- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Varki Ouseph v. Narayanan Parameswara Panicker
Judgment Summary — K.T. Koshi, C.J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeal concerns execution proceedings on a money decree recorded in O.S. 92 of 1115 (Alleppey District Court). The decree awarded interest on the decretal amount until payment. The opinion records that on 20-8-1122 the present Appellant (judgment-debtor No. 2) deposited Rs. 1,500/- in Court for payment to the decree-holder toward amounts due under the decree. (The opinion subsequently refers to the deposit on 20-3-1122 in other paragraphs; these differing references appear in the opinion as given.)
The Court, while directing credit for the amount, ordered that notice be given to the decree-holder about the deposit; no notice was issued because the judgment-debtor did not pay the process fees. The Appellant thereafter made three further payments into Court on different dates; the petitions filed in respect of those later payments made no reference to the earlier deposit.
On 17-12-1129 (2-8-1954) the decree-holder filed an execution application claiming amounts he considered still due; he was not aware of the earlier deposit and therefore did not deduct it in his claim. When the Appellant received notice of the execution application he filed objections on 29-4-1130 (14-12-1954), contending inter alia that the Rs. 1,500/- deposited earlier should be credited from the date of the deposit itself and that he was liable only for the remaining balance after deducting that sum (with interest on the sum as appropriate) from the amount claimed in the execution application.
The decree-holder contended that the deposit should cease to carry interest only from the date on which the decree-holder had notice of the deposit (the date of the judgment-debtor's objection). The learned District Judge accepted the decree-holder's position and held that the judgment-debtor was liable for interest on the deposited amount at the rate specified in the decree until the date he filed his objection (stated as 14-12-1954). This order was the subject of the present appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, in the case of a decree that awards interest on the decretal amount until payment, interest ceases to run from the date of deposit into Court even though notice of the deposit has not been given to the decree-holder.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The amount deposited into Court (Rs. 1,500/-) should be credited to the decree from the date of the deposit itself.
- Accordingly, the Appellant should be liable only for the balance due after deduction of the deposited sum, taking into account interest on that deposited sum from the date of deposit.
Decree-holder's Arguments
- The deposit made into Court should cease to carry interest only from the date on which the decree-holder actually had notice of the deposit.
- The decree-holder was unaware of the deposit and therefore was entitled to interest on the decretal amount up to the date he obtained notice (the date of the objection).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ramaray Shanbogue v. Venkataramanayya, AIR 1919 Mad 445 (A) | Held that when judgment-debtor deposits the decree amount into Court, payment becomes effective only from the date notice is given; Order 24, Rule 3 principle applied to execution payments. | The Court described this Madras decision as adopting the view that interest ceases only when the decree-holder is given notice; it forms the principal view followed by most High Courts and is accepted by the Court in the present appeal. |
| Rangpur Raiyat Bank v. Hesabuddin, AIR 1932 Cal 111 (B) | Followed the Madras decision (A). | Cited as one of the High Court authorities following the Madras view that interest ceases only from date of notice. |
| Special Land Acquisition Officer, Ahmedabad v. Ambalal Trikamlal, AIR 1951 Bom 394 (C) | Followed the Madras decision (A). | Listed among High Courts adopting the Madras position; used to show preponderance of authority. |
| Raichand Amulak v. Naimuddin Ismailji, AIR 1954 Sau 119 (D) | Followed the Madras decision (A). | Noted as another High Court decision in favour of the rule that interest ceases only upon notice to the decree-holder. |
| Vinayak Yeshwant v. Shri Kishan Chandmal, AIR 1955 MP 126 (E) | Followed the Madras decision (A). | Cited as a Madhya Bharat High Court decision adopting the Madras view; relied on by the Court to show consistency among High Courts. |
| South Indian Rly. Co. Ltd. v. M.C. Mayilvahanan, AIR 1943 Mad 334 (F) | After referring to dissenting authorities, the Madras High Court adhered to the view in AIR 1919 Mad 445 (A). | Quoted approvingly; the Court cites King J.'s comments from this decision to reject an over-broad reading of the Privy Council case relied upon by the dissenting Nagpur view. |
| Laxminaiayan v. Ghasiram, AIR 1939 Nag 191 (G) | Dissenting view: deposit into Court ipso facto causes interest to cease from date of payment into Court. | Identified as the principal contrary decision; the Court records this dissent but rejects it on the ground that it overreads the Privy Council authority cited to support it. |
| Mahmed Rahimtulla v. Esmail Allarakhia, AIR 1924 PC 133 (H) | Privy Council: in the particular facts, payment into Court was equivalent to payment to the decree-holder; dealt with satisfaction of a conditional decree. | The Nagpur decision relied on this Privy Council case. The Court here states that the Privy Council's observations do not establish a general rule and cannot be extended beyond the facts of that case. |
| Narayan v. Ganpatrao, AIR 1921 Nag 148 (I) | Earlier single-judge Nagpur view: when payment is brought to Court's notice the Court should inform decree-holder of the payment. | The present Court refused to accept that the Court has such an onerous duty in all circumstances, saying it will not go so far though if the Court can give notice it is well if it does. |
| Janaki Amma v. Mathiri, AIR 1952 TC 236 (J) | Analogy: in a redemption decree, mortgagee's liability for mesne profits arises from date of service of notice of deposit, not date of deposit. | The Court treated this decision as a useful analogy supporting the view that notice date is relevant for stopping running of interest; cited by the District Judge below and considered helpful by the appellate Court. |
| Travancore Law Reports 1946 TLR 155 (K) (also referred to as 1948 TLR 155 in the opinion) | Left open whether interest ceases from date of deposit or from date of notice; held that payment into Court contemplated by Order 21, Rule 1 is of the entire money due and that where parts are paid the decree-holder is not bound to accept them in satisfaction. | The Court noted this decision and observed that its view (that partial deposits need not stop interest unless notice is given) has not won favour with some other High Courts; the Court did not adopt K as authoritative for the present case. |
| Tooydun Singh v. Poono Chunder Shome, 7 Suth WR 20 (L) | Authority (cited in K) for proposition that a creditor prior to decree is not bound to receive part payment; supports idea that a decree-holder need not accept part payments. | Cited in the opinion as authority relied upon by the Travancore decision (K); the present Court noted the existence of this authority but did not rely on it to depart from the majority rule. |
| Mt. Amtul Habib v. Mohammad Yusuf, AIR 1918 All 234 (M) | Held that where money is paid into Court in satisfaction of a decree, interest on the decree will cease from date of payment in proportion to the amount paid (even if not whole amount); deposit was made along with objection so notice was not an issue. | Cited as supporting the view that partial payments into Court can operate to stop interest pro tanto; acknowledged by the Court as a line of authority but not controlling the present decision. |
| Gopalji v. Sumrit Mandar, AIR 1933 Pat 89 (N) | Followed the Allahabad decision in M and held that payment of a portion of the decretal amount is valid to the extent of such payment; the word "all" in Order 21, Rule 1 does not mean entire amount must be paid. | Cited to show judicial commentary and decisions supporting the proposition that partial deposits can be effective; the Court noted these authorities but rested its decision on the majority view about notice. |
| Sir Dinshah Mulla, Commentaries on the Code of Civil Procedure (cited commentary) | Interprets Order 24, Rule 3 and applies its principle to execution (Order 21) and cites AIR 1918 All 234 for support; commentary to Order 21, Rule 1 states "all" does not imply entire amount. | Used to demonstrate doctrinal support in authoritative commentary for the view that partial payments can be valid and that the notice principle applies to execution; cited by the Court as part of the body of supportive authority. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeds from the text and purpose of Order 21, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The relevant provision has two parts: Rule 1(1) sets out modes of payment under a decree (including payment into the court of execution under sub‑rule (1)(a)), and Rule 1(2) provides that where payment is made under clause (a) notice of such payment shall be given to the decree-holder.
The Court reasons that when a judgment-debtor elects to pay by depositing the amount in the Court of execution (the mode prescribed by Rule 1(1)(a)), Clause (2) creates an express obligation that notice of such payment be given to the decree-holder. Although Rule 1 does not expressly state that interest shall cease to run only from the date of notice, a reading of Rule 1(1)(a) together with Clause (2) indicates that the payment becomes effective only from the date notice is given. The Court explains the rationale: the object of notice is to enable the decree-holder to withdraw and make use of the money; where interest is awarded until payment, it is just to compensate the decree-holder for being kept out of his money until he can actually receive and utilize it.
The Court rejects the proposition that a deposit into Court should ipso facto stop the running of interest regardless of notice (the dissenting Nagpur view). The Nagpur decision relied on the Privy Council's ruling in Mahmed Rahimtulla v. Esmail Allarakhia (AIR 1924 PC 133), but the Court holds that the Privy Council's observations are confined to the facts of that case and do not establish a general principle applicable to all deposits in all circumstances.
The Court surveyed the authorities and concluded that a large preponderance of High Court decisions support the view that interest ceases to run only from the date the decree-holder is given notice of the deposit. The Court accordingly accepted the District Judge's conclusion that the judgment-debtor remained liable for interest on the deposited sum until the date upon which the decree-holder had notice (the date of the objection).
On the related question whether partial deposits can have the effect of stopping interest on the deposited portion, the Court observed that some authorities (including the Travancore decision K) take a stricter view that the deposit must be of the entire decretal amount to stop interest. Other authorities (including AIR 1918 All 234 and AIR 1933 Pat 89) support the proposition that a deposit of a portion is valid to that extent and will stop interest pro tanto. The Court noted that the decree-holder in this case conceded that when notice is served of a payment into Court of part of the decree-debt, interest will cease to run on that part from the date of the notice; therefore the Court did not find it necessary to resolve the wider conflict about partial deposits for purposes of this appeal.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The Court affirmed the District Judge's conclusion that interest on the amount deposited into Court (Rs. 1,500/-) ceased to run only from the date the decree-holder had notice of the deposit. The Court concluded the appeal "will stand dismissed with costs."
Implications:
- Direct effect: The judgment-debtor remains liable for interest on the deposited amount until the decree-holder actually receives notice of the deposit (the date on which the decree-holder is in a position to withdraw and use the money). The District Judge's order on that basis is upheld.
- Precedential effect: The Court framed its decision as following a preponderance of High Court authorities favoring the notice-based rule and expressly rejected the narrower Nagpur view that deposit ipso facto halts interest. The opinion does not purport to establish a novel legal principle beyond giving effect to its interpretation of Order 21, Rule 1; it relies on existing authorities and commentary.
This summary is confined to information expressly contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer material beyond the text of that opinion.
K.T. Koshi, C.J.
1. This appeal arises out of the proceeding to execute the decree in O.S. 92 of 1115, or the file of the Alleppey District Court. The said decree is one for payment of money and it awarded interest on the decretal amount until payment. On 20-8-1122 the present Appellant (judgment-debtor No. 2) deposited in Court an amount of Rs. 1,500/- for payment to the decree-holder toward the amounts due under the decree.
The court while directing credit to be given for the amount, ordered notice to be given to the decree-holder about the deposit. No notice was however issued as the judgment-debtor did not pay the process fees. The Appellant thereafter made three further payments into Court on different dates, but the petitions filed in that behalf contained no reference to the deposit made on 20-3-1122.
On 17-12-1129 (2-8-1954) the decree-holder filed an execution application claiming the amounts which according to him were still due. As the decree-holder was not aware of the deposit made on 20-3-1122 the balance claimed by him was without taking into account the amount of the said deposit. When the Appellant got notice of the execution application, he filed his objections, contending inter alia that the amount deposited on should be given credit towards the decree on the date of the deposit itself and that he was therefore liable only for the balance due after deducting the said sum with interest thereon from the amount shown in the execution application.
This objection was filed on 29-4-1130 (14-13-1954). The decree-holder contested the matter stating that the amount deposited on 20-3-1122 should cease to carry interest only from the date of the judgment-debtor's objection, on which date alone he had notice of the deposit. The learned District Judge accepted the decree-holder's position, and held that the judgment-debtor was liable for interest on the amount of the deposit in question at the rate specified in the decree till the date he filed his objection viz., 14-12-1954. This order it is that is challenged in the appeal.
2. The question is whether in the case of a decree which awards interest on the decretal amount until payment, interest ceases to run from the date of deposit into Court, although notice of the deposit has not been given to the decree-holder. The decisions bearing on the point are not uniform, but as we shall presently show, there is large preponderance of opinion for the view that interest will cease to run only from the date the decree-holder has notice of the deposit.
The relevant provision of law on the matter is to be found in Order 21, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure, Act V of 1908. The said rule consists of 2 parts and the rule is in these terms:
(1) All money payable under a decree shall be paid as follows, namely:
(a) into the Court whose dirty it is to execute the decree; or
(b) out of Court to the decree-holder (by postal money order or on a registered receipt); or
(c) otherwise as the Court which made the decree directs.
(2) Where any payment is made under Clause (a) of Sub-rule (i), notice of such payment shall be given to the decree-holder.
3. In this case the mode of payment adopted by the judgment-debtor was that contemplated by Rule 1(1)(a) viz., payment into the Court of execution. With reference to such payment Clause (2) enjoins that notice of it shall be given to the decree-holder. It is not stated as to who should give the notice, but for reasons which are obvious the responsibility for it can only be that of the judgment-debtor.
Unlike the provision in Order 24, Rule 3, Order 21, Rule 1 does not state that when notice, of the deposit is given to the purly entitled to the money, interest shall cease to run on the amount deposited. However, reading the provision in Order 21, Rule 1(1)(a) together with Clause (2), it looks fairly clear that when a judgment-debtor chooses to deposit the amount due as per a decree into the court of execution, the payment becomes effective only from the date of the notice.
The reason for the provision as to notice is to enable the decree-holder to withdraw the money due to him, so that he may make use of it in the manner he deems proper. Where interest is awarded by the decrees on the decretal amount until payment, we cannot find any valid reason for refusing to pay the decree-holder the interest that is due to him until such time as he is in a position to receive the money into his hands and make use of it.
If the payment were made direct to the decree-holder he could make immediate use of the money and we cannot find any justification for depriving the decree-holder of the just compensation allowed to him by die decree for his being kept out of his money, because the judgment-debtor chooses a particular method of paying it to him. This is the view which commended itself to two learned judges of the Madras High Court (Oldfield and Seshagiri Ayyar, JJ. when the question came up be fore them in the case reported in - 'Ramaray Shanbogue v. Venkataramanayya' AIR 1919 Mad 445 (A).
Seshagiri Ayyar, J. expressed the view that the principle behind Rule 3 of Order 24, can very well be applied to payments in the course of execution proceedings, especially as Order 21, Rule 1(1)(a) does not say that by the payment, satisfaction of the claim of the decree-holder is ipso facto entered.
To our minds the provision for notice in Clause (2) is sufficient indication that the decree-holder's right cannot be affected until he is informed that the decree amount is available for h and that he can draw it out of Court. Unless the rule is understood in this light, Clause (2) will be rendered (sic)gatory. No sanction to compel the judgment-debtor to comply with Clause (2) will he there, unless the rule is so understood.
4. The Madras decision referred to above has been followed by the Calcutta High Court in -- 'Rangpur Raiyat Bank v. Hesabuddin' AIR 1932 Cal 111 (B), by the Bombay High Court in - Special Land Acquisition Officer, Ahmedahad v. Ambalal Trikamlal AIR 1951 Bom 394 , (C), by the Saurashtra High Court in - 'Raichand Amulak v. Naimuddin Ismailji AIR 1954 San 119 (D), and by the Madhya Bharat High Court in Vinayak Yeshwant v. Shri Kishan Chandmal' (S) AIR 1955 MP 126 (E).
In - 'South Indian Rly. Co. Ltd. v. M.C. Mayilvahanan' AIR 1943 Mad 334 (F), after referring to the dissent elsewhere, the Madras High Court adhered to the view enunciated in AIR 1919 Mad 445 (A).
5. The dissenting view that, when the decree amount is deposited into the Court, interest thereon will ipso facto cease to run, was taken by the Nagpur Hihg Court in - 'Laxminaiayan v. Ghasiram' AIR 1939 Nag 191 (G). The head-note to that case reads:
Where a decree orders the payment of a sum of money awarding interest until payment and the money is paid by payment into Court under the provision of Order 21, Rule 1, the interest does not run until notice has been given to the decree-holder under Order 21, Rule 1(2) but ceases to run from, the date of such payment.
The Madras decision in AIR 1919 Mad 445 (A), has been expressly dissented from by the learned Judges1 of the Nagpur High Court. The main reason the Nagpur High Court gives to differ from the Madras view is the decision of the Privy Council in the case reported in - 'Mahmed Rahimtulla v. Esmail Allarakhia' AIR 1924 PC 133. (H).
In the Privy Council case, in a suit to set aside a sale, a conditional decree was passed, the condition being that the Plaintiffs should pay a certain sum within a certain time and if they did so they would recover possession of the disputed property, but if they did not, then the suit would stand dismissed. Instead of paying the money directly to the party concerned it was deposited in Court and that not by the Plaintiffs, but by their mortgagees. The Judicial Committee observed:
Their Lordships are clearly of opinion that while the condition would have been satisfied by a payment to the Appellant in person, which he accepted it was equally satisfied by a payment Into Court, and that the latter was in the circumstances, the appropriate mode of satisfying the condition.
No question of any interest after the deposit or of notice of deposit to the Appellant arose for decision in that case. Indeed it would appear that notice was duly given to the Appellant about the deposit. All that their Lordships said time, was that on the terms of the decree payment into Court was as good as payment into the hands of the Appellant, and that the payment did not cease to be good because it was made, not by the Plaintiffs as enjoined by the decree, but by their mortgagees.
Of the decisions we cite in this judgment, AIR 1943 Mad 334 (F), AIR 1954 Sau 119 (D), and (S) AIR 1955 MP 126 (E), refer to this Privy Council decision and to the Nagpur case and those decisions point out that the learned Judges in the Nagpur case interpreted the Privy Council decision too broadly and that the observations Lord Salvesen made there cannot be extended beyond the facts of that particular case. In this context it is instructive to quote the comments King J. (Kunht Raman J., concurring) made in AIR 1943 Mad 334 (F), about those two cases: The passage reads as follows:
We have now been referred by the learned Advocate for the Appellant to a ruling from Nagpur AIR 1939 Nag 191 (G). in which AIR 1919 Mad 445 (A), is dissented from, mainly on the ground that in an intervening decision the Privy Council had laid It down that in a particular case payment into Court was equivalent to payment to the decree-holder. No doubt that was so upon the facts of the particular case which has been dealt with by the Privy Council.
But we do not think their Lordships were laying down any general principle to be applied to all kinds of deposits in all kinds of circumstances, and that ruling, we think, cannot be utilised as authority overruling AIR 1919 Mad 445 (A).
6. Earlier in this judgment we indicated our view that in the circumstances of the present case, interest on the amount of Rs. 1,500/- would cease to run only from the date the decree-holder had notice of its payment into court. The foregoing discussion shows that except for the Nagpur High Court, all the High Courts in India which had to deal with the question of the construction of Order 21, Rule 1 answered it in terms similar to our Interpretation of the Rule.
In an earlier case in Nagpur, a learned Single judge expressed the view that when a payment under Rule 1(1)(a) of Order 21 is brought to the notice of the Court, even if the judgment-debtor docs not take out notice to the decree-holder as ordered by the Court, the Court is bound to inform the decree-holder of the payment when next he appears to ask for the execution of the decree see - 'Narayan v. Ganpatrao' AIR 1921 Nag 148 (I). We regret we cannot agree that there, is any such onerous responsibility on the Court, No doubt, if, the Court can do it, it is well and good; beyond that we are not prepared to go.
7. The Madhya Bharat decision cited earlier refers to a decision of this Court reported in - 'Janaki Amma v. Mathiri' AIR 1952 TC 236 (J). That case related to the question, when the mortgagee's liability for mesne profits arises with respect to a decree for redemption; whether from the date of the deposit of the price of redemption into Court, or only from the date of the service of the notice of the deposit on him? It was held that the latter date was the relevant one. The decision is helpful to the present case only by way of analogy and the learned Judge below has cited the decision in the order under appeal for that purpose.
8. Clearly the appeal fails. Before parting with it we think it necessary to refer to a decision of the Travancore High Court brought to our notice during the course of the argument. The case is that reported in 1946 TLR 155 (K). The question whether on the deposit of the decree, amount, interest thereon provided in the decree would cease to run from the date of the deposit or only from the date of the notice to the decree-holder, is left open there.
What we are concerned with now is the view held in that case that payment into Court that is contemplated by Order 21, Rule 1, is of the entire money due to the decree-holder. Krishnaswamy C.J. (Abraham, J., concurring) further held that when the full amount of the decree is not deposited, but parts of that amount are paid into court from time to time, the decree-holder is not bound to accept thorn in satisfaction of the decree-amount and that Order 21, Rule 1, Clause (2) does not say that interest should cease to run on the fractions of the decree-amount from the dates on which the deposits were made. In support of the view, the learned Chief Justice said:
This question is directly decided in - 'Tooydun Singh v. Poono Chunder Shome' 7 Suth WR 20 (L), and no authority subsequent to this decision has been brought to our notice where the correctness of that decision has been challenged. Before the decree, a creditor is not bound to receive part payment under the common law and there is reason to suppose that the obtaining of a decree puts him in a worse position.
In this present case the decree-holder has not chosen to dispute the proposition that when notice of a deposit is given to him, interest on that amount would cease to run even though the deposit is only of a part of the decree, debt. We shall therefore for the present content ourselves by pointing out that the view expressed in 1948 TLR 155 (K)', is not one which has found favour with some other High Courts.
In - 'Mt. Amtul Habib v. Mohammad Yusuf' AIR 1918 All 234 (M), Sir Henry Richards, C.J. and Sir Pramada Charan Banerji, J. held that where money is paid into court by the judgment debtor in satisfaction of a decree, interest on the decree will cease from the date of payment in proportion to the amount paid, although such amount rimy not in fact be the whole amount due under the decree. No question of notice of the deposit to the decree holder arose there, because the deposit was made along with the objection to the execution application.
In - 'Gopalji v. Sumrit Mandar' AIR 1933 Pat 89 (N), Macpherson and Fazl Ali, JJ. followed this Allahabad case. In repelling the contention that the words "all moneys payable under the decree" in Order 21, Rule 1, meant the entire amount payable under the decree, Fazl Ali, J. who delivered the leading judgment said:
Thus view, however, docs not find support in AIR 1918 All 234 (M), whole it was held Unit where money is paid into court by the judgment-debtor in satisfaction of a decree, interest on the decree will cease from the date of payment in proportion to the amount paid, although such amount may not in fact be the whole amount duo under the decree. This decision, clearly implies that even if a portion of the decretal amount is paid it will be valid payment.
9. In Sir Dinshah Mulla's Commentaries on the Code of Civil Procedure in commenting on Order 24, Rule 3, which provides that when notice of deposit is received by the Plaintiff, interest on the amount of deposit would cease to run, whether the sum deposited is in lull discharge of the claim or falls short thereof, the learned author has said that the principle of the rule applies to proceedings in execution and as authority for the view has cited AIR 1918 All 234 (M), (Page 995 foot-note (d) 12th Edition).
Commentary to Order 21 , Rule 1, states that the word "all" does not imply that, payment must be of the entire amount and that payment of a portion of the decretal amount is valid to the extent of such payment-(page 749 foot-note (K)). The decision relied upon in support of the proposition is the decision of Fazl Ali, J. in AIR 1933 Pat. 89 (N). These authorities show that there is faint support in decided cases for the view held in 1946 TLR 155 (K), that, for interest to cease to run on a decree debt, the payment into Court must he in full satisfaction of the decree.
However, as the decree-holder has conceded the position that when notice is served of a payment into court of a part of the decree-debt, interest will cease to run on that part with effect from the date of the notice, it is unnecessary for the purpose of the present appeal to pursue the question further.
10. The appeal will stand dismissed with costs.
Alert