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Abdul Kader v. Ali Mia

Calcutta High Court
Apr 22, 1912
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Factual and Procedural Background

During the pendency of a suit on a hand-note by Defendant No.1 against Defendant No.2, Defendant No.2 sold his homestead with a tank to the Plaintiff for 700 rupees. Defendant No.1 later obtained a decree on the hand-note and attached the said land. The Plaintiff filed a claim under section 278 of the Civil Procedure Code which was disallowed; the property was sold and purchased by Defendant No.1 at the execution sale for 40 rupees, his decree being for about 348 rupees. The Plaintiff then brought this suit under section 283 of the Civil Procedure Code for declaration of title and confirmation of possession. The Defendant pleaded that the Plaintiff's purchase was benami for the debtor and fraudulent. The trial Court decreed for the Plaintiff; the Subordinate Judge set aside that decree, finding the sale was made by Defendant No.2 to defeat Defendant No.1's claim and that the Plaintiff was aware of the fraudulent motive. The matter proceeded to a second appeal before the Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the case was decided on a point not raised by the pleadings (relating to section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act).
  2. Whether the execution purchase by Defendant No.1, made after the institution of the present suit, is subject to the result of the present suit.
  3. Whether, on the findings (that the Plaintiff purchased for value and was in possession), the Plaintiff's suit under section 283 should have been decreed.
  4. Whether a single creditor (Defendant No.1) can avoid a transfer under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act for himself (and whether he can raise that plea as a defence rather than by independent suit).
  5. Whether Defendant No.1's purchase can be impeached only to the extent of his decree (about 348 rupees) and whether he could be required only to that extent.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The Plaintiff claimed title and possession under a purchase for valuable consideration (700 rupees) and filed a claim under section 278 CPC when the property was attached.
  • The Plaintiff asserted a right to declaration of title and confirmation of possession under section 283 CPC after his claim was disallowed in execution.

Defendant No.1's Arguments (as presented on second appeal)

  • Contended that the matter was decided on a point not raised by the pleadings (relating to section 53, Transfer of Property Act).
  • Argued the execution purchase made after institution of the suit is subject to the suit's result.
  • Maintained that, on the findings, the Plaintiff's suit should not have been decreed.
  • Asserted that as a defendant acting for himself and not for all creditors he could not avoid a transfer that was only voidable under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • Argued his purchase could be impeached only to the extent of his decree (about 348 rupees) and offered to pay that amount.

Defendant No.2's Arguments

  • Pleaded that the sale to the Plaintiff was benami and fraudulent and made with the object of defeating Defendant No.1's prospective execution.
  • Insisted in defence that the title on which the Plaintiff relied was in fraud of his claim and therefore ineffectual as against him.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Phul Kumari v. Ghansyham Misser Scope of a suit under section 283 CPC: that it is essentially a suit for review of a summary decision and that summary decision in a claim case is confined to consideration of the possession of the judgment-debtor at the time of attachment. Used to define the scope of the Plaintiff's section 283 suit and to conclude that, given the finding of Plaintiff's possession, the suit should have been decreed absent other restricting pleadings.
Smith v. Hursl, Spirett v. Willows, Blenkinsopp v. Blenkinsopp That a judgment-creditor is entitled to act for himself and may seek a declaration that a conveyance is void as against his own claim. Relied on to show that Defendant No.1, being a judgment-creditor, could act for himself to avoid the transfer as against his debt.
Ishan Chandra Sarkar v. Bishu Sardar Instances where the plea under section 53 was raised by a Defendant without objection to competency. Referred to as precedent where a defendant raised the section 53 plea; supported the view that such a plea can be pleaded in defence.
Rajani Kumar Das v. Gour Kishore Shaha Similar instance of a defendant raising the plea under section 53 in defence. Used to show prior practice of allowing the section 53 plea by a defendant; weighed in considering competency of raising the plea in defence.
Re Maddever Three Towns: Banking Co. v. Maddever That a party who does not avoid a voidable transfer and waits until his claim is barred by limitation loses the right to avoid. Applied to explain that the right to avoid is elective and must be exercised or it may be lost by limitation.
Clough v. London and North Western Railway Co. That a party may express his determination to avoid a transfer by way of defence to a suit brought against him. Relied on to support the proposition that Defendant No.1 could elect to avoid the transfer by raising the defence in this suit.
The Eastern Mortgage and Agency Co. v. Rebati Kumar Ray and Hem Chandra Sarkar v. Lalit Mahon Kar Authorities on a creditor's right to challenge transfers and the modes of asserting such rights. Used alongside other authorities to support that a creditor may elect to avoid a transfer and assert that election in defence.
Ideal Bedding Co. v. Holland That a transferee may be directed to join and concur in acts necessary to make the property available for satisfying the creditor's claim. Applied to support a remedy requiring transferees to assist in making property available to satisfy the creditor's demand.
Cornish v. Clark Statement that a settlement bad as against creditors is bad merely as against them and donees must rateably contribute to pay the debt and costs. Relied on to justify confining avoidance or requiring contribution proportionate to the creditor's claim.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed each contention in turn:

  • On the first ground (pleadings and section 53): The Court found the written statement of Defendant No.1 raised the point, albeit not in the precise words of section 53 Transfer of Property Act; the Munsif had relied on the section previously, and the issue of defeating prospective execution made the pleadings sufficiently comprehensive.
  • On the second ground (timing of Defendant No.1's execution purchase): The Court held the execution purchase, being after institution of the present suit, was subject to the result of the suit.
  • On the third ground (effect of findings under section 283): Relying on Phul Kumari v. Ghansyham Misser, the Court explained that a section 283 suit reviews the summary decision limited to possession at attachment. The summary decision had found the judgment-debtor in possession, but the Subordinate Judge found the Plaintiff was in possession after a purchase for valuable consideration; on that finding the section 283 suit should have been decreed unless restricted by pleadings outside that scope.
  • On the fourth ground (whether one creditor can act for himself and whether he can do so in defence): The first part did not arise because there was only one creditor and he was a judgment-creditor, who may act for himself (citing the noted authorities). On whether the plea can be availed as a defence, the Court noted authorities where section 53 was raised by defendants and reasoned that the transfer is voidable at the creditor's option; the creditor may avoid by an independent suit or may indicate his election by way of defence to a suit brought against him.
  • On the fifth ground (limitation of avoidance to extent of the decree): The Court held the creditor's right is to satisfy his demand out of the debtor's property; if the property exceeds what would satisfy the debt, the creditor's avoidance or remedy is confined to making available enough to satisfy his claim. Authorities were cited to support directing transferees to assist or to require rateable contribution.
  • Conclusion of analysis: Given the findings that Plaintiff purchased for value and was in possession, and bearing in mind the rights and limits of the judgment-creditor, the Court set aside the lower Appellate Court's decree and entered the decree described below.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; the decree of the lower Appellate Court is set aside.

Direct effect on the parties:

  • The Court ordered that the Plaintiff's title be declared subject to satisfaction of Defendant No.1's decree.
  • If the amount of Defendant No.1's decree with interest is not paid within one month from arrival of the record in the Court below (notice to be given), the property in suit will be sold; any surplus after satisfaction of the decree will be received by the Plaintiff.
  • Each party will bear its own costs in all Courts.

No broader precedent was expressly declared beyond the application of cited authorities to the facts; the decision determines rights between these parties without stating that a new legal principle is established.

Show all summary ...

During the pendency of a suit on a hand-note by the Defendant No. 1 against Defendant, No. 2, the latter sold his homestead with a tank to the Plaintiff for a consideration, of 700 rupees. The Defendant No. 1 subsequently obtained a decree on the hand-note and attached the said land. The Plaintiff put in a claim under sec. 278 of the Civil Procedure Code and it was disallowed and the property was sold and purchased by Defendant No. 1 for 40 rupees only, his decree being for 348 rupees odd. The Plaintiff brings this suit under sec. 283 of the Civil Procedure Code for declaration of title and confirmation of possession. The Defendant pleaded that the purchase of the Plaintiff was benami for the debtor and fraudulent.

The first Court held that the purchase was not benami, and that there was no evidence that the Plaintiff knew of the decree or the suit and decreed the Plaintiff's suit.

The learned Subordinate Judge has set aside the decree of the first Court holding that although consideration had been paid and Plaintiff was in possession, the Defendant No. 2 living on some other land, the Defendant No. 2 made the sale with the object of defeating the claim made by Defendant No. 1, that the Plaintiff was aware of the fraudulent motive of Defendant No. 2 in selling the property to him and helped him in carrying out the fraudulent object.

It is contended in second appeal before us (1) that the case has been decided on a point not raised by the pleadings, (2) that the purchase of the Defendant No. 1 was made after the present suit of the Plaintiff and is therefore subject to the result of the present suit, (3) that upon the findings the suit should have been decreed, (4) that the Defendant No. 1 cannot as a Defendant acting for himself and not for the whole body of creditors avoid a transfer that was only voidable under sec. 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, (5) that the Defendant's claim being only for 348 rupees odd under his decree his purchase could he impeached only to the extent of 348 rupees and he was ready to pay the same.

As regards the first ground, there can be no doubt that the written statement of Defendant No. 1 does raise the point although not precisely in the words of sec. 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. The section was relied upon by the Munsif in the claim case and must have, been in the contemplation of the Defendant although his main case was that the kobala was a benami transaction. It is clear however that the only issue framed in this connection was the issue of benami and the evidence was directed almost entirely to the question of benami. The ostensible object of the creation of the benami however being the defeating of the prospective execution of a prospective decree the issue actually raised in the case may be taken to have been comprehensive enough.

The execution purchase of Defendant No. 1 was after the institution of the present suit and must be subject to be result of the suit. This disposes of the second ground.

In order to decide of the third ground we must consider the scope of the suit and the effect of the findings.

The suit was one under sec. 283 of the Civil Procedure Code. The scope of such a suit was the subject of discussion in the Privy Council in the case of Phul Kumari v. Ghansyham Misser(1) and the Judicial Committee held that a suit under sec. 283 was essentially a suit for the review of a summary decision. The summary decision in a claim case is confined to a consideration of the possession of the judgment-debtor at the time of the attachment: any other discussion in such a decision is material only so far as it is relevant to the determination of that essential matter.

In this case the summary decision was that the judgment-debtor was in possession and not the claimant (Plaintiff) and the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge is that the Plaintiff was and has been in possession after a purchase for valuable consideration and not the judgment-debtor, Defendant No. 2. Upon this finding the suit under sec. 283 should have been decreed unless there was anything in the pleadings outside the scope of sec. 283, Civil Procedure Code, to restrain or restrict such a result.

The fourth ground resolves itself into two parts (i) whether one creditor can take action for himself or must he act on behalf of the whole body of creditors, (ii) whether he can take action by way of defence to a suit brought against him or must he proceed by an independent suit. The first part of the question does not arise in this case for two reasons 1 the first is that upon the findings there was but one creditor in this case: and the second is that the Defendant No. 2 having already obtained a decree for his debt is entitled to act for himself—he may have a declaration that the conveyance was void as against his own claim. See Smith v. Hursl, Spirett v. Willows, Blenkinsopp v. Blenkinsopp. The reason is that he is more than a creditor, he is 3 judgment-creditor. As regards the second part of the ground there is some apparent difficulty in coming to a satisfactory answer that would meet all cases. If there are more creditors and the particular creditor impleaded as, a Defendant stands on the same footing as other creditors, he must plead, for all and may perhaps be allowed to do so even as a Defendant if the Court has jurisdiction to entertain a claim for the claims of all the creditors. That however is a larger question that does not arise in this case. Here the Defendant No. 1 is the only creditor and he has already obtained judgment and taken out execution. He could bring an independent suit for himself, but can he do as Defendant what he could have done as a Plaintiff? There are two reported cases which have a bearing on this point. Ishan Chandra Sarkar v. Bishu Sardar(5), Maclean, C.J, and Banerjee, J., and Rajani Kumar Das v. Gour Kishore Shaha(6), Mitra and Caspersz, JJ. In both these cases the plea under sec. 53 was raised by a Defendant and no objection was made to the competency of the plea by way of defence although the parties were ably represented. It is true the question was not raised and discussed and these cases would not stand in the way of our overruling the plea as incompetent: but is there any reason why we should do so? The section says the transfer would be voidable at the option of the party delayed etc., it is not ipso facto void and is therefore valid until it is avoided. If he does not care to avoid the transfer but waits until his debt or decree is barred by limitation, be loses the right. See Re Maddever Three Towns: Banking Co. v. Maddever(7). If he takes advantage of his legal right to avoid, he may do so by way of suit which is the most unequivocal way of doing it or he may express, his determination by way of defence to a suit brought against him, See Clough v. London and North Western Railway Co.. See also The Eastern Mortgage and Agency Co. v. Rebati Kumar Ray and Hem Chandra Sarkar v. Lalit Mahon Kar(10). In this case the election was made for the first time when the Plaintiff made a claim in the execution taken out by Defendant No. 1 and Defendant No. 2 insisted on his determination in his defence in this case. He had every right to say that the title upon which the Plaintiff relied was in fraud of his claim and therefore ineffectual as against him.

The fifth and last ground is also good. The only interest which the creditor has in the property of his debtor is his right to satisfy himself out of that property. If the property is larger than what would satisfy his demand he cannot complain if his right to avoid the transfer is confined to that part of the property which is taken out of his reach by the transfer or if the transferee be made to satisfy his demand. In the case of Ideal Bedding Co. v. Holland(11) the transferee was directed to join and concur in all acts and things necessary for making the properly comprised in the transfer available for satisfying the claims of the creditor. In the case of Cornish v. Clark(12), Lord Romilly said in respect of a settlement in fraud of creditors, “I think the whole bad as against creditors, but merely as against them, and that the donees must rateably contribute to pay the debt and the costs of the suit.”

We therefore set aside the decree of the lower Appellate Court and order and decree that the title of the Plaintiff be declared subject to the satisfaction of the decree of Defendant No. 1. If the amount of the decree with interest as decreed be not paid within one month from the arrival of the record in the Court below, of which arrival due notice will be given, the property in suit will be sold and any surplus remaining after the satisfaction of the decree will be received by the Plaintiff. Each party will bear its own costs in all Courts.

Appeal allowed.