Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

(Manna) Vazhmuni Mudali v. Nathumuni Mudali

Madras High Court
Sep 18, 1929
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Concise Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

On 14 February 1921 the plaintiff instituted a suit for taking partnership accounts between himself and defendants 1 and 2 and for recovery of any amount found due to him. The pleaded defence (initially) was that the partnership ended in a loss and nothing was due to the plaintiff. A decree for Rs. 570 in favour of the plaintiff was passed by the District Munsiff on 9 April 1923. Defendant 1 appealed.

On 19 February 1925 the Sub-ordinate Judge reversed that decree and remanded the suit to the District Munsiff for fresh trial because the original trial appeared irregular: no preliminary decree had been passed as should have been done in partnership suits. The Sub-ordinate Judge suggested that at the re-trial the question whether the partnership was illegal (a new ground pressed by defendant 1) might be considered.

At the re-trial defendant 1 filed an additional written statement on 31 July 1925 alleging that the partnership was illegal and opposed to public policy. The plaintiff applied to amend his plaint to seek a decree for money advanced in case the Court held the partnership illegal; that amendment was allowed by order dated 8 October 1925. Defendant 1 filed a further additional written statement on 20 October 1925.

On 21 December 1925 the District Munsiff, while finding all issues in favour of the plaintiff, nonetheless dismissed the plaintiff's suit; on issue 5 he held that the partnership contract was illegal and contrary to public policy. On the plaintiff's appeal the District Judge (learned District Judge) on 6 December 1927 reversed the District Munsiff and passed a preliminary decree in favour of the plaintiff for taking accounts. Defendant 1 thereupon preferred the present second appeal (S.A. No. 467 of 1928).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the agreement of partnership between the parties was illegal and contrary to public policy (in particular, whether it contravened conditions of the Madras Abkari Act as applied to toddy-selling licences).
  2. Whether the particular partnership involved a transfer (such as transfer of stock or capital) so as to attract illegality under the applicable licensing regime.
  3. Whether the appellant (defendant 1) should be permitted, at the stage of the second appeal, to produce additional evidence (specifically, production of the relevant licence for 1918–1919) to establish illegality.
  4. Procedural: whether the original trial was irregular because no preliminary decree was passed, necessitating remand for fresh trial (this ground had already been addressed by the Sub-ordinate Judge).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Defendant 1)'s Arguments

  • The partnership agreement was illegal and therefore the suit should have been dismissed by the District Munsiff.
  • Defendant 1 held a licence to sell toddy in a shop and took the plaintiff as a partner in respect of the toddy business; such an agreement of partnership is prohibited by the Madras Abkari Act.
  • The licence under which defendant 1 had the privilege of selling toddy was not produced before the Court at the trial; defendant 1 asserted that the plaintiff had taken away the licence.
  • In the present proceedings the appellant sought to produce before the appellate court a licence granted to a third person for 1918–1919 and asked that it be admitted in evidence to prove the terms and show illegality.

Plaintiff's Arguments and Procedural Steps

  • The plaintiff amended his plaint (allowed on 8 October 1925) to claim a decree for money advanced in case the Court held the partnership illegal.
  • Implicitly, the plaintiff relied on the absence of proof by defendant 1 of the relevant licence and on oral and other evidence at trial supporting the plaintiff's case; the District Judge and the lower appellate Court ultimately found for the plaintiff on the contested issues (excepting the District Munsiff's earlier contrary finding on illegality).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Natla Bapiraju v. Achuta Rajaju [1910] 20 M.L.J. 337 Where the relevant licence is not on record, it is impossible to say that the partnership contravenes any condition contained in that licence. The court relied on this decision to support the proposition that, in the absence of production of the licence for the partnership period (1918–1919), there were no grounds to hold the partnership illegal.
O.S.A. No. 72 of 1925 (Chief Justice & Ramesam, J.) The licence which was granted is not forthcoming; the onus of establishing illegality lies heavily on the party alleging it, and failure to produce the licence may be fatal to that defence. The court cited this observation to reinforce that the appellant bore the burden of proof and had not discharged it in the courts below.
Appadurai Mudali v. Murugappa Mudali In absence of evidence to show a licence required all concerned names on its face, the partnership could not be held illegal; courts should ensure illegality is clearly established before refusing aid. The court relied on this case to support the view that courts should not declare partnerships illegal without clear proof and that, where the licence is not produced, a partnership is not prima facie illegal.
Connolly v. Consumer's Cordage Co. [1904] 89 L.T. 347 (Lord Halsbury) It is the right and duty of the Court, at any stage, to consider and act upon an illegality if it is sufficiently proved. Quoted to explain the general principle that courts must and may take account of illegality when facts are established, but the court emphasized that illegality must be sufficiently proved.
Scott v. Brown [1892] 2 Q.B. 724 (Lindley, L.J.) If plaintiff's own evidence proves illegality, the court should not assist the plaintiff, regardless of whether defendant pleaded illegality. Used to state the principle that the court will refuse to enforce illegal transactions if illegality is established by evidence, while emphasizing that here illegality was not established.
Padmanabham v. Badrinath Sarda [1912] 35 Mad. 582 Not every partnership involves a transfer, but in some circumstances a partnership may involve a transfer (e.g., where stock and capital of an existing business are made joint property). The court used this reasoning to examine whether the facts of the present case involved a transfer; it concluded the facts did not show a transfer and thus did not make the partnership illegal.
Marudamuthu Pillai v. Rangasami Moopan [1901] 24 Mad. 401; Thithi Pakurudasu v. Bheemudu [1903] 26 Mad. 430; Namasivaya Gurukkal v. Subramania Ayyar [1916] 34 I.C. 927; Gangadhara Sah v. Swaminatha Mudali A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 218; Brahmayya v. Ramiah [1920] 43 Mad. 141; Karsan v. Gatlu Shivaji [1913] 37 Bom. 320; Nazaratti Syad Imam v. Babamiya Dureyatimsha [1916] 40 Bom. 64; Champsey Dossa v. Gordhandoss Kessoivji [1917] 19 Bom. L.R. 381; Jnanendra Nath v. Ghandi Charan Saha [1915] 29 I.C. 480; Behari Lall v. Jagodish Ghunder [1904] 31 Cal. 798 These cases were cited in argument before the court; the opinion does not set out the specific legal proposition extracted from each case in the text of the judgment. The court expressly stated that it would not discuss these decisions because the case was disposed of on the grounds already mentioned (lack of proof of licence and failure to establish illegality).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in these principal steps (as stated in the opinion):

  1. Evidence and burden: The court emphasized that the burden of establishing illegality lies on the party who alleges it (defendant 1). The court repeatedly noted that defendant 1 had ample opportunity in the trial and appeals to produce the relevant licence for the partnership year (1918–1919), but had not done so.
  2. Importance of producing the licence: The learned District Judge and this court regarded production of the licence held by defendant 1 for the year of the partnership as essential to adjudicate the illegality plea. Because the licence for 1918–1919 was not produced, the court could not determine whether any condition of the licence was contravened.
  3. Precedent support: The court referred to earlier decisions (including Natla Bapiraju v. Achuta Rajaju and O.S.A. No. 72 of 1925) that supported the proposition that, absent production of the licence, a court cannot say that a partnership contravened conditions of the licence; and that the onus to establish illegality was not discharged by defendant 1.
  4. Prima facie legality and statutory reference: The court stated that partnership is prima facie legal and that illegality must be positively established (the opinion references Section 23 of the Contract Act in this context). The court held that defendant 1 had not proved the necessary facts to show illegality.
  5. Whether partnership involved a transfer: The court analyzed the factual nature of the partnership. There was no deed of partnership and terms had to be inferred from oral evidence. The judge concluded that the case did not show defendant 1 had an existing going toddy trade with stock and capital which he made joint property; rather, it appeared each party contributed equal shares and the business was started with the license taken in defendant 1's name, but defendant 1 had not begun trade or possessed stock at the time. On that basis the court held the partnership did not involve a transfer that would render it illegal.
  6. Refusal to admit fresh evidence in second appeal: The appellant produced a licence for 1918–1919 at the stage of the second appeal and sought its admission. The court declined to allow additional evidence at this late stage, noting the long history of the litigation (plaint was filed in 1921; the new plea was filed in 1925) and that the appellant had multiple earlier opportunities to produce the relevant materials. The court therefore refused to permit the late production.
  7. Conclusion from facts and law: Because the appellant failed to produce the licence and did not otherwise establish the illegality of the partnership, and because the facts did not show a transfer, the court concluded that the lower appellate Court (District Judge) was correct in passing a preliminary decree in favour of the plaintiff and ordering accounts.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

SECOND APPEAL DISMISSED.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The preliminary decree passed by the District Judge in favour of the plaintiff for taking accounts stands, and the usual accounts were directed to be taken as ordered by that decree.
  • The appellant (defendant 1) was not permitted to adduce additional evidence (the licence for 1918–1919) at the stage of the second appeal; the court refused to reopen the evidentiary record at that late stage after the appellant had had prior opportunities to produce the licence.
  • The court concluded that defendant 1 had not discharged the burden of proof required to establish that the partnership was illegal or contrary to public policy; therefore the dismissal by the District Munsiff on the ground of illegality was reversed in favour of the plaintiff.
  • The opinion states no new broader legal principle was laid down; the court expressly declined to discuss a number of cited authorities because the case was disposed of on the grounds already mentioned (lack of proof of licence and absence of established illegality). Accordingly, no novel precedent was created by the judgment beyond the application of established principles to the facts of this litigation.
P.R.S/V.B

Disposition: Appeal dismissed (with costs as noted in the opinion).

Show all summary ...

1. The plaintiff instituted on 14th February 1921 a suit for taking of partnership accounts between him and defendants 1 and 2 and for the recovery of the amount to be found due to him on the taking of the accounts. ??? he only defence was that the partnership ended in a loss and that there was nothing due to the appellants. A decree for Rs. 570 was passed in favour of the plaintiff on 9th April 1923 by the District Munsiff. The present defendant 1 preferred an appeal. On 19th February 1925, the learned Sub-ordinate Judge reversed that decree and remanded the suit to the District Munsiff for a fresh trial, on the ground that the trial by the District Munsiff was irregular as no preliminary decree seemed to have been passed as should have been done in the case of partnership suits. While remanding the suit the learned Sub-ordinate Judge suggested that the Court of first instance might at the re-trial consider a new ground pressed before the lower appellate Court by the defendant, viz., that the partnership was illegal. At the re-trial, defendant 1 put in an additional written statement on 31st July 1925 that the partnership in question was illegal, and opposed to public policy. The plaintiff then applied to have his plaint amended by alleging that he would be entitled to a decree for the money advanced by him in case the Court should hold that the partnership was illegal as was contended by the defendant. That amendment was allowed by the District Munsiff by his order dated 8th October 1925. Defendant 1 filed a further additional written statement: on 20th October 1925 to the amended plaint. On 21st December 1925 the then District Munsiff, while finding all the issues raised in the case in favour of the plaintiff, dismissed the plaintiff's suit. His finding on issue 5 was that the contract of partnership was illegal and opposed to public policy. On plaintiff's appeal the learned District Judge on 6th December 1927 reversed the ‘decision of the District Munsiff and passed a preliminary decree in favour of the plaintiff for the taking of accounts in the light of the findings of the District Munsiff on the other issues which were not disputed before the District Judge. Defendant 1 has accordingly preferred the present S.A No. 467 of 1928 against the decision of the District Judge. The main contention urged by the learned advocate for the appellant is that the agreement of partnership is illegal and that the suit was rightly dismissed by the District Munsiff. Defendant 1 held a license to sell toddy in a shop. According to him, he took the plaintiff as a partner in respect of the toddy business and that such agreement of partnership is prohibited by the Madras Abkarij Act (1 of 1886). The license under which defendant 1 had the privilege of selling toddy has not been produced by defendant 1. The defendant's case was that the license was taken away by the plaintiff. This is what the learned District Judge said on this point.

“On one simple point I think the contention of defendant 1 must fail. He has not produced the license under which he had the privilege of selling the toddy. His explanation is the easily made one that the license has been taken away by the plaintiff. Even if he had not the original license, he could quite easily have got a copy of it from the Collector or have produced at any rate a copy of the license which was in force in 1918-1919, the year of the partnership. At the re-trial all that defendant 3 produced was a license of the year 1921-1922. The learned District Munsifi refused to receive it. That license was taken back from the lower. Court by the vakil for defendant 1, and in the course of the argument before me no form of license was produced, the defendant relying on the notification in the Port St. George Gazette of the conditions of sale of Abkari privileges for the year 1918-1919. After the argument had concluded, I waited…. The vakil for defendant then produced a license granted to a third party. But it was granted for 1919-1920, and not 1918-1919. I do not think that I should presume, in favour of a man who is making a case of the kind made by defendant 1, that the license for 1918-1919 was in identically the same terms as the license for the year 1919-1920… It must be taken then that there is no proof of the terms of the license which defendant 1 held.”

2. After referring to certain decisions, the learned District Judge observed as follows:

“Following these decisions, I hold that, since the license relating to the year 1918-1919 of the partnership has not been produced, there are no grounds for saying that the contract of partnership was illegal.”

3. After discussing the terms of the partnership between the parties and after observing that there was no deed of partnership to evidence the agreement of partnership, the lower appellate Court in para. 5 of its judgment observed as follows:

“It seams to me that there are no sufficient grounds for holding that the agreement between defendant 1 and the other two (plaintiff and defendant 2) was contrary to law. As His Lordship, the Chief Justice said in O.S.A No. 72 of 1925 a man who, like defendant 1, sets up a case in which he attempts to take advantage of his own wrong, must prove his case to the hilt. I am clear that the respondent has not proved his case.”

4. The appellant has produced before me a license granted to a third person for the year 1918-1919, and has sought to have the same admitted in evidence. I, however, do not think that at this stage, and in second appeal, I should allow him to do so. The plaint was filed on 14th February 1921, and the additional written statement in which he took this new plea was filed by him on 31st July 1925. The appeal was pending before the lower appellate Court from 22nd June 1926 till 6th December 1927. The learned District Judge remarks that even after the arguments were heard on 21st September 1927 and judgment reserved to get a copy of the High Court: judgment in O.S.A No. 72 of 1925, defendant 1's vakil produced only a license granted to a third party for the year 1919-1920 and not any license granted for 1918-1919. Defendant 1 had plenty of opportunities to prove his case, and, I do not think that I should in the circumstances allow defendant 1 to produce in second appeal additional evidence, even if there be no other legal objections in his way of doing so.

5. It goes without saying that the production of the license granted to defendant 1 is essential to enable the Court to properly adjudicate on the question of illegality of the partnership raised by defendant 1. In Natla Bapiraju v. Achuta Rajaju . [1910] 20 M.L.J 337, Miller and Krishnaswami Ayyar, JJ., with reference to a similar argument observed as follows:

“The Sub-ordinate Judge sustained this objection and dismissed the suit. The license is not on record and it is impossible for us to say that the partnership contravenes any condition therein set forth.”

6. In O.S.A No. 72 of 1925, the late learned Chief Justice and Ramesam, J., observed as follows:

“The license which was granted is not forthcoming. It is impossible to say why it was not produced. Had he produced the same, we would have been in a position to say, as we are not now, what exactly were the restrictions; imposed upon his enjoyment of the license. The onus of establishing the illegality of the contract obviously lay heavily on defendant 1, and I am content to dispose of this case on the ground that this burden he never discharged in the Court below in spite of the latitude given to him.”

7. See also Appadurai Mudali v. Murugappa Mudali Mudali2, Odgers and Madhavan Nair, JJ. No doubt in matters contrary to public policy, Courts should not lend there aid in favour of persons who seek their aid to carry out something which is illegal and contrary to public policy: but there could be no doubt that Courts should in the first instance be satisfied that what a party is seeking to carry out is clearly against what has been declared to be against public policy. As observed by Lord Halsbury in Connolly v. Consumer's Cordage Co. . [1904] 89 L.T 347.:

“their Lordships entertain no doubt that it is the right and duty of the Court, at any stage of the cause, to consider, and, if it is sufficiently proved, to act upon an illegality which might turn out to be fatal to the claims of either of the parties to the litigation.”

8. The Lord Chancellor added, that:

“their Lordships did not doubt that the learned Judges who tried the case in the Court below had a right, and that it was their duty, if they thought the facts were established, to take care that the process of the Court should not be used for the purpose of establishing a claim that ought not to be permitted to be enforced in a Court of Justice.”

9. Lindley, L.J, observed in Scott v. Brown . [1892] 2 Q.B 724:

“It matters not whether the defendant has pleaded the illegality or whether he has not. If the evidence adduced by the plaintiff proved the illegality, the Court ought not to assist him.”

10. While the duty of the Court is not to render its aid to the enforcement of transactions which are illegal, it is at the same time, incumbent that the illegality should be “sufficiently proved” (in the words of Lord Halsbury), and that the “facts were established” (in the words of Lord Chancellor). A partnership is prima facie legal, unless it is proved that the object of the same was illegal, or that the object of the partnership necessarily involved something illegal or contrary to public policy. (Section 23 of the Contract Act). The defendant who alleged the illegality has not succeeded in establishing the necessary facts which would enable the Court to come to that conclusion. Defendant 1 not having produced the necessary materials before the Court, I am unable to say that the learned District Judge was wrong in his decision on this point.

11. On the second contention raised by the learned advocate for the appellant, I propose to say only a very few words. It could not be said that every partnership relating to abkari business involves a transfer. As observed by Benson and Sundara Iyer, JJ., in the case reported in Padmanabham v. Badrinath Sarda . [1912] 35 Mad. 582 at p. 586:

“it is no doubt true that every contract of partnership is not necessarily a transfer; but it is equally clear that such a contract may in the circumstances in many cases involve a transfer. Thus if two persons agree to start a business in partnership and to contribute capital therefor, there is no transfer involved in the transaction; but if one person carrying on a trade and possessing stock and capital, admits' another into partnership with himself, making the stock and the capitals, the joint property of both, it is impossible to contend that there is not a transfer in such a case.”

12. The learned District Judge considers this question in para. 5 of his judgment. He says:

“there is no deed of partnership and one has to gather what the terms were from the oral evidence of the parties. As I understand the evidence, the case is not one of the respondent, having a going toddy trade and taking the other two (plaintiff and defendant 2) into partnership. So far as I can gather, each of the three parties contributed an equal share of money and the business was started, the license being taken in the name of defendant 1. It seems to be clear that at the time the partnership was formed he had not begun the trade in toddy and had no stock which he made the joint property of all the three…….”

13. Therefore in that view also the learned District Judge was, I think, right in overruling the contention of defendant 1, as the partnership in the particular case did not involve a transfer. In Appadurai Mudali v. Murugappa Mudali Mudaly Odgers and Madhavan Nair, JJ., decided:

“where it was alleged that a partnership between defendants 1, 2 and 3 in the matter of an abkari business was illegal and opposed to public policy because the abkari license stood only in the names of defendants 2 and 3, instead of three persons, but the license itself was not produced,…. that, in the absence of evidence to show that it was a condition of the license that all the names of licensees or persons concerned in that particular trade or business by way of partnership etc. must appear on the face of the license, the partnership could not be held to be illegal; and that there was nothing prima facie illegal in such a partnership under the Abkari Act.”

14. Defendant 1 is no doubt entitled to take objection that the partnership entered into by him with the plaintiff and defendant 2 was illegal and contrary to public policy; but he should have produced proper materials before the Court to enable the Court to properly adjudicate on such pleas. He not having done so in the present case, the lower appellate Court was right in passing a preliminary decree in favour of the plaintiff and directing the usual accounts to be taken. I do not propose that this litigation, begun on 14th February 1921 should further be prolonged by allowing defendant 1 at this stags to adduce additional evidence.

15. In this view, I do not propose to discuss the various decisions cited before me by the learned advocates on either side in the second appeal, viz: Marudamuthu Pillai v. Rangasami Moopan . [1901] 24 Mad. 401.; Thithi Pakurudasu v. Bheemudu . [1903] 26 Mad. 430.; Namasivaya Gurukkal v. Subramania Ayyar . [1916] 34 I.C 927.; Gangadhara Sah v. Swaminatha Mudali . A.I.R 1926 Mad. 218.; Brahmayya v. Ramiah . [1920] 43 Mad. 141 of this Court Karsan v. Gatlu Shivaji . [1913] 37 Bom. 320; Nazaratti Syad Imam v. Babamiya Dureyatimsha . [1916] 40 Bom. 64; Champsey Dossa v. Gordhandoss Kessoivji . [1917] 19 Bom. L.R 381; of the Bombay High Court; Jnanendra Nath v. Ghandi Charan Saha . [1915] 29 I.C 480. and Behari Lall v. Jagodish Ghunder . [1904] 31 Cal. 798 of the Calcutta High Court, as I consider that the case before me could be disposed of on the grounds already mentioned by me. The result is that the second appeal as dismissed with costs.

P.R.S/V.B

16. Appeal dismissed.