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Chhadami Lal v. Shyama Charan

Allahabad High Court
Dec 1, 1913

1. It appears that a grove situate in Mouza Abudaudi was in the possession of Jai Mal, Mohan, Thakuri, Musammat Manno and seven others as tenants. The first four of them had a half share in it, while the other seven had the remaining half. The plot on which the grove stood was recorded in two mahals, namely, Mahal Abi and Mahal Zard. At the recent settlement, the land of that portion of the grove which was in Mahal Abi, patti Bainjni, was numbered 315 and the land of the other portion that was in Mahal Zard was numbered 316. On the 18th September 1909, Jaimal, Mohan, Thakuri and Musammat Manno executed a sale-deed in favour of Shama Charan in respect of their half share in the grove together with some other property. The sale-deed purported to convey both land and trees. On 14th September 1911, Chhadammi Lal and Daya Ram, zemindars of the village of Abudaudi, instituted two suits in the Court of the Munsif of Pilibhit in respect of the grove in question. They instituted two suits because the grove was situate in two mahals. The suits were brought against Shama Charan, the vendee, and against Jaimal, Mohan, and the sons of Thakuri, as the latter had died after the sale of 18th September 1909. Chhadammi Lal and Daya Ram sued to recover possession of the grove by ejectment of Shama Charan on the allegation that they were the zemindars of the pattis in which the grove in question was situate and that the vendors were in possession of the grove as tenants, and had no right to transfer either the land or the trees. Jaimal, Mohan and the sons of Thakuri supported the claim of the plaintiffs so far as to admit that they had no right to sell and did not sell the land of the grove. They said that they had sold whatever interest they had in the trees. Shama Charan resisted the two suits on several grounds. He said that his vendors and seven others were the proprietors of both the land and the trees of the grove and that the tenants holding groves in Abudaudi could, under the custom obtaining in the village, transfer them. He further said that after his purchase of 18th September 1909, he had obtained a partition decree against cosharers of his vendors under which the grove situate on the plot No. 315 was awarded to him. He had no concern with the grove situate on plot No. 316. He advanced an alternative plea with regard to the grove on the plot No. 315 to the effect that he was a mortgagee of patti Bainjni in which the plot No. 315 was situate and that the plaintiffs could not claim possession of it as long as his mortgage subsisted. They could only redeem him. Both the suits were tried together. The two suits were numbered 1049 and 1050 of 1911. The suit No. 1049 related to grove on plot No. 315 and the other suit to the grove on plot No. 316. All the evidence was by consent recorded in Suit No. 1049.

2. The learned Munsif found that Jaimal and others had no right in the land of the grove, that they were in possession of the grove as tenants and that no custom was established under which they could sell the trees of the grove. He also found that Shama Charan had failed to prove that under a partition decree, the grove on plot No. 315 had fallen to his lot and the grove on plot No. 816 to the lot of the cosharers of his vendors. Accordingly, a decree for actual possession was passed in Suit No. 1050 and a decree for proprietary possession only was passed in Suit No. 1049, that is, in respect of the grove on plot No. 315 as Shyama Charan was found to be a mortgagee of patti Bainjni. Shyama Charan preferred an appeal from the decree in Suit No. 1049, and preferred no appeal from the decree in Suit No. 1050.

3. The plaintiffs in opposing the appeal of Shama Charan in the lower appellate Court, urged, among other grounds, the plea of res judicata, but it was disallowed. The learned Judge agreed with the first Court as to the proprietorship of the land of the grove vesting in the zemindars but disagreed with it as to the right of the tenants to sell the trees of their groves. The decree of the first Court was accordingly modified. The plaintiffs have come up on second appeal to this Court.

4. One of the grounds involved in the appeal is that of res judicata. The plea is urged on the basis of the decree in Suit No. 1050 from which no appeal was preferred and which has become final. The learned vakil for Shama Charan meets the objection on two grounds. He contends the plea of res judicata was not taken in the memorandum of appeal to this Court and in fact was not advanced until the attention of the vakils for the appellants was called by the Court to the omission. Secondly, it is urged that as by the partition decree, the grove on plot No. 315 had fallen to the lot of Shama Charan, he had no concern with the decree in Suit No. 1050, hence that decree would not operate as res judicata. I do not think that either contention for Shama Charan is correct. It is true that the objection of res judicata was not taken in the memorandum of appeal to this Court and was taken when the Court called the attention of the appellants' vakil to the omission. But such an objection can be taken at any stage. This view is borne out by the Full Bench case of Muhammad Ismail v. Chatter Singh (1). The second objection would perhaps have been valid if Shama Charan had proved that the grove on plot No. 315 had fallen to his share and the grove on plot No. 316 to the lot of the cosharers of his vendors. He made that allegation in Suit No. 1050 and failed to prove it: Vide the judgment of the learned Munsif which is on the record. Under these circumstances, in my opinion, the decree in Suit No. 1050, which decided the same question as the decree in Suit No. 1049, supports the plea of the bar of res judicata. In view of this finding, it is unnecessary to discuss the other points raised in the appeal. The appeal prevails. I allow it and set aside the decree of the lower Appellate Court and restore that of the first Court. Costs are allowed to the appellants, including costs on the higher scale in this Court.

V.S/R.K

5. Appeal allowed.