- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Pydah Chinna Ramakrishnayya v. Manyam Mahalakshamma Garu
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff sued for a declaration that the adoption of the 2nd defendant by the 1st defendant was invalid. The Subordinate Judge of Cocanada dismissed the plaintiff's suit. Two appeals were before the Court: Appeal No. 428 of 1922 (the plaintiff's appeal against the dismissal) and Appeal No. 7 of 1923 (filed by defendants 1 and 2 in respect of costs). The central factual circumstance affecting jurisdiction was that defendants 1 and 2 were found to be French subjects domiciled in Yanam, which was French territory. The opinion contains separate judgments by Sir William Phillips, Kt., J., and Reilly, J., addressing primarily the question of jurisdiction and the appropriate orders on costs.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Courts of British India had jurisdiction to adjudicate a suit for declaration that an adoption effected in French territory between French subjects was invalid, given that domicile is the usual test of jurisdiction in matters affecting status (e.g., divorce, legitimacy).
- Whether the rule that domicile governs jurisdiction in matters of status (as applied to legitimacy, divorce, probate) applies equally to adoption.
- Whether a judgment in an adoption suit is a judgment in rem and what effect any such characterization has on finality and jurisdictional questions.
- Whether jurisdiction could be founded on provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure — specifically Section 16(d) or Section 20 (a) or (c) — given the facts of this case.
- Whether, even if jurisdiction existed, the Court should exercise its discretionary equitable power to refuse to entertain a merely declaratory suit concerning the status of foreign domiciliaries.
- What order on costs should be made in light of an earlier interim costs order and the outcome on jurisdiction.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Plaintiff's / Advocate-General's) Arguments
- The appellant argued that the domicile-as-test principle applicable in English law to divorce, legitimacy, and probate should not necessarily be applied in Courts in British India (i.e., the principle should not prevent the British Court from assuming jurisdiction).
- It was contended that adoption is unknown to English law and therefore the rules applicable to probate/divorce/legitimacy might not apply to adoption.
- The appellant further argued (on an assumed factual stance) that until adoption was declared valid the 2nd defendant would remain a British subject, implying British jurisdiction might be appropriate.
- On jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure, the appellant relied on Section 16(d) and Section 20 (a) and (c) as potential bases for jurisdiction.
- Specifically under Section 20(a) it was argued the defendants must be deemed to carry on business in British India because they owned estates in British India and appointed agents there for collection of revenue, which was submitted could constitute carrying on "business."
Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments and Factual Points Relied Upon
- The defendants relied on the principle that domicile for the time being is the true test of jurisdiction in matters of status and contended that, being French subjects domiciled in Yanam (French territory), jurisdiction lay with French Courts.
- Evidence was put before the Court (including the deposition of the 2nd defendant's natural father, D.W.27, and Exhibit C(iv)) to prove that the natural father (and by implication the family) were French subjects; this evidence was treated by the Court as establishing French nationality/domicile.
- Implicitly, the defendants resisted the idea that the British Court should decide a family-status question affecting foreign domiciliaries when French law and French Courts were the appropriate forum.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subbammal | Authority that a suit of this nature (an adoption suit) is maintainable in Courts in India; authority that a judgment in an adoption suit can be a judgment in rem. | The Court acknowledged the Privy Council's authority that adoption suits are maintainable and that the judgment in adoption may be in rem; but nevertheless proceeded to examine jurisdictional limits (domicile) and whether British Courts should exercise jurisdiction here. |
| Gurdyal Singh v. Raja of Faridkot | Privy Council observations supporting the international-law principle that domicile governs jurisdiction in matters of status. | The Court relied on these observations to reject the appellant's contention that the domicile principle should not be applied to Courts in British India, reinforcing the domicile test for jurisdiction. |
| Yarakalamma wife of A. Nagamma v. Naramma | Addressed the finality/validity of judgments under Section 41 of the Evidence Act; used to support the proposition that a judgment in rem in India is not necessarily final except as between parties. | The Court noted this authority deals with Section 41 of the Evidence Act and the validity/finality of judgments, but observed that the case does not address the separate question of jurisdiction. |
| Achayya v. Yellamma | Considered the plaintiff's ability to rely on a spes successionis and reasoning about cause of action arising within the jurisdiction; used in discussion of Section 20(c) CPC. | The Court treated that decision as contrary to the extension the appellant sought: Phillips criticized the reasoning as straining the meaning of "cause of action" and refused to extend it to permit jurisdiction here where no specific property in British India was the subject of dispute. |
| Subbaraya Mudali and others v. The Government and Cunliffe | Held that the word "business" in the relevant jurisdictional provision did not necessarily mean only commercial business. | The Court cited the authority but noted a subsequent Bench (Govindarajulu Naidu v. Secretary of State) doubted its correctness; in any event, the Court held that even if the 1st defendant could be said to carry on business through agents, the 2nd defendant (a minor) could not, so Section 20(a) could not confer jurisdiction over all defendants. |
| Govindarajulu Naidu v. Secretary of State | Expressed doubt about the correctness of the decision in Subbaraya Mudali regarding the meaning of "business" for jurisdictional purposes. | The Court mentioned this decision as indicating that the earlier expansive view of "business" had been questioned, supporting its reluctance to apply Section 20(a) to establish jurisdiction here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in a sequence linking international private law principles, factual findings about domicile, statutory jurisdictional provisions, and the equitable discretionary power to refuse declaratory relief:
- Principle of Domicile: The Court accepted the established English-law principle (reinforced by Privy Council authority) that domicile at the relevant time is the proper test of jurisdiction in matters affecting status (such as divorce and legitimacy). The Court concluded this is an international-law question applicable to Courts in British India.
- Applicability to Adoption: The Court rejected the appellant's attempt to exclude adoption from that principle. It reasoned that adoption creates a legal status analogous in principle to legitimacy because both involve the declaration of a person as the legal son of a father, and adoption carries rights (including property and religious obligations). Therefore the domicile rule should apply to adoption as well.
- Judgment in Rem and Finality: The Court accepted that an adoption judgment may be characterized as a judgment in rem (citing Privy Council authority), but noted arguments based on authorities concerning the finality and evidentiary effect of such judgments under Section 41 of the Evidence Act did not address jurisdiction itself.
- Factual Finding on Domicile/Nationality: The Subordinate Judge had found that the natural father and the adoptive parents were French subjects domiciled in Yanam; that finding was not successfully controverted on appeal. Documentary and testimonial evidence (D.W.27 and Exhibit C(iv)) were relied upon to establish French nationality.
- Conclusion on Jurisdiction: Applying the domicile principle to the undisputed findings of French domicile, the Court held that jurisdiction over the adoption question lay with French Courts and not the Courts of British India. Consequently the Subordinate Judge was right in declining jurisdiction and the plaintiff's suit could not be entertained in British India.
- Code of Civil Procedure Clauses: The Court examined whether jurisdiction could nonetheless be founded on CPC provisions:
- Section 16(d): Held inapplicable because the present suit was solely for a declaration as to adoption and did not determine any right to a specific immovable property; the plaintiff, being a reversioner, could not rely on mere spes successionis as a right to immovable property.
- Section 20(c): The Court declined to extend the reasoning of Achayya v. Yellamma to treat a speculative interest or an unspecified future claim as a "part of the cause of action" arising within the jurisdiction; since no specific property in British India was implicated, Section 20(c) did not confer jurisdiction.
- Section 20(a): The Court treated the contention that defendants "carried on business" in British India (because they had estates managed by agents) as inapt. Even if the 1st defendant could be so described, the 2nd defendant (a minor) could not, and the statutory requirement that all defendants carry on business within the jurisdiction was not satisfied.
- Discretion to Refuse Declaratory Relief: Even assuming arguendo jurisdiction might exist, the Court held that this was a mere declaratory suit concerning foreign domiciled persons and their family status. Because French law on adoption and a Hindu widow's rights might differ from British Indian law, and because foreign domiciliaries are entitled to have their status determined according to the law of their domicile, it would be undesirable for a British Court to usurp jurisdiction. The Court therefore exercised its equitable discretion against granting the declaratory relief.
- Costs and Prior Interim Order: The Court examined a prior order of the Subordinate Judge (3 November 1920) directing the plaintiff to bear costs incurred up to that time and to pay costs defendants might incur in adducing evidence on newly-raised facts. On the Subordinate Judge's final judgment he had disallowed half the defendants' costs on the ground one plea was false; the appellate court found this inconsistent with the prior interim order and considered that the costs should have been ordered to abide the result, and granted the defendants' appeal on costs accordingly.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
- Appeal No. 428 of 1922 (plaintiff's appeal against dismissal): The appeal was dismissed. The Court held that the Subordinate Judge correctly declined jurisdiction because defendants 1 and 2 were French subjects domiciled in French territory and questions of status (including adoption) should be determined by the Courts of the domicile.
- Appeal No. 7 of 1923 (defendants' appeal in respect of costs): The appeal was allowed. The appellate Court held that the Subordinate Judge's prior interim costs order entitled the defendants to costs and that the final allocation of costs in the lower Court (disallowing half of defendants' costs) was inconsistent with that prior order; the defendants were accordingly entitled to appropriate costs.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff's declaratory suit was rejected for want of jurisdiction in British India; the defendants were vindicated on the jurisdictional point and succeeded on their costs appeal.
- Forum and choice-of-law affirmation: The Court underscored that status questions (such as adoption) involving foreign domiciliaries are appropriately determined by the law and courts of the domicile; British Courts should not, as a matter of international private law and judicial discretion, decide such matters in anticipation where the parties are domiciled abroad.
- No broader precedent beyond the case facts: The opinion reasons from established principles (domicile as the jurisdictional test for status; limits of CPC provisions) and exercises discretionary equitable powers; it does not purport to create novel rules beyond applying those principles to the facts at hand.
Judges and procedural identifiers present in the opinion: Sir William Phillips, Kt., J., and Reilly, J.; Appeals referenced: Nos. 428 of 1922 and 7 of 1923. All summary points are drawn exclusively from the provided opinion.
Sir William Phillips, Kt., J. — This appeal is against the decree of the Subordinate Judge of Cocanada, dismissing the plaintiff's suit for a declaration that the adoption of the 2nd defendant by the 1st defendant is invalid. It is well-settled law that a suit of this nature is maintainable in Courts in India as will appear from the Judgment of the Privy Council in Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subbammal(1): but a further question of jurisdiction arises in this case, because defendants 1 and 2 have been found to be French subjects, residing in Yanam which is French Territory.
A number of points have been decided by the learned Subordinate Judge; but the question on which we have heard arguments in this Appeal is the question of jurisdiction. It is pointed out by the Subordinate Judge in his Judgment that the principle of English law in these matters is:
“that the domicile for the time being affords the true test of jurisdiction in matters of divorce, legitimacy etc., all of which determine the status of the parties concerned,”
And this is not disputed. It is contended that this principle should not be applied to Courts in British India; but as it is a question of International Law, this argument does not seem to be tenable, more especially in view of the observations of the Privy Council in Gurdyal Singh v. Raja of Faridkot. The learned Advocate-General for the appellant does not seriously dispute the proposition that in matters of probate, divorce, and legitimacy, the jurisdiction is in Courts, within whose jurisdiction the party is domiciled. His first contention is that adoption is unknown to English Law and that therefore what is applicable in proceedings relating to probate, divorce and legitimacy is not applicable to adoption. Adoption however creates definite relationship between the person adopted and the person adopting and it is difficult to imagine any distinction in principle between a case of legitimacy and a case of adoption; for, in both, the right of a person to be declared as the legal son of a father is involved. Adoption naturally carries with it rights to property; but the main element in adoption is a religious element; for, the status conferred by adoption involves religious obligations and it is usually for the performance of these religious obligations that adoption is effected. There can be few, if any, cases of status, which do not involve rights to property or other legal rights. There does not therefore seem to be any distinction in principle to be drawn between cases of adoption and legitimacy.
On the assumption that the judgment in an adoption suit is a judgment in rem, for which proposition we have the authority of the Privy Council in Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subbammal(2), a long argument has been addressed to us that a judgment in rem in this country is not necessarily final, except as between parties to the suit and Yarakalamma wife of A. Nagamma v. Naramma(3) was recited in support of this proposition. That judgment and the argument founded thereon really deal with the question of the validity of a judgment under Sect. 41 of the Evidence Act and does not touch the question of jurisdiction. A further argument was addressed to us by the learned Advocate-General on the assumption that until his adoption was declared valid the 2nd defendant was a British subject. The Subordinate Judge has found that the 2nd defendant's natural father as well as his adoptive father and mother were French subjects and this finding was not controverted in the appellant's argument. On the other hand the evidence on the point has been put before us by the Respondent's Advocate and the deposition of the 2nd defendant's natural father, D.W 27 and Ex. C (iv) clearly prove that he is a French subject. Applying therefore the principle of English law mentioned above, I would hold that the jurisdiction in a mere question of adoption over defendants 1 and 2 who are French subjects lies in French Courts and not in the Courts of British India and that the Subordinate Judge was right in declining jurisdiction.
It also seems to be doubtful whether the Subordinate Judge had any jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure, in this case. It is argued that he would have such jurisdiction under Sect. 16 (d) and (2), under Sect. 20 (a) and (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Sect. 16 (d) deals with suits for the determination of any right to or interest in immovable property, other than those previously enumerated. In the present suit, which is merely one for a declaration as to an adoption, no right to any particular immovable property is determined and the plaintiff who is a mere reversioner certainly cannot put forward his spes successionis as a right to immovable property. The point has also been determined against the appellant in Achayya v. Yellamma. This latter is, however, relied on as authority for holding that Sect. 20 (c) is applicable to the present case, because a part of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge. In that case, the suit was for a declaration that a certain Will was a forgery and for its cancellation; and the learned Judges held that a portion of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction, because some property enumerated in the Will was situated within the jurisdiction of the Court and Krishnan. J., held that in a suit to set aside a Will, the plaintiff must allege that he has some interest in one or more of the properties dealt with in it, to enable him to maintain a suit for its cancellation; consequently, he held that plaintiff's interest in this particular property was a part of the cause of action which gave him a right to sue and that portion arose within the jurisdiction. With all respect, this decision seems to me to strain the meaning of the words “cause of action” as far as is legitimate and I am not prepared to extend it any further. In that case, certain property was specified in the Will and that property was situated within the jurisdiction of the Court, which had to determine the validity of the Will; but in the present case, that element is wanting; for, no property is specified as being in British India, in respect of which the plaintiff has to prove his right. The sole cause of action is the adoption and that took place in French India and consequently I would hold that even under the Code of Civil Procedure, Sect. 20 (c), the Subordinate Judge has no jurisdiction to decide this point. With regard to Sect. 20 (a) Civil Procedure Code, it is argued that defendants 1 and 2 must be deemed to carry on business in British India, because they have estates in British India, for which agents are appointed for the collection of revenue etc. It may be pointed out that this can hardly be deemed to be business, within the meaning of that Section. In Subbaraya Mudali and others v. The Government and Cunliffe, it was held that the word ‘business’ did not necessarily mean Commercial business; but a Bench of this Court in a recent case [Govindarajulu Naidu v. Secretary of State] has doubted the correctness of that decision and come to a contrary conclusion. In any case, even if the 1st defendant could be said to be carrying on business, inasmuch as she manages her estates in British India through Agents residing there, it cannot be said that the 2nd defendant, a minor, is so carrying on business and therefore this section would not confer jurisdiction on the Court, as it is necessary that all the defendants should be carrying on business within the jurisdiction, under the provisions of the section.
There is a third fatal objection to this suit and that is that even if the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction in the matter, this being a mere declaratory suit, the right to relief must be dependent on the discretion of the Court. Naturally, this discretion must be exercised judicially; but certainly the circumstances of this case are such that the discretion should be exercised against the appellant.
It would appear from the evidence in the case that the French Law, as to adoption and as to a Hindu widow's rights in property, is not on all fours with the law as administered in British India. While therefore the British Courts might give the decision in one way, the French Courts might decide the same matter in a contrary sense. Dafendants 1 and 2 being French subjects are entitled to have the question of status determined according to the law prevailing in the country in which they are domiciled and for a foreign Court to usurp jurisdiction in such a matter is highly undesirable. It may be necessary in a litigation with regard to property situated in British India for Courts to decide such questions as best as they can, but in a suit where such determination is unnecessary to afford relief in respect of property in British India, it certainly seems wrong to snatch jurisdiction in a matter like this, and consequently the Court must use the discretion vested in it and refuse to entertain a mere declaratory suit.
Many other points which arise in the case do not now need determination; for, the suit must fail and the appeal be dismissed with costs.
Appeal No. 7 of 1923 has been filed by defendants 1 and 2 in respect of costs. The Subordinate Judge has disallowed half of the defendants' costs on the ground that they raised one plea which has been found to be false. If, however, the suit had been at once dismissed for want of jurisdiction, such plea would not have been investigated and costs would have had to abide the result in the ordinary course. Apart from this, the learned Subordinate Judge appears to have forgotten a prior order made by him on 3rd November, 1920, in respect of costs, possibly because that order was made more than a year before the date of his judgment. In that order, he allowed the plaintiff to amend his plaint but directed him:”
“to bear the costs of this suit incurred till now, irrespective of the result of the suit, as also to pay the costs which defendants might incur by having to adduce evidence in respect of the facts now raised.”
By that order, he directed the plaintiff to bear a large proportion of the coat of the litigation irrespective of the result of the suit; but now the plaintiff has failed and is relieved of the burden of half the costs. This is clearly wrong, and I feel sure that the Subordinate Judge would not have passed such an order had he had in mind his prior order in the matter. There is no reason why the usual order should not be made that costs should abide the result.
This appeal is therefore allowed with costs.
Reilly, J.—Appeals Nos. 428 of 1922 and 7 of 1923.
The plaintiff sues for a declaration that adoption of defendant 2, which was made in French territory into the family of defendant 1 and her late husband, French subjects with a French domicile, is not valid according to French law. Stated like that the suit is clearly one which no British Court would entertain. But it happened that 1st defendant's husband owned a considerable amount of immovable property in British India. It is possible that defendant 2 may some day make a claim to that property, though he has not yet done so. It is possible also that, if he survives, the plaintiff may some day have a claim to an interest in that property. In such circumstances a suit for declaration of the kind for which the plaintiff prays would be permissible in a British Court between British subjects under the special provisions of our law. But can that give a British Court jurisdiction to haul French subjects before it and investigate their family relationships?
It is true that some day a suit may properly be brought in a British Court about the property in British India which I have mentioned and for decision it may be necessary to decide incidentally whether defendant 2 has been validly adopted by defendant 1. The consideration on which the decision of that incidental question would turn, it is unnecessary now to discuss. But the possibility that that question may arise at some day for decision as an element in a suit properly brought in a British Court is no sufficient reason for deciding it in anticipation now. It might later on be convenient to the plaintiff to have had the question decided now; but the possible convenience of a British subject is no justification for requiring French subjects to submit their family affairs to be investigated in our Courts. The learned Advocate-General who contended for the plaintiff that the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to hear this suit suggested in one part of his argument that suits for declarations, such as that for which the plaintiff prays, are historically a development of proceedings for perpetuating testimony. There, if I may say so, I think he struck the right track. A bill for the perpetuation of testimony was available only in Chancery; and, though we have now statutory provision for making such a declaration as the plaintiff wants, the jurisdiction to do so is in its essence equitable. Equitable jurisdiction, which can be enforced only in personum never extended to foreign subjects beyond the realm. I agree that the Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain this suit and that Appeal No. 428 of 1922 must be dismissed with costs.
I agree also that the plaintiff should have been ordered to pay the full costs of defendants 1 and 2 in the Original Court and that therefore Appeal 7 of 1923 must be allowed with costs.
N.R.R
Alert