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Mohesh Chunder Das v. Jahiruddi Mollah
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a suit in which the plaintiff-appellant sought recovery of possession of immoveable property. The first Court granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff. Defendant No. 1 appealed to the Lower Appellate Court, which concluded that the first Court's judgment was based upon an admission by the defendant that could be explained if a specific factual question — the position of the river Padma at a particular date — were correctly determined. The Lower Appellate Court found that this factual question had not been properly determined and remanded the case to the first Court.
The remand was made under Section 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure, though the opinion records that it ought to have been made under Section 566. The Lower Appellate Court also set aside the first Court's decree and directed the first Court to decide the suit. No appeal was taken against that remand order under Clause 28 of Section 588, although the opinion says an appeal could have been preferred under that provision.
After remand, the first Court retried the case and made a decree in favour of the plaintiff, but for less relief than originally granted. The plaintiff accepted that partial decree; the defendant appealed again. On that subsequent appeal the Lower Appellate Court modified the first Court's second decree and gave the plaintiff still less. The plaintiff has preferred the present (second) appeal against that last-mentioned decree of the Lower Appellate Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- A preliminary procedural question: whether the appellant may now raise objections to the remand order despite not having preferred an appeal against the remand under Clause 28 of Section 588 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- Whether the Lower Appellate Court's remand of the case under Section 562 (when, it is contended, Section 566 should have been used) was an act in excess of its jurisdiction such that the remand and all subsequent proceedings are a nullity and the original appeal should be remitted to the Lower Appellate Court to be tried according to law.
- Even if the remand is not an absolute nullity, whether Section 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies and, in that event, whether the erroneous remand order affected the merits of the case so as to require setting aside the remand order and all subsequent proceedings.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The remand by the Lower Appellate Court was made in contravention of Sections 562 and 566 of the Code of Civil Procedure; consequently the remand and all subsequent proceedings are a nullity and the matter should be sent back to the Lower Appellate Court to decide the original appeal lawfully.
- Alternatively, even if the remand is not a jurisdictional nullity, Section 578 is applicable; the erroneous remand affected the merits of the case (because the first Court's favourable judgment had been wrongly set aside and the plaintiff did not have the benefit of that judgment when the Lower Appellate Court last disposed of the case), and therefore the remand and subsequent proceedings ought to be set aside.
- The appellant relied on several authorities in support of the contention that remanding under Section 562 when it was inapplicable was an act in excess of jurisdiction.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's (defendant's) legal arguments on these points.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Maharajah Moheshur Singh v. The Bengal Government (1859) 7 M00. I.A. 283 | Cited in relation to whether the appellant could raise objections despite not appealing the remand (procedural question). | The court relied upon this authority (together with Savitri v. Ramji) to answer the preliminary procedural question in favour of the appellant. |
| Savitri v. Ramji (1889) I.L.R. 14 Bom. 232 (appears also as Savitri v. Bamji) | Cited in relation to the preliminary procedural question and later as authority on whether Section 578 applies where remand error does not affect merits. | The court cited this case with Maharajah Moheshur Singh to allow the appellant to raise the objection; later the Bombay High Court's observation in this case was invoked to say that each case must be considered on its facts regarding whether remand affected merits. |
| Rameshur Singh v. Sheodin Singh (1889) I.L.R. 12 All. 510 | Relied upon for the proposition that a Court doing something positively prohibited is acting without jurisdiction (distinction between omitting to do and doing prohibited act). | The court examined this authority but rejected its broader application to treat remand under Section 562 as necessarily affecting jurisdiction under Section 578; the court declined to adopt the view expressed in Rameshur Singh. |
| Subba Sastri v. Balachandra Sastri (1894) I.L.R. 18 Mad. 421 | Cited as authority bearing on erroneous orders of remand and their treatment under Section 578. | The court noted that a later Madras decision (Malhkarjuna v. Pathaneni) held Section 578 applicable in cases of erroneous remand if the defect did not affect merits; the court treated the Madras authorities as supportive of allowing Section 578 to operate in such circumstances. |
| Mahesh Chandra Das v. Madhub Chunder Sirdar (1868) 2 B.L.R. XIII (short notes) | Relied on to show an instance where remand was bad because it permitted actions (fresh evidence) that affected the merits. | The court found this case distinguishable: there was no ground even for the partial remand that the Code allows, and the order allowed adduction of fresh evidence, which affected the merits; thus it did not support the appellant's position here. |
| Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Sing (1884) I.L.R. 11 Cal. 6 | Referred to as a Privy Council authority that reached a different conclusion than the view in Rameshur Singh about jurisdictional excess. | The court observed that the Privy Council did not adopt the view that an Appellate Court trying a suit contrary to a positive prohibition was necessarily acting without jurisdiction; this undercut the Allahabad High Court view in Rameshur Singh. |
| Birj Mohan Thakur v. Rai Umanath Chowdhry (1892) I.L.R. 20 Cal. 8 | Cited for the proposition that when a Court omits to do what it is required to do and does what the law affords no warrant for doing, it may act without jurisdiction under Section 622. | The court treated this as authority for a principle under Section 622 (a remedial provision with a different object) and noted that Section 622's use of "jurisdiction" may be broader than Section 578; it did not lead the court to adopt the appellant's claim under Section 578. |
| Malhkarjuna v. Pathaneni (1896) I.L.R. 19 Mad. 479 | Held that Section 578 is applicable in curing the defect of an erroneous order of remand if it did not affect the merits of the case. | The court invoked this later Madras decision to support the view that Section 578 can cure remand errors that do not affect the merits; it weighed this as persuasive authority. |
| Nussurooddeen Hossein Ghowdhry v. Lall Mahomed Puramaniek (1870) 13 W.R. 234 | Cited as supporting the court's view that not every erroneous remand renders proceedings void for want of jurisdiction. | The court listed this case (along with others) as supporting the conclusion that the remand error in the present matter did not necessarily affect jurisdiction within Section 578. |
| Matra Mondal v. Hari Mohtm Mullick (1889) I.L.R. Cal. 155 | Cited as supporting the court's construction that remand error need not be treated as a jurisdictional nullity under Section 578. | The court included this case among authorities endorsing its approach that Section 578 cures certain remand defects when the merits are unaffected. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in two main stages: it first answered a preliminary procedural question and then addressed the two substantive contentions raised by the appellant.
Preliminary question
The court considered whether the appellant could raise objections to the remand order despite not having appealed the remand under Clause 28 of Section 588. Relying upon the provisions of Section 591 of the Code and the authorities Maharajah Moheshur Singh v. The Bengal Government and Savitri v. Ramji, the court answered that preliminary question in favour of the appellant and proceeded to examine the merits of his contentions.
First contention — jurisdictional effect of erroneous remand
The appellant argued that the Lower Appellate Court's remand under Section 562 when Section 566 should have been used, and when Section 564 disallowed remand for a second decision except as provided in Section 562, was an act in excess of jurisdiction and therefore void. The court identified that resolving the point turns on the meaning of the word "jurisdiction" in Section 578 of the Code.
The court explained that "jurisdiction" can be used in two senses: (a) the ordinary sense (local, pecuniary, or subject-matter jurisdiction), and (b) the sense of the legal authority of a Court to do particular acts. The court held that Section 578 must be read with "jurisdiction" in the former sense (local/pecuniary/subject-matter jurisdiction), not the latter. The court gave several practical reasons: adopting the broader meaning would make it difficult to distinguish procedural errors from jurisdictional errors and lead to anomalous and unfair results (for example allowing parties to treat long-standing decrees as void years later where the error was one of the Court and not the party).
Therefore, an erroneous remand under Section 562, even if technically inapplicable, does not automatically amount to an error affecting jurisdiction within the meaning of Section 578. The court concluded, on constructional grounds and policy considerations, that Section 578 was intended to cure technical defects rather than to treat all such remand errors as jurisdictional nullities.
Consideration of authorities
The court reviewed the authorities cited by the appellant. It did not accept the broader view taken in Rameshur Singh v. Sheodin Singh and observed that the Privy Council in Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Sing had taken a different approach. The court distinguished Mohesh Chandra Das because that case permitted the adduction of fresh evidence on remand (and thus affected the merits). The court also noted Madras decisions (including a later decision in Malhkarjuna v. Pathaneni) that supported the proposition that Section 578 may cure an erroneous remand where the merits are not affected. Other cases (Nussurooddeen, Savitri v. Bamji/Ramji, Matra Mondal) were cited as supporting the court's construction.
Second contention — whether the remand affected the merits
Turning to the alternative contention, the court examined whether the erroneous remand had in fact affected the merits of the case. The appellant's argument was that the favourable judgment obtained in the first Court had been wrongly set aside and the plaintiff did not have the benefit of that judgment when the Lower Appellate Court finally disposed of the appeal.
The court analysed the actual sequence of events and what should have occurred: the proper course would have been for the first Court to take further evidence as to the Padma river's position and submit its finding to the Lower Appellate Court, which would then have considered the first judgment together with the additional evidence. In the actual course, the first Court's judgment after remand was before the Lower Appellate Court as a judgment rather than merely as a finding. However, the court noted (i) the plaintiff remained in the position of a respondent before the Lower Appellate Court as he originally was and as he ought to have been, and (ii) there was nothing in the Lower Appellate Court's final judgment to indicate that it was influenced by treating the first Court's post-remand decision as a judgment rather than as a finding. The court also observed that it was not pointed out how the absence of the first Court's earlier judgment from consideration had affected the Lower Appellate Court's decision.
On that basis the court concluded there was no good ground to hold that the erroneous remand order had affected the merits of the case. Accordingly, the second contention also failed.
Observations on exceptional cases
The court acknowledged that in some cases a complete remand may be the only way to secure justice where a previous trial was imperfect, and that in such cases provisions of the Code may need to be stretched to enable a proper decision. The court noted that such adjustments are ultimately matters for the Legislature.
Holding and Implications
Final Disposition: THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED WITH COSTS.
Direct effect: The appellant's two contentions failed. The court rejected the argument that the remand under Section 562 amounted to a jurisdictional nullity and also rejected the argument that the remand had affected the merits so as to require setting aside the subsequent proceedings. By dismissing the appeal with costs, the final decree of the Lower Appellate Court stands as the operative decision between the parties.
Broader implications: The opinion construes "jurisdiction" in Section 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure narrowly (to mean local, pecuniary or subject-matter jurisdiction) and indicates that Section 578 is a remedial provision intended to cure technical defects rather than to treat all erroneous remand orders as jurisdictional nullities. The court did not state that it was creating a new binding precedent beyond its construction and application of existing authorities; instead, it reconciled and distinguished prior decisions and applied them to the facts before it.
This summary is limited to and derived exclusively from the content of the provided opinion.
1. This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the plaintiff-appellant to recover possession of certain immoveable property.
2. The first Court gave the plaintiff a decree. On appeal by the defendant No. 1 the Lower Appellate Court held that the first Court's judgment was based upon an admission of the defendant which could be explained, if a certain question of fact, namely, what was the position of the river Padma at a certain date, was correctly determined, and as that question the Lower Appellate Court found had not been properly determined, it remanded the case to the first Court. But instead of remanding it under Section 566 of the Civil Procedure Code, as it ought to have done, it made its remand order under section 562 of the code, after setting aside the decree of the first Court, and it directed that Court to decide the suit itself. No appeal was preferred against this erroneous remand order, although an appeal could have been preferred under Clause 28 of Section 588 of the Code. After remand the case was retried by the first Court, and a decree was made in favour of the plaintiff, but not a decree in full as had been originally granted to him. The plaintiff was satisfied with that partial decree, but the defendant again preferred an appeal, and upon that appeal the Lower Appellate Court modified the decree of the first Court and gave the plaintiff something less than what the first Court on the second occasion had given him. Against the last-mentioned decree of the Lower Appellate Court the plaintiff has preferred this second appeal, and it is contended on his behalf, first, that as the remand was in contravention of the provisions of Sections 562 and 566 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it and all subsequent proceedings should be treated as a nullity and the case sent back to the Lower Appellate Court in order that it may try, according to law, the original appeal that had been preferred against the first decree of the first Court; and secondly, it is contended that even if the order of remand be not treated as an absolute nullity and void for want of jurisdiction, and if Section 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure be applicable to this case, still the remand order and all subsequent proceedings ought to be set aside on the ground of the error in making that order having affected the merits of the ease.
3. A preliminary question may arise for consideration, the question, namely, whether it is open to the appellant to raise the abovementioned objections now, he not having preferred any appeal against the remand order under Clause 28 of Section 588 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Having regard to the provisions of Section 591 of the Code, and the cases of Maharajah Moheshur Singh v. The Bengal Government (1859) 7 M00. I.A. 283 and Savitri v. Ramji (1889) I.L.R. 14 Bom. 232 we are of opinion that the preliminary question ought to be answered in favour of the appellant. That being so, let us now see how far the two contentions urged on his behalf are well sustained.
4. In support of the first contention it is argued, that as the jurisdiction of the Lower Appellate Court is founded upon the provisions of the Code of Civil Pocedure, and Section 562 is limited in its application to cases where a suit has been disposed of by the first Court on a preliminary point and the decision of that Court on such preliminary point is reversed, and Section 564 expressly provides that the Appellate Court shall not remand any case for a second decision except as provided in Section 562, we must hold that the erroneous remand of a case under Section 562 is an act of the Lower Appellate Court in excess of its jurisdiction, or in other words is an error affecting the jurisdiction of the Lower Appellate Court, and therefore not cured by Section 578.
5. In support of the contention stated above, the learned vakil for the appellant relies upon the oases of Rameshur Singh v. Sheodin Singh (1889) I.L.R. 12 All. 510 Subba Sastri v. Balachandra Sastri (1894) I.L.R. 18 Mad. 421 and Mahesh Chandra Das v. Madliub Chunder Sirdar (1868) 2 B.L.R. (Short notes) XIII mainly, and incidentally upon certain other eases which are not necessary to be noticed just now.
6. We shall first consider the argument based upon the language of the Civil Procedure Code, and then deal with the authorities cited in support of it.
7. The gist of the contention is that the error of the Lower Appellate Court in remanding the case under Section 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure when that section was not applicable to the case, and when a remand for a second decision was expressly prohibited by Section 564, was an error affecting the jurisdiction of that Court within the meaning of Section 578, and that the erroneous order being made by the Court in excess of its jurisdiction, it and all proceedings held thereunder should be treated as a nullity. The determination of this point depends upon the meaning to be attached to the term "jurisdiction." That word is used in two different senses. It may either mean what is ordinarily understood by the term "jurisdiction" when used with reference to the local jurisdiction of a Court, or pecuniary jurisdiction of a Court or its jurisdiction with reference to the subject-matter of a suit, or it may mean the legal authority of a Court to do certain things. It is only in this latter sense that an erroneous order of remand by an Appellate Court can be treated as an order made without jurisdiction. But the Court which made the remand order in this case clearly had jurisdiction to deal with the appeal, if the term "jurisdiction " is understood in the former sense. There is no question that it was the Court to which the appeal would lie. and the question, therefore, is reduced to this, namely, whether the term "jurisdiction " used in Section 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure is used in the former sense or in the latter. We are of opinion that regard being had to the scope and object of the section, the term "jurisdiction" must be held to have been used there in the former and not in the latter sense. For, if it be held to be used in the latter sense, that is, in the sense of the power of the Court to make any particular order in a case over which it has jurisdiction, local and pecuniary, as well as jurisdiction with reference to the subject matter, it may sometimes be difficult to draw the line between an error which is merely an error of procedure and one that is an error of jurisdiction understood in that sense. There is another way of viewing it, from which it would appear that the term "jurisdiction" could only have been intended to be used in Section 578 in the sense of pecuniary or local jurisdiction, or jurisdiction relating to the subject-matter. Where a Court which is wanting either in local jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction or in jurisdiction with reference to the subject-matter is made to hear a suit or appeal, the error primarily is the error of the party who invokes the Court's jurisdiction, though that error may also be shared by the Court, and there is always good reason for saying that the order of the Court should be treated as a nullity, and the party who finds the order he has obtained is infructuous cannot reasonably complain, because it was he who brought the suit or appeal in a wrong Court. When, however, the defect of jurisdiction is not in the nature of a defect or want of pecuniary jurisdiction or local jurisdiction, or jurisdiction with reference to the subject-matter, but is a defect of jurisdiction consisting in a Court making an order in excess of its power, the error is primarily one of the Court, and may not be at all shared by the party in whose favour the order is made; and to hold in such a case that the order of the Court and all proceedings had thereunder should be treated as a nullity would be to visit that party for an act for which he may not at all be responsible. The anomaly may be intensified in certain cases. Take for instance a case in which a remand order is made and a decree in favour of the party in whose favour that order is made is eventually passed after remand. That decree may stand unimpugned for years, until it is sought to be used on his behalf, when his adversary may say that it was made wholly without jurisdiction and should be treated as a nullity. If the contention of the appellant is correct, carried to its legitimate consequences it would lead to this result. We do not think such a result was contemplated by the Legislature; at any rate, it could not have been their intention in a remedial provision like Section 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is enacted to cure technical defects, to use the word jurisdiction" in a sense which may lead to such anomalous consequences. We are, therefore, of opinion that so far as the question depends upon the construction of Section 578, it cannot reasonably be answered in favour of the appellant's contention.
8. We will now deal with the authorities upon which reliance has been placed. The decision in the case of Rameshur Singh v. Sheodin Singh (1889) I.L.R. 12 All. 510 rests mainly upon-the ground that a distinction ought to be drawn between a Court's omitting to do sumething which it is required by law to do and its doing something which it is positively prohibited to do, and that when a Court does anything of the latter description, its acts ought to be treated as done without jurisdiction. There is no doubt a distinction between the two classes of acts, but we are not St prepared to hold that acts of the latter class are acts which affect the jurisdiction of the Court within the meaning of Section 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We may observe that the view taken in this case is to a certain extent inconsistent with that taken by the Privy Council in the: case of Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Sing (1884) I.L.R. 11 Cal. 6, for the erroneous order or decision that was complained of in that case was the decision of a suit upon a wrong view of the effect of a certain previous decision which was set up as operating by way of res judicata. If the contention of the defendant in the case was well founded, the Court by Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure was positively prohibited to try the suit, and its trying it in contravention of that positive prohibition was, upon the view taken by the Allahabad High Court, an act done in excess of the Court's jurisdiction. The Privy Council, however, did not take that view, as it held that interference with the decision of the Lower Court under Section 622 was not warranted in that case.
9. We are referred incidentally to the case of Birj Mohan Thakur v. Rai Umanath Chowdhry (1892) I.L.R. 20 Cal. 8 as supporting the appellant's contention, and the view of the law taken by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Rameshur Singh v. Sheodtn Singh (1894) I.L.R. 12 All. 510. It is true the case of Birj Mohun Thakur is authority for the proposition that when a Court does not do that which it is required by law to do, and does that which the law affords no warrant for its doing, it declines to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it and acts without jurisdiction within the meaning of Section 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But that again is a remedial provision with a different object, and having regard to that object, which is to vest the Court of Revision with the discretionary power to rectify certain erroneous orders in non-appealable cases, the term "jurisdiction" may well be taken to have been used in it in a more comprehensive sense than in Section 578. With all respect for the learned Judges who decided the case of Rameshur Singh v. Sheodin Singh (1889) I.L.R. 12 All. 510 we must say that we cannot assent to the view which they have expressed.
10. As for the case of Subba Sastri v. Balachandra Sastri (1894) I.L.R. 18 Mad. 421 we may observe that in a later case, that is the case of Malhkarjuna v. Pathaneni (1896) I.L.R. 19 Mad. 479, Section 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure was held to be applicable incuring the defect of an erroneous order of remand, if it did not affect the merits of the case, and we may add that the learned Chief Justice of the Madras High Court, who was one of the Judges who decided the earlier Madras case, was also a party to the later decision.
11. The case of Mohesh Chandra Das v. Madhub Chunder Sirdar (1868) 2 B.L.R. XIII (short notes) is quite distinguishable from the present case, for there it was not only found that the order was bad as a complete remand, but it was further found that there was no ground even for that partial remand that the Code allows, namely, a remand by the Appellate Court retaining the case on its file for taking further evidence on any point, and, if that was so, the order was bad on the simple ground that it affected the merits of the case by allowing one of the parties to do that which he had no right to do, namely, to adduce fresh evidence.
12. On the other hand we may refer to the case of Nussurooddeen Hossein Ghowdhry v. Lall Mahomed Puramaniek (1870) 13 W.R. 234 Savitri v. Bamji (1889) I.L.R. 14 Bom. 232 and also to the case of Matra Mondal v. Hari Mohtm Mullick (1889) I.L.R. Cal. 155 as supporting the view we take.
13. Upon reason then, as well as upon authority, we think that the first contention urged on behalf of the appellant must fail.
14. It remains now to consider the second question. It has been argued that the erroneous remand order of the Lower Appellate Court in this case, even if it did not affect the jurisdiction of that Court, must be held to have affected the merits of the case, because by that order the favourable judgment which the appellant before us had obtained in the first Court and which the Lower Appellate Court was bound to set aside before it could make the modified decree that has now been made had been wrongly set aside, and the plaintiff appellant had not had the benefit of that judgment when the Lower Appellate Court last disposed of the case. No doubt this matter requires consideration; but, as the Bombay High Court in the case of Savitri v. Bamji (1889) I.L.R. 14 Bom. 232 just referred to observed, each case must be considered with reference to its own circumstances in dealing with the question now under consideration; and referring to the circumstances of this case we do not find any good ground for saying that the erroneous remand order has affected the merits of the case. If the right course had been followed, the first Court should have been directed to take further evidence upon the question as to the position of the river Padma at the date referred to in the remand order, and then the first Court ought to have submitted its finding to the Lower Appellate Court, which together with the additional evidence taken on remand would have had to be considered along with the first judgment of the first Court. As events took their course, however, what happened was, instead of the finding of the first Court after remand being laid before the Lower Appellate Court, the judgment of that Court was before it; but the plaintiff was still in the position of a respondent before the Lower Appellate Court as he was originally, and as he ought to have been if the right course had been followed. Moreover there is nothing in the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court on the last occasion which would show that it was influenced in any way by the last judgment of the first Court being treated as a judgment rather than as a finding, nor is it pointed out that the absence of the first judgment of the first Court from its consideration has in any way affected the last decision of the Lower Appellate Court; that being so, the second contention of the appellant must also fail.
15. We may add that cases may arise, and a perusal of the concluding portion of the first judgment of the Lower Appellate Court which was placed before us shows that the present was a case of that nature, in which, although a complete remand under Section 562 may not be warranted by the Code, still nothing short of a retrial of all the issues, rendered necessary by the previous imperfect trial of them, would satisfy "the requirements of justice. In such a case the provisions of the Code have to be strained to a certain extent, in order to enable the Appellate Court to decide the appeal properly. But that of course is a matter for the Legislature to consider.
16. In the result the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.
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