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Province Of Bengal v. Mahammad Yusuf

Calcutta High Court
Apr 1, 1942
Smart Summary (Beta)

Judgment Summary — Mitter, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal is directed against the judgment of the Special Land Acquisition Judge on a reference made under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The central dispute concerns whether the whole of cadastral plot No. 3127 of mouzâ Baghail, or only the northern portion depicted in the plan (referred to in the s.6 declaration), was acquired. The Collector's award had been made in respect of the whole plot, but both parties admit that the Collector cannot acquire land not covered by the declaration published under s.6 of the Act; accordingly the determinative question is the proper construction of that s.6 declaration (Ex. 5) published in the Calcutta Gazette on October 15, 1938.

Material admitted facts: the claimant's tenancy covers the whole of cadastral plot 3127 (created by kabuliyat dated July 24, 1920); the claimant is in possession of the whole plot; the southern boundary is a fixed natural landmark — a dahar or water channel; the recorded area is 55 acres (and as measured was slightly in excess). The plan referred to in the declaration, lying in the Collector's office, omits a small southern strip of the plot; the parties' dispute is limited to that strip.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the whole of cadastral plot No. 3127 of mouzâ Baghail was included in the s.6 declaration and therefore validly acquired, or whether only the portion depicted in the plan (excluding a small southern strip) was acquired.
  2. Whether the plan, to which the declaration referred (and which was available for inspection but not published with the declaration), operates to restrict the declaration (and thus the acquisition) or serves only to elucidate the text of the declaration when there is a conflict between text and plan.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gajendra Sahu v. Secretary of State for India in Council The Collector cannot acquire land which is not covered by the declaration under s.6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Used to frame the central legal premise that the validity of acquisition depends on the scope of the s.6 declaration; therefore construction of the declaration is decisive.
Harish Chunder Neogy v. Secretary of State for India in Council Same principle: the Collector cannot acquire land beyond the s.6 declaration. Relied upon with Gajendra Sahu to support that the award cannot cover land outside the published declaration; prompts analysis of Ex. 5.
Roe v. Vernon (1804) Principle of falsa demonstratio non nocet: where description suffices, erroneous additions (name, quantity, locality) do not vitiate the instrument. Adopted as the first and fundamental principle guiding construction of the declaration; informs whether an erroneous plan or description can be disregarded.
Deo v. Galloway Where there is a sufficient description, a false demonstration may be rejected; but where general terms are qualified by a particular description, the latter controls. Applied to illustrate interplay between general and specific descriptions and to introduce specialis generalibus deroget as a rule for identifying parcels.
Llewellyn v. Earl of Jersey If there is an adequate and certain definition, subsequent erroneous additions will not vitiate a deed. Used to reinforce that an adequate textual description can prevail over erroneous adjuncts.
Wyse v. Leahy A plan must be incorporated into the instrument to have effect; mere annexure is not sufficient. Relied upon to stress that a plan not properly incorporated cannot automatically control or override the text of the declaration.
Brain v. Harris The delineation in a plan does not invariably override definite boundaries stated in the instrument (and vice versa); incorporation and certainty are key. Cited to show that plan and textual boundaries must be compared and that plan is not always controlling where boundaries in text are certain.
Willis v. Watney Even where a plan's colouring or marking is imperfect, actual usual occupation or the texture of the description can cause a part to pass despite apparent omission on the plan. Used as an example supporting the view that plan markings are not necessarily decisive if the textual description and facts indicate inclusion.
Wrotesley v. Adams When the primary words of description are certain, later added particulars that are false or superfluous do not defeat the conveyance; the addition of another certainty may be superfluous. Applied to support the proposition that a clear primary textual description controls over a subsequent inconsistent particularity.
Horne v. Struben (Privy Council) A diagram attached to a grant can be consulted to elucidate the text but does not necessarily subordinate the text to the diagram; if diagram is inaccurate it affords only a rough delineation. Quintessential authority for treating the plan as an elucidatory aid rather than a controlling limitation; relied on heavily in concluding the plan could not restrict the declaration.
Lodna Colliery Company v. Bepin Behary Bose Decision consistent with the established rules of construction (no new rule laid down by it). Noted by the court as not inconsistent with the court's view and therefore taken into account without altering the conclusion.
Watchman v. Attorney General of East Africa In cases of ambiguity, contemporaneous evidence and evidence of conduct may be admissible to interpret an instrument. Cited as leading authority for the alternative line of cases (admissibility of extrinsic evidence) which the court did not find necessary to pursue because it found the declaration not ambiguous; nevertheless the court noted that such evidence, where admissible, supported acquisition of the whole plot.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first framed the legal starting point: under s.6 of the Land Acquisition Act a declaration must specify the particular land proposed to be acquired, and if a plan exists the declaration must indicate where it may be inspected (the plan need not be published in the Gazette). Because the Collector cannot acquire land outside the s.6 declaration, the dispositive issue is the construction of Ex. 5 (the s.6 declaration).

The court examined the text of Ex. 5, which declares "a piece of land comprising cadastral plot 3127 and measuring more or less 55 of an acre" is required. The court emphasized the word "comprising" — interpreted as "enveloping" or "including the whole" — and noted that the area description ("more or less 55 acres") is inherently inexact. Thus, taken by its text alone, the declaration unambiguously describes the whole of cadastral plot No. 3127.

The court then confronted the discrepancy: the plan to which Ex. 5 referred did not include a small southern strip of the plot. To resolve whether the plan restricts the declaration the court applied established rules of construction derived from English authorities: the doctrine of falsa demonstratio non nocet, the principle that a sufficient textual definition will not be vitiated by erroneous additions, and the corollary that where the text is certain, particulars inconsistent with that text may be disregarded. The court also stressed that for a plan to have binding effect it must be incorporated into the instrument; mere annexure or a plan simply lying for inspection is not per se conclusive.

Applying these principles (illustrated by cases such as Roe v. Vernon, Deo v. Galloway, Wrotesley v. Adams, Brain v. Harris, Willis v. Watney and Horne v. Struben), the court concluded that the plan at the Collector's office was an elucidatory aid and, being inaccurate (since it omitted a southern strip), could not subordinate or restrict the clear textual declaration that the whole plot was to be acquired. The locality contained definite natural boundary marks (notably the southern dahar/water channel), lending certainty to the textual description.

The court also observed that, had the declaration been ambiguous, it could have considered contemporaneous evidence and conduct (per Watchman v. Attorney General of East Africa), but it found such inquiry unnecessary because the text was, on construction, clear. Nonetheless the court noted that where admissible that contemporaneous evidence also established the intention to acquire the whole of the plot.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED.

Core Ruling: The whole of cadastral plot No. 3127 of mouzâ Baghail has been validly acquired.

Consequences and directions: The appeal was allowed and the court ordered that, in the circumstances, the parties should bear their respective costs throughout. The cross-objection was dismissed with no order as to costs.

The opinion does not purport to announce a novel rule of law; rather it applies established principles of construction (including falsa demonstratio non nocet and the rule that a plan is for elucidation unless properly incorporated) to the facts and reaches a decision that the declaration's text governs. The court expressly noted that another line of authorities permitting contemporaneous evidence was unnecessary to decide the case, although such evidence was consistent with the conclusion.


End of summary (prepared strictly from the text of the provided opinion).

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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Mitter, J.:— This appeal is directed against the judgment of the Special Land Acquisition Judge passed on a reference made under s. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The question in the appeal is whether the whole of cadastral plot No. 3127 of mouzâ Baghail or only the northern portion thereof, as depicted in the plan referred to in the declaration made under s. 6 of the said Act, has been acquired. The award made by the Collector under the Act is in respect of the whole of the said plot, but that fact is not of great importance, for it is admitted by both parties, and that is also the law, that the Collector cannot acquire land which is not covered by the declaration under s. 6 of the Act as published in the Official Gazette; Gajendra Sahu v. Secretary of State for India in Council ; Harish Chunder Neogy v. Secretary of State for India in Council . The question involved in this appeal, therefore, depends upon the construction of the declaration made under s. 6 of the Act. That declaration, as published in the Calcutta Gazette, is Ex. 5. (11-26). It was published on October 15, 1938. The material portion of that declaration runs as follows:—

It is hereby declared that for the above purpose a piece of land comprising cadastral plot 3127 and measuring more or less-55 of an acre is required within the aforesaid village of Baghail………..

A plan of the land may be inspected in the office of the Collector of Pabna.

It is admitted by the claimant that cadastral plot 3127, covers the whole of his tenancy, which was created in his favour on July 24, 1920, when he executed the kabuliyat (Ex. 1), in favour of his landlord, that he is in possession of the whole of that plot and that the boundaries of his tenanted land have not changed since the date when he took settlement. The southern boundary, which is the material boundary of that plot, is admitted to be a dahar or water channel, which is a fixed land-mark. The area of plot No. 3127 as recorded in the settlement khatiyân is 55 acres and, as measured by the commissioner, is slightly in excess of that area. The plan to which reference was made in the declaration (Ex. 5), however, does not comprise the whole of cadastral plot No. 3127. It excludes a small strip, the southern part of the said plot. The dispute between the parties is in respect of this small strip. That dispute depends solely upon the question as to whether, by the terms of the declaration (Ex. 5), the whole of cadastral plot No. 3127, was intended to be acquired or the acquisition was to be on the basis of the plan which was then lying in the office of the Collector, to which reference was made in the declaration. The declaration follows closely the provisions of s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. That section requires a declaration to be made in respect of the particular land proposed to be acquired, and where a plan had already been made of the land, the plan is not to be published with the declaration in the Official Gazette, but only information is to be given by that publication as to the place where the said plan can be inspected by any one desirous of inspecting the same. In cases of acquisition ordinarily the plan agrees with the description of the property intended to be acquired as given in the body of the declaration, but in this case the plan does not include the whole of dâg No. 3127. If the plan be not taken into account, the meaning of the declaration would be unambiguous. What was proposed to be acquired was “a piece of land comprising cadastral plot No. 3127 and measuring more or less 55 of an acre”. The area by itself is an indeterminate factor, for that area was approximately stated. The words “comprising”, however, makes the position clear. It means “enveloping”, “including the whole”. The text of the declaration (Ex. 5), is that the whole of cadastral plot 3127 was proposed for acquisition. The question, therefore, is whether the plan has a restricting effect or whether it has the effect of only elucidating the text. In the former case, the effect would be that only, so much of plot No. 3127, as is covered by the plan, and no more, would be affected by the declaration under s. 6 of the Act and that much only could be legally acquired. In the latter contingency the plan would have to be disregarded and the legality of the acquisition would have to be judged by the text of the declaration, which in this case includes the whole of cadastral plot 3127 of mouzâ Baghail.

The learned advocate for the respondent, Mr. Amaresh Chandra Roy, who has shown great industry, learning and ability in arguing the case, for which we expressed our appreciation at the close of his argument, has placed before us a number of decisions bearing upon the construction of deeds, mostly leases, and we have ourselves looked into many decisions not cited at the bar. In our judgment, the principles laid down in those decisions have an important bearing on the questions before us. We, accordingly, proceed to discuss the principles formulated in those decisions. The first and fundamental principle is the principle of falsa demonstratio non nocet. That principle was stated in 1804 in Roe v. Vernon in the following language;—

If there be a description of the property sufficient to render certain what is intended, the addition of a wrong name, or of an erroneous statement as to quantity, occupancy, locality or an erroneous enumeration of particulars will have no effect.

In 1833, Parke, J. formulated the principle thus;—

Now the rule is clearly settled, that when there is a sufficient description set forth of premises by giving the particular nance of a close, or otherwise, we may reject a false demonstration; but if the premises be described in general terms and a particular description be added, the latter controls the former.

Deo v. Galloway .

In 1843, Baron Parke formulated the rule thus:—

As soon as there is an adequate and sufficient definition, with convenient certainty, of what is intended to pass by a deed, any subsequent erroneous addition will not vitiate it.

Llewellyn v. Earl of Jersey .

The principle thus formulated in the abstract is definite, but its applications, to some concrete cases, is difficult. In all cases, the following elements must be ascertained from the document, where the different parts of the description of the parcel do not agree:—

(i) which part of the document adequately defines the subject intended to pass, and

(ii) which part thereof contains the erroneous description of the subject.

In comparatively simple cases the application of the principle would not be difficult. Thus, where the parcels are described by divers special descriptions and nothing exists which satisfies all the descriptions, but something exists which satisfies some or one of them, and that is described with sufficient certainty, the other or others may be disregarded. As for instance, where a named close or a close within certain boundaries is conveyed with the description that it is in the occupation of A and no part of it was in occupation of A “the phrase in the occupation of A” would be disregarded and the close identified either by name or boundaries, as the case may be, would pass. But if, in the case, only a part was in the occupation of A, it may be a matter for consideration whether only that part of the close which was in the occupation of A would pass. That was the type in Deo v. Galloway (supra). The phrase “now in the occupation of Richard Smallbones” was held to have no restricting effect in the case on a consideration of the texture of the whole sentence containing the description of the parcel demised. One rule, however, was formulated in that case namely, that the legal maxim specialis generalihus deroget applies to the identification of parcels sought to be conveyed by an instrument.

Cases have occurred, in which the parcel, as defined by boundaries or as defined in the plan, did not tally with the area stated in the instrument. There the definition as made by boundaries or as given in the plan prevailed, for that was the only definite description, as the statement of area by itself would be indefinite in locating the parcel. The type of cases which have a bearing on the case before us is where the definition by boundaries or by a definite name does not agree with the plan annexed to the instrument. To have any effect the plan must be incorporated in the conveyance. It is not sufficient that the plan is merely annexed to the instrument. [Wyse v. Leahy .] Where however, the plan is so incorporated, it is an important criterion, but it cannot be said, as a rule of construction, that in every case the delineation of the parcel as made in the plan would override the delineation according to boundaries as stated in the instrument, if the boundaries are certain and definite and vice versa. This was laid down by Coleridge, J. in Brain v. Harris . In Willis v. Watney , the conveyance was of “the capital messuage or mansion house called Cardigan House, and all outbuildings and yards usually occupied therewith, delineated on the plan annexed to these presents, and thereon coloured green and pink and the paths “brown”. The question was whether a stable yard passed. It was on the site plan, but that portion was not coloured green or pink, only a, black line was drawn across it. It was held that, notwithstanding the fact that it was not coloured green or pink, it passed to the purchaser, as that stable yard was usually occupied with the said mansion house.

In a very old case Wrotesley v. Adams , the principle of construction was stated thus:—

And therefore there is a diversity where a certainty is added to a thing that is in certain, and where to a thing certain. For if I release all my right in all my lands in Dale, which I have by descent on the part of my father, and I have lands in date by descent on the part of my mother but no lands by descent on the part of my father, then the release is void. And so the words of the certainty, viz., to which I have by descent on the part of my father, being added to the general words which were in certain (e.g, all lands in Dale) are of effect; But if the release had been in Whiteacre, in Dale, which I have by descent on the part of my father, and I had it not by descent on the part of my father, but otherwise, yet the release is good…….. for the thing was certainly expressed by the first words, in which case the addition of another certainty is not necessary, but superfluous, and therefore he shall not there take an averment upon a thing, which is of no effect, be the same true or false.

The substantial rule is no doubt, as in all English precedents, mixed up with old technical rules of pleading, but the rule itself, in our judgment, is a sound one and ought to guide us in interpreting documents of the nature which we have before us. That rule in its substantial form was applied by the Privy Council in Horne v. Struben . There a farm, had been granted in the early part of the 19th century on “loan lease”. Its name had acquired a reputation as to its extent. Under the proclamation of August 6, 1843, all the lands held on “loan lease tenure” could be granted in perpetual tenure at a quit rent. In 1843, that farm was converted to a perpetual tenure at a quit rent. The description of the parcel in the grant was in the following terms:—

A piece of land containing 2.520 morgens, situate is the division of Stall enbosch Field Cornetcy of Hottentots Holland, being the loan place of “Kogel Baay” or “Langgezoeht” extending west to the seashore, south, south-east, and east to the mountains, and north to the Steenbrazem River, as will further appear by the diagram framed by the surveyor.

The diagram was attached to the instrument of grant. The respondent, who acquired the farm by a subsequent purchase, sued the Surveyor-General of the Colony of Good Hope and the Secretary of Agriculture in the Colonial Government for declaration of his title to all lands up to the seashore and the river. The diagram did not show the western boundary extending up to the high water mark of the sea, but further inland, and the northern boundary did not coincide with the river bank. The Crown contended that the plaintiff would be entitled to claim only according to the diagram. The dispute between the parties was accordingly with regard to the western and northern boundaries. The diagram supported the Crown, but the text supported the plaintiff. Lord Roberstson first observed that the area given in the grant would not tally either with the plaintiff's or the defendants' case but that it would be approximate more to the plaintiff's case. Dealing with the western boundary he observed thus:—

Now as matter of construction, this is merely an appeal to the diagram for farther elucidation of the text and not a subordination of the text to the diagram. If in a matter not requiring elucidation the diagram is repugnant to the text, this merely shews (what in the present instance is abundantly proved by other circumstances) that, the diagram is not exact, and affords only a rough delineation of the farm.

He then went to show in what respect the diagram was inaccurate. The fact that the diagram was inaccurate was introduced parenthetically in the above passage only to lend additional weight in that particular case to what the general rule of construction led to. The case of Lodna Colliery Company v. Bepin Behary Bose does not lay down any new rule, which we have not taken into consideration, and is in no way inconsistent with the view we are taking. Keeping in view the principles of construction which we have discussed above we are of opinion that the plan, to which reference had been made in the declaration (Ex. 5), cannot restrict the operation of the acquisition to only such portion of cadastral plot No. 3127 as would be covered by the said plan. The plan is admittedly inaccurate in the sense that it does not depict the whole of the said plot. Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act requires the land proposed to be acquired to be specified but it does not require a plan to be prepared at that stage and made a part of the notification. It only ??? that, where a plan had already been prepared at that stage, information should be given in the notification as to the place where the plan is lying. The declaration (Ex. 5) clearly states that the whole of cadastral plot 3127 was to be acquired. That plot had a definite location, for in the locality there are natural boundary marks, hedges, rows of trees and a water channel. The southern boundary which is the only boundary material to the controversy is clearly defined in the locality, being a dahar or natural water channel. In these circumstances, we hold that the plan can only be referred to for elucidation, where elucidation is necessary, but cannot subordinate the text of the declaration. We accordingly held that the whole of cadastral plot No. 3127 of village Baghail has been validly acquired. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to consider another line of cases, of which Watchman v. Attorney General of East Africa, Protectorate , is the leading authority. If Ex. 5 had been ambiguous, contemporaneous evidence and evidence of conduct would have been admissible. That evidence conclusively establishes that the intention was to acquire the whole of cadastral plot No. 3127.

The appeal is accordingly allowed, but we think that, in the circumstances of the case, the parties should bear their respective costs throughout. The cross-objection was not pressed. It is dismissed but we make no order as to costs.

Khundkar, J.:— I agree.

Appeal allowed.
N.C.C