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Ramchandra Mulchand v. Bhagwan Gopal And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
Four plaintiffs, brothers and sons of defendant 2, sued for a declaration that two mortgages executed by defendant 2 in favour of defendant 1 (dated 16-6-1922 and 26-6-1925) were not binding on the plaintiffs' share in the property in suit. The plaintiffs alleged the property was ancestral and that the alienations were not for legal necessity. The trial Court held that plaintiffs 3 and 4, being born after the dates of the alienations, could not challenge those alienations; it held that the alienations were void as regards plaintiffs 1 and 2 and declared that the alienations were not binding on one-half share of plaintiffs 1 and 2. An appeal to the Assistant Judge was dismissed. The plaintiffs filed cross-objections asserting that their share was two-thirds (not one-half) and that the trial Court should have held the mortgage was not binding on two-thirds; the cross-objections were dismissed.
There was also a related procedural history: defendant 1 had previously filed a suit to enforce the two mortgages, resulting in a compromise decree; defendant 1 then filed an application for execution (a darkhast). The present suit by the plaintiffs was filed on 20th April 1940, following the execution application.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiffs' suit was barred by limitation because the mortgages were executed on 16-6-1922 and 26-6-1925 and the suit challenging them was filed on 20-4-1940.
- Whether the alienations (mortgages) executed by the father (defendant 2) of ancestral property without legal necessity were void as against the plaintiffs, and if so, what proportion/share of the property of the plaintiffs (specifically plaintiffs 1 and 2) remained unaffected by the alienation β one-half or two-thirds β having regard to Mitakshara principles and the status of the wife.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Mr. B. G. Thakor)
- Primary contention was limitation: plaintiffs could have challenged the alienations at the dates they were made (16-6-1922 and 26-6-1925), and limitation should run from those dates; since the suit was filed on 20-4-1940, it was argued to be time-barred.
- Underlying premise: cause of action arose from the execution of the mortgage instrument itself and therefore accrued at the dates of the mortgage deeds.
Cross-Objectors / Respondents' Arguments (Mr. Chitale)
- Challenged the lower Courts' finding that only one-half of the plaintiffs' share was saved; urged that the plaintiffs' share was two-thirds of the property in suit (on the basis that the joint family consisted of three coparceners: father and two sons) and therefore the alienation should not bind two-thirds.
- Argued that the wife's share should be ignored because a wife is not a coparcener and cannot challenge the alienation; therefore the shares of coparceners alone (father and two sons) should determine what portion is saved from alienation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| 41 Bom. 3471 (Paragauda and Babagauda case) | Held that an after-born son could not challenge an alienation executed before his birth; the alienee acquires only the share the alienor had at the date of alienation (court observed the alienee acquired the one-half share the alienor was entitled to at that date). | The Court in the present opinion noted this decision but observed that the specific point about the wife's share was not considered in that case; the precedent was discussed but not determinative on the exact question before the Court here. |
| 40 Bom. L.R. 10292 | Determined that to ascertain the share of a coparcener at the date of alienation one must assume a partition at that date; applied to give plaintiff 1 a one-fourth share (thus treating the mother as having a share on partition at the date). | The Court treated this decision as a direct and binding authority. It adopted the principle that shares are to be ascertained hypothetically on partition at the date of alienation, and relied on it to determine that the plaintiffs' saved share was one-half (given the presence of the wife at the date). |
| Naro Gopal v. Paragauda (as cited) | Express statement of the principle: "The alienee gets the share which the alienor would have got if a partition had taken place at the date of the alienation." | The Court endorsed and applied this principle as authoritative for determining what share the alienee acquires and for computing the share of plaintiffs at the date of alienation. |
| 20 Cal. 6823 | Held (in a Dayabhaga context) that a widow's right to a share in lieu of maintenance arises only when partition occurs such that the joint estate ceases to exist; on the facts the widow was not entitled to such share. | The Court distinguished this precedent: it was governed by Dayabhaga (not Mitakshara), concerned different facts (partition of only one item), and therefore was not helpful on the question before the Court. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court addressed the issues in two main strands: limitation and the question of the quantum of share saved from the alienation.
Limitation
The Court rejected the appellant's contention that limitation began to run from the dates of the mortgages (16-6-1922 and 26-6-1925). It observed that although the plaintiffs, as coparceners, could have challenged the mortgages at the dates of execution, they did not do so. The present suit did not challenge the mere execution of the mortgage documents as the operative wrong; rather, the plaintiffs' cause of action arose when defendant 1 filed the application for execution (the darkhast) seeking to enforce the compromise decree and thereby threatened to bring the property to sale. Because the mortgagee had not gone into possession and had merely a documentary mortgage, the plaintiffs' cause of action accrued when execution proceedings were launched. On that basis the Court held the suit (filed on 20-4-1940) was within time.
Share of Plaintiffs under Mitakshara Principles
The Court considered the cross-objection argument that plaintiffs' share should be two-thirds because the joint family at the date of mortgage consisted of three coparceners (father and two sons). The Court explained the applicable Mitakshara principle: under Mitakshara a coparcener does not have a specific definite share in ancestral property except on partition; to determine what share a coparcener had at the date of an alienation one must assume what the shares would have been on a hypothetical partition at that date. In particular, if a partition were to take place at the date of alienation, the wife (though not a coparcener) would receive a share equal to that of the sons. Thus, in the present case when the mortgages were executed the joint family included defendant 2 (father), plaintiffs 1 and 2 (sons) and the wife; on a partition at that date the wife would have received a share equal to each son, and consequently the two sons together would only receive one-half of the property (not two-thirds).
The Court relied on prior decisions (including the 40 Bom. L.R. 10292 authority and Naro Gopal v. Paragauda) to adopt the rule that the alienee gets the share the alienor would have had on partition at the date of alienation. The Court distinguished a Calcutta decision (20 Cal. 6823) on grounds of differing school of law (Dayabhaga) and differing facts, and held that that decision did not assist the present case.
Applying the adopted principle to the facts before it, the Court concluded that plaintiffs 1 and 2 together were entitled to only one-half of the property on the assumption of a partition at the date of the alienation; therefore only one-half was saved from the alienation and not two-thirds as contended by the cross-objectors.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Both the appeal and the cross-objections are dismissed. Appeal and cross-objections dismissed with costs.
Implications:
- The Court held the plaintiffs' suit was within time because the cause of action accrued when defendant 1 filed the application for execution (darkhast), not at the dates of execution of the mortgage instruments.
- The Court held that, applying Mitakshara principles and assuming a hypothetical partition at the date of alienation, the plaintiffs 1 and 2 together were entitled only to one-half of the property which accordingly was not affected by the alienation; the cross-objects that sought protection for two-thirds were rejected.
- No broader legal innovation was announced; the decision applied existing principles (as stated in prior Bombay authorities) to the facts and affirmed the outcome reached by the lower Courts.
End of summary based exclusively on the provided opinion.
1. The four plaintiffs in the suit from which this appeal arises are brothers and sons of defendant 2. They filed the suit for a declaration that the two mortgages dated 16-6-1922 and 26-6-1925, executed by defendant 2 in favour of defendant 1 were not binding on the plaintiffs' share in the property in suit. The plaintiffs' case was that the property was ancestral property and the alienation was not made for legal necessity. The trial Court held that plaintiff? 3 and 4 were born after the date of the alienation and, therefore, they could not challenge the alienation of their father. With regard to plaintiffs 1 and 2, it held that the alienation was bad and gave a declaration that the alienation was-not binding on the one-half here of plaintiffs 1 and 2 in the suit property. There was an appeal to the learned Assistant Judge, and that appeal was dismissed. There were cross-objections filed by the plaintiffs urging that the plaintiffs' share was not one-half but two-thirds in the property in suit and the trial Court should have held that the mortgage was not binding on the two-thirds share. The cross-objections were also dismissed.
2. Before me, Mr. B.G Thakor for the appellant has only urged the question of limitation. The position with regard to limitation is this. Defendant 1 filed a suit to enforce the two mortgages and in this suit a compromise decree was passed. Then defendant 1 applied to execute the decree by filing a darkhast. It is urged by Mr. Thakor that it was open to the plaintiffs to challenge the alienations at the date when they were made, namely, 16th June, 1922, and 26th June, 1925, and limitation began to run from those two respective dates, and the Suit having been filed on 20th April, 1940, the plaintiffs' suit was out of time. Now it is true that it was open to the plaintiffs as coparceners to challenge the mortgages executed by their father, but they did not choose to do so. Their cause of action in the present suit is not the execution of the mortgages but the application for execution by defendant 1 whereby he threatened to bring the property in suit to sale. Therefore, the cause of action accrued to the plaintiffs when defendant 1 filed the application for execution. As the mortgagee defendant 1 did not go into possession and merely a document was executed by defendant 2, the plaintiffs chose to ignore the mortgages. It was only when the joint family property was threatened by execution proceedings launched by defendant 1 that a cause of action accrued to the plaintiffs and they filed the suit. In my opinion Mr. Thakor's contention must fail and the suit is within time and, therefore, the appeal must fail.
3. Mr. Chitale has urged before me the same cross objections which he urged before the lower appellate Court, and it raises a very interesting question of Hindu law. If a coparcener alienates a portion of an ancestral property without legal necessity and which alienation in Hindu law is bad, it is competent to the other coparceners to challenge that alienation; and to the extent that the alienation goes beyond the share of the coparcener the alienated the property, the alienation would be set aside. Now, in this case, the father defendant 2 alienated a portion of the joint family property. The two sons, plaintiffs, 1 and 2, who were alive at that date come to Court and challenge the alienation and the alienation has been proved to have been bad. Therefore the share of the coparceners who are contesting the alienation would not be bound by that alienation. The question, therefore, is what is the share of plaintiffs 1 and 2 in the property? Now it is a very well-recognized principle of Hindu law that what has got to be ascertained is the shares of the coparceners at the date of the alienation and not at the date when the alienation challenged. Now when the two mortgages were executed, the joint family consisted of defendant 2 and his two sons, plaintiffs 1 and 2. At that time the wife of defendant 2 was also living. What Mr. Chitale says is this: he says that the joint family consisted of three coparceners and the share of his clients must, therefore, be two-thirds, as against one third of the father and therefore both the lower Courts were wrong in holding that only one-half share was saved from the alienation. What the Court should have held, so says Mr. Chitale, was that two-thirds share in the property in suit was not affected by alienation. Now what Mr. Chitale overlooks is this: under the Mitakshara law no coparcener can say that he has a specific share in ancestral property. The position is different from what obtains under the Daya-bhaga law. It is only on partition that shares can become specified. Therefore in order to ascertain what the shares of the plaintiffs were when the alienation took place, I have to assume what the shares would be on a partition; and if there was a partition when the alienation was made as between defendant 2 and his sons plaintiffs 1 and 2, the mother of plaintiffs 1 and 2, would have had a share equal to the shares of plaintiffs 1 and 2. Therefore, on a partition at the date of the alienation, plaintiffs 1 and 2 would have only received one-half share in the property in suit. Mr. Chitale contends that I must ignore the share of the wife because he urges that a wife is not a coparcener and she is not entitled to challenge the alienation and, therefore, all that has got to be considered is the share of the coparceners, namely, defendant 2 and plaintiffs 1 and 2. This argument is based on a misconception. It is perfectly true that the Hindu law does not give a right to a wife to challenge an alienation made by her husband. It is equally true that the Hindu law does not give aright to a wife to ask for partition. But the Hindu law does give the wife a share equal to her sons if there is a partition between her husband and her sons. When the sons challenge the alienation and their shares are to be determined, it is only on the basis of a partition that these shares can be determined; and, as I have pointed out if there was a partition when the father executed the mortages, the wife would undoubtedly have received a share and the only share that plaintiffs 1 and 2 would have received would have been one-half share in the property in suit.
4. I should like to refer to two or three cases which were cited at the bar. There are two decisions of our High Court. One is reported in 41 Bom. 3471, In that case the plaintiffs Paragauda and Babagauda with their father Basagauda constituted a joint Hindu family. Defendant 2, the father and the head of the family, effected a sale of certain ancestral property in favour of defendant 1 and the plaintiffs sued to recover possession of the land or, in the alternative, to get their two thirds share by partition by metes and bounds alleging that the land was the ancestral property of the family. The plaintiff Babagauda was born after the date of the alienation. The Court of Appeal consisting of the Chief Justice Sir Basil Scott and Mr. Justice Heaton held that the after-born son could not challenge the alienation and that defendant 1 had acquired only the one-half Bhare in the alienated property to which defendant 2 was entitled at the date of the alienation. It is urged that on the facts of this case, although the wife of defendant 2 was alive, the Court did not take into consideration her share in determining the shares of defendant 2 and the plaintiff. Now from the facts it does not appear as to whether Babagouda was the son of the same wife as Paragauda, and it may be that at the date of the alienation the father was a widower and Babagauda was born to a second wife of defendant 2. In any case the point which I have to decide here was not considered in that case. The other decision is 40 Bom. L.R 10292, In that case plaintiffs 1 to 6, who were brothers forming a joint Hindu family with their father, brought a suit to set aside an alienation made by their father which was not for payment of antecedent debts or for legal necessity. At the time of the alienation, the joint family consisted of plaintiff 1 and his father, mother and a step-brother. Plaintiffs 2 to 6 were born subsequent to the date of the alienation; and the Court of Appeal consisting of Mr. Justice Broomfield and Mr. Justice Sen held that plaintiff 1 was entitled to set aside the alienation only to the extent of his one-fourth share in the property alienated and that the other plaintiffs could not question its validity. Therefore it would be noticed that the share of plaintiff 1 was arrived at on the basis that his mother had a one-fourth share on the basis of a partition at the date of the alienation. To my mind, this is a direct authority on the matter I am considering, and being a decision of a Court of Appeal, it is binding on me. Although the question is not explicitly diseussed either by Mr. Justice Sen or by Mr. Justice Broomfield, the decision is inexplicable except on the basis that the Bench considered that in order to determine the share of plaintiff 1 at the date of the alienation, it had to assume a partition and on that partition it took the view that the mother would have a share, and it was on that basis that plaintiff 1 was given a one fourth share; and it is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Broomfield in his judgment at p. 1039 observes:
βThe law in Bombay as settled in this Presidency by Naro Gopal v. Paragauda is that the alienee gets the share which the alienor would have got if a partition had taken place at the date of the alienation.β
5. Therefore, the principle, with which, with respect I entirely agree, enunciated by Mr. Justice Broomfield is that the alienee gets that share of the alienor which he would have got in the joint family property if a partition had taken place at the date of the alienation. Applying that principle to the facts of this case, it is clear that the share of the plaintiffs at the date of the alienation would be the share which they would have received if a partition had taker; place when the father mortgaged the properties and that share would only have been one-half and not two-thirds.
6. Mr. Chitale has also relied on a decision re= ported in 20 Cal. 6823, In that case it was held that the right of a widow to a share in lieu of maintenance only arises when there is a partition of the joint family estate in the sense that it ceases to exist as a joint estate. Hence upon a partition enforced by a stranger in respect of property which forms only one item of the joint estate, the widow is not entitled to such share, if notwithstanding such division, the main estate remains undivided. Now two or three things ought to be noticed in this case. First of all, the parties were governed by the Dayabhaga and not by Mitakshara. Secondly, the alienee was not suing for partition of the whole of the joint family property but only for a specific share, and even so the Court was at pains to observe that it was on the special facts of that case that it came to the conclusion that the widow was not entitled to a share.
7. In my opinion that case is not of much assistance in deciding the quite different facts which I have before me. In my opinion, therefore, both the lower Courts were right in coming to the conclusion that the declaration sought by the plaintiff could only apply to the one-half share in the property in suit and not to the two-thirds share. In the result both the appeal and the cross-objections fail and are dismissed with costs.
V.R/D.H
8. Appeal and cross-objections dismissed.
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