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Lalji Nensey Ludha v. Keshowji Punja And Ors.

Bombay High Court
Jan 18, 1912
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from the dismissal by Mr. Justice Beaman of a suit originally instituted by the plaintiff, who alleged that he was the sole surviving partner of a firm carried on by himself and his father, Nensey Ludha, from 1903. The defendants had incurred obligations to that firm in 1903. The plaintiff alleged that his father died on 4 February 1905 and that the plaintiff then became the sole owner of the firm.

The defendants filed a written statement in 1906 in which they challenged the allegation that the present plaintiff had been a partner with his father. The suit was heard beginning 8 July 1911; the primary first issue was whether the plaintiff had been a partner with his father in the firm. Some evidence was recorded on that day and it appeared the plaintiff might not be able to establish the alleged partnership. The plaintiff was granted an adjournment and on 15 July 1911, over the defendants' objection, the plaint was amended.

The amendments struck the phrase "in partnership with each other" from the original allegation of partnership and replaced it with an allegation that the grocery business was "an asset of a joint and undivided Hindu family" whose only male members were the plaintiff and his father. Further amendments alleged that the plaintiff became sole owner "by survivorship" and added that since filing the suit the plaintiff had two sons and was the manager of a joint Hindu family consisting of himself, his two sons (minors) and his mother.

The lower Court (Mr. Justice Beaman) held that, following the decision in Naranji v. Moti, all members of a joint Hindu family in existence at the date of filing — and extending to members born between filing and decree — were necessary parties. On that basis the lower court dismissed the suit. The present opinion sets aside that decree and remands the case for trial.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, after the amendment of the plaint to allege that the business was an asset of a joint Hindu family and that the plaintiff is manager for himself and his minor sons, the plaintiff may continue to sue alone or whether the minor sons must be joined as co-plaintiffs.
  2. Whether minors born after the institution of the suit (and who were not in existence at the date of the cause of action) must be joined as necessary parties when the suit is for a business debt arising from dealings before their birth.
  3. Whether the amendment to the plaint introduced a new cause of action which could be defeated by limitation, or whether the amendments were merely developments of the original cause of action.
  4. Whether the identity of the contracting parties at the time the contract was made controls who must be joined in a suit to recover the debt arising from that contract.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Plaintiff) — as presented in the plaint and the amendments

  • The plaintiff asserted initially that he and his father carried on a grocery business in partnership in 1903 and that he became sole owner by survivorship upon his father's death in 1905.
  • By amendment the plaintiff alternatively framed the business as an asset of a joint and undivided Hindu family (originally consisting of himself and his father), and alleged that he was the manager of the family consisting of himself, his two minor sons (born after filing) and his mother.
  • Implicit in the amendment and the court's later summary of the plaintiff's position is the contention that the amendments are developments of the original cause of action and do not create a new, time-barred cause of action.

Respondents (Defendants)

  • The respondents contended that the amendment removed the partnership allegation and substituted a claim dependent on the plaintiff's right to sue on behalf of himself and his minor children as members of a joint Hindu family in which they are all equally entitled.
  • On that footing, the respondents argued that the plaintiff could not sue alone and that, if the minor sons should be joined (which had not been done), the suit would be barred by limitation.
  • The lower Court accepted this contention and considered itself bound by the decision in Naranji v. Moti to require joinder of such family members.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Naranji v. Moti The reported ratio was that the debt sued for was joint family property and that a minor born after the date of filing should be joined with co-parceners in a suit for that debt. The Court analyzed Naranji and concluded its ratio related to the character of the debt as joint family property; the Court held that Naranji did not decide the separate question whether parties to the suit should correspond to the parties to the contract at the time the contract was made.
Ramsebuk v. Ramlall Koondoo (1881) 6 Cal. 815 Shows that those who actually were contracting parties with the defendant must be joined in a suit brought by members of a Hindu family. The Court cited it for the proposition that the persons who contracted with a defendant are the ones who can claim to sue; but observed this case does not show that infant family members who took no part in business must be joined.
Kalidas Kevaldas v. Nathu Bhagvan (1883) 7 Bom. 217 Also indicates that actual contracting parties must be joined in suits by members of a Hindu family. The Court relied on it similarly to support the view that joinder should follow contractual participation rather than mere family status; it noted the case does not require joining minors not shown to have taken part in the business.
Lutchmanen Chetty v. Siva Prokasa Modeliar (1899) 26 Cal. 349 Holds that minor members of a family who take no part in the family business need not be joined as co-plaintiffs in suits to recover business debts. The Court treated this decision as authority contrary to the lower Court's approach and as supporting the proposition that infants not shown to be contracting parties need not be joined; it noted this case was not cited below.
Petumdoss v. Ramdhone Doss (1848) Taylor 279 Held that a minor son could not join in a claim upon a mercantile contract for nondelivery of goods; contains a statement that joinder of parties is procedural and governed by the lex fori, and that infants should not be made necessary parties solely by use of their names. The Court referred to it for the historical and doctrinal support that infants should not be required to be joined as co-plaintiffs merely because a family name appears in trading dealings; it used the case to question treating infants as co-contractors by mere name.
Ramlal Thakursidas v. Lakhmichand Muniram (1861) 1 Bom. H.C.R. Appx. 51 Early Bombay authority on law relating to infants interested in family businesses; referenced in relation to the Petumdoss principle. The Court cited it as part of the line of authority recognizing limits on joining infants in mercantile claims simply by virtue of family interest.
Kishen Parshad v. Har Narain Singh (1911) L.R. 38 I.A. 45 From the Judicial Committee's discussion of Ramsebuk it appears a man can only claim to be sued by the people with whom he contracted. The Court relied on the Judicial Committee's discussion to reinforce the point that contractual parties at the time of contract are decisive for joinder, i.e., one can only claim to be sued by those with whom one contracted.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining the authorities relied upon by the lower Court and by asking what question the present case calls for: should joinder of parties in a suit for a business debt be governed by the membership of the Hindu family at the date of decree or filing, or by who were the parties to the contract at the time the contract was made?

Key steps in the Court's analysis:

  • The Court read Naranji v. Moti and concluded that its ratio decidendi was that the debt sued for was joint family property and that a minor born after filing ought to be joined in that particular factual context. The Court emphasized that Naranji does not address whether parties to a suit should be determined by the parties to the contract at the time of the contract.
  • The Court stated that the present case should be decided with reference to who were the parties to the contract. It held that it is not necessary in the case of a Hindu family to join minor members who in fact take no share in the business which is carried on on behalf of the family.
  • To support this, the Court cited Ramsebuk and Kalidas Kevaldas as showing that those who actually were contracting parties must be joined, but noted these cases do not extend to requiring joinder of minors who took no part in the business.
  • The Court relied on Lutchmanen Chetty v. Siva Prokasa Modeliar (cited but not referred to in the lower Court) to the effect that infant members not shown to have been admitted into trading partnership or to have taken part in the business are not required to be joined as co-plaintiffs in suits to recover business debts.
  • The Court further referenced Petumdoss v. Ramdhone Doss and early Bombay authority for the proposition that procedural rules of joinder should not be made to force infants into litigation as if they were co-contractors by virtue of mere name or inheritance of an interest.
  • Applying these principles to the amended plaint, the Court observed the amendment has a twofold aspect: (a) the plaintiff alleges a firm carried on between himself and his deceased father of which he is the sole surviving partner; and (b) the plaintiff alleges that he and his father were joint, with the plaintiff's subsequently born sons now joint in family property. The Court concluded that defendants cannot insist on joinder of those sons merely because of the second aspect, where the sons did not exist at the date of cause of action and are not shown to have been contracting parties.
  • Finally, the Court held that the amendments were developments of the original cause of action and did not introduce a new cause of action which could be defeated by limitation.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court SET ASIDE the decree of the lower Court and remanded the case for trial to a conclusion. The order also recorded "Costs costs in the cause."

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The dismissal by Mr. Justice Beaman is overturned; the suit proceeds to trial on its merits in the lower Court. The plaintiff need not at this stage be barred for failing to join the minor sons alleged to have been born after filing, because the Court regarded the amendments as developments of the original cause of action rather than a new, time-barred cause of action.
  • On broader legal principle: The Court clarified that joinder in suits to recover business debts should be guided by who were the parties to the contract at the relevant time, and that infants who did not in fact participate in the business are not necessarily required to be joined as co-plaintiffs. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel rule beyond applying and reconciling earlier authorities on this point.
Show all summary ...

1. This is an appeal from the dismissal by Mr. Justice Beaman of a suit filed by the plaintiff, as the sole surviving partner of a firm carried on by himself and his father Nensey Ludha in the year 1903, in which year the defendants incurred certain obligations to that firm. The plaintiff alleged that his father died on the 4th of February 1905 and that the plaintiff then became the sole owner of the firm. The defendants put in a written statement in the year 1906, putting in issue the allegation that the present plaintiff was a partner with his father Nensey Ludha.

2. The suit came on for hearing on the 8th July 1911 and the first issue raised was whether the plaintiff, was a partner with his father Nensey Ludha in the firm of that name. Certain evidence was recorded. The plaintiff alleged a partnership and he was cross-examined, and as a result of the hearing on the first day it was apparently suggested that the plaintiff could not succeed unless the plaint was amended; and on the 15th July, in spite of the objection of the defendants, an amendment was allowed whereby the plaintiff altered his plaint in certain respects. The learned Judge states the circumstances, under which the amendment was allowed, as follows: "This suit was originally instituted by the plaintiff as the surviving partner in a firm. An objection was taken that the firm, alleged to consist of the plaintiff and his father, was in no real sense a partnership, and the suit as framed was bad on that account. Issues were raised and some evidence was gone into, at the close of which it certainly did appear that the plaintiff would have little chance of establishing the alleged partnership. He was granted an adjournment to amend the plaint. This has now been done and the plaintiff sues as the surviving member of a joint Hindu family originally consisting of his father and himself alone, but at the present day consisting of himself and his two minor children born after the filing of the suit and his mother." The amendments in the plaint are as follows:The first paragraph as it originally stood was: "In the year 1903 the plaintiff and his late father Nensey Ludha were carrying on business as grocers in Bombay in partnership with each other in the name or firm of Nensey Ludha." By the amendment the words "in partnership with each other" were struck out and the following sentence was added, namely, "The said business was an asset of a joint and undivided Hindu family, the only male members of which were the plaintiff and his said father." In the fourth paragraph instead of the words, "the plaintiff is now the sole owner of the said firm of Nensey Ludha" is substituted, "the plaintiff thereupon became the sole owner of the said firm of Nensey Ludha by survivorship." And paragraph 9(a) was added stating as follows: "since the filing of this suit the plaintiff has had two sons born to him. The plaintiff is the manager of the joint and undivided Hindu family consisting of himself, his said two sons and his mother."

3. There is, therefore, no allegation that the liability of the defendants was incurred to a firm or a business which at that time was being carried on by the plaintiff as manager on behalf of his minor sons. According to the plaint, they were not in existence at the date of the cause of action or at the date of the filing of the plaint. It has been contended on behalf of the respondents that the effect of the amendment of the plaint is to delete the allegation that the plaintiff and his father carried on business in partnership and to substitute a claim based upon the right of the plaintiff to sue on behalf of himself and his minor children as members of a joint Hindu family possessed of a cause of action in which they are all equally entitled, and it is contended that upon that footing the plaintiff cannot sue alone, and that if his minor sons should be joined, which they have not been, the suit would be barred by limitation. The learned Judge in the lower Court acceded to that argument and considering himself to be bound by the decision of this Court in Naranji v. Moti held that there was a rule that all members of a joint Hindu family in existence at the date of the filing of the plaint were necessary parties and that the same rule extended to the members of a joint family born between the filing of the plaint and the decree.

4. Now, the report of the case of Naranji v. Moti shows clearly, we think, that the ratio decidendi was that the debt sued for was joint family property and, treating the case from that point of view alone, that a minor who was born after the date of the filing of the suit ought to be joined with his co-parceners in the suit. No reference is made in the judgment to the question whether the parties to the suit ought to be regulated according to the parties to the contract at the time the contract was made. It appears to us that this case should be decided with reference to the question who were the parties to the contract and that it is not necessary in the case of a Hindu family to join in a suit upon a business contract minor members of the family who in fact take no share in the business which is carried on behalf of the family. The cases of Ramsebuk v. Ramlall Koondoo (1881) 6 Cal 815 and Kalidas Kevaldas v. Nathu Bhagvan (1883) 7 Bom. 217 show that those who actually were contracting parties with the defendant must in the case of a suit by members of a Hindu family all be joined, but neither of those cases shows that minor members of the family who take no part in the family business should be joined in suing for business debts. The contrary has in fact been held by Mr. Justice Sale in Lutchmanen Chetty v. Siva Prokasa Modeliar (1899) 26 Cal. 349, a case which unfortunately does not appear to have been cited to the learned Judge in the Court below. Mr. Justice Sale had before him a case the facts of which were as follows:The only original partners of a firm in whose name, the note in suit was given were the plaintiff and his brother Ramanathen Chetty, and upon the death of the latter and at the date of the note the plaintiff was the sole surviving partner of the firm. But it was proved that he had four sons living, the eldest of whom was nine or nine and-a-half, while the youngest was born since the institution of the suit, and the son of the deceased brother Ramanathen Chetty died after the institution of the suit leaving only a daughter. None of the plaintiff's sons were in existence at the time the dealings with the defendant commenced. At the date of the execution of the note in suit the plaintiff's eldest son was probably in existence, and the plaintiff's brother's son was also in existence, but it did not appear when he was born and the defendant relied mainly in bar of the suit on the plea that all necessary parties to the suit had not been joined as plaintiffs. Mr. Justice Sale, after referring to Ramsebuk's case, said (p. 354): "No authority has been cited to show that infant members of a Hindu co-parcenary must be joined as co-plaintiffs in suits to recover claims arising out of a joint family business managed by adult members of the family. A debtor of a firm carrying on a joint family business is no doubt entitled to insist that all his co-contractors should join as plaintiffs in a suit instituted to recover the debt, but on what principle can it be said that infants, possibly of tender years as in this case, who are not shown to have been admitted into the trading partnership or to have taken any part in the business or exercised any control therein, are in any sense co-contractors of the debtor? A trade like other personal property is descendible amongst Hindus, but it does not follow that a Hindu infant, who by birth or inheritance becomes entitled to an interest in a joint family business, becomes at the same time a member of the trading partnership which carries on the business." He then refers to the case of Petumdoss v. Ramdhone Doss (1848) Taylor 279. In that case it was held that a minor son of a Hindu father could not join in a claim upon a mercantile contract for nondelivery of goods, and the Chief Justice said (p. 281): "The son is proved to be only three years of age, and it appears that there are other sons of the father. The witness who said that they were partners, appears to us to have drawn that conclusion merely from the use of the child's name in the firm. The law of joinder of parties is a law of procedure, and is governed by the lex fori. It is desirable that it should be uniform. If we were to decide in this case that the infant son may be joined, it would be equivalent to a decision that he and others, situated as he is, must be joined in all cases as co-plaintiffs, and as this could only proceed on the ground of a real partnership evidenced by the mere use of a name, it would be really equivalent to deciding that such infants might be joined as defendants at the pleasure of a plaintiff." That case was referred to in the earliest of the Bombay cases upon the law relating to infants interested in family businesses: Ramlal Thakursidas v. Lakhmichand Muniram (1861) 1 Bom. H.C.R. Appx. 51. It is also pointed out by Mr. Justice Sale that a dormant partner in England may join in a suit as plaintiff but never need do so: That is stated in Lindley on Partnership, page 333 (8th edn.); and in Dicey on Parties, page 151, it is said "A dormant partner is a person who does not appear to be a partner, but is so, and occupies the position of an undisclosed principal, and therefore always may, and never need, join in an action on a contract made with the firm." The case of Ramsebuk v. Ramlall Koondoo (1881) 6 Cal. 815 has lately been discussed by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Kishen Parshad v. Har Narain Singh (1911) L.R. 38 I.A. 45 at p. 53 and from that judgment it appears that a man can only claim to be sued by the people with whom he contracted.

5. It appears to us that upon amendment the plaint has a twofold aspect. It is based on the allegation that a firm was carried on for the purpose of a grocery business between the plaintiff and his deceased father, of which the plaintiff is the sole surviving partner and also upon the allegation that the plaintiff and his father were joint and that as a necessary consequence the sons of the plaintiffs born after the institution of the suit are joint with the plaintiff in the family property. It does not follow from that, however, that the defendants can insist upon those sons being joined.

6. We are of opinion that the allegations introduced in the plaint by amendment are mere developments of the plaintiff's position and they do not introduce any new cause of action which can be defeated by applying the law of limitation. The amendments only develop the original cause of action.

7. We set aside the decree of the lower Court and remand the case for trial to a conclusion. Costs costs in the cause.