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Punjab National Bank v. Balikram Kissenchand

Calcutta High Court
Jun 2, 1939
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Punjab National Bank (the Bank) obtained a decree against a firm carrying on business in the name Balikram Kissenchand and applied for leave to execute that decree against Beharilal Jhamb on the footing that he was a partner of the firm. Beharilal opposed the application and, at the preliminary stage, raised two objections to its maintainability. The court considered these two preliminary objections and recorded its order that the preliminary objections fail and the Bank's application be heard on the merits upon evidence one month from the date of the order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Bank's application to execute the decree against Beharilal is barred by the doctrine of res judicata (or analogous principle) arising from a prior decision of the Insolvency Court regarding whether Beharilal was a partner of the insolvent firm.
  2. Whether the prior decision of the Insolvency Court that Beharilal was not a partner operates as a judgment in rem (i.e., binding inter omnes) under Section 41 of the Evidence Act so as to bar the Bank's application.
  3. Whether the procedure under Order 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) applies only to contractual partnerships (per the cited decisions 38 CWN 9141 and 39 CWN 2752) and, if Balikram Kissenchand is a Hindu joint family business rather than a contractual partnership, whether Beharilal (as a member of that joint family) can be proceeded against in execution as if he were a partner of a contractual firm.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent (Beharilal Jhamb)'s Arguments

  • The Bank's application is barred by res judicata by reason of a previous decision of the Court made in insolvency proceedings that Beharilal was not a partner of the insolvent firm.
  • The insolvency court's decision is a judgment in rem and therefore binds all (i.e., is valid inter omnes).
  • The suit out of which the Bank's application arises was instituted under Order 30 CPC against Balikram Kissenchand in the firm's name. Relying on decisions reported as 38 CWN 9141 and 39 CWN 2752, Order 30 applies only to contractual partnerships and not to Hindu joint family businesses; since Balikram Kissenchand is said to be a Hindu joint family business, Beharilal (even if a member) cannot be proceeded against in execution as though he were a partner of a contractual firm.
  • The respondent relied upon a document dated 2 May 1933 (annexure B to his affidavit) in which Balikram Kissenchand is described as a Hindu joint family business and in which certain persons are described as adult members of the firm (and Beharilal's name does not appear among those listed).
  • The respondent argued that the Official Assignee in the insolvency proceedings represented all creditors, and therefore the Insolvency Court's decision should bind each and every creditor (including the Bank).

Applicant (Punjab National Bank)'s Position as Recorded by the Court

  • The Bank contested that the description in the 1933 agreement (annexure B) binding Rai Bahadur Sukhram Jhamb as "karta" or managing member of the joint Hindu trading family is not conclusive against the Bank except for the purposes of that particular agreement; the Bank may assert that the firm was a co-partnership firm and that Beharilal was a member.
  • The Bank was only one of the creditors in the insolvency proceedings and was not the petitioning creditor; there is nothing to show the Bank sought adjudication against Beharilal or actively participated in obtaining any declaration that he was a partner. Therefore the earlier insolvency decision cannot be treated as res judicata against the Bank.
  • The Bank's position (as summarized by the court) is that the Official Assignee does not represent creditors for all purposes in insolvency proceedings and that the insolvency decision was not inter partes so as to be res judicata against the Bank.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
38 CWN 9141; 39 CWN 2752 Authority for the proposition that the procedure under Order 30 CPC applies only to contractual partnerships and not to Hindu joint family businesses. The court records that the respondent relied on these decisions to support his contention that Balikram Kissenchand is a Hindu joint family business and therefore not subject to Order 30; the court held that whether Balikram Kissenchand is a contractual partnership is a matter requiring evidence and could not be disposed of as a preliminary objection.
48 IA 187 Authority on the broader principle of res judicata beyond Section 11 CPC and that the doctrine can apply outside formal suits. The court accepted that res judicata is not confined to Section 11 CPC but applied the established requirement that the matter must have been in controversy between the same parties (or parties under whom the present parties claim); since the Bank was not the petitioning creditor and did not participate, the court found res judicata did not bar the Bank's application.
AIR 1924 Mad 662 Held that an order of an Insolvency Court refusing to adjudicate a person insolvent on the ground he was not a member of a declared insolvent firm is not a final order conferring or taking away a legal character within Section 41 of the Evidence Act (i.e., not a judgment in rem). The court relied upon this authority to support the conclusion that the Insolvency Court's finding that Beharilal was not a partner did not confer or take away any legal character and therefore was not a judgment in rem binding inter omnes.
AIR 1931 Mad 441 Interpreted the term "legal character" as being something more than a mere legal right (i.e., it denotes status). The court cited this case to emphasize that a declaration that a person is a creditor (or that he is not a partner) does not amount to the conferral or removal of a "legal character" within the meaning of Section 41, and thus is not a judgment in rem.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the two preliminary objections in sequence and explained its legal analysis as follows.

Analysis of the Objection Based on Order 30 CPC / Nature of the Firm

  • The court observed that to succeed on the objection that Order 30 CPC does not apply (because the firm is a Hindu joint family business, not a contractual partnership), the respondent must establish that Balikram Kissenchand is not a contractual partnership. This is a fact question requiring evidence and could not be disposed of at the preliminary stage.
  • The respondent relied upon an agreement dated 2 May 1933 (annexure B), to which the Bank was a party, in which Rai Bahadur Sukhram Jhamb is described as the karta or managing member of a joint Hindu trading family carrying on business in the name Balikram Kissenchand. The court held that such a description may be binding on Rai Bahadur Sukhram Jhamb and within the scope of that particular agreement, but it is not conclusive against the Bank for all purposes.
  • The court concluded that the annexure B document may be evidence in favour of Beharilal but does not preclude the Bank from asserting that the firm was a contractual partnership or from asserting that Beharilal was a member of the firm. Therefore the second preliminary objection failed at the interlocutory stage.

Analysis of the Res Judicata and Judgment in Rem Objections

  • Res judicata: The court acknowledged that Section 11 CPC does not apply literally to insolvency proceedings (since insolvency proceedings are not a "suit") but accepted the broader principle that res judicata may apply in contexts outside Section 11. However, the court emphasized an essential element for res judicata: the matter must have been in controversy between the same parties or their privies. The Bank was not the petitioning creditor and there was no evidence that it pursued the adjudication or sought a declaration that Beharilal was a partner. The Bank was merely one creditor among others. Consequently, the Insolvency Court's decision, which was not inter partes as regards the Bank, could not be held to bar the Bank's present application by way of res judicata.
  • Official Assignee argument: The respondent's contention that the Official Assignee represents all creditors for all purposes (and hence the decision binds individual creditors) was rejected. The court explained that the Official Assignee does not necessarily represent the creditors for all purposes and that the interests of the Official Assignee and an individual creditor may conflict; therefore, the insolvency decision being binding on the Official Assignee did not automatically bind each creditor.
  • Judgment in rem under Section 41 Evidence Act: The court examined Section 41 (a final judgment, order or decree of a competent court in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction which confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character ... is relevant) and concluded the Insolvency Court did not confer upon or take away from Beharilal any legal character. The finding that a person is not a partner was characterized as a negative declaration about his position in relation to a particular firm, not a conferral or deprivation of status or "legal character" in the sense contemplated by Section 41.
  • The court further drew a distinction between a declaration of a legal right (which generally operates as between particular persons) and a declaration of legal character or status (which is a broader definition of a person's status vis-à-vis the world). The court held that stating someone is not a partner is not a declaration of status in that sense. The court relied on authorities (noted above) to support this interpretation and thereby concluded the insolvency decision was not a judgment in rem binding inter omnes.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court dismissed the preliminary objections. It ordered that the Bank's application for leave to execute the decree against Beharilal proceed to be heard on the merits upon evidence one month from the date of the order.

Implications:

  • The direct practical effect is that Beharilal's preliminary pleas that the Bank's application was barred (either by res judicata or by virtue of a judgment in rem) were rejected; consequently, the Bank's execution application is to be adjudicated on its merits with evidence.
  • The court did not record any new legal principle or broader precedent beyond applying established principles (res judicata requirements; interpretation of Section 41 Evidence Act). The opinion confines itself to resolving the preliminary objections on the facts and legal authorities cited and directs a full hearing on the merits.
D.S/R.K

Order recorded: "Order accordingly." The application to be heard on the merits upon evidence one month from the date of the order.

Show all summary ...

1. This is an application by the Punjab National Bank which has obtained a decree against a firm Balikram Kissenchand for leave to execute the decree against Beharilal Jhamb on the footing that he is a partner of the firm. Beharilal opposes the application on various grounds. When the matter came up for hearing two preliminary objections were taken on his behalf as to the maintainability of the application. First it was contended that the application is barred by the principle of res judicata by reason of a previous decision of this Court in its insolvency jurisdiction and that it is also barred by reason of that decision being a judgment in rem. The second objection is raised in the following manner. The suit out of which the application arises was instituted in accordance with the provisions laid down in O. 30 of the CPC against Balikram Kissenchand in its firm name. Belying on the decision of this Court in 38 CWN 9141 and 39 CWN 2752 it is pointed out that the procedure laid down in O. 30 of the CPC applies only to a contractual partnership and has no application to a Hindu joint family business. Then it is contended that as Balikram Kissenchand is not a contractual partnership but a Hindu joint family business, Beharilal, even if he be a member of this joint family firm, cannot be proceeded against in execution as if he were a partner of a contractual firm.

2. I shall deal with the second objection first. In order to succeed, the respondent must establish that Balikram Kissenchand is not a contractual partnership. If this fact has to be decided, after going into evidence then the objection cannot be disposed of as a preliminary one. On behalf of Behari Lal, it is pointed out that in a document dated 2nd May 1933 which is anaexure B to the affidavit in opposition it is stated that Balikram Kissenchand is a Hindu joint family business and it is contended that the Punjab National Bank is bound by this statement inasmuch as it was a party to the document. In my opinion this is not a correct view. The document relied upon is an agreement to which several persons including the Punjab National Bank were parties. By this agreement certain claims and matters between the parties were settled. In that document Rai Bahadur Sukhram Jhamb was a party and he is described as the karta or managing member of the joint Hindu trading family carrying on business at amongst other places 118 Cross Street in the town of Calcutta in the name and style of Balikram Kissenchand.

3. Now this description may be binding on Rai Bahadur Sukhram Jhamb but I do not see how it can be binding on the Punjab National Bank except for the purposes of that particular agreement. This document may be a piece of evidence in favour of Beharilal, but it is not conclusive against the Punjab National Bank so as to prevent the Bank from asserting that the firm was a co-partnership firm. In this connexion I might as well mention that in this document certain persons are stated to be adult members of the firm and among those names the name of Beharilal does not appear. My remarks about the effect of the description of the firm would apply equally to the statement regarding the members of the firm. In my opinion this document does not preclude the Punjab National Bank from asserting that this is a contractual partnership or from asserting that Beharilal is a member of the firm. This preliminary objection fails.

4. I take up the next objection. The firm of Balikram Kissenchand was adjudicated insolvent. Beharilal contended that he was not a partner of the firm and the adjudication so far as he was concerned was annulled on the ground that he was not a partner of the insolvent firm. It is argued that this decision bars the present application as the point for decision therein is res judicata and also because the decision is a judgment in rem. I shall now consider the first branch of this argument. It is admitted by the learned counsel for Beharilal that Section 11 of the CPC, does not apply in terms to the facts of this case inasmuch as insolvency proceedings do not constitute a suit but he says that this Section is not exhaustive and that the application is barred on the principle of res judicata. He referred me to the well known case in 48 IA 187.3 There can be no doubt that Section 11 of the CPC, is not exhaustive regarding the principle of res judicata and that the plea of res judicata may successfully be raised in circumstances which do not fall within the purview of the Section. Such a plea can be supported on the general principle of law that there must be an end to litigation. But an element essential to the success of such a plea is that the matter must have been in controversy between the same parties or between parties under which the present parties claim. Now the Punjab National Bank was not a petitioning creditor in the insolvency proceedings. There is nothing to show that the bank took any steps to have the firm adjudicated or to get any declaration that Beharilal was a partner of the insolvent firm. The bank was merely one of the creditors. In these circumstances I cannot see how on any principle it can be held that the present application of the bank is barred on the ground that the matter in issue is res judicata by reason of the decision of the Insolvency Court and that Biharilal was not a partner of the insolvency firm, a decision which was neither sought for nor opposed by the bank or by anyone under whom the bank claims. It is contended on behalf of Beharilal that the Official Assignee represented all the creditors and that if the decision is binding on the Official Assignee, as it undoubtedly is, it must also be binding on each and every creditor. In my opinion the argument is unsound. The Official Assignee does not represent the creditors for all purposes in insolvency proceedings. In many respects his interest and that of a creditor may be in conflict. In the present case it may be that it was not to the interest of the bank that Beharilal should be adjudicated. It is not every creditor who desires to have his debtor adjudicated. The decision of the Insolvency Court not being inter partes it does not render the point for decision in this application res judicata.

5. Next I examine the contention that the finding of the Insolvency Court to the effect that Beharilal was not a partner of the insolvent firm is a judgment in rem or a judgment which is valid inter omnes. In order that the decision may operate as a judgment in rem, it must be one of the kind described in Section 41 of the Evidence Act, which is the only Section dealing with this matter, A mere perusal of the Section in my opinion exposes the weakness of this contention. The Section is as follows:

A final judgment, order or decree of a competent Court in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction, which confers upon or takes away from any person any legal Character, or which declares any person to be entitled to any such character, or to be entitled to any specific thing, not as against any specified person but absolutely, is relevant when the existence of any such legal character, or the title of any such person to any such thing is relevant.

6. Such judgment, order or decree is conclusive proof—that any legal character which it confers accrued at the time when such judgment, order or decree came into operation; that any legal character to which it declares any such person to be entitled, accrued to that person at the time when such judgment, order or decree declares it to have accrued to that person; that any legal character which it takes away from any such person ceased at the time from which such judgment, order or decree declares that it had ceased or should cease and that anything to which it declares any person to be so entitled was the property of that person at the time from which such judgment, order or decree declares that it had been or should be his property.

7. Now the Insolvency Court did not confer upon or take away from Behari Lal any legal character. The first portion of Section 41 can have no application. The point for decision is whether the Court declared Behari Lal to be entitled to a legal character. To say of a person that he is not a partner is a negative declaration; it does not in my opinion amount to a declaration that he is entitled to a legal character or to anything at all. Next even if it be held that a negative declaration is a declaration within the meaning of Sec. 41, there is another difficulty in the way of the respondent. The words used are “declares any person to be entitled to a legal character.” A declaration of a legal right is a different thing from a declaration of a legal character. The word “character” means status, it is something more than a mere right. The declaration of a person's right operates as against a particular person or group of persons against whom the right is claimed, whereas a man's status is something which defines his position not in relation to any particular person or group of persons but in relation to the rest of the world; his status distinguishes him from the rest of the world.

8. To say that a person is not a partner of a firm is not to declare his status or legal character, it is merely to declare his position with respect to the particular firm. In this connexion I would refer to the case in AIR 1924 Mad 6624 where Schwabe, C.J and Ramesam, J. held that an order of an Insolvency Court refusing to adjudicate a person insolvent, on the ground that he was not a member of a firm which had been declared insolvent is not a final order which conferred upon or took away from him any legal character within the meaning of Section 41 of the Evidence Act and hence is not a judgment in rem. I would also refer to the case in AIR 1931 Mad 4415 where the term “legal character” has been interpreted as being something more than a legal right. It was held that the declaration by the Insolvency Court that a person was a creditor of the insolvent did not amount to a declaration of any legal character and was therefore not a judgment in rem. For the reasons given above the preliminary objections must fail. The application will be heard on the merits upon evidence a month from this date.

D.S/R.K

9. Order accordingly.