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Jaggarnath v. B.K Ray
Factual and Procedural Background
Village Chainpur had at one time belonged to the Palganj Estate. The present appellant no. 1 is the holder of that estate, which is managed under the Encumbered Estates Act; appellant no. 2 is the Manager of the encumbered estates and appellant no. 3 is the Province of Bihar. The previous holder was Raja Ranbahadur Singh (the Raja).
On 17 February 1930 village Chainpur was sold in execution of a decree obtained against the Raja; a sum of Rs. 6,050 was realised and the property was knocked down in the name of Rameshwar Lall. The plaintiff-respondent obtained from Rameshwar Lall a sale deed dated 27 November 1931 for a consideration of Rs. 7,250. Further attestations of the executant's signature were made on 28 November 1931, and on that date the plaintiff executed an agreement in favour of the Raja promising to convey the village to the Raja within three years on certain terms (this agreement was registered on 21 March 1932). The plaintiff also executed a second agreement on 28 November 1931 promising to get the first agreement executed. After these transactions the plaintiff was given possession of Chainpur and remained in possession until 10 December 1940, when possession was delivered to the Manager of the Encumbered Estates in accordance with an order of the Deputy Commissioner of Hazaribagh dated 1 November 1941. The plaintiff unsuccessfully applied to the Board of Revenue to reverse that order and then brought the present suit.
In the trial court the plaintiff obtained a decree declaring his title to village Chainpur with recovery of possession and mesne-profits. The trial court held that Rameshwar Lall did not get possession of the village, found that it was not established that he was a benamidar of the Raja, held that the transactions of 27 and 28 November 1931 were not intended to operate as a mortgage, and further held that the defendants' claim that these documents constituted a mortgage was barred by the proviso to section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act. The trial court decreed the suit against defendants 1 and 2 and awarded mesne-profits from 5 March 1942; the suit was dismissed as against the Province of Bihar (defendant no. 3).
The defendants (appellants) appealed. The plaintiff-respondent filed a cross-objection challenging the period for which mesne-profits were allowed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether it is legally open to the appellants to urge that the transactions of 27 November 1931 and 28 November 1931 constituted a mortgage (i.e., whether that plea is barred by the proviso to section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act).
- Whether the transactions of 27 November 1931 and 28 November 1931 in fact constituted a mortgage by conditional sale.
- Whether Rameshwar Lall was a benamidar (nominee/benami holder) of the Raja.
- On behalf of the appellants: whether the plaintiff-respondent was entitled to agitate the matter in the Civil Court (i.e., jurisdictional/competency question).
- On behalf of the appellants: whether the Manager of the Encumbered Estates was entitled to possession of the village even if the transactions did not amount to a mortgage, if Rameshwar Lall was the Raja's benamidar.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant-Appellants' Arguments
- Rameshwar Lall was a benamidar for the Raja both at the time of his purchase in execution (17 February 1930) and at the time he executed the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff (27 November 1931).
- The sale deed of 27 November 1931 together with the agreement executed by the plaintiff on 28 November 1931 (promising to convey the village to the Raja within three years) amounted, taken together, to a mortgage by conditional sale.
- Accordingly, the Manager of the Encumbered Estates lawfully took possession of the village and lawfully removed the plaintiff as a mortgagee or conditional vendee under section 16 of the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act.
- The appellants relied on a decision of the Bombay High Court (Kuppa Krishna Hegde v. Mhasti Goli Naik) for the proposition that the right of repurchase must be embodied in the same document of ostensible sale.
Plaintiff-Respondent's Arguments
- The plaintiff sought a declaration that Rameshwar Lall was not a benamidar of the Raja and that the sale by Rameshwar Lall to the plaintiff dated 27 November 1931 was an out-and-out sale.
- The plaintiff contended that the agreement executed in favour of the Raja on 28 November 1931 was a personal covenant by the plaintiff and that the two documents together did not constitute a mortgage by conditional sale; accordingly the agreement of 28 November 1931 was no longer enforceable.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kuppa Krishna Hegde v. Mhasti Goli Naik (Bombay High Court) | Suggested that when intention is deduced from document construction the proviso requires that a right of re-purchase be embodied in the same document of ostensible sale; it included an observation that if the condition is embodied in more than one document the inference of mortgage would not necessarily arise. | The court treated the observations relied on as obiter in that case (because there the condition was embodied in the sale deed). Beevor, J. respectfully dissented from the broader reading of that sentence and concluded that the proviso to section 58(c) must be read to preclude treating the transaction as a mortgage unless the condition is embodied in the document effecting or purporting to effect the sale. |
| Ma Sein Nyo v. Maung San Pe (Rangoon High Court; Moselv, J.) | Interpretation supportive of the view that the proviso requires the condition to be embodied in the sale document and that where it is not so embodied the transaction cannot be treated as a mortgage by conditional sale. | Beevor, J. agreed with the view taken by Moselv, J. and relied upon it to hold that because the 27 November 1931 sale deed did not embody the condition, the transaction could not be treated as a mortgage under the proviso to section 58(c). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in stages:
- Primary focus on the proviso to section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act. The proviso provides that no transaction of the kind described in section 58(c) shall be deemed to be a mortgage unless the condition is embodied in the document which effects or purports to effect the sale. The court quoted the subsection and the proviso and interpreted its plain language to mean that if the condition is not embodied in the sale document, the court cannot treat the transaction as a mortgage by conditional sale.
- Consideration of precedent: the appellants relied on a Bombay High Court decision (Kuppa Krishna Hegde). The court noted that the particular sentence in that judgment relied upon was obiter because in that case the condition actually was embodied in the sale deed. The court also observed that the amending Act XX of 1929 (which added the proviso) does not have retrospective effect by virtue of section 63 of the same amending act; however, the 27 November 1931 sale falls after the amendment, so the proviso applies directly to the present transactions.
- Applying the proviso to the facts: the sale deed dated 27 November 1931 did not itself embody the condition for sale or re-sale to the Raja. On that basis Beevor, J. concluded that the transactions could not be treated as a mortgage by conditional sale and that it was not legally open to the appellants to contend the contrary in the present case.
- The court observed that the finding just reached (that the proviso precluded treating the transaction as a mortgage) would be sufficient to dispose of the appeal. Nonetheless the court addressed the position that would obtain if the proviso were absent: in that event the appellants would have to establish that Rameshwar Lall was a benamidar of the Raja in order to succeed. The court recognised this as a necessary subordinate issue.
- On the question of mens rea of Rameshwar Lall (benami status), the court recorded the trial court's finding that it was not established that Rameshwar Lall was a benamidar. Meredith, J. (concurring) explained reasons why he considered Rameshwar Lall to be a benamidar: the Raja's evident interest in Chainpur, the Raja's agents attesting and identifying documents (including a raiyati patta) and the Raja taking a personal interest when Rameshwar purported to sell to a third party. Meredith, J. considered these circumstances to make it irresistible that Rameshwar Lall was a benamidar. However, Beevor, J.'s principal disposition did not rest on a definitive judicial finding of benami; rather the proviso to section 58(c) was determinative.
- On the cross-objection concerning mesne-profits, the court analysed the trial court's award date. The trial court had awarded mesne-profits from 5 March 1942, apparently under the belief that possession had not been delivered to the Manager until the Board of Revenue disposed of the plaintiff's objection. The appellate court noted that possession had in fact been delivered to the Manager on 10 December 1940 and that the Board of Revenue's purported stay had no practical effect on the actual delivery of possession. Accordingly, the court concluded the plaintiff was entitled to mesne-profits from 10 December 1940, not 5 March 1942.
- Costs: because the plaintiff succeeded only by reason of the technical bar of the proviso to section 58(c) while the appellants had some success on the substantial questions (benami and intention), the court directed that the parties should bear their own costs in this Court.
Holding and Implications
Appeal dismissed; cross-objection allowed.
Direct effects on the parties:
- The decree of the lower court in favour of the plaintiff-respondent is maintained as against defendants 1 and 2 (the plaintiff's declaration of title, recovery of possession and award of mesne-profits are upheld subject to the modification noted below).
- The decree as to mesne-profits is modified: the date from which mesne-profits are to be awarded is substituted as 10 December 1940 (in place of 5 March 1942).
- The plaintiff's suit against defendant no. 3 (the Province of Bihar) was dismissed at trial and that result stands in this Court.
- The parties are directed to bear their own costs in this Court.
Legal implication emphasised by the court:
The court interpreted the proviso to section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act to mean that a transaction will not be deemed a mortgage by conditional sale unless the condition is embodied in the document which effects or purports to effect the sale. Applying that provision to the facts (the sale deed dated 27 November 1931 did not embody the condition), the court held that the transaction could not be treated as a mortgage by conditional sale. The court also addressed factual indicators of benami status (in the concurring reasoning of Meredith, J.), but the dispositive legal bar on treating the transaction as a mortgage was the proviso to section 58(c).
Disposition
Appeal dismissed.
Cross-objection allowed.
Beevor, J.:— This appeal has been filed by the defendants in a suit in which the plaintiff-respondent has been granted a decree for a declaration of his title to village Chainpur with recovery of possession together with mesne-profits. There is a cross-objection by the plaintiff-respondent relating to the period for which mesne-profits have been allowed.
Village Chainpur admittedly belonged at one time to what is known as the Palganj Estate. Appellant no. 1 is the present holder of that estate, but his estate is managed under the Encumbered Estates Act and he is, therefore, sued through; the Manager of the encumbered estates who is himself appellant no. 2. The Province of Bihar is appellant no. 3. The previous holder of the Palgani Estate was Raja Ranbahadur Singh, father of appellant no. 1, hereinafter referred to as the Raja. On the 17th February, 1930, village Chainpur was sold in execution of a decree obtained against the Raja by Akshoy Krishna Trigunait and a sum of Rs. 6,050 was realised, the property being knocked down in the name of one Rameshwar Lall. The plaintiff-respondent obtained from Rameshwar Lall a sale deed in respect of the property, dated the 27th November, 1931, for a consideration of Rs. 7,250. Further attestations of the executant's signature on the sale deed were made next day, the 28th November, 1931, and on the latter date the plaintiff executed an agreement in favour of the Raja whereby he agreed to convey the village to the Raja within three years on certain terms. This document was not registered until the 21st March, 1932, but meanwhile on the 28th November, 1931, the plaintiff had executed a second agreement in favour of the Raja promising to get the agreement for sale executed. It is also undisputed that after the transactions of the 27th November, 1931, and the 28th November, 1931, the plaintiff was given possession of village Chainpur and remained in possession until the 10th December, 1940, when possession was delivered to the Manager of the Encumbered. Estates in accordance with an order of the Deputy Commissioner of Hazaribagh, dated the 1st November 1941. The plaintiff-respondent unsuccessfully moved the Board of Revenue to reverse the order of the Deputy Commissioner and then brought the present suit.
The main case for the defendant-appellants is that Rameshwar Lall was a benamidar for the Raja both at the time of his purchase in execution on the 17th February, 1930, and at the time he executed the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff respondent on the 27th November, 1931, that the sale deed, just mentioned, together with the agreement executed by the plaintiff-respondent in favour of the Raja on the 28th November, 1931, to convey the village to him within three years taken together amounted to a mortgage by conditional sale, and that, therefore, the Manager of the Encumbered Estates had lawfully taken possession of the village and had lawfully removed the plaintiff-respondent as mortgagee or conditional vendee under section 16 of the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act, 1876. It was in accordance with this case of the defendant-appellants that the order of the Deputy Commissioner, dated the 1st November, 1941, was passed and that order was upheld by the Board of Revenue.
In these circumstances the plaintiff in his plaint claimed not merely a formal declaration of his title but a declaration that Rameshwar Lall was not a benamidar of the Raja and that the sale by Rameshwar Lall to the plaintiff, dated the 27th November, 1931, was an out and out sale, and the agreement in favour of the Raja executed next day by the plaintiff was a personal covenant made by the plaintiff and that the two documents together did not constitute a mortgage by conditional sale and that the agreement of the 28th November, 1931, was no longer enforceable.
The trial court held that Rameshwar Lall did not get possession of the village but that it was not established that he was a benamidar of the Rai a. He also held on the merits that the transactions of the 27th November, 1931, and the 28th November, 1931, were not intended to operate as a mortgage, and he further held that the defendants' claim to have these documents regarded as constituting a mortgage was barred by the, proviso to section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act. He, therefore decreed the plaintiff's suit as against defendants 1 and 2 with mesne-profits against defendant no. 1 from the 5th March, 1942, and dismissed the suit against defendant no. 3, the Province of Bihar.
The first question for decision in this appeal is whether it, is legally open to the appellants to urge that the transactions of the 27th November, 1931, and the 28th November, 1931, constituted a mortgage. The second question is whether those transactions did in fact constitute a mortgage. This involves a third question which, though subsidiary, is important, namely, whether Rameshwar Lall was a benamidar of the Raja. On behalf of the appellants further questions were raised: first, whether the plaintiff-respondent was entitled to agitate the matter in the Civil Court, and secondly whether the Manager of the Encumbered Estates was entitled to possession of the village even if the transactions did not amount to a mortgage by conditional sale, in the event of it being found that Rameshwar Lall was a benamidar for the Raja.
I will deal first with the question whether the appellants' contentions are barred by the proviso to section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act. section 58(c) runs as follows:—
“Where the mortgagor ostensibly sells the mortgaged property—
on condition that on default of payment of the mortgage-money on a certain date the sale shall become absolute, or
on condition that on such payment being made the sale shall become void, or
on condition that on such payment being made the buyer shall transfer the property to the seller,
the transaction is called a mortgage by conditional Bale and the mortgagee a mortgagee by conditional sale.
Provided that, no such transaction shall be deemed to be a mortgage, unless the condition is embodied in the document which effects or purports to effect the sale”.
The proviso was added by the Amending Act no. XX of 1929. I think that the wording of this proviso shows clearly that if the condition is not embodied in the document which effects or purports' to effect the sale, then it is not open to the court to treat the transaction as a mortgage. The appellants relied on a decision of the Bombay High Court in Kuppa Krishna Hegde… v. Mhasti Goli Naik….. Reliance was placed on one sentence in the judgment: “In case a mortgagor passed in favour of a mortgagee an ostensible sale-deed and the intention of the parties is to be arrived at by the construction of the document, the proviso says that the right of re-purchase must be embodied in the same document, and that if it is embodied in more than one document, the inference of a mortgage would not necessarily arise, and that no transaction should be deemed to be a mortgage by conditional sale unless the condition is embodied in the document of the ostensible sale but the sub-section and the proviso do not dispense with the condition that it must be a; transaction between the creditor and the debtor.” The difficulty is created by the word “necessarily” in this sentence. It is important, I think, to notice that in the case before the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court the condition was embodied in the sale deed. The remarks regarding the effect of two separate documents were, therefore, obiter. Moreover, the learned Judges were dealing with a transaction of the year 1910 and section 63 of the amending Act XX of 1929, expressly enacts that the amendments in section 58 shall not have retrospective effect. If this sentence, however, is to be taken as the considered view of the Bombay High Court, I must respectfully dissent from it. I agree with the view of the section taken by Moselv, J. of the Rangoon High Court in Ma Sein Nyo v. Maung San Pe. I hold, therefore, that in this case as the document of sale, dated the 27th November, 1931, does not embody the condition for sale or re-sale to the Raja, the transaction cannot be treated as a mortgage by reason of the proviso to section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act.
The finding just reached would be sufficient to dispose of this appeal, but I think it is desirable that I should consider what the position would have been in the absence of the proviso to section 58(c). Clearly the appellants' claim must fail unless they can establish that Rameshwar Lall was a benamidar of the Raja. * * * *
Coming now to the cross-objection, the judgment and decree under appeal granted the plaintiff mesne-profits from the 5th March, 1942. The passage in the judgment dealing with this matter is as follows:
“He will also be entitled to mesne profits from the date of his dispossession, viz., 5th March 1942 on which date the Board of Revenue finally disposed of the objection of plaintiff up to the date of recovery of possession the amount thereof (sic) will be ascertained on plaintiff's application.”
It looks as if the learned Subordinate Judge was under the impression that possession had not been delivered to the Manager of the Encumbered Estates until the Board of Revenue disposed of that objection. It seems that what purported to be an order of stay was issued by the Board of Revenue, but that had no effect as possession had actually been delivered to the Manager for defendant-appellant no. 1 on the 10th December 1940, and clearly it is from the latter date that the plaintiff-respondent is entitled to mesne-profits.
For the reasons given above I would dismiss this appeal and allow the cross-objection and direct that the decree of the lower court be modified by substituting the date the 10th of December, 1940, for the date the 5th of March, 1942, in the decree as the date from which the plaintiff is allowed mesne-profits. As the plaintiff-respondent has succeeded only by reason of the technical bar imposed by the proviso to section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act while the appellants have succeeded on the substantial question relating to the question of benami and the real intention of the parties to the transactions of November, 1931, I would leave the parties to bear their own costs in this Court.
Meredith, J.:— I agree. Two circumstances have particularly influenced me in coming to the conclusion that Rameshwar Lall was merely a benamidar of the Raja. The evidence makes it clear beyond doubt that Chainpur was a favourite village with the Raja, as he was doing everything he could to save it for the estate. If Rameshwar Lall was a genuine purchaser at the auction sale, and subsequently was struggling with the Raja to obtain possession, it is impossible to suppose that the Raja would help him in any way to establish his possession or to create evidence thereof. Yet we find that when Rameshwar Lall gives a raiyati patta to one Rameshwar Prasad, in respect of lands in Chainpur, on the 28th of October, 1931, by the document, exhibit 1, far from the Raja's men trying to prevent this we find the Raja's Manager, Mahadeo Ray, attesting the document, and the Raja's Forester identifying the executant before the Sub-Registrar. The inference is, to my mind, irresistible that this settlement was really made by the estate in the name of Rameshwar Lall.
The second circumstance is that, when Rameshwar Lall purports to sell Chainpur to a third party, the Raja takes a personal interest in the transaction, has the sale-deed read over to him, and attests it. This conduct, having regard to the Raja's attitude towards Chainpur, seems, to me to show that the Raja was not opposed to that sale. Had Rameshwar Lall not been his benamidar, and had that been a genuine out and out sale, that is, I feel sure, the very last thing the Raja would have done. The position is, in my view, that a mortgage by conditional sale was intended, but by reason of the bar imposed by the proviso to section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act we cannot deem the transaction to be a mortgage. It must, therefore, be regarded as a sale with a condition attached. Regarded as such, upon the terms of the documents, time was of the essence of the contract. When the Manager took possession, three years had expired, the condition had lapsed and. But to Krishto Ray's title was no longer conditional but absolute. The property, therefore, in no sense remained part of the estate, and the Manager was not entitled to take possession under section 16 of the Encumbered Estates Act.
Appeal dismissed.
Cross-objection allowed.
S.H
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