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Hem Chandra Chowdhury v. Tafazzel Hossein Khan

Calcutta High Court
Mar 4, 1904
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Summary of Opinion — Mortgage Enforcement Appeal

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit concerned enforcement of a mortgage security dated 13th Aswin 1301 B.S. (28 September 1894) executed by Karim Neoaz Khan in favour of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff sued the heirs of the mortgagor on 12 August 1896, claiming Rs. 93,460 as due under the mortgage. Pending the suit, property No. 4 (a putni taluq) was sold for arrears of rent on 26 September 1896 and purchased by the Plaintiff for Rs. 26,500.

Several procedural steps followed: on 8 September 1897 Defendants Nos. 3, 4 and 8 filed a written statement challenging the mortgage's validity and asserting apportionment of the debt among hypothecated properties; on 29 March 1898 the Plaintiff and certain defendants (Nos. 1, 3, 4, 7 and 8) presented a compromise petition fixing amounts and absolving some defendants from further liability; Hyatunnisisa (who did not join the compromise) filed a written statement on 29 April 1898 reiterating objections; purchasers of shares in mortgaged properties applied to be made parties and the Subordinate Judge ordered their joinder.

At trial the Subordinate Judge framed issues including (i) the genuineness and validity of the mortgage bond, and (ii) the effect of the Plaintiff's purchase of property No. 4 and the relief to which the Plaintiff was entitled. The Subordinate Judge held the mortgage valid and, relying on Goluck Chunder Das v. Ram Sunker Sutt, treated property No. 4 as purchased subject to the encumbrance because the Plaintiff failed to serve the notice under section 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The Subordinate Judge assessed the value of property No. 4 at Rs. 34,741-9 as., deducted that from the plaint claim of Rs. 93,460 and awarded a 3 anna 6 gunda 2 kara 2 krant share (Rs. 12,232-15) against certain defendants (Nos. 5, 6 and 9 and added defendants). The Plaintiff appealed the modified decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the mortgage bond propounded by the Plaintiff is genuine and binding on the heirs of Karim Neoaz Khan (i.e., the validity of the mortgage).
  2. What is the legal effect of the Plaintiff's purchase of property No. 4 (sold for arrears of rent) on the encumbrance created by the mortgage: did the purchase extinguish the mortgage, or was property No. 4 purchased subject to the mortgage?
  3. Whether the notice prescribed by section 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act was required where the purchaser of the property is also the incumbrancer (i.e., whether the statutory notice must be served on the purchaser when he is the encumbrancer himself).
  4. How the mortgage debt should be apportioned among the mortgaged properties (and between defendants) where one mortgaged property has been sold for arrears and purchased by the mortgagee, and how any surplus from such sale should be treated.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Position

  • The Plaintiff instituted the suit to enforce the mortgage and claimed Rs. 93,460 as due under the mortgage bond.
  • The Plaintiff purchased property No. 4 (sold for arrears of rent) and, by subsequent petitions, entered into a compromise with certain defendants recognizing sums due (a compromise acknowledging Rs. 108,000 as justly due and other allocations) and sought enforcement against remaining defendants.

Defendants' Positions

  • Defendants Nos. 3, 4 and 8 contended in their written statement that the mortgage bond was invalid — alleging lack of intelligent execution by Karim Neoaz Khan and absence of consideration — and argued that, since the Plaintiff had purchased property No. 4, any mortgage debt should be apportioned among the hypothecated properties so that they could only be held liable for the portion attributable to the properties in their possession.
  • Hyatunnisisa (who did not join the compromise) reiterated these objections and questioned the principle on which the compromise between some defendants and the Plaintiff was entered.
  • Other purchasers of shares in mortgaged properties (such as Gyanada Sundari and others) petitioned that the share of the mortgage debt attributable to the properties they had purchased be ascertained.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Goluck Chunder Das v. Ram Sunker Sutt Used by the Subordinate Judge to support the proposition that a purchaser who fails to take steps prescribed by law (as interpreted in that case) may be taken to have purchased subject to existing incumbrances; the case involved a sale in execution of a rent decree and considered whether that sale was under section 165 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and whether incumbrances were annulled. The present court examined the Goluck Chunder Das decision, explained its factual distinctions (sale in execution after a mortgage decree and the decree-holder's conduct) and observed that, on the materials before that court, it could not be held the sale was under section 165 and that related comments on annulment under section 167 were obiter. The present court therefore did not accept the Subordinate Judge's reliance on that case to hold that the Plaintiff purchased property No. 4 subject to the mortgage.
Mastulla Mondal v. Jan Mahmud Sha Interpreted the notice requirement in section 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act; held that section 167 contemplates a purchaser other than the incumbrancer and that it would be untenable to require an incumbrancer-purchaser to procure service of a notice on himself. The court expressly adopted the view in Mastulla Mondal that the statutory notice under section 167 is intended for the incumbrancer as a third party, and that the provision was not meant to apply where the purchaser and the incumbrancer are the same person. This precedent supported the court's conclusion that the Plaintiff was not obliged to serve the formal notice on himself.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded step-by-step from the record and statutory framework:

  1. Evidence regarding the sale of property No. 4 showed it was sold for arrears of rent and "without any reservation whatsoever" (i.e., not sold subject to any registered and notified encumbrance under Chapter XIV of the Bengal Tenancy Act). Thus, the sale was treated as a sale under section 165 of that Act, and not as a sale expressly subject to an extant registered incumbrance.
  2. The court observed that a purchaser in such a sale (apparently under section 165) has, by the statute, the power to annul encumbrances as indicated in section 164, clause (2). The issue was whether the purchaser was also bound to serve the notice prescribed by section 167 in order to effect that annulment.
  3. The critical statutory interpretation turned on the identity of the incumbrancer. Section 167 contemplates service of notice upon the incumbrancer. In the present case the incumbrancer and the purchaser were the same person (the Plaintiff). The court agreed with the reasoning in Mastulla Mondal v. Jan Mahmud Sha that the statutory scheme assumes the purchaser is different from the incumbrancer and that it would be absurd to insist that an incumbrancer procure service of a notice on himself to effect annulment. Accordingly, where the purchaser and incumbrancer are identical, the object of the statutory notice—informing an independent incumbrancer that his incumbrance is annulled—has been achieved without formal service.
  4. The court examined the Subordinate Judge's reliance on Goluck Chunder Das v. Ram Sunker Sutt and found that case factually distinguishable. In Goluck the sale occurred in execution of a rent decree after a mortgage decree and the decree-holder had conducted proceedings in a manner that gave rise to particular conclusions. Further, where the Goluck opinion held that incumbrance had not been annulled by section 167 proceedings, those observations amounted to obiter dictum on the material then before that court. Consequently, Goluck did not support treating the Plaintiff's purchase in the present case as necessarily subject to the mortgage.
  5. Applying the Transfer of Property Act, the court noted section 82 (rateable contribution between mortgaged properties) but held it was only applicable in the present case with respect to properties in the possession of Defendants Nos. 5, 7 and 9. The mortgage deed also permitted the mortgagee to sell any of the mortgaged properties, and there was nothing in the record to found an equitable objection to the Plaintiff's choice of sale.
  6. The court relied on section 73 of the Transfer of Property Act to explain the effect of a sale of mortgaged property for arrears of revenue or rent: the mortgagee has a charge on the surplus, if any, of the proceeds of such sale for the balance due on the mortgage, and, effectively, the charge on the property sold is extinguished and transfers to the surplus proceeds. The court noted that section 101 of the Act supports this understanding.
  7. From these statutory and precedential considerations, the court concluded that the Subordinate Judge was wrong to hold property No. 4 to be still subject to the mortgage. Even if the Subordinate Judge's contrary view were accepted, the court held he erred in deducting the entire present value of property No. 4 from the Plaintiff's claim; the correct approach would have been to determine the proportional part of the mortgage debt chargeable to property No. 4 and deduct that proportionate amount, and then ascertain the balance due as of the date of decree.
  8. Finally, the court declared that the Plaintiff (as mortgagee) is entitled to a declaration of a charge on the surplus of the sale proceeds of property No. 4 and to sell the other mortgaged properties (other than property No. 4) for satisfaction of the remainder of his claim. Because of the earlier compromise between the Plaintiff and some defendants, the decree ordered was to be given only in respect of the 3 anna 6 gunda 2 kara 2 krant share of the debt, subject to deduction of any surplus due from the other defendants (Nos. 5, 6 and 9), in the manner indicated by the Subordinate Judge's last paragraph.

Holding and Implications

Final Ruling: The appeal is allowed and the decree of the Court below is modified; costs were awarded to the Plaintiff.

Direct implications and operative effects:

  • The Subordinate Judge's conclusion that property No. 4 remained subject to the mortgage is reversed; property No. 4 was sold for arrears of rent without reservation and the mortgagee's charge (if any) attaches to any surplus of the sale proceeds rather than to the property itself.
  • The Plaintiff (mortgagee) is entitled to a declaration of a charge on any surplus proceeds of the sale of property No. 4 and to proceed to sell the other mortgaged properties (other than property No. 4) to satisfy the remainder of the mortgage claim.
  • Because of the compromise between the Plaintiff and certain defendants, the decree to be entered is limited to the 3 anna 6 gunda 2 kara 2 krant share of the debt, subject to deduction of any surplus recoverable from Defendants Nos. 5, 6 and 9 as indicated.
  • The Subordinate Judge was also found to have erred procedurally in deducting the whole value of property No. 4 from the Plaintiff's claim; the correct approach is proportionate apportionment of the mortgage debt to that property (if it were to be treated as chargeable).

The opinion applies and interprets existing statutory provisions (notably sections of the Bengal Tenancy Act and sections 73 and 82 of the Transfer of Property Act) and follows the reasoning in cited authorities; it does not announce any novel legal doctrine beyond its application of those provisions to the facts before the court.

Disposition: Decree modified; appeal allowed with costs.

Show all summary ...

This appeal arises out of a suit to enforce a mortgage security, dated the 13th Aswin 1301 B.S, corresponding to 28th September, 1894, executed by one Karim Neoaz Khan in favour of the Plaintiff. The Court below has given a modified decree and hence this appeal by the Plaintiff.

The suit was instituted on the 12th August, 1896 against the heirs of the mortgagor, he having died in the meantime; and it was laid at Rs. 93,460, the amount alleged then to be due to the Plaintiff. Pending the suit, one of the properties mortgaged, that is, the property No. 4, which is a putni taluq, was sold for arrears of rent accruing on the taluq itself, on the 26th September, 1896, and was purchased by the Plaintiff for Rs. 26,500. On the 8th September, 1897 a written statement was put in by three of the Defendants, who are some of the heirs of the said Karim Neoaz Khan, namely, the Defendants Nos. 3, 4 and 8. In this, they raised the question of the validity of the mortgage bond propounded by the Plaintiff upon the ground that there was no intelligent execution thereof by Karim Neoaz Khan, and that no consideration passed thereunder. And they stated that the property No. 4 had been purchased by the Plaintiff, and that if he be found entitled to any money, the mortgage debt should be apportioned between all the properties hypothecated, and that they could be held liable only for the amount justly attributable to the share of the properties in their possession.

On the 29th March, 1898, two petitions were presented to the Court below, one by the Plaintiff, and the other by the Defendants Nos. 1, 3, 4, 7 and 8, stating that they had come to a compromise between themselves and that the sum of Rs. 1,08,000 was then justly due to the Plaintiff under the mortgage bond in question, that the said Defendants were liable in the sum of Rs. 85,500 in respect of a 12 anna 13 gunda 1 kara 1 krant share, that being their share in the mortgaged properties that they had sold their share in the properties, other than properties Nos. 3 and 4, for the said sum of Rs. 85,500 to the Plaintiff, and that the compromise come to was to the effect that they should be absolved from further liability; and further that the suit should proceed against the other Defendants in respect of the, sum of Rs. 22,500 due by them in respect of their 3 anna 6 gunda 2 kara 2 krant share.

On the 29th April, 1898, one of the Defendants who had not joined in the compromise, namely, Hyatunnisisa put in a written statement, in which she reiterated the objections which had been raised by the Defendants Nos. 3, 4 and 8 in their written statement, and questioned the principle upon which the compromise was entered into by those Defendants and the Plaintiff. On the 2nd August, 1899, and on some date in September of the same year, one Gyanada Sundari and others presented two petitions stating that they had purchased from the heirs of Sayela Bibi, Defendant No. 5, and from the Defendant Hyatunnissa Bibi, their respective shares in some of the mortgaged properties, and asking that the share of the mortgage debt attributable to the property purchased by them might be ascertained. The Subordinate Judge by his order of the 1st December, 1898 directed that these persons might be made party Defendants.

At the trial, certain issues were raised between the parties, one of them being as to the genuineness and validity of the mortgage bond in question, and the other issues related to the effect of the purchase made by the Plaintiff of the property No. 4 and to the relief that the Plaintiff was entitled to against the Defendants. The Subordinate Judge has held, that the mortgage bond is a valid and genuine transaction, and binding upon the heirs of Karim Neoaz Khan, and referring to the purchase of property No. 4 by the Plaintiff, he has expressed the opinion, relying upon the case of Goluck Chunder Das v. Ram Sunker Sutt(1) that, inasmuch as the Plaintiff after his purchase was bound to have given notice, as prescribed by sec. 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, for the purpose of cancelling the encumbrance upon the property No. 4 and as he failed to do so, he must be taken to have purchased the said property subject to that encumbrance. Then he proceeds to find what may be the true value of the property No. 4, and finding that it is Rs. 34,741-9 as., he deducts this amount from the sum of Rs. 93,460, the amount stated in the plaint as due on the mortgage, and the balance Rs. 58,718 being considered as due from all the Defendants, he has awarded a 3 anna 6 gunda 2 kara 2 krant share thereof, namely, Rs. 12,232-15 as against the Defendants Nos. 5, 6 and 9 and the added Defendants, with proportional costs and interest. Dissatisfied with this judgment, the Plaintiff, as already indicated, has preferred this appeal.

Referring to the certificate of sale of property No. 4 granted to the Plaintiff, it will appear that it was sold for arrears of rent accruing thereupon, and that it was so sold without any reservation whatsoever. It was not sold subject to any registered and notified encumbrance within the meaning of Chapter XIV of the Bengal Tenancy Act and, therefore, we may take it that there was no such encumbrance upon the property. The sale was apparently a sale under sec. 165 of that Act; and assuming that the Plaintiff did not purchase the property free from all encumbrances, he had certainly the power to annul any encumbrance upon it, as indicated in sec. 164, clause (2) of the Act. And the question here arises, whether he was bound to have served the notice prescribed by sec. 167, declaring that the encumbrance is annulled. It will be observed that the notice contemplated by the said sec. 167 is a notice upon the incumbrancer. That incumbraneer in this case, however, was the purchaser himself; and the question is whether the section was intended by the Legislature to apply in a case like the present. The section, as we understand it, evidently applies in a case where the incumbrancer is a third party, and not where the purchaser and encumbrancer are identically the same person. And that was the view that was adopted in the case of Mastulla Mondal v. Jan Mahmud Sha(2). The learned Judges who decided the case, after referring to the various sections of the Bengal Tenancy Act bearing upon the matters, observed as follows:—“If the argument of the learned pleader for the Appellant be correct, the incumbrancer must go before the Collector and ask for service of a notice upon himself and the notice must be served although he himself is to receive it. In our opinion, the proposition is wholly untenable; for looking at the words of the section itself, it appears to us, that the purchaser there contemplated is a purchaser other than the incumbrancer. The Legislature in making this provision had in view, we think, the fact that the person who purchased property under sec. 165 was different from the person who claimed to have a charge or incumbrance on that property and intended that the purchaser, if he wanted to destroy anybody else's interest in the property purchased by him, was bound to proceed in accordance with the provisions of sec. 167. We cannot impute to the Legislature the enactment of any provision of law which in its application would lead to an absurdity.” We concur in the view herein expressed. The object of the Legislature in framing the section was evidently that the incumbrancer should be informed that his incumbrance is annulled, so that he might not thereafter be taken by surprise, or prejudiced in his rights and remedies whatever they might be. This object has been fully gained in the present case, the purchaser being the incumbrancer himself; and we hardly think that in a case like the present, it was intended that there should he a formal notice served upon the very person, who may ask the Collector to issue such notice.

As to the case of Goluck Chunder Das v. Ram Sunker Sutt, relied upon by the Subordinate Judge, it will be observed that the mortgaged property was sold in execution of a rent decree after the mortgage decree was passed, and that decree provided that the mortgaged properties should be sold in the first instance, and if that should prove insufficient, other properties belonging to the mortgagor should be sold. But the decree-holder, notwithstanding the provisions in the mortgage decree, applied to sell the other properties without proceeding against the mortgaged property,.which he had purchased. It may well be said, that the mortgagee was bound, having regard to the terms of his own decree, to have pursued his remedy against the property purchased by himself before he could touch any other property not comprised in the mortgage. The learned Judges who decided the case were of opinion that, upon the materials before them, they could not hold that the sale in execution of the decree for rent was a sale under sec. 165 of the Bengal Tenancy Act with power to avoid all incumbrances. If so, there could be no doubt, that the decree-holder purchased the mortgaged property subject to incumbrances. The learned Judges, however, expressed the opinion that, even if the sale was a sale under sec. 165, the incumbrance had not been annulled by the proceedings under sec. 167 of the Act. This opinion was, in the circumstances, an obiter dictum.

The Subordinate Judge, it will be observed, has held that, because the Plaintiff did not serve upon himself the notice prescribed by sec. 167, he must be taken to have purchased the property No. 4 “subject to incumbrances.” This ??? not be accepted as correct, bearing ??? mind the fact that the sale to the Plaintiff was without any reservation, namely, not subject to any incumbrance.

No doubt, under sec. 82 of the Transfer of Property Act, properties mortgaged are, in the absence of any contract to the contrary, liable to contribute rateably towards the satisfaction of the mortgage debt. But it is obvious that, in the circumstances of the present case, the provisions of the section are not applicable, except as to the property in the possession of the Defendants Nos. 5, 7 and 9. And we may add, that under the terms of the mortgage deed, the mortgagee, the Plaintiff, is at liberty to bring to sale any of the mortgaged properties as he pleases, there being nothing, so far as any question of equity is concerned, to prevent him from doing so.

In this connection, we might as well refer to the provisions of sec. 73 of the Transfer of Property Act. That section runs as follows:—“Where mortgaged property is sold through failure to pay arrears of revenue or rent due in respect thereof, the mortgagee has a charge on the surplus, if any, of the proceeds, after payment there out of the said arrears, for the amount remaining due on the mortgage, unless the sale has been occasioned by some default on his part.” The effect of this section is, as we understand it, that the mortgagee (the Plaintiff in this case) has no charge upon the property sold for rent, such charge being taken to be extinguished, and transferred, as it were, to the surplus sale-proceeds. And this seems to be supported by the terms of sec. 101 of the said Act.

On these considerations, we are of opinion, that the Subordinate Judge is wrong in holding that the property No. 4 should be regarded as still subject to the mortgage.

But supposing the view expressed by the Subordinate Judge to be correct, he was certainly wrong in deducting the entire value of the property No. 4 from the debt due to the Plaintiff, and in regarding that debt to be the amount due only on the date of the presentation of the plaint. All that he could do was to determine what may be the proportional amount of the mortgage debt justly chargeable upon property No. 4, and to deduct such amount from the claim of the Plaintiff, and then find what may be proportionately due from the Defendants other than those who entered into a compromise with the Plaintiff and he should have determined what may be the amount due to the Plaintiff upon the date of the decree.

There is one other matter that we desire to refer to. Under sec. 73 of the Transfer of Property Act already referred to the Plaintiff, the mortgagee (the property No. 4 having been sold for arrears of rent) has a charge upon the surplus, if any, of the proceeds of the sale. Such charge, we think, should be declared in this case and the Plaintiff entitled to sell the mortgaged properties other than property No. 4 for the satisfaction of the remainder of his claim. There having been, however, a compromise between the Plaintiff and some of the Defendants, a decree should be given in respect only of a 3 anna 6 gunda 2 kara 2 krant share of the debt minus the surplus, if any, due from the other Defendants, namely, Defendants Nos. 5, 6 and 9 in the lines indicated in the last paragraph of the judgment of the Subordinate Judge.

The decree of the Court below will be modified, and this appeal allowed with costs* as we have already stated.

S.C.S
Decree modified.