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K.A. Desai & Co. v. Vijaysinhji Bhimsinhji
Judgment Summary — S.J. Chhatpar, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeal arises from an order of the Assistant Judge, Central Saurashtra Division, Morvi, which refused to set aside an ex-parte decree under Order 9, Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure. The Respondent-Plaintiff sued the Appellant for recovery of approximately Rs. 6,000. The Defendant is Mr. K.A. Desai trading as Messrs. K.A. Desai and Co., Rajkot.
The first summons in the suit was sent by registered post; the postal acknowledgment was signed by Ratilal, a clerk in the Defendant's concern, dated 5-4-51. The summons fixed hearing for 21-4-51. On the morning of 21-4-51 the Defendant sent a telegram to the Court: "Unwell. Certificate follows. Kindly adjourn." A letter from the Defendant with a doctor's certificate requesting an adjournment (and enclosing a stamped envelope for the Court's reply) was posted from Rajkot and received by the Court on 24-4-51. The trial Court took no notice of the telegram or the later letter and, on 21-4-51, proceeded ex-parte; an ex-parte decree was drawn on 25-4-51.
A notice informing the Defendant that an ex-parte decree had been passed was received by Ratilal on 20-6-51. The Defendant filed an application on 23-6-51 to set aside the ex-parte decree on two grounds: (1) summons was not duly served, and (2) the Defendant was prevented by sufficient cause (illness) from appearing. The Assistant Judge refused the application, finding service proper and that the Defendant had not proved sufficient cause beyond his affidavit. The Defendant appealed to the High Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the ex-parte decree should be set aside under Order 9, Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that the summons was not duly served.
- Whether the ex-parte decree should be set aside under Order 9, Rule 13 on the alternative ground that the Defendant was prevented by sufficient cause (illness) from appearing.
- Whether the trial Court was authorised to effect service of summons by registered post to a Defendant who resided outside the Court's territorial jurisdiction but within the State of Saurashtra (i.e., whether service by post in the circumstances was valid under Order 5 of the Code).
- Whether the application to set aside the ex-parte decree was barred by limitation under Article 164 of the Limitation Act (i.e., whether the Defendant knew of the decree within 30 days before filing the application).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Defendant)
- The summons was not duly served because the trial Court was not authorised to serve summons by registered post in the circumstances of this case.
- The Defendant was prevented by sufficient cause from attending on the hearing date due to illness; nothing in the record contradicted the Defendant's affidavit that he was ill.
Respondent's Arguments (Plaintiff)
- The application for setting aside the decree was barred by limitation under Article 164 because the summons was duly served and the application was filed more than 30 days after the decree.
- Alternatively, if summons was not duly served, the Defendant failed to prove when and from what source he acquired knowledge of the decree within 30 days of filing the application; the Defendant's affidavit stating knowledge on 20-6-51 was insufficient, according to the Respondent, even though it coincided with receipt of the Court's notice.
- The Respondent also relied on Rule 10 (service by delivering/tendering a copy signed and sealed) arguing the conditions of that rule had been met since a signed and sealed copy was received.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Gyanammal v. Abdul Hussain, AIR 1931 Mad 813(A) | Illustrates that a record of personal service is not conclusive; a Defendant may show that what was served was not the summons, or lacked essential information, or was not in proper form for true knowledge of the claim. | The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that mere receipt or alleged personal service does not automatically constitute "duly served" under the Code; a Defendant may challenge the sufficiency or form of service. |
| K.K.N.K.A.R. Chettyar Firm v. Aga M. Sheerazee, AIR 1939 Rang 436 | Defines "due service of summons" (Article 164/Order 9, Rule 13) to mean service in proper form according to the Code and under circumstances enabling the Court to be satisfied that the Defendant had knowledge of the decree. | The court cited this decision to emphasise that due service requires both correct form and circumstances ensuring the Defendant's knowledge; therefore mere knowledge without proper form does not suffice. |
| Sunder Spinner v. Makan Bhula, AIR 1922 Bom 377 | Remarks that service by post is at any time a poor substitute for personal service. | The court invoked this authority to reinforce caution against treating postal service as equivalent to personal service and to support skepticism about postal service in the Saurashtra context. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded step-by-step, applying statutory rules and the authorities cited by the parties:
- Legal standard under Order 9, Rule 13: A Defendant seeking to set aside an ex-parte decree must prove either that the summons was not duly served or that he was prevented by sufficient cause. If summons was not duly served, the Defendant is entitled to set aside the decree, subject to limitation under Article 164 (application within 30 days of knowledge of the decree).
- The threshold question was whether the trial Court was authorised to effect service by registered post to this Defendant. The court examined Order 5 of the Code (as applicable in Saurashtra, noting no local amendments to Order 5 were made by the Saurashtra High Court) and identified five possible provisions under which post service might be ordered: Rule 25 and Rule 30(3) (specific provisions), Rule 20 (substituted service under the Court's discretion), Rule 9 (possibly construable as allowing post where defendant resides within jurisdiction), and Rule 19 (consequent on failure under Rule 17).
- Applying those rules to the facts, the court found that the Defendant did not reside within the trial Court's jurisdiction nor outside the State; therefore the Court had no power under Rule 9 or Rule 25 to send summons by post, and the record did not show that the Court had purported to issue summons under substituted service provisions (Rule 20 or Rule 30(3)). Rule 19 was inapplicable (no return under Rule 17). The proper procedure would have been to send for service to the Court at Rajkot under Rule 21.
- The Respondent's reliance on Rule 10 (delivery/tendering of a copy signed and sealed) was rejected. The court explained Rule 10 contemplates personal service when read with Rules 12 and 15. The court rejected a broad proposition that mere receipt of a document containing the required ingredients amounts to due service; instead "duly served" must mean service in the manner prescribed by the Code (reference to Section 27 of the Code).
- The court applied authorities (Gyanammal and the Rangoon decision in Chettyar Firm) to show that the presence of a signed copy or even a Defendant's knowledge does not dispense with the requirement of service in the prescribed form and under circumstances ensuring the Court can be satisfied of the Defendant's knowledge.
- Considering the facts, the court found no record of any Order authorising service by post, and no application by the Plaintiff for such service; it was unclear how summons had been sent by post. The Court therefore concluded the Defendant had not been "duly served" within the meaning of Order 9, Rule 13.
- On limitation: because the Defendant was not duly served, entitlement to set aside the decree depended on timely application under Article 164. The Defendant filed an affidavit stating he came to know of the decree on 20-6-51; the Court's notice had been received by Ratilal (his clerk) on that date. The court accepted that the Defendant derived his knowledge from that notice and that it could not be inferred that he knew of the decree earlier (particularly since he had earlier written to the Court requesting adjournment and was awaiting a reply). Consequently the application filed on 23-6-51 was within 30 days of knowledge.
- The court therefore concluded it was unnecessary to decide the alternative contention of sufficient cause (illness). The court also observed that, had service been held to be proper, the application might have been time-barred unless delay was condoned under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act (the Saurashtra High Court had applied Section 5 by amendment to applications under Order 9, Rule 13).
Holding and Implications
Final Holding: The appeal was allowed. The Order of the Assistant Judge refusing to set aside the ex-parte decree was set aside. The Defendant's application to set aside the ex-parte decree was granted and the suit was restored to the file to be disposed of in accordance with law. The court made no order as to costs.
Implications and immediate consequences:
- The ex-parte decree previously passed on 25-4-51 was set aside and the suit was restored for further proceedings.
- The Court held that in the facts of this case the Defendant had not been "duly served" within the meaning of Order 9, Rule 13 because the trial Court lacked authority to serve the summons by post in the circumstances; therefore the defect in service entitled the Defendant to relief, subject to limitation considerations.
- The Court emphasised caution in ordering service by post in Saurashtra (noting that the Saurashtra High Court had not adopted amendments to Order 5 permitting postal service and referring to authorities that treat postal service as a poor substitute for personal service). This guidance reflects the Court's view of the limited circumstances in which postal service should be treated as adequate.
- Because the Court accepted the Defendant's account of when he learned of the decree (20-6-51), it found the application to set aside (filed 23-6-51) timely under Article 164; the Court therefore did not address the merits of the separate "sufficient cause" (illness) claim.
Note: This summary is confined to the information and reasoning expressed in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences not present in the judgment text.
JUDGMENT
S.J. Chhatpar, J.
1. This is an appeal from an Order of the Assistant Judge, Central Saurashtra Division, Morvi, refusing to set aside an ex-parte decree under Order 9, Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure. The Respondent-Plaintiff had filed a suit against the Appellant for recovery of Rs. 6000/- and odd. It is common ground that the Defendant is not a firm, but Mr. K.A. Desai trades in the name Messrs. K.A. Desai and Co., at Rajkot. The very first summons was issued by registered post and the postal acknowledgment was received signed by one Ratilal. The summons was for a hearing on 21-4-51. The acknowledgment is dated 5-4-51. It is admitted that Ratilal is a clerk in the Defendant's concern. On the morning of 21-4-51, the Defendant sent a wire stating Unwell. Certificate follows. Kindly adjourn." This telegram was received by the Court on the same date. A letter hearing the same date was posted by the Defendant from Rajkot stating that he was ill enclosing a certificate of a doctor, and requesting for an adjournment and also enclosing a stamped envelope for a reply from the Court. This letter was received by the Court on 24-4-51. The Court took no notice of either the telegram or the letter.
On 21-4-51 the date of hearing, the Court passed an Order that the case be proceeded ex-parte and an ex-parte decree was passed on 25-4-51, a day after the letter of the Defendant along with the certificate was received by the Court requesting for adjournment on the ground of his illness. The Court sent a notice informing the Defendant of the ex-parte decree having been passed against him, which was received by Ratilal on 20-6-51. The Defendant filed an application for setting aside the ex-parte decree on 23-6-51. The application was based upon two grounds, first, that the summons was 1 not duly served and secondly that the Defendant was prevented by sufficient cause on account of his illness from being present in. Court when the case was called for hearing on 21-4-51. The learned Assistant Judge of the lower Court refused this application holding both that the summons was duly served and that the Defendant had failed to prove that he was prevented from sufficient cause from attending the Court remarking that beyond the affidavit of the Defendant there was no evidence to prove that the Defendant was really ill. The learned Judge observed that the doctor had not been summoned who had given the certificate that the Defendant was suffering from diarrhea and that the Defendant had not dared to step into the witness box, which remark was apparently unjustified as the Defendant had filed his affidavit and it was for the Plaintiff to have cross-examined him it he wanted to do so. The Defendant has now come in appeal to this Court.
2. Mr. A.R. Baxi, the learned advocate for the Appellant, has reiterated the same points urged before the lower Court, firstly, that the summons was not duly served and secondly that the Defendant was prevented by sufficient cause owing to his illness from being present in Court at the date of hearing, contending that there was nothing to contradict the affidavit of the Defendant showing that he was in fact ill. Mr. M.O. Shah the learned Advocate for the Respondent has urged that the application for setting aside the decree was barred, by limitation under Article 164 both on the basis that the summons was duly served, the application being filed after 30 days of the ex-parte decree and also on the ground that even if the summons is held to be not duly served the Defendant had failed to prove that he had knowledge of the decree within 30 days before filing his application for setting aside the ex-parte decree, the argument being based upon the burden lying upon the Defendant to prove as to when and from what source the Defendant came to know of the passing of the decree. The Defendant's affidavit merely stating that he came to know on 20-6-51 was not sufficient, although it coincided with the receipt of the notice from the Court informing the Defendant of the passing of the ex-parte decree.
3. I may deal with the contentions of the respective parties together. In the first place, it is clear under Order 9, Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure that the Defendant need either prove that the summons was not duly served or that he was prevented from sufficient cause. If it is proved that the summons was not duly served, he is entitled to get the ex-parte decree set aside subject to the question of limitation under . Article 164 which enjoins him to file the application within 30 days of the knowledge of the decree. Mr. A.R. Baxi for the Appellant contends that the summons was not duly served on the ground that the trial Court was not authorised to serve the summons, by registered post. This leads me to the consideration under what circumstances the Court is authorised to serve summons by post. I may state that the Saurashtra High Court has not amended the provisions of Order 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure as has been done by several other High Courts by amending Rule 9 or Rule 10 or framing a separate Rule as has been done by the Bombay High Court providing for service of summons by post. So that we have to consider the power of Court to serve summons by post as is laid down by Order 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure without any local amendment.
4. Now there are five Rules under which a Court can possibly Order service of summons by post to be sent direct to the Defendant. Rule 25 and Rule 30(3) of Order 5 contain specific provisions for sending summons or letter substituted for summons by post. Summons by post can also be sent by way of substituted service under Rule 20. It. would be justified as authorised by the words or in such manner as the Court thinks fit' in Clause (1) of Rule 20. Under Rule 9, a Court may probably send a summons by post as the words 'unless the Court otherwise directs' may be construed to include delivery of summons to postal authorities for service on the Defendant; but under this Rule the Defendant must be residing within the jurisdiction of the Court. The fifth provision under which the Court may possibly issue summons by post is under Rule 19 by construing the words 'or such service as it thinks fit' as authorising service by post. This Rule is however consequent on the failure of the service of summons under Rule 17. Now in the present case the Defendant was not residing within the jurisdiction of the Court nor was he residing outside the State; so that the Court had no power either under Rule 9 or Rule 25 to issue summons by post nor did the Court purport to issue the summons by substituted service under Rule 20 or a latter Rule 30(3). The provisions of Rule 19 do not apply as there was no return of the summons under Rule 17. Consequently it appears to me quite clear that the Court could not in the first instance send summons by post to the Defendant who was admittedly residing outside the jurisdiction of the Court but within the State of Saurashtra. The proper procedure was to send the summons under Rule 21 to the Court at Rajkot for service.
Mr. M.O. Shah the learned advocate for the Respondent has strongly relied upon Rule 10, which says that the service of summons shall be made by delivering or tendering a copy thereof signed by the Judge or such officer as he appoints in this behalf and sealed with the seal of the Court. And he contends that the conditions of this Rule have been satisfied inasmuch as the Defendant has received a copy of the summons, which is signed by the authorised officer and sealed with the seal of the Court. But this Rule contemplates personal service which is made clear by reading this rule along with rules 12 and 15. He has also tried to propound a general proposition that a due service means any receipt of summons containing all the ingredients required by law if such receipt is within sufficient time to enable the Defendant to appear in Court. But I must repel this broad proposition of law that a mere receipt of summons by the Defendant without being served in the manner prescribed by law is due service. The words 'duly served' have been used in Order 9, Rule 113 as also in Articles 164 and 169, Limitation Act. They have not been Refined anywhere; but appears to me clear by Reference to the basic Section 27 of the Code that due service can only be service effected in the manner prescribed by the Code. In - Gyanammal v. Abdul Hussain : AIR 1931 Mad 813(A), it was held:
It cannot be said in all cases of personal service on a Defendant that because the return is that the summons has been served personally, it has been duly served and so the Defendant cannot get an ex parte decree against him set aside. It is open to a Defendant in such circumstances to show that the summons in the suit was not really served upon him but upon somebody else, or that what was served upon him was not the summons in the suit, or that it did not give the correct date or some other essential information about the suit, or that it was not accompanied by a copy of the plaint in the suit concerned so that although in a sense he was personally served, he was not provided with the knowledge of the claim against him, which is the object of the service. All these and similar allegations are open to him even if there is a record that he has been personally served.
And I may add that a fortiori it is equally open to him to show that the Court had no power to issue summons by post, as in, the present case. The mere fact that he might have come to know of the filing of the suit or might have received summons does not amount to due service. Else, if a bailiff throws a summons in the house of the Defendant in his absence and the Defendant on return picks it up, he would be deemed duly served as he would have knowledge of the suit and the date of hearing. There is considerable authority for the proposition that even when the Defendant refuses service of summons and the bailiff does not affix a copy of the summons upon the outer door of the Defendant's house, such service is not good service.
I may also refer to a Rangoon decision in - K.K.N.K.A.R. Chettyar Firm v. Aga M. Sheerazee AIR 1939 Rang 436(B), wherein It was observed that the expression 'due service of summons' in Article 164, Limitation Act and Order 9, Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure, meant not only that the summons was served in proper form according to the directions laid down in the Code but also' that the summons was served under circumstances which enabled the Court to be satisfied that the Defendant had knowledge of the decree, against him, except of course in the case where" the Defendant had purposely put it out of his power to have such knowledge. The primary condition that the, summons must be served in the proper form according to the directions prescribed in the Code must in all cases be satisfied. The object of service of summons as observed by some High Courts is that the Defendant may be informed of the institution of the suit in due time before the date fixed for hearing, but It does not necessarily follow that whenever the Defendant knows of the institution of the suit and the date fixed for hearing in sufficient time, he must be deemed to have been duly served, apart from the question whether the manner of ser" vice of summons as prescribed by the Code is carried out or not.
5. I am therefore clearly of the opinion that' in the present case the Defendant, could not he said to have been duly served within the meaning of Order 9, Rule 13. The record also does not any Order of the Court authorising service summons by post and, not in the ordinary. There is no application by the Plaintiff for ordering such service. It is not understood how the summons was sent by post in the very first instance. Service by post as observed by the Bombay High Court in - Sunder Spinner v. Makan Bhula : AIR 1922 Bom 377 (1)(C) is at any time a poor substitute for personal service. The Saurashtra High Court has advisedly refrained from amending Order 5 to provide for service by post in view of the backward conditions prevailing in the State, which has emerged as an unified State only recently. The other High Courts which have made amendments have been careful to provide limitations to service by post. Some have confined it to places which are the headquarters of a District or Taluka or where there is regular daily postal service and even when postal acknowledgment purporting to be signed by the Defendant is received, it is only prima facie proof of service. The Peshawar Court has gone to the length of providing that if the Defendant does not appear at the date of hearing in Court, the Court should serve him in the ordinary way, the sending of summons by post being only an attempt at service. The Courts in Saurashtra should be very careful in Ordering service by post even when authorised by the Code bearing in mind the above remarks of the Bombay High Court that service by post is at any time a poor substitute for personal service.
6. As the Defendant has not been duly served he is entitled to get the decree set aside, apart from the question whether there was sufficient cause for his non-appearance on the date of hearing. This finding is however subject to the question of limitation that the Defendant should have filed his application for setting aside the ex-parte I decree within 30 days of his knowledge of the decree. The onus of proof no doubt lies upon the Defendant as the application was admittedly filed more than 30 days of the passing of the decree. He has filed his affidavit showing that he came to know of the decree on 20-6-1951 and he did not know anything about the decree before. This statement taken along with the fact on the record that the Court's notice informing him of the passing of the decree was received by Ratilal, his clerk, on 20-6-51 leaves no doubt that he came to know from this source. He had already sent a letter to the Court with a stamped envelope for information of the adjourned date and he was presumably awaiting a reply from the Court in ordinary course; so that it cannot be inferred that he knew of the decree before he received information from the Court on 20-6-51.
7. In view of this finding, it is not necessary for me to consider the alternative case whether the Defendant had shown sufficient cause for non-appearance. If he is held to have been duly served, the application was time-barred unless the Court condoned delay under Section 5, Indian Limitation Act, which has been applied to an application under Order 9, Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure, by an amendment of the Saurashtra High Court. The result is that this appeal is allowed and the Order of the learned Assistant Judge is set aside. The application of the Defendant to set aside the ex-parte decree is granted and the suit is restored to the file to be disposed of in accordance with law. In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case I make no Order as to costs.
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