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Deokinandan v. Aghorenath Banerji
Judicial Opinion Summary — Manohar Lall, J. (with Beevor, J. concurring)
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff purchased by registered sale deed (5 March 1918) a portion (1 anna 17 gandas and odd share) of land out of a larger proprietary share held by the defendants second party in village Sikandarpur Ferda. The khudkast and bakast lands appertaining to that share were amicably partitioned between the plaintiff and the defendants second party. The defendants second party allegedly disturbed the plaintiff's possession, and the plaintiff instituted a partition suit on 23 December 1918, seeking a declaration of his right to retain khas possession (or, alternatively, a regular partition by commissioner) and mesne profits.
While that suit was pending, the plaintiff applied for attachment before judgment (20 May 1919) of immovable properties of the defendants second party. Attachment was ordered on 27 May 1919. The partition suit proceeded to the High Court and was compromised, resulting in a final decree on 26 November 1927 that partitioned the khudkast and bakast lands by metes and bounds and awarded mesne profits and costs in the plaintiff's favour.
Having realized part of the decree, the plaintiff filed (23 May 1939) for execution of the balance by attachment and sale of the residential house of the defendants second party standing on plots 1999, 2000 and 2002 — plots that, by the partition decree, had been allotted exclusively to the 13 gandas share of the defendants second party.
During execution the defendant first party filed a claim under Order 21, rule 58, alleging that he had purchased the house along with the land in execution of a mortgage decree obtained against the defendants second party. The court discovered a mortgage bond dated 13 May 1919 in favour of the defendant first party, executed before the court-ordered attachment of the land covered by that mortgage bond. The mortgagee obtained a decree and in execution purchased the 13 gandas share on 5 May 1934, obtaining delivery of possession in April 1937.
The plaintiff alleged the mortgage bond was fictitious and fraudulent; however, the courts below rejected that allegation on the ground that the plaintiff had been made a party to the mortgage suit and the mortgage decree was passed in his presence. The principal contested legal question became whether the defendant first party, as execution-purchaser under the mortgage decree, acquired only the land or also the house standing on that land.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, on an execution sale (pursuant to a mortgage decree), the purchaser acquires only the land described in the sale certificate or also the house standing on that land.
- Whether Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act applies to an involuntary sale in execution of a decree so as to pass "all things attached to the earth" (i.e., whether houses pass with land on such execution sales).
- Whether the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Umrao Singh v. Kacheru Singh (holding that a zamindar's residential house is a separate unit and does not pass on transfer of proprietary interest unless included in the mortgage) is applicable to the facts of this case.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Plaintiff / Counsel: Mr. Baldeva Sahay)
- Contended that Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act has no application to an involuntary sale in execution of a decree, and hence the house should not pass to the execution-purchaser merely because the land was sold.
- Relied strongly on the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Umrao Singh v. Kacheru Singh, which held that a zamindar's residential house is a separate unit and does not pass to the transferee on transfer of the proprietary interest in the mahal unless the abadi/site had been specifically transferred or the house included in the mortgage.
- Also advanced an analogy to section 37 of the Revenue Sale Law (arguing by analogy that a house should not pass), though this was later rejected by the court in view of precedent.
- Earlier (in the proceedings) accused the mortgage bond of being fictitious and fraudulent, implying the mortgage-based claim to the house should be invalidated.
Defendant First Party (Mortgagee / Execution-Purchaser)
- Claimed, under Order 21, rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that he had purchased the house along with the land in execution of the mortgage decree obtained against the defendants second party.
- Relied upon the mortgage bond (dated 13 May 1919), the subsequent decree and sale certificate describing the mortgaged property, and the execution purchase (5 May 1934) and delivery of possession (April 1937) as establishing full title to the land and the house.
Position Adopted by Courts Below (as reported)
- The courts below rejected the plaintiff's allegation of fraud in the mortgage bond because the plaintiff was made a party to the mortgage suit and the decree was passed in his presence; therefore the mortgage decree was treated as valid.
- They concluded that because the house was attached to the land and there was no reservation in the mortgage bond or the sale certificate, the execution-purchaser became full owner of the house; they also found that the defendants second party continued in occupation as tenants of the mortgagee after auction sale.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Umrao Singh v. Kacheru Singh (Allahabad High Court, Full Bench) | Holds that a zamindar's residential house (abadi) is a separate unit and does not pass to a transferee on transfer of an undivided proprietary interest in the mahal unless the site or house is specifically included; Section 8 is not intended to apply to transfers of undivided shares in land so as to vest entire houses in purchasers of undivided shares. | The court distinguished this authority on facts: in Umrao Singh the abadi was undivided and the purchaser acquired only an undivided share; in the present case the partition had allotted exclusive possession of the site/land on which the house stood to the mortgagor before sale, so the purchaser obtained the full interest in that specific site and house. |
| Asghar Reza Khan (their Lordships, Lord Lindley quoted) | Principle that where conveyance/sale certificate contains no words of exception or reservation, and the description is ample, the conveyance passes the vendor's interest in houses on the land (even if the instruments predate the Transfer of Property Act); absence of words showing intention to retain suffices to transfer house interests. | The court relied on the reasoning and language in Asghar Reza Khan to conclude that the mortgage bond and sale certificate in the present case contained no reservation and were sufficiently worded to pass the mortgagor's interest in the house. |
| Narayan Das Khettry (their Lordships) | Held that a revenue sale under Act XI of 1859 (a sale by the Collector of Government's interest) did not pass ownership of a building; distinction drawn between conveyance by proprietor and a revenue sale by Collector. | The court referred to Narayan Das Khettry to reject the appellant's analogy to section 37 of the Revenue Sale Law, indicating that the revenue-sale principle does not control the present mortgage-execution sale context. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court opened by identifying the central factual determinative point: whether, on the execution sale under the mortgage decree, the execution-purchaser acquired only the land or also the house standing on that land. The analysis proceeded along these lines:
- Validity of the mortgage decree: The lower courts had found the mortgage bond and resulting decree to be valid because the plaintiff had been made a party to the mortgage suit and the decree was passed in his presence. Consequently, the court accepted that full title passed to the defendant first party by the execution purchase.
- Examination of the instruments: The court had translations of the mortgage bond and the sale certificate. The mortgaged property was described in broad proprietary terms ("13 gandas 4 kauries 14 bauries ... forming proprietary interests including Kamat, khudkast lands, orchards, etc., and all rights and interests appertaining thereto"). The court found no words of exception or reservation in these documents.
- Application of principle from authorities: Quoting and applying the reasoning of Asghar Reza Khan, the court held that where a conveyance or sale certificate contains language broad enough to pass all the mortgagor's interest in the proprietary share, that includes the interest in houses on the land in the absence of any explicit reservation to retain them. The court explicitly read the sale certificate as "quite sufficient to pass" the mortgagor's interest in the house.
- Distinguishing the Full Bench (Umrao Singh): The court accepted the Full Bench's principle that Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act should not be stretched to give whole houses to purchasers of merely undivided shares. But it distinguished Umrao Singh on the facts: in Umrao Singh the abadi/site was undivided and the purchaser acquired only an undivided share; in the present case, by partition prior to the sale, the site and the land on which the house stood had fallen exclusively to the mortgagor, so the subsequent mortgage security and execution sale attached to and passed the entire interest in that specific land and the house upon it.
- Rejection of revenue-sale analogy: The court rejected the appellant's reliance on section 37 of the Revenue Sale Law by reference to Narayan Das Khettry, holding that the revenue-sale principle did not apply to the mortgage-execution sale under consideration.
- Conclusion from documents and facts: Because the documents contained broad proprietary language with no reservations and because partition had placed exclusive possession of the site with the mortgagor before the sale, the sale certificate passed the mortgagor's entire interest in the land and the house. The courts below therefore correctly concluded that the defendant first party became full owner of the house, and that the defendants second party were occupying thereafter as tenants.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Direct effect on the parties: The appellate court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts that (a) the mortgage decree and execution-sale were valid, (b) the execution-purchaser (defendant first party) acquired the full interest in the land described in the sale certificate and the house standing on that land, and (c) the defendants second party were occupying as tenants after the execution sale. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Broader implications: The opinion focused on application of established principles to the facts and distinguished the Full Bench authority relied on by the appellant. The court did not purport to lay down a new general rule beyond applying precedents and the plain language of the mortgage and sale documents; accordingly, the decision primarily resolves the rights between the parties on these facts rather than establishing a novel precedent.
Reported bench: Manohar Lall, J.; Beevor, J. concurred.
Manohar Lall, J.:— This appeal by the plaintiff was referred by me to a Division Bench in order to consider the applicability of the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court to decide the question whether on the sale of land the house standing thereon also passes to the purchaser.
The facts are these. In village Sikandarpur Ferda, tauzi no. 4990, the defendants second party were proprietors in possession of 2 annas 10 gandas and odd share. Out of this they sold 1 anna 17 gandas and odd share to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 30,000 by a registered sale deed dated the 5th March, 1918. The khudkast and bakast lands appertaining to this share were amicably partitioned between the plaintiff and the defendants second party, but as the defendants second party were still causing trouble and disturbing possession of the khudkast and bakast lands thus allotted to the plaintiff's share, he instituted a suit on the 23rd of December, 1918, for a declaration that he was entitled to retain khas possession of the lands which he said had been allotted to his share on amicable partition, but in case the private partition was not established to the satisfaction of the court then a regular partition should be made by the appointment of a commissioner; mesne profits were also claimed against the defendants for a certain period. On the 20th of May, 1919, during the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff applied for attachment before judgment of the immoveable properties of the defendants second party, that is to say of their 13 gandas and odd share. The court granted the prayer for attachment on the 27th of May, 1919. The partition suit was fought up to the High Court where it was ultimately compromised and a final decree in terms of the compromise was passed on the 26th of November, 1927, by which the khudkast and bakast lands were partitioned by metes and bounds and a decree for mesne profits and costs was also passed, in favour of the plaintiff. After realising a portion of the decree the plaintiff filed a petition on the 23rd May, 1939, for execution of the balance by attachment and sale of the residential house of the defendants second party which stood on plots 1999, 2000 and 2002 in that portion of the lands which by partition was allotted exclusively to the 13 gandas share of the defendants second party. During this execution proceeding the defendant first party preferred claim, case under Order 21, rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure alleging that he had purchased that house along with the land upon which the house stood in execution of a mortgage decree which he had obtained against the defendants second party. The plaintiff then came to know that the defendants second party had actually executed a mortgage bond dated the 13th May, 1919, in favour of the defendant first party. It will be noticed that the mortgage bond was executed before the actual attachment of the land., which was covered by the mortgage bond, as ordered by the court. The mortgagee in due course obtained a decree and in execution of that decree he purchased of the 5th May, 1934, the 13 gandas share of the defendants second party and obtained delivery of possession in April, 1937.
The case of the plaintiff that the mortgage bond was fictitious and fraudulent has not been accepted by the courts below upon the ground that the plaintiff was made a party to the mortgage suit and the mortgage decree was passed in his presence. It must, therefore, be assumed chat the mortgage decree was a valid decree and in execution full title passed to the defendant first party to the land covered by the mortgage bond.
The serious question which was then agitated between the parties was as to whether by the execution purchase the defendant first party became the owner only of the land which was exclusively allotted to the 13 gandas share or also to the house which stood upon a portion of this land.
The courts below have concurrently come to the conclusion that as the house was attached to the land and as there was no reservation in the mortgage bond and in the sale certificate which, was granted to the mortgagee auction purchaser, the latter became the full owner of the house—they also accepted his case that the defendants second party was living in that house since the date of the auction purchase as a tenant of the defendant first party.
In appeal Mr. Baldeva Sahay strenuously argues that the provision of section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act has no application to an involuntary sale in execution of a decree. He also relies upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Umrao Singh v. Kacheru Singh where it was held that the residential house of a zamindari is a separate unit and in no sense a part and parcel of the proprietary right owned by him in the mahal so that on the transfer of the proprietary interest of the zamindar in execution of a mortgage decree against him his residential house in the abadi site, unless it is included in the mortgage itself, cannot pass to the transferee. Allsop, J. took a contrary view.
In the case of Asghar Reza Khan Lord Lindley in delivering the judgment of their Lordships made these observations with regard to the interpretation of a conveyance and a sale certificate. I am reading from page 75: “The conveyances of the plaintiffs” ancestor Syad Lutf Ali Khan were made in 1883 and 1894, and are set out in the record. The deed of 1883 contains no words of exception or reservation, and is ample in point of language to pass all Syad Haidar Reza's interest in the zemindary, including the land on which the bazar was situate. His interest in the houses on that land and in the profit rents derived, from them would, pass by the deed in the absence of words shewing an intention to retain them…………….
The share of Safdar Reza was sold under the decree of the court, and the sale certificate of the 18th of December, 1894, shows that all his interest in the property mortgaged by him was sold to the plaintiffs. The description in the certificate is again quite sufficient to pass his interest in the bazar in the absence of any words showing an intention to exclude it.” It should be pointed out that the mortgage bond in this case was executed on the 25th of April, 1876, that is to say before the passing of the Transfer of Property Act.
In the case of ‘Narayan Das Khettry their Lordships had to consider the contention that as the result of a revenue sale of land in December 1919 held under Act XI of 1859 the ownership of the house passed to the auction-purchaser. At page 222 of the report it is stated that “it was not disputed that if the plaintiff's case was based upon a conveyance by the late proprietor of the land, the house would pass with the land to the purchaser; but it was argued on behalf of the defendant that as the sale in question was under the Act XI of 1859 it was merely a sale by the Collector of the Government's interest”. Their Lordships, accepted this contention and came to the conclusion that the ownership of the building did not pass to the plaintiff by reason of the revenue sale.
It is thus important to consider the terms of the mortgage bond and the sale certificate in the present case. We have had these two documents translated. The details of the mortgaged property, given in the mortgage bond are:
“13 gandas 4 kauries 14 bauries out of the entire 16 annas partitioned patti of 10 annas 15 gandas, pokhta share in Mahal Sikandarpur Pharichh, Pargana Bali…… …………………forming proprietary interests including Kamat, khudkast lands, orchards, etc., and all rights and interests appertaining thereto, which we, the executants have……………….”
The same description is recorded in the sale certificate. Upon the interpretation of these two documents it is clear to me that no words of exception or reservation are to be found in these two documents and that the words are ample in point of language to pass all the interest of the mortgagor in the 13 gandas zamindary including the land upon which the house was situate so that his interest in the house on that land has passed by the sale certificate in the absence of words showing intention to retain it. To adopt the words of their Lordships in Asghar Reza Khan's case “the share of the Kumars was sold under the decree of the court and the sale certificate of the 11th of February, 1937, shows that all their interest in the property mortgaged by them was sold to the mortgagee. The description in the certificate is again quite sufficient to pass their interest in the house in the absence of any words showing the intention to exclude it”.
Mr. Baldeva Sahay, as stated above, placed very strong reliance upon the Full Bench case of the Allahabad High Court. It is enough to state that the facts of that case can be well distinguished. In that case the abadi upon which the houses in question stood was not partitioned and the mortgagor Umrao Singh only held an undivided share in it, and, therefore, by the auction sale the plaintiffs merely acquired an undivided share in the abadi and not the full ownership of any particular part of the abadi. Bennet, J. said in his judgment that in these circumstances: “The plaintiffs are not, the owners of the sites, but merely of undivided shares in the sites. On this being pointed out, learned counsel for plaintiffs had considerable difficulty in stating whether his claim was that the plaintiffs acquired the whole of the three houses under section 8 or only undivided shares in the houses. Either claim would lead to considerable confusion. But it appears quite clear to me that section 8 is not intended to apply in this way to the case of a transfer of an undivided share in land. The section refers to ‘a transfer of property’ and in paragraph 2states ‘where the property is land’. And must therefore have ‘transfer of land’ and in such a case there will pass ‘all things attached to the earth that is to the land which is transferred. The sites of the houses have not been transferred. Therefore the houses attached to those sites have not been transferred. It is only where the sites had been transferred to the plaintiffs that the plaintiffs could claim that the houses attached to those sites were also transferred under the provisions of section 8.” In the present case, as I have stated, even upon the findings of fact of the courts below it has been found that the defendants second party were separately and exclusively in possession of the land upon which the house stood on the date when the sale took place in favour of the defendant first party. It is true that on the date of the mortgage the defendants second party were in possession of the undivided share in the lands appertaining to the entire patti of 2 annas and odd but on the date of the sale as a result of, a partition between the parties, the land on which the house stood fell exclusively to the share of the mortgagor, and, therefore, the security of the mortgage would now fasten upon that land which on partition was allotted to the mortgagor so that the sale certificate passed the entire interest of the mortgagor in the land which was allotted to him, for 13 gandas and odd share, and in the house which stood on the plots which fell into the exclusive share of the mortgagor.
Mr. Baldeva Sahay relied upon the analogy of section 37 of the Revenue Sale Law but that argument is, in my opinion, inadmissible in view of the decision of the Privy Council in Narayan Das Khettry, which I have already referred to.
For these reasons I am of opinion that the courts below have taken a correct view. The appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.
Beevor, J.:— I agree.
Appeal dismissed.
K.D
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