declared void by statute; cited by the court in evaluating equitable remedies.
Shiam Lal v. Ram Piari Some doubts were expressed in this case about the doctrine of equitable subrogation/assignee status where purchaser pays mortgage. Mentioned: the court noted doubts raised in Shiam Lal but nonetheless followed Syamalarayudu and Chama Swami and held the subrogation doctrine founded on right principles applicable here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two main strands of reasoning corresponding to the appellant's two principal contentions.

1. Claim for reimbursement of sums paid to discharge debts other than mortgage debt

  • The court rejected the appellant's primary contention that as a bona fide purchaser for value she could treat the vendor (the plaintiff's mother) as having acted in a guardian capacity (thus rendering the plaintiff bound to reimburse amounts of purchase money that discharged debts binding on him).
  • The court examined authorities and concluded that those authorities which supported reimbursement in certain cases (for example, Sabapathy Chetty and Audimula Mudali) were fact-specific and involved transferors (e.g., Hindu fathers) who held powers akin to full owners or where the documents of alienation did affect part-ownership; those facts were distinguishable.
  • The court relied directly on the Privy Council decision in Balvant/Balwant Singh v. R. Clancy and on Nathu v. Balwantrao (and a quoted passage from Ram Tuhul Sing v. Bioseswar Lall Sahoo) to state the controlling principle: mere benefit or payment of another's debts does not, without an express or implied obligation to repay, create a right to reimbursement. The court emphasized that to support such a suit there must be an obligation, express or implied, to repay.
  • Applying those principles to the present facts, where the mother unequivocally asserted sole ownership and the deed in question was a document that conveyed no title of the plaintiff, the court held that the 1st defendant had no right to recover sums she paid to discharge debts not charged upon immoveable property.

2. Claim for subrogation in respect of mortgage sums

  • The court recognized a distinct doctrine (analogous to salvage) that where a purchaser in good faith pays money to discharge a mortgage encumbering the purchased property, the purchaser may be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee to the extent of the sums so paid.
  • The court cited Syamalarayudu v. Subbarayudu and Chama Swami v. Padala Anandu as supporting decisions and noted some doubts expressed in Shiam Lal v. Ram Piari but concluded the subrogation doctrine was sound and should be followed.
  • Because the lower courts had not determined whether the 1st defendant in fact paid any sums to the mortgagee under the mortgage deed of 19 April 1899 (and the amounts and dates), the court directed that this factual issue be tried and a finding returned. The appellate court set a timetable for the finding (to be submitted within 4 weeks of receipt of the records with 10 days for objections).
  • After the lower court returned a finding that the 1st defendant paid Rs. 285 on 6 October 1905 to the mortgagee (mortgage carrying interest at 9%), the higher court accepted that finding and applied the subrogation principle by setting off Rs. 285 and interest from date of plaint against the supplemental decree for mesne profits.

On the applicability of Sections 39 and 41, Specific Relief Act

  • The court examined the appellant's attempt to rely on Sections 39 and 41 (relating to suits for cancellation and compensation when cancellation is ordered) and concluded those provisions apply where cancellation is necessary to obtain the legal remedy. Here the suit was one by the true owner to recover possession and there was no necessity to cancel the sale-deed executed by a stranger asserting title. Thus Section 41 did not give the appellant an entitlement to compensation in these facts.
  • The court distinguished Mallacheruvu Raghavayya v. Mallacheruvu Subbayya on this ground: in that case there existed a document from the true owner which had to be set aside before recovery; not so here.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court accepted the lower court's finding that the 1st defendant paid Rs. 285 on 6 October 1905 to the mortgagee under the mortgage deed of 1899 and modified the Lower Appellate Court's decree by directing that Rs. 285 and interest from the date of plaint be set off against the supplemental decree for mesne profits. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs of the Second Appeal.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the decree in favour of the plaintiff is modified to give the 1st defendant credit (set-off) for Rs. 285 and interest (from date of plaint) against the supplemental decree for mesne profits; the appellant must pay the respondents' costs of the Second Appeal.
  • Doctrine applied and limited: the Court reaffirmed that (a) a purchaser cannot recover amounts paid to discharge debts of the true owner (other than encumbrances charged on the property) absent an obligation to repay, and (b) a purchaser who in good faith pays a mortgage encumbrance may be subrogated to the mortgagee's rights to the extent of such payments. The opinion limited the applicability of Sections 39 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act to cases where cancellation is necessary to obtain a legal remedy; it declined to treat the present facts as falling within those provisions.
  • No new expansive precedent was announced beyond application of these established principles to the facts; the decision modifies the decree between the parties rather than announcing a novel legal rule.

Disposition: Decree modified as above. Costs awarded to respondents.

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JUDGMENT

Sadasiva Aiyar, J. — The 1st defendant is the appellant before us. The plaintiff brought a suit for possession of certain properties which had been bequeathed to him by his elder brother Abboy Naidu (when the plaintiff was a minor) under a will dated 4th August 1901. The plaintiff's mother asserting a title in herself to the property sold it to the 1st defendant in February 1904 under Exhibit VI for a sum of Rs. 3,400. The title she asserted against her deceased son Abboy Naidu (in whose name the title deeds stood) and against Abboy Naidu's brother and legatee, the minor plaintiff, was based upon her contention that though the property was purchased in Abboy Naidu's name Abboy Naidu was a benamidar for herself (his mother). The plaintiff of course denied that Abboy Naidu was a benamidar for his mother and he sued upon his title derived from Abboy Naidu. He also prayed in his plaint for the cancellation, if necessary, of the deed of February 1904 executed by his mother. I might at once say that not only is no such cancellation necessary but that the plaintiff has no legal cause of action to get the relief of the cancellation of a document which was not executed and which does not even purport to have been executed by himself or by anybody from whom he traces his title. The lower Appellate Court has found on the facts in the plaintiff's favour and on his title so found, given a decree for him.

The contentions argued before us in Second Appeal were that the plaintiff in any event should have been ordered to pay the amounts of the debts binding on Abboy Naidu and therefore on his legatee (the plaintiff) and paid by the 1st defendant as purchaser under Exhibit VI before the plaintiff recovers the properties; secondly, that so far at least, as a mortgage debt binding on the plaintiff was paid by her she was entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee and that the plaintiff ought to be made to pay the amounts due to her as such mortgagee by right of subrogation before recovering the properties.

So far as the debts other than the mortgage debt are concerned, the learned vakil for the appellant, Mr. Seshagiri Sastri, put forward his contention under three heads. The first head may be formulated thus: though the plaintiff's mother purported to execute the deed in her own right alleging herself to be the sole owner, the first defendant as a bona fide purchaser for value is entitled to treat the sale deed as having been executed by the plaintiff's mother as his guardian and in that view, the plaintiff is bound to reimburse so much of the purchase money as went to discharge the debts binding upon the plaintiff. Having heard full arguments, I do not think that any case quoted on the appellant's behalf supports her contention. On the other hand, the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Balvant Singh v. R. Clancy, directly held that where person who was the de jure manager of an undivided family purported to create a mortgage as if he was the full owner denying the right of the junior member of the family, the alienee cannot under either the ordinary principles of equity or under the Statutory provision (Sect. 41 of the Specific Relief Act) claim to be reimbursed the portion of the consideration which went to discharge the debts binding on the junior member of the family. As regards the decisions of this Court in Sabapathy Chetty v. Ponnusawmy Chetty, and Audimula Mudali v. Alamelammal, the alienations were by a Hindu father who for certain purposes has got all the powers of a full owner and in whom the interest of a full legal owner is vested for many purposes notwithstanding that he might have undivided sons. The decisions in those cases seem to have gone on the particular facts of those cases and the Court came to the conclusion on the evidence that there was nothing to prevent the Court from holding that the father (alienor) intended also to make the disputed alienation in a capacity which would have given him an interest sufficient to affect the rights of his sons also, and that in the case of a bona fide purchaser for value such an inference should, if possible, be drawn from the facts and circumstances of those particular cases. In this case it seems to me it is impossible on the evidence and on the pleadings to hold that the plaintiff's mother could have intended to act in any other capacity than that of herself being the full owner. Further in those cases, the documents of alienation were not mere waste papers conveying no title or interest whatever in the property alienated as in this case, but did affect, at least, the part-ownership right of the alienor. In the case in Bij Rajnopani v. Pura Sundari Dasee, the document was executed (along with others) by a person who was the full legal owner, who had the right to convey the full legal ownership and who intended to convey such full rights. It was under those circumstances held that the erroneous description of the origin and incidents of his title in the sale deed did not prevent the alienee from obtaining a valid title to the rights of a full owner. I do not think that case has any bearing upon the question we are now considering. As regards the English cases of salvage quoted by the appellant's learned vakil they were cases where a person who was not the owner of goods paid freight and other similar charges and the jury were held justified in estimating damages to allow such charges to be deducted in favour of the wrongdoer where the plaintiff's action was brought for damages in trover or where the defendant had an option to return the goods or to pay damages. Those cases also have no bearing on the question now under consideration. On the other hand there is a case in I. L. R., 27 Bom., 390 (Nathu v. Balwantrao) which is a direct authority on this point; and respectfully concurring in that decision, I would hold that the 1st defendant has no right to recover any sums which she paid to discharge Abboy Naidu's debts and which were not charged upon any immoveable property. As stated by the Privy Council in Ram Tuhul Sing v. Bioseswar Lall Sahoo, quoted in the above case “It is not in every case in which a man has benefitted by the money of another that an obligation to repay that money arises. The question is not to be determined by nice considerations of what may be fair or proper according to the highest morality. To support such a suit, there must be an obligation, express or implied, to repay.”

Then we have left for consideration the other point based upon the allegation that the 1st defendant has released the property from the mortgage charge created by Abboy Naidu by payment of certain sums of money to the mortgagee. I think that if the 1st defendant in good faith purchased the property from the plaintiff's mother and as such purchaser felt herself bound to pay a mortgage charge created by the real owner which charge the plaintiff was himself under an obligation to meet, she is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee in so far as her money went to discharge that mortgage. I think I need refer only to the two decisions of this Court in Syamalarayudu v. Subbarayudu, and Chama Swami v. Padala Anandu, in support of this proposition. The lower Courts, however, have not gone into that question, namely whether the 1st defendant after her purchase paid any money to the mortgagee mentioned in Exhibit VI in payment of the mortgage dated 19th April 1899. Before finally disposing of this appeal it is therefore necessary to obtain a finding from the lower Appellate Court on the following issue on the evidence on record: Did the 1st defendant pay any amount to the mortgagee under the mortgage deed of 1899 for the purpose of discharging the encumbrance on the plaint properties and if so what are the amounts and dates of such payments? The finding will be submitted within 4 weeks from the date of the receipt of the records and 10 days will be allowed for objections.

Napier, J.—I agree. The first point taken by the appellant is that we should not accept the finding of the lower appellate Court that the plaintiff's mother purported only to convey her own interest and totally ignored any interest in the plaintiff; and reliance is placed on the decision in Audimula Mudali v. Alamelammal, where the Court stated as follows: “In our opinion Courts should incline to the view that the transferor alienated the property in the capacity most beneficial to the bona fide purchaser”. This doctrine may be properly applicable for the purpose of ascertaining on the evidence what the intention of the transferor is, but whereas in a case like this, a transferor deliberately claimed that the person in whom the title stood was only a benamidar for her and that the property was her own absolute property it is impossible to find any ambiguity and thereby give any scope for the application of this doctrine. We must deal with this case on the footing that a stranger having no interest in any property but making a claim against the titles which were vested in another person sold that property to a third person. It is now further argued that as part of the proceeds of the purchase money went to discharge the debts which would have been binding on the vendor if the title had vested in her and were in fact debts which were binding on the true owner the true owner cannot recover the property without making compensation for the discharge of those debts. It is sought to support this proposition on two grounds: one, that it is covered by the language of the Specific Relief Act, Sects. 39 and 41, the other that there is an equity which the Courts should apply. With regard to the claim under the Specific Relief Act reference to the chapter shows that this claim only arises in suits for cancellation of instruments, Sect. 41 being “On adjudging the cancellation of an instrument, the Court may require the party to whom such relief is granted to make any compensation to the other which justice may require”. This is undoubtedly an application of the English doctrine of the Chancery Courts that he who seeks equity must do equity; and the first point we have to be satisfied on is whether there was any necessity for the plaintiff in this case to seek equity. As my learned brother pointed out, all that the plaintiff said in his suit was that if it was necessary to have the document cancelled the Court should do it. To my mind it is clear that there is no necessity to have this document cancelled. The illustrations to Sect. 39 indicate that it is only where a party cannot get his legal remedy without first having the document set aside that he comes within the section. This is a suit by the true owner to recover possession of the property. The title adverse to him is not one procured from him or from any one under whom he claims or from any one who purported to convey an interest of his. It seems to me therefore that there can be no necessity for him to apply to have the document cancelled and further that the Court would have no jurisdiction to do so. But it is urged on us that in Mallacheruvu Raghavayya v. Mallacheruvu Subbayya where the suit was to recover possession of property, the Court held that they were empowered to give compensation under this section. The case is S. A. No. 803 of 1916. In that case, however, the plaintiff who brought the suit to recover the property himself executed a sale-deed of certain lands to the 2nd defendant jointly with his undivided brother, the 1st defendant. At the time of the conveyance he was a minor. The Court then considered the question as to whether he represented he was of age and found that was not proved. So in that case there was in existence a document from the true owner which on the face of it conveyed the property. In those circumstances although the suit was one for recovery of property the learned Judges thought that the document must be set aside first and that therefore the doctrine applied. It is therefore no authority for the contentions in this case. I am therefore clearly of opinion that this doctrine does not apply.

It is next argued that the equitable doctrine entitles us to give relief, and reliance is placed on the case of Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose, a decision of the Privy Council. In that case a minor had executed a mortgage in favour of one Brahmo Dutt to secure the payment of Rs. 20,000. A suit was brought on the mortgage. On the day the mortgage was executed the minor signed a declaration that he was of age. Two months after the execution of this mortgage he by his mother as guardian brought a suit against the mortgagee praying for a declaration that the mortgage was void and inoperative and that it should be delivered up and cancelled. Their Lordships of the Privy Council deal with the question as to whether compensation should be given under two heads on which it was argued, viz., Specific Relief Act and the equitable right. Their Lordships appear to have recognised the possibility of the application of Sect. 41 of the Specific Relief Act to the case. But they say that the Lower Courts saw no reason for ordering the return of the money and they themselves would not interfere. They then consider the application of the purely equitable doctrine and state the proposition, “It was also contended that one who seeks equity must do equity”. Now it must be noted that in this case there was no question but that the plaintiff was seeking equity, namely for directing the mortgage to be delivered up and cancelled. And then referring to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Thurston v. Nottingham Permanent Benefit Building Society they quoted the language of Lord Justice Romer which is as follows “the short answer is that a Court of Equity cannot say that it is equitable to compel a person to pay any moneys in respect of a transaction which, as against that person the Legislature has declared to be void”. So that apart from the Statute they held that even where a minor has received a benefit under a void mortgage he cannot be compelled by any principle of equity to give compensation. The fundamental doctrine was stated in the judgment of the Privy Council in a case which is quoted in Nathu v. Balwantrao, which is (1875) 2 I. A. p. 131 at p. 143. The doctrine is as follows: “It is not in every case in which a man has benefited by the money of another that an obligation to repay that money arises. The question is not to be determined by nice considerations of what may be fair or proper according to the highest morality. To support such a suit, there must be an obligation, expressed or implied, to repay. It is well settled that there is no such obligation in the case of a voluntary payment by A of B's debt”. We have therefore to find some obligation on the part of the plaintiff in this case to repay the amounts which have been paid by the 1st defendant in discharge of his debts. It is well settled that there is no such broad obligation under the Contract Act; and it rests on the 1st defendant to find some doctrine which will enable her to ask the Court to make the order. This language here is a very specific and definite warning to Courts that they must not use their powers simply to avoid hardships. The question in which this very point arose was decided by the Privy Council in Balwant Singh v. R. Clancy. There undoubtedly a person sought to be charged had been largely benefited by money lent by a Bank to his brother for the discharge of debts binding on the family. The brother had however borrowed the money claiming to be a Rajah owning an impartible Zamindari. The Privy Council decided that the money was borrowed by him in that capacity and in no other and that it is not open to the Courts to find that because he was the manager of a joint family the borrowing could be attributed to that capacity; and the claim of the Bank to make his younger brother liable in respect of debts which had been cleared from the joint family property being the debts of his father was negatived. It seems to me that we cannot make any order for compensation in this case without directly disregarding the decision in Balwant Singh v. R. Clancy. I am therefore of opinion that there is no doctrine which will empower a Court to make an order for compensation where the property has been sold by a stranger as the stranger's property even though the true owner has benefited. That is the broad proposition.

There is, however, another doctrine which may affect some payments in this case, and that is one analogous to the doctrine of salvage. It is dealt with in the case of Syamalarayudu v. Subbarayudu, and Chama Swami v. Padala Anandu, and the doctrine comes to this that where a person buys property in good faith and for the purpose of clearing a mortgage on that property pays money to the vendor to be so applied then even if the vendor had no title, still as the mortgage was binding on the estate the vendee becomes an equitable assignee of the mortgage. This doctrine has been applied in those two cases and although some doubts have been thrown upon it in Shiam Lal v. Ram Piari, it seems to me that it is founded on right principles and I think that we should follow the decisions of our Court. I agree therefore with the order of my learned brother remanding an issue for trial.

In compliance with the order contained in the above judgment the Temporary Subordinate Judge of Tanjore submitted the following:—

I, therefore, believe that the first defendant must have paid Rs. 285-0-0 on 6-10-1905 towards discharge of the encumbrance, and find that the first defendant paid Rs. 285-0-0 to the mortgagee under the mortgage deed of 1899 for the purpose of discharging the encumbrance on the plaint properties, and that amount was paid on the date of Exhibit 1-B, 6th October 1905. The mortgage deed carried interest at 9 per cent.

This Second Appeal coming on for final hearing after the return of the finding of the Lower Appellate Court upon the issue referred by this Court for trial, the Court delivered the following.

JUDGMENT

We accept the finding.

The Lower Court's decree will be modified by directing that Rs. 285 and interest from date of plaint shall be set off against the supplemental decree for mesne profits directed to be passed by the Lower Appellate Court's decree.

The appellant will pay respondents' costs of this Second Appeal.

C. K.Decree modified.