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G.A. Natesan, In Re

Madras High Court
Aug 16, 1916
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Factual and Procedural Background

A meeting of the Senate of the University of Madras was held on 3 March 1916. The Syndicate had placed on the agenda a set of proposed "Standing Orders" (Appendix A) relating to the appointment and duties of University professors. The Vice-Chancellor presiding ruled that the Standing Orders had to be accepted or rejected in toto and announced that one clause (Special B(1) concerning the Professor of Comparative Philology) was withdrawn by the Syndicate as inconsistent with an existing regulation. Mr. G.A. Natesan (a Fellow) and Mr. K.B. Ramanathan gave notice of protest under Regulation 64 and lodged written protests within the time prescribed. The Registrar returned Natesan's protest, asserting Regulation 64 did not cover protests against rulings of the Vice-Chancellor and requesting deletion of paragraphs challenging those rulings; the Syndicate declined to forward the protest while those paragraphs remained.

The applicants (Natesan and Ramanathan) applied to the High Court under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act seeking an order (analogous to mandamus) to compel the Syndicate to forward their protests and the counter-memoranda to the Governor in Council. A rule was granted calling upon the Syndicate to show cause. The Court heard argument and reviewed the Acts (the Act of Incorporation 1857 and the Indian Universities Act VIII of 1904), the University regulations (including Regulation 64 and Regulation 96), the minutes, correspondence and affidavits. The Court ultimately made the rule absolute in favour of both applicants with taxed costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Syndicate of the University is a person or body liable to be ordered under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act (i.e., whether it is a "person holding a public office" for that purpose).
  2. Whether the applicant (Mr. G.A. Natesan) possessed the specific legal right required by section 45 to seek the Court's assistance in respect of the Syndicate's refusal to forward his protest under Regulation 64.
  3. Whether Regulation 64 of the University Regulations validly extends to all "resolutions" of the Senate or only to resolutions that amount to "regulations" within the meaning of section 25 of the Universities Act (i.e., those requiring the sanction of the Government).
  4. Whether the Syndicate's function under Regulation 64 is discretionary (permitting refusal or censorship of the contents of a protest) or ministerial (obliging it to forward a legitimate protest as received).
  5. Whether the Vice-Chancellor's rulings (on points of order and on withdrawal of parts of the proposals) converted the applicant's protest into a challenge to the Vice-Chancellor's ruling rather than a protest against the Senate's resolution.
  6. Whether the Court should exercise its discretionary power under section 45 to grant mandamus in the circumstances of this case.

Arguments of the Parties

Advocate-General / Syndicate / Registrar (Respondent) — principal contentions

  • The protest presented by Mr. Natesan was, in substance, a protest against the ruling of the Vice-Chancellor and not against the resolution of the Senate; Regulation 64 does not cover protests against rulings.
  • The Syndicate (or its members) are not "persons holding a public office" within section 45 of the Specific Relief Act, so the relief sought is not maintainable against them.
  • Even if the Syndicate had the duty asserted by the applicant, there is no specific right in the applicant personally that has been injured; a right common to all Fellows is insufficient.
  • The Syndicate had a discretion to withhold, moderate or edit a protest (for example, where it contained scandalous or improper matter), and its bona fide exercise of discretion is not reviewable.
  • Regulation 64 should be construed to apply only to resolutions that are "regulations" within the meaning of section 25 of the Universities Act (i.e., matters requiring Government sanction); the Syndicate's proposals were put forward under Regulation 96(iii) and so are not necessarily regulations.
  • There are alternative remedies available to the applicant (petition to Government, motion in the Senate, action to set aside an ultra vires resolution), and thus mandamus should not issue where other adequate remedies exist.
  • The Vice-Chancellor's rulings on points of order were final at the meeting; those rulings could not be questioned in this forum, and a protest that is only a challenge to such a ruling falls outside Regulation 64.
  • Practical and discretionary considerations: the Court should refuse relief to avoid encouraging frivolous applications or burdening the Court with matters of internal university management.

Applicant / Mr. Ramaswami Ayyar (for Mr. Natesan) and Mr. Natesan — principal contentions

  • The protest served by Mr. Natesan was a protest against the Senate's resolution and not merely against the Vice-Chancellor's ruling; arguments about the ruling were advanced only to demonstrate why Government should withhold sanction to the resolution.
  • The Syndicate's duties under Regulation 64 are purely ministerial (to print and circulate the protest and forward it with the memorandum and copy of the resolution to the Governor in Council); it has no power to censor or compel amendment of the protest.
  • The Syndicate is a statutory body performing public functions; its members are persons holding public office for the purposes of section 45 and are amenable to mandamus.
  • Regulation 64 gives every Fellow a specific right to protest; a right enjoyed in common with others nevertheless creates a specific enforceable right in the individual who is aggrieved.
  • Substance, not terminology, controls: the Senate's approval of the Syndicate's proposals (though called "Standing Orders" and presented under Regulation 96(iii)) was, in substance, the making of regulations in matters which by the Act require Government sanction; therefore Regulation 64 applies.
  • Because the protest seeks only to prevent the resolution receiving Government sanction (not to reverse the Vice-Chancellor's ruling), the Syndicate's refusal to forward it is wrongful and remediable by mandamus.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Henley v. The Mayor of Lyme The Advocate-General relied on observations by Best, C.J., concerning the definition of a public officer. The Court noted the reference in argument but rejected the Advocate-General's narrow construction; held Syndicate members are persons holding public office for s.45 purposes.
The Queen v. The Guardians of the Lewishan Onion Cited for the principle that the existence of a specific right in the applicant is a necessary qualification for relief. The Court accepted that a specific right is required and concluded Natesan had a specific right to have his protest forwarded.
Attorney-General v. Sillem Invocation of the rule with regard to judicial bodies and appeals to executive bodies. Used to reject the argument that referring matters to an executive body (Government) is distinguishable in principle from allowing appeals to a judicial body.
In re Dronfield Sikstone Coal Company Principle that a transaction ultra vires directors might be validated if adopted by the company. The Court considered such company-law analogies with caution and applied general principles (notice, substance of resolution) only where appropriate to the statutory scheme of the University.
Tiessen v. Benderson Authority that notice of the substance of a proposal is ordinarily sufficient. The Court relied on the sufficiency of substantive notice (not formal nomenclature) in evaluating whether Senate members had adequate notice.
Torbook / Torbock v. Lord Westbury Principle that a special resolution need not follow the exact terms of the notice if adequate notice of the substance was given. Applied to hold that the agenda and appendix gave sufficient notice of substance, so the Senate resolution was not invalid for lack of formality.
McConnell v. E. Prill & Co., Ltd. Decision emphasizing that where statute prescribes notice to be in a particular form or calls something by name, that requirement must be observed. The Court distinguished McConnell as inapposite: no statute requires the agenda to call such proposals by the statutory name here, so the decision did not invalidate the Senate's resolution.
In re Bridport Old Brewery Company Older authorities holding notices good where substance was conveyed. Referenced to support the proposition that substance of notice controls validity when statute is silent as to form.
Stone v. City and County Bank Another authority on notice sufficiency under earlier law. Used to support the Court's analysis on notice/substance; applied by analogy.
Hopkins v. The Mayor, etc. of Swansea Reasoning that by-laws/regulations made under a statute have effect within their limits akin to statutory provisions. Relied upon to conclude that university regulations (made under section 25) are subordinate legislation with binding force and enforceable by mandamus.
Willingale v. Norris Lord Alverstone's view that regulations made under a statute become, for purposes of obedience, provisions of the Act. Used to support the view that University regulations have statutory force and can be enforced.
Rex v. Walker Authority cited to the effect that regulations made under a statute have binding effect. Cited as supporting authority for the statutory force of regulations made under delegated power.
Re Langlois v. Biden (Lord Esher) County Court rules under statute had statutory force. Reinforced the Court's conclusion that rules/regulations under the Universities Acts are to be treated with statutory effect.
Kruse v. Johnstone (Lord Russell) By-laws, if validly made, have the force of law within their legitimate scope. Supported the Court's treatment of University regulations as having enforceable effect.
Narendra Nath Basu v. H.L. Stephenson Indian authority applying mandamus to enforce rules made under the Medical Registration Act. Referred to as precedent that mandamus may be used to enforce subordinate statutory rules in India.
In the matter of Rudra Narain Roy Mandamus issued to enforce rules under the Legal Practitioners Act (India). Indian practice cited to show mandamus available against statutory bodies in their official designation.
In the matter of Purno Chunder Dutt Mandamus in relation to statutory rules for examinations under the Legal Practitioners Act. Used as Indian authority on issuing mandamus to statutory bodies.
In re Provas Chandra Roy Similar Indian authority enforcing statutory rules via mandamus. Supported the Court's view on form of proceedings and availability of mandamus against statutory bodies.
Bholaram Chowdhry v. The Corporation of Calcutta Authority on proceeding against the appropriate statutory body when specific functions are allotted to a smaller body. Applied to hold that proceeding against the Syndicate (not the Senate) was proper, because Regulation 64 imposes duties on the Syndicate.
Re Barlow; Rex v. The Archbishop of Counterbury; R. v. Leicester Union; The Queen v. Price; The Queen v. Thomas; In re Natham Series of decisions establishing that mandamus lies to compel public statutory duties unless another equally adequate remedy exists. Cited to show the settled principle that mandamus is available where a statutory public duty is refused and no equally effective remedy exists; the Court applied that principle here.
Henderson v. The Bank of Australasia Authority against the view that a prior chairman's erroneous ruling automatically prevents later challenge or review by another body (or executive). Relied on to reject the contention that the Vice-Chancellor's rulings rendered a subsequent protest unacceptable for consideration by Government.
Campbell's Case; Oakbank Oil Co. v. Crum Principles that members are presumed to know the statutes and regulations governing their corporation and to have read the agenda in context. Used to support the conclusion that Fellows had sufficient notice of the substance of the proposals despite the label "Standing Orders."
Parker v. South Eastern Railway Company; Richardson Spence & Co.; Lord Gough Steamship Company v. Rawntree Authorities about notice and what a member of a corporate body is expected to do to acquaint himself with meeting business. Applied to reinforce that lack of attention by an individual member does not invalidate a resolution when adequate notice of substance was given.
Hessen v. Henderson General rule that a resolution is valid where due notice of meeting and of the business to be transacted has been given. Invoked to support the validity of the Senate's resolution once substance was provided in the agenda and appendix.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured manner, resolving jurisdictional and substantive points before exercising its discretion:

  1. Scope of section 45 Specific Relief Act and nature of the remedy:
    • The Court treated applications under s.45 as analogous to the English prerogative writ of mandamus but emphasised that the analogy must be confined within the words of the Indian statute.
    • The Court accepted that where a statute imposes public duties on a body, those persons constitute holders of public office for the purposes of s.45.
  2. Whether the Syndicate is amenable to s.45:
    • Relying on the Universities Acts and regulations, the Court held the Syndicate was a statutory executive body charged by regulation 64 with specific duties; the Syndicate therefore falls within "persons holding public office" under s.45.
    • English and Indian authorities were considered; the Court rejected the Advocate-General's contention that emoluments were a necessary test of public office.
  3. Whether the applicant possessed a specific right:
    • The Court accepted established authority that an applicant must have a specific legal right; it held Mr. Natesan had a specific right under Regulation 64 to have a valid protest forwarded.
    • It rejected the contention that a right held in common by all Fellows was insufficient to ground the remedy.
  4. Construction and validity of Regulation 64:
    • The Court observed section 25 empowered the Senate with the sanction of Government to make "regulations"; Regulation 64 purported to authorise submission of protests and submissions to the Governor in Council.
    • Two possible readings were considered: a narrow reading limiting "resolution" in Reg. 64 to matters that are "regulations" under s.25, and a broader reading. The Court concluded Reg. 64 is ultra vires insofar as it attempts to subject to Government sanction matters that by statute do not require Government sanction.
    • However, because some of the Syndicate's proposals (Appendix A) were, on their substance, rules of general application that fell within the scope of section 25 (and therefore required Government sanction), Reg. 64 applied to those items and thus to the protests against them.
    • The Court emphasised substance over nomenclature: what mattered was whether the Senate's action in effect made regulations under s.25, not whether the Syndicate called the proposals "Standing Orders" under Regulation 96(iii).
  5. Whether the Syndicate's function under Regulation 64 was discretionary:
    • The Court found the Syndicate's functions under Regulation 64 to be ministerial — to cause the protest to be printed and circulated and to submit the protest and memorandum to the Governor in Council — and not judicial or quasi-judicial.
    • The Syndicate therefore had no power to act as a censor and to require deletions from a protest that on its face was a protest against the resolution; limited exceptions (scandalous, indecent or non-protest material) were noted as theoretical possibilities but not present here.
  6. Effect of Vice-Chancellor's rulings and procedural objections:
    • The Court rejected the submission that the Vice-Chancellor's rulings converted the nature of the protest into a mere challenge to the ruling; it accepted that criticisms of a ruling could be advanced as part of a protest against the resolution and that Government (in confirming regulations) might take such procedural objections into account.
    • The Court also addressed the argument that the ruling (that the proposals be accepted/rejected en bloc) rendered subsequent consideration meaningless — concluding the Vice-Chancellor's rulings, though final at the meeting, did not remove the right to protest or the Government's power to refuse sanction.
  7. Notice and validity of the Senate's resolution:
    • Applying company-law analogies selectively, the Court held that because the Universities Acts do not prescribe a particular formal nomenclature for regulations, the substance of what was proposed and the notice of the substance are decisive.
    • The agenda and Appendix A sufficiently informed Fellows of the substance; the fact that the Syndicate labelled the proposals "Standing Orders" did not prevent them being treated as regulations in substance.
  8. Discretion to grant mandamus:
    • The Court acknowledged mandamus is a discretionary remedy but observed the discretion is governed by established principles. Because Mr. Natesan had a clear legal right, no adequate alternative remedy, and the application was made bona fide in reasonable time, the Court found it appropriate to exercise its discretion in his favour.
    • Practical objections (public importance or fear of frivolous suits) were rejected as insufficient grounds for denying relief in this matter of educational and public importance.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Rule made absolute — mandamus granted. The Court ordered that the Syndicate comply with the provisions of Regulation 64 and forward the protests and the accompanying memoranda (to be prepared by the committee of three members) together with a copy of the resolution to the Governor in Council. The same disposition was made in the companion application of K.B. Ramanathan Ayyar.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The Syndicate was directed to perform its ministerial duty under Regulation 64 and to forward the protests and related materials to the Governor in Council; the applicants' protests must be circulated as required by the regulation.
  • Legal conclusions of wider application drawn by the Court:
    • The Syndicate, being a statutory executive body vested with public functions by the Universities Acts and regulations, is amenable to proceedings under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act.
    • Regulations made under the Universities Acts (including Regulation 64) are delegated statutory instruments with binding effect in their legitimate scope and may be enforced by mandamus; however Regulation 64 is ultra vires to the extent it attempts to vest Government with supervisory powers over matters the statute does not commit to Government sanction.
    • When determining the validity of what a deliberative body has done, courts will look to the substance of the act (whether it amounts to a regulation under the statute) rather than be misled by the labels or the particular clause under which the proposals were introduced.
  • The opinion did not purport to create a novel legal principle beyond applying existing rules on mandamus, delegated legislation, and the ministerial/judicial distinction; it resolved the application by applying those established principles to the facts at hand.

Outcome summary: The Court found for the applicants (Natesan and Ramanathan); the Syndicate was ordered to forward the protests and accompanying memoranda to the Governor in Council. Costs were taxed against the Syndicate.

Show all summary ...

Coutts Trotter, J.:— This was a rule granted by my brother Bakewell, calling upon the Syndicate of the University of Madras to show cause why it should not be required to deal with the protest of Mr. G.A Natesan, a Fellow of the University, against certain resolution of the Senate of the University passed at its meeting of the 3rd of March 1916 and to submit the protest in question to the Governor in Council. The proceedings are taken under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act and are obviously analogous to proceedings for the obtaining of the English prerogative writ of mandamus. The writ of mandamus has been abolished in this country, and care must be taken to see that the analogy of the English cases does not lead one outside the words of the Indian statute. section 45 of the Specific Relief Act provides that the High Court may make an order requiring any specific act to be done or forborne, by any person holding a public office, whether of a permanent or a temporary nature, or by any corporation or inferior Court, provided (a) that an application be made by a person whose personal right would be injured by the forbearing or doing of the said specific act, (b) that such doing or forbearing is, under any law for the time being in force, clearly incumbent on such person or Court in his or its public character, or on such corporation in its corporate character, (c) that, in the opinion of the High Court, such doing or forbearing is consonant to right and justice, (d) that the applicant has no other specific and adequate legal remedy, and (e) that the remedy given by the order applied for will be complete.

The University of Madras was incorporated by the Act of Incorporation No. XXVII of 1857 and, for the understanding of this case, it is necessary to examine its constitution under that and the succeeding statutes and regulations. The establishment of the University is recited to be “for the better encouragement of Her Majesty's subjects of all classes and denominations within the Presidency of Port St. George and other parts of India in the pursuit of a regular and liberal course of education.” It then proceeds to establish a Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and Fellows of the University and constitutes them as one Body Politic and Corporate. By section 8 the Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and Fellows are to have the entire management of, and superintendence over the affairs, concern and property of the University.

I now pass to the Indian Universities Act VIII of 1904, which, by virtue of its second section, is to be deemed part of the Act of Incorporation. Section 3 is as follows:—“The University shall be deemed to have been incorporated for the purpose (among others) of making provision for the instruction of students, with power to appoint University Professors and Lecturers, to hold and manage educational endowments…. to make regulations relating to the residence and conduct of students and to do all acts, consistent with the Act of Incorporation and this Act, which tend to the promotion of study and research.” Section 4 provides that the Body Corporate shall consist of the Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and two classes of Fellows called ex-officio and ordinary, and constitutes them the Senate, which thus becomes a convertible term with the Body Corporate. Section 15 makes reference to a new body, the Syndicate, consisting of a relatively small number of Fellows under the chairmanship of the Vice-Chancellor, and in the Syndicate is vested the executive government of the University. By section 25, the Senate, with the sanction of the Government, may from time to time make “Regulations” consistent with the Act of Incorporation and this Act, to provide for all matters relating to the University. Section 25(2) proceeds: “In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such regulations may provide for” a number of specified matters, but at the present moment I need only mention (c) the procedure at meetings of the Senate, Syndicate and Faculties, and (e) the appointment and duties of the Registrar and of officers and servants of the University and of Professors and Lecturers appointed by the University. It is thus seen that the power to make regulations is expressed to be permissive, but section 26 provides machinery to ensure that a body of regulations shall come into existence and, in fact, a large body of regulations for the Madras University has been brought into existence and added to and modified from time to time. To these regulations I now turn. The first group concerns the Senate and the procedure at its meetings, and for the purposes of the present case, it is only necessary to refer to two, No. 60 which makes the chairman (ordinarily the Vice-Chancellor) the sole judge on any point of order at meetings of the body and No. 64 which it is necessary to set out at length: “Any member intending to protest against a resolution of the Senate shall give notice in writing of his intention to the Registrar within forty-eight hours from the date of the meeting at which the resolution was passed and within one week from such date Judge his protest with the Registrar. The Syndicate shall, thereupon, cause the protest to be printed and circulated to each member who was present at the meeting, with a request that he will record a vote for three members of the Senate to form a committee to prepare a memorandum in support of the resolution. The three members receiving the largest number of votes including the casting vote or votes of the Vice-Chancellor, if such be necessary, and who are willing to act shall frame the memorandum accordingly, and the Syndicate shall submit the protest and memorandum, together with a copy of the resolution, for the consideration and orders of the Governor in Council.”

The next group of regulations refers to convocations with which we are not concerned, and the third group Nos. 87 to 98 deal with the Syndicate. Regulation 96 enumerates certain powers of the Syndicate of which the following are material to the present case:—(iii) to nominate University professors and lecturers, to define their duties and fix their remuneration and to report any such proposed arrangements to the Senate for its sanction; (viii) to draft such regulations as may from time to time, be necessary, and to submit them to the Senate for approval; and (ix) to make its own Standing Orders and, subject to the regulations of the University, to regulate the disposal of its own business.

The general scheme of the Act and the regulations to be framed would appear to be this, that the Senate should be the legislative and the Syndicate the executive government of the University, the powers of the Senate being subject, in certain matters, to the control of the Government, that the Senate should pass general rules in the form of regulations under section 25 of the Act of 1904 and that the Syndicate should deal with the administration of specific matters and the application of the, regulations to them. It is, I think, farther clearly involved that the Syndicate should exercise its functions subject to and in conformity with the regulations and from that I think too it necessarily follows that a proceeding of the Syndicate which is contrary to the regulations would be invalid, and that the Syndicate cannot adopt measures or pass resolutions, or whatever else they may be termed, which would be in conflict with or affect a modification of the existing regulations or bring about a result, such as by the Act is reserved to the Senate to effect by the passing of a regulation. This, as I say, seems to be a clear deduction from the general scheme of the Act. As regards the limitation of the powers of the Syndicate, that can be put on an even surer, if narrower, ground. The proceedings of the Syndicate are not subject to any sanction of Government. If the Syndicate had the power, of itself, to achieve the same results as may be achieved by regulations under section 25 of the Act of 1904, the effect would be to nullify the statutory mandate that such matters should be subject to the sanction of Government.

With these preliminary observations, I pass to the actual facts of the present case, which are to be gathered from the affidavits and correspondence. What took place is fortunately free from doubt, and the facts I am about to state were admitted on both sides in the argument at the Bar. A meeting of the Senate was convened for the 3rd March 1916 and an agenda paper was circulated outlining the nature of the business to be transacted. Among the agenda was the following: “IV The Syndicate presents to the Senate for sanction, under Regulation 96(iii), the Standing Orders printed as Appendix A relating to the appointment and duties of University professors. Mr. Hunter will move that the sanction of the Senate be accorded to the arrangements embodied in these Standing Orders.” Appendix A contains a list of provisions divided into two classes—one called “General” and the other “Special.” For present purposes, I need only refer to No. 1 and No. 6 of the first group and No. B(1) of the second group. These respectively run as follows: “General 1. University professors shall be appointed by the Syndicate, subject to the confirmation of the Senate, and of His Excellency the Governor in Council 6. A University professor may be required not only to engage in the work of research, but also to deliver courses of lectures and conduct classes as the Syndicate may direct. Special B(1). The Professor of Comparative Philology shall be ex-officio Chairman of the Board of Studies in Sanskrit, Uriya, Marathi, Burmese and Sinhalese.” Notice had been given by Mr. K.B Ramnathan of certain amendments that he proposed to move, and these were printed is the agenda paper. When the meeting took place Mr. Hunter duly moved the motion standing in his name. The Vice-Chancellor, in the course of the debate, ruled that all the proposed amendments were out of order and that it was only competent to the meeting to accept or reject the “Standing Orders” in toto. He further added that the Standing Order Special B(1) relating to the professor of Comparative Philology appeared to be in consistent with Regulation 140 and announced that in consequence it was withdrawn by the Syndicate, and he further ruled that, as that particular order was separable from the other orders relating to the professorship of Comparative Philology, it was competent to the Syndicate to withdraw it. In the course of the ensuing discussion Mr. Justice Srinivasa Ayyangar made the suggestion that Standing Order No. 6 was inconsistent with the group of regulations regarding the University lectureships Nos. 392 to 399. The official minutes of the meeting, which by consent were placed before us, are so brief that it is not possible to say what his exact argument was, but from certain passages in the letters it would appear to have been to this effect: by Regulations 392 and 393 the initiative of suggesting the courses of lectures to be delivered during the academic year lies with the Board of Studies; they are to be approved by the Syndicate and laid before the Senate. The effect of General Standing Order No. 6 would appear to be to transfer the initiative and indeed the whole control of the matter to the Syndicate. He also seems to have pointed out that the practical inconvenience resulting it would be to transfer the initiative of suggesting particular courses of lectures to be given and the subjects with which they were to deal from the Boards of Faculties which consist of groups of experts on associated subjects, to the Syndicate which, with regard to any given group of subjects, is not a body of experts at all. The Vice-Chancellor would appear to have ruled that there was no such inconsistency with the regulations as was suggested, After further discussion, it was proposed by Mr. Govindaraghava Ayyar that the subject-matter of the new proposals should be referred for further consideration to a committee, but this was lost by 37 votes to 35. Subsequently the original proposals, with the exception of the one relating to the Professor of Comparative Philology which was withdrawn, were carried by a narrow majority.

On the 10th of March the applicant Mr. Natesan forwarded to the Registrar of the University a protest against the passing of the Resolution moved by Mr. Mark Hunter at the meeting of the 3rd of March. This protest was doubtless meant to be, and was understood by the Syndicate to be, put forward in accordance with Regulation 64. Among other matters, which it is unnecessary to discuss, it urged that the ruling of the Vice-Chancellor that no amendments could be moved to the Standing Orders was wrong and was also inconsistent with his later ruling that one of the proposals embodied in the Standing Order could be withdrawn at the meeting by the Syndicate. In answer to this communication, on the 14th of March, the Registrar returned the protect on the ground that Regulation 64 provided only for protests against resolutions of the Senate and not for protests against rulings of the Vice-Chancellor. The letter continued. “The Syndicate therefore requires that the paragraphs of your protest calling in question the rulings of the Vice-Chancellor be deleted therefrom before action can be taken under Regulation 64 in the direction of printing and circulating the protest to the Senate.” A further correspondence ensued, the general effect of which was that Mr. Natesan insisted that his protest was a protest against the resolution of the Senate and against nothing else, that he was at liberty to use such arguments against the resolution as he thought fit, that the functions of the Syndicate in forwarding his protest were purely ministerial and that it was not competent to that body to exercise a censorship over the contents of his protest, while the Syndicate through their Registrar adhered to their attitude of refusing to forward the protest so long as it contained the matter to which they took exception. In the end Mr. Natesan applied to this Court and we have now to determine the rights of the parties.

With some of the contentions raised, there is, I think, very little difficulty in dealing and I propose to clear the ground by disposing of them at once. In the first place, the Advocate-General reiterated the point taken by the Syndicate, namely, that this was not a protest against the resolution of the Senate but against the ruling of the Vice-Chancellor; and he further urged that, even if this Court should think that the Syndicate took a wrong view of this matter, that body had a discretion which could not be over-ridden, provided it were exercised honestly and in good faith. I am unable to accede to either of these propositions. To my mind, the protest is a protest against the resolution and against nothing else, and any criticisms of the rulings of the Vice-Chancellor are advanced as a reason for Government's withholding its sanction; the fact that such arguments are advanced does not seem to me to alter its character of a protest against the resolution. So far from having a discretion vested in them, the functions of the Syndicate under Regulation 64 appear to me to be purely ministerial. Of course that which they have to forward must be a protest, and they would doubtless be justified in refusing to forward something, that was not a protest at all; e.g, a bill of exchange, to take the illustration given by my learned brother in the course of the argument. It may be also that if the protest contained grossly scandalous or indecent matter they would be justified in refusing to forward it, but that is purely an academic speculation which has no bearing on the present case. In my opinion, if the document is a protest against the resolution, the Syndicate must forward it as it stands, and if the Syndicate takes upon itself to say that the given document, which purports to be such a protest, is, in fact, something else, it does as at its pert. If it is wrong in the opinion of this Court, I think this Court must compel it to exercise the functions cast upon it by the regulation.

It was next urged that the Syndicate or its members did not fall within section 45 of the Specific Relief Act, inasmuch as they did not fulfil the character of persons holding a public office. The Advocate-General referred to the definition of a Public Officer in section 1(17) of the Civil Procedure Code and certain observations of Best, C.J, in Henley v. The Mayor of Lyme. The Syndicate is a creature of statute with certain duties imposed upon it by statute and those duties are to be carried out for the benefit; of the public at large (see the very wide words in the preamble to the Act of Incorporation), and especially for that portion of the public which desires to utilize the educational advantages of the University. It seems to me too plain for argument that, where a statute appoints a body of persona to carry out purposes of public benefit, the persons constituting such a body ipso facto become holders of a public office within the meaning of the section. It is not disputed that to hold otherwise would be to go contrary to a vast number of English decisions with regard to the writ of mandamus and that it would also give the go bye to the principle which if not expressly enunciated is underlying numerous decisions of the High Courts both of Bombay and Calcutta. I am therefore of opinion that the Syndicate is a body amenable to the jurisdiction of section 45 of the Specific Relief Act, if the other conditions for that relief are present.

It is next argued by the Advocate-General that, even supposing that the obligation to perform this duty rested upon the Syndicate, there is no specific right in the present petitioner to ask for the interference of the Court. That the existence of such a right is a necessary qualification in the applicant is clear: see The Queen v. The Guardians of the Lewishan Onion. The Advocate-General sought to paraphrase that doctrine into a very different proposition, namely, that the right must reside in the individual applicant and in no one else, and that, if every member of the Senate had an equal interest with the applicant to see that the regulations were obeyed, the requirements of the section were not fulfilled. That argument seems to me to be wholly fallacious. A right may be enjoyed in common with every subject of the Crown, but when it is infringed in the respect an individual subject, there at once arises in that individual a further right to seek the protection of the Court to enforce such right. I entertain no doubt that Mr. Natesan, as the author of the rejected protest, had a specific right to as that his protest should be sent to its proper destination, and not the less so because any other member whose protest was rejected would have a similar right, or because the Senate as a whole may be said to have an interest in the maintenance of the rights of one of its members.

I now pass to the real point of substance and difficulty in this case. Regulation 64 is the regulation from which the applicant derives his right, if it exists, to have his protest forwarded for the consideration of Government. Regulation 64 purports to give a right of protest against any resolution of the Senate, and it could not, I think, be seriously contended that the proceedings of the 3rd of March did not at least amount to a resolution or a series of resolutions of the Senate. Regulation 64, like other regulations of the University, is made under statutory authority and like statutory regulations or statutory by laws will only be valid in so far as it is consistent with the provisions and within the powers of the statute under which it purports to be made. It is argued by the Advocate-General that, in order to render the regulation valid, it is necessary to construe the word “resolution” is Regulation 64 as meaning a “regulation” in the sense conveyed by section 25 of the Act of 1904. He rests his contention upon this ground, that it is not competent for the framers of the regulations to introduce into a regulation a power to Government to pass orders or entertain appeals in matters other than those in regard to which powers are given to Government by statute. The only functions of the Senate which are subjected to the sanction of Government by the Act are the functions exercised by them in passing regulations under section 25 and certain functions regarding the affiliation and disaffiliation of colleges. Accordingly, if Regulation 64 purports to subject other activities of the Senate to the sanction or supervision of the Government, it is obnoxious to the statute in two ways: in the first place it clothes the Government with an authority not vested in it by the statute, in the next, it would enable the Senate to cast upon a body other than itself functions which have been entrusted to it and to it only, by the statute. The rule with regard to judicial bodies is clearly enunciated in Attorney-General v. Sillem and I can see no distinction in principle between giving a right of appeal to an executive and to a judicial body. Nor can I see anything in the argument that the provision is saved by the fact that the body to which reference is to be made is Government. If the regulation had said that the protest was to be laid before the Chamber of Commerce no one would contend that it was intra vires, yet, if the Senate has the power to refer matters to Government without the specific authorization of the Act, I do not see why it should not refer them to any other body. I have therefore come to the conclusion that the word “resolution” in Regulation 64 must be read as if “regulation” was substituted for it, or what comes to the same thing, that Regulation 64 if and in so far as it purports to extend the right of protest to a resolution other than a regulation under section 25 of the Act of 1904, or a resolution on any other matter requiring Government sanction is ultra vires the statute.

The matter does not end there, for Mr. Ramaswami Ayyar for the applicant contends that, even if this view is accepted, what the Senate did on the 3rd of March was, in fact, to pass regulations within the meaning of section 25, and it is with this contention that the main and closest part of the argument was concerned. To test this contention, let us see first exactly what happened. There is no manner of doubt that the Syndicate did not imagine themselves to be framing regulations “for the approval of the Senate” under Regulation 96(viii); when they desired to propound regulations for the approval of the Senate, they did so in terms. Numerous regulations were put before this very meeting as “regulations,” and were set out in the agenda paper and described as “regulations”. But the Syndicate called these proposals “Standing Orders” of the Syndicate, i.e, rules to govern the Syndicate is its own business. That the term “Standing Orders” was a complete misnomer for proposals of this nature is obvious enough. They were concerned not with the proceedings at meetings of the Syndicate, but with the general government and constitution of the University. Indeed the members of the Syndicate themselves seem to have realized that the term was a misnomer, for they submitted these-proposals for the approval of the Senate, whereas the power to make their own Standing Orders [Regulation 96(x)], is subject to no such obligation. Moreover, the proposals were expressly stated to be brought forward under the provisions of Regulation 96(iii), whereby the Syndicate are empowered to define the duties of the University professors and lecturers and to report the proposed arrangements of that nature for the sanction of the Senate. Nevertheless, whatever confusion of nomenclature there may have been, it is, I think, incontrovertible that the Syndicate intended these proposals when sanctioned to be something binding upon the Syndicate and not upon the Senate or the University; to be, as it were, a by-law or a set of by-laws of the Syndicate.

I turn now to the Vice-Chancellor who presided at the meeting of the Senate, who, it is impossible not to remember, was an ex-officio member of the Syndicate and who, as such, could hardly have failed to be cognizant of what the Syndicate imagined to be the trend of its own proposals. The first ruling he gave—I am act concerned now to inquire whether it was correct or the reverse—was that it was incompetent to entertain amendments to the proposals, but that they must be sanctioned or rejected in toto as they stood. No one has suggested or could suggest that it was incompetent to members of the Senate to move amendments to regulations proposed for its approval, and indeed at this very meeting amendments to regulations were moved and discussed and voted upon. The ruling is only intelligible if regarded as a ruling that these were not regulations of the Senate that were being considered, but were merely proceedings of a body other than the Senate upon which it could set its seal or not as it chose. The Advocate General lays stress upon this point, and it is no doubt of importance that the Chairman of this meeting, ruling upon all points of order, of which by Regulation 60, he is the sole Judge, must be taken to have been ruling that the Senate was not then engaged in discussing or approving anything that was or could eventuate in a regulation within the meaning of section 25 of the Act. The next ruling of the Chairman—and once more I am not concerned to inquire whether it was right or wrong—makes the matter equally clear. He announced that the Syndicate withdrew one of the proposed Standing Orders, because it was in conflict with Regulation 140. Nobody contends that, when the Senate is making regulations, it has not the fullest power to modify or rescind any of its existing regulations, though in all its other transactions it, no doubt, would be bound by them, now the Syndicate managed the extraordinary feat of holding a meeting and coming to a determination during the actual progress of a session of the Senate is not apparent, but the point made is that the Chairman's ruling on this as well as on the other matter clearly involved the assumption and the decision that the Senate was not engaged in its function of making regulations.

I now pass to the only member of the State of whose attitude we have any record—Mr. Justice Srinivasa Ayyangar. His argument, whatever else it went to, clearly went to this that some of the Syndicate's proposals were bad. Why? Because they were in conflict with certain of the existing regulations. His attitude, therefore also clearly was that the meeting was not engaged in framing regulations and consequently that its proceedings, if in conflict with the existing regulations, would be invalid. The Chairman's answer to his objection is again in the same strain. He thinks them not invalid or had, again because in his (the Chairman's) judgment the criticized proposals do not in fact conflict with the existing regulations.

Mr. Ramaswami Ayyar's contention, as I understand it, is this: He says that all these proposals of the Syndicate are matters which can only be brought about by regulations under section 25 of the Act. They are all general measures regulating the whole course of University business, laying down in the widest terms what shall be done not in regard to particular persona or particular things or particular situations, but what shall be the general studies and duties of the holders of different chairs for the future. To make general dispositions of this nature is altogether outside the scope of the Syndicate's power. These purposes, however, could be effected by means of regulations approved by the Senate. What must be looked at is the substance of what was done and not the mere terminology used and, in any case, that construction if possible must be put upon that which was done which will validate—on the principle ut res majis valeat quam pereat. What taken place when regulations are passed? They are drafted by the Syndicate and submitted to the Senate for approval [Regulation 96(viii)]. What else was done here, and what does it matter that by purporting to act under Regulation 96(iii) a few words have to be changed—for “draft” you have “define,” for “submit” you have “report,” for “regulations” you have “arrangement,” for “approval” you have “sanction.” The nature and substance of what was done is identically similar, and the result is that the seal of the Senate was set upon a body of “rules,” to call them by a colourless term, which are of such a nature as not only to be aptly expressed as “regulations,” but of such a nature that any attempt to bring them into operation otherwise than as regulations would be invalid and of no effect.

In much of this argument there is undoubtedly great force. There is much to be said for the view that all of the so-called Standing Orders are of so general a nature as to be outside the province of the Syndicate and only competent to the legislative powers of the Senate to bring them into effect; but it is not necessary to decide that, for it is conceded by the Advocate-General that one at least of these proposals is indubitably of that character. Still it does not follow that, because as transactions of the Syndicate they would be in whole or in part invalid, they necessarily are to be regarded as valid transactions of some other body.

On the other hand there are cases in which a transaction though invalid as the proceedings of one body, may on adoption by another body become valid proceedings of that latter body. See the observations of James, L.J, in In re Dronfield Sikstone Coal Company: “If the transaction was ultra vires the directors, it was not ultra vires the company, and having been confirmed by the company, and the company having acquiesced in it and taken the benefit of it, it could not now be questioned by the company.” We are referred to a number of cases in which questions of the validity of proceedings at meetings of English limited companies arose. In my opinion arguments and analogies derived from these cases have to be applied to a different subject matter with very great caution, for two main reasons: the first the general one, that when learned Judges are construing the words of a statute, any principles they may enunciate must be regarded with reference to the words of the statute; the second that an English company has a highly specialized and differentiated machinery for exercising its various functions, its ordinary special and extraordinary meetings and resolutions, a machinery which is quite peculiar to itself, and does not correspond at all to the machinery of the Madras University and its Senate. Nevertheless, guarding myself as best I can from being misled by false analogies, I think certain general principles can be extracted from the cases. The first is, that if a particular act must by statute be done at a particular kind of meeting, convened in a particular way, no meeting can do that act which is not a meeting of that particular kind or has not been convened in that particular way. Another is that the members of the body must have notice of what it is proposed to do at the meeting, or its proceedings will be invalid. Ordinarily it will be sufficient if they have notice of the substance of what is proposed: Tiessen v. Benderson and Torbook v. Lord Westbury; unless the statute in terms enacts that the notice must not only give the substance of what is proposed, but must call it by its statutory name: McConnell v. E. Prill & Co., Ltd.. I lay especial stress on that decision, a decision by a learned Judge whose authority on such matters stands very high; because I think it is clear from his judgment, that but for that express provision of the statute, he would have held the notice good as conveying the substance of what was done. Indeed under the older Act, such notices had been held good: see In re Bridport Old Brewery Company and Stone v. City and County Bank].

Applying these principles to the present case what is the result?

In the first place, there is no question here of a meeting of a particular kind, because the meetings of the Senate are all of one kind convened in the same way, whatever the nature of the proceedings. In the next place, and to my mind this is the most important consideration of all, not only does the statute not say that the convening notice must describe what is to be proposed as a regulation, but it does not even define anywhere what a regulation is. In those circumstances I think we cm only look at the substance of what was proposed and passed; and I think that a vote of the Senate purporting to effect the regulating of matters within the scope of section 25 of the Act of 1901 must be held to be a regulation within the meaning of that section and to require the sanction of Government. If this step in the argument be sound, it follows of necessity that regulation 64 applies and that the applicant is entitled to have his protest submitted to Government.

The Advocate-General advanced one other argument, which has given me a good deal of trouble both at the hearing and since; it is based on the ruling of the Vice-Chancellor. His argument is to this effect. A ruling that you must accept or reject a number of proposals en bloc is in effect a ruling that you cannot discuss or vote upon any one of them on its merits. A Fellow cannot reject what he may regard as an undesirable proposal regarding the Professor of Comparative Philology, without also rejecting what he may consider a salutary one regarding the Professor of Indian Economics. So that if it is held that what the Senate passed were regulations, it passed them after a discussion so crippled by the ruling as to be in reality no investing discussion at all, debarred from its right, or rather obstructed from its duty of scrutinizing each separate proposal on its merits.

That the result is startling, no one can deny but I do not think the contention can be put higher than an argumentum ab inconvenienti. And, after all, the “inconvenience” remains in any case; if the Advocate-General is right in saying that the Senate enacted matters which it had never had the opportunity of debating properly, that is equally true whether you call that which it enacted “regulations” or anything else. But it is not necessary to have regard to such considerations; the answer to the difficulty was provided by the Advocate-General himself in another portion of his argument, in which he emphasized the finality of the Chairman's rulings at all meetings of the Senate. It follows inevitably that no erroneous ruling of the Chairman can vitiate the proceedings of any meeting. I have had yet no answer which satisfies my mind to the question which I put to the learned Advocate-General during the argument: supposing these had been called “regulations” eo nomine and had been put to the vote as such, could it be said that the ruling of the Chairman vitiated them? When the proceedings of the Senate come up for confirmation by Government, the matter is altogether on a different footing; and it may be that if in any instance Government thought that a ruling of the Chairman had prevented any topic from being adequately discussed, that would be a reason for withholding confirmation. But with that I have no concern except for this one purpose; I think it adds force to the applicant's contention that discussion of the nature and effect of the Chairman's rulings was a permissible and relevant matter of argument in his protest.

I am therefore of opinion that all the requirements exist enabling the applicant to call upon the Syndicate to carry out the provisions of rule 64. But the Advocate-General points out that our powers under the Act are discretionary, as they indubitably are, and asked us not to exercise them in favour of the present applicant, apparently on two grounds. The first is that this is not a matter of any public importance; the second is that to grant this rule would be to encourage innumerable frivolous applications of a similar nature in future. I know of no standard or criterion whereby to measure what is or is not of public importance; it is a question which every one must decide for himself in each particular case, and I can only say that this appears to me to be a matter of very considerable public importance. The topics dealt with by the resolutions were of vital educational interest, and the right of protest vested in the applicant was a right valuable to himself and to the University. As to the other argument, I must confess myself utterly unable to follow the reasoning which Beaks to say that you must not give effect no a just claim because you will encourage others to make unjust ones. The rule must be made absolute, and the order decreed as prayed.

Re K.B Ramanathan.

This application stands on exactly the same footing as the one with which we have already dealt, and it is not suggested that there is any point of differentiation. The rule in this also must be made absolute.

Kumaraswami Sastriyar, J.:— This application arises out of the refusal by the Syndicate of the Madras University to forward to Government the protest of Mr. G.A Natesan against a resolution of the Senate passed at a meeting held on the 3rd March 1916 concerning the appointment and duties of University Professors. It appears from the agenda that one of the items of business was the presentation by the Syndicate to the Senate for sanction under Regulation 96(iii) the Standing Orders printed as appendix A to the agenda paper relating to the appointment and duties of University Professors. Mr. Mark Hunter was to move that the sanction of the Senate be accorded to the arrangements embodied in those Standing Orders. Notice of amendment was given by Mr. K.B Ramanathan and some other Fellows of the University. Appendix A is divided into two parts, general and special, the latter relating to (A) Professor of Indian Economics, (B) Professor of Comparative Philology and (C) Professor of Indian History and Archæology. It appears from the Minutes of the Proceedings that Mr. Mark Hanter proposed and Mr. Prendergast seconded that the sanction of the Senate be accorded to the arrangements embodied in the Standing Orders which were presented by the Syndicate to the Senate. After some discussion the Vice-Chancellor ruled that the amendments proposed by Mr. Ramanathan and others were out of order but added that the Standing Order relating to the Professor of Comparative Philology being the ex-officio Chairman of the Board of Studies was withdrawn by the Syndicate as inconsistent with the provisions of Regulation 140. It does not appear nor is it alleged before us that there was any meeting of the Syndicate which authorized the withdrawal of any of the propositions which they submitted for approval. On a question being raised by one of the Fellows as to the power of the Syndicate to withdraw any proposal at that stage the Vice-Chancellor was of opinion that it was open to the Syndicate to withdraw the proposals as to the Chairmanship, as it was separate from the other proposals relating to the Professorship of Comparative Philology. These rulings were binding on the meeting and the effect of it was that they had either to accept or reject the suggestion of the Syndicate en bloc. After further discussion the proposition was put to the meeting and carried. Mr. Natesan gave notice the next day of his intention to avail himself of the provisions of Regulation 64 and to protest against the resolution of the Senate. He subsequently and within the time limited by Regulation 64 sent in his protest. As it is contended that the protest is not really a protest but is merely an objection to the ruling of the Vice-Chancellor, it is necessary to set it out in detail. It runs as follows:—

To10th March 1916.

The Registrar,

University of Madras.

I send herewith my protest against the passing of the Fourth Resolution in the agenda of the last Senate meeting. I submit:—

(1) That the Honourable the Vice-Chancellor was wrong in his ruling that no amendments could be moved to the Standing Orders referred to and that the only alternative left to the State was to approve or reject them in toto.

(2) That the Vice-Chancellor was further wrong in allowing a part of the Standing Orders relating to the ex-officio Chairmanship of the Board of Studios in Sanskrit to be withdrawn and the remaining clauses to be retained. The ruling of the Vice-Chancellor in this respect is inconsistent with the ruling given with regard to Mr. K.B Ramanathan's amendment as out of order.

(3) That as pointed out by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Srinivasa Ayyangar Avergal [?] the very Regulation 96(iii) under which the Resolution relating to the Standing Orders was moved is contravened by the provisions contained in the clauses requiring the University Professors to lecture on class-subjects. That 96(iii) should be construed in the light of Regulations 391, 392, 393 and 398 and that the Syndicate did not obtain the recommendations of the Boards of Studies concerned in respect of the lectures on Honours subjects.

(4) That the Standing Orders if approved of by the Government will lead to the absurd result of placing the Dravidian Readers under the control of the University Professor of Comparative Philology who cannot lay claim to an adequate knowledge of any of the Dravidian languages; that Mr. Mark Hunter said at the meeting that the University Professor of Comparative Philology had undertaken the work “under great difficulties” and that the Hon'ble Mr. Stone said in the course of the discussion on one of the amendments that if a period of two years mote were to elapse, the said University Professor of Comparative Philology “might make improvements in the study of the Dravidian languages”.

(5) That the Indian Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology at the Presidency College who could reasonably be expected to be thoroughly conversant with the Sanskrit language and literature in their various stages and aspects of development and conversant to the required extent with the principles of Linguistic Science, is obviously competent to do the teaching work relative to Sanskrit and Sanskritic Philology.

(6) That under the arrangements made, students in the colleges in the city of Madras will get an undue advantage, and the interests of students in the mufassal colleges will be prejudicially affected. This respect of the case was also pressed on the attention of the Senate by the Rev. Father Bertram of the St. Joseph's College, Trichiaopoly, and by others representing the mufassal colleges.

(7) That there is a great deal of unnecessary, uncalled for, and unjustifiable variation in language in the clauses (4), (5) and (2) under A, B and C respectively. That several members of the Senate protested against making invidious distinctions between University Professors in describing their functions and duties.

(8) That it is understood (the statement is made subject, to correction) that the Standing Orders in question were discussed at a meeting of the Syndicate at which the Vice-Chancellor and the Honourable the Director were absent and that the Standing Orders were approved by a very narrow majority, two Indian members of the Syndicate voting against the same.

(9) That in the Senate itself the proposals were approved by only 37 to 35: and that there was considerable feeling over the result that a further motion to refer the matter back to the Syndicate was immediately moved but with the same result.

(Signed) G.A Natesan.

This protest was returned by the Registrar on the 14th March 1916 on the ground that Regulation 64 provides only for protests against resolutions of the Senate and not for protests against-rulings of the Vice-Chancellor, that on points of order the Vice-Chancellor was the sole judge under Regulation 60 and that his rulings were not to be questioned. The Registrar also informed Mr. Natesan that the Syndicate required that the paragraphs of his protest calling in question the rulings of the Vice-Chancellor should be deleted before action could be taken under Regulation 64. Objection was also taken to the statement in paragraph 8 of the protest as to what took place in the Syndicate and Mr. Natesan was asked to delete this paragraph also from his protest. On the 17th March 1916 Mr. Natesan wrote back saying that he was unable to find any provision either in the Act or in the Regulation which empowered the Syndicate to call on him to make alterations but that he was prepared to correct any misstatements of facts to which his attention might be drawn by the Syndicate. He resubmitted the protest and requested that further action might be taken under Regulation 64. On the 22nd March the Registrar of the University wrote to Mr. Natesan informing him that he was directed to state that the Syndicate was not required or authorised to circulate protects against rulings of the Vice-Chancellor and was not prepared to do so. Mr. Natesan wrote back on the 26th March pointing out that he was not objecting to the ruling of the Vice-Chancellor but to the resolution of the Senate, that the Syndicate had no power under Regulation 64 to withhold the protest and that if the Syndicate persisted in the action he would be compelled to take steps to vindicate his own rights and those of the Senate. To this letter a reply was sent by Mr. Dewsbury on the 29th March stating that his letter of the 26th March has been considered by the Syndicate and recorded. Mr. Natesan on the 4th April again wrote to the Registrar stating that the action of the Syndicate was (to use his words) “illegal, high handed and a gross encroachment on the rights of Fellows,” that he was not prepared to let the matter rest there and that he would take all steps “to make the Syndicate realize that they cannot trifle with the rights of the Senate in any manner.” The Registrar on the 6th April sent a reply to Mr. Natesan stating that his letter had been considered and recorded. Thereupon Mr. Natesan presented the present application and obtained a rule under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act.

The facts set out by Mr. Natesan in his affidavit have not been controverted, but various legal objections have been taken in the affidavit of the Registrar of the University as to the maintainability of the application. The grounds taken are—

(1) that the Syndicate is not a Corporation and that the application under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act is not competent;

(2) that Regulation 64 of the University Regulations affords no absolute legal right as it only applies to the internal management of the affairs of the University and that the applicant has no personal right which has been injured;

(3) that the application being to compel the Syndicate to circulate the protest to the members of the Senate who were present at the meeting and several of whom were resident in the mufassal and outside the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of this Court, it was a matter where the act could not be done or forborne within the local limits;

(4) that the applicant has other specific and adequate legal remedies in that he can present a petition to the Government direct or move the Senate to annul the decision of the Syndicate complained of, or move the Senate to rescind or modify the original resolution or bring an action to set aside the resolution if it were ultra vires;

(5) that the relief sought is not complete as the Senate has power to over-rule or modify Regulation 64 or to confirm the decision of the Syndicate which is under the control of the Senate;

(6) that the Syndicate had the right to decide and decided that the protest was not a protest against the resolution of the Senate but was a protest against the ruling of the Vice-Chancellor;

(7) that as the ruling of the Chairman on points of order was conclusive neither the Government nor this Court could entertain any appeal against the ruling;

(8) that the Syndicate was not bound to circulate any protest irrespective of its form and contents and that having a discretion and having exercised it, it could not be questioned by any Court;

(9) that Regulation 64 applies only to any resolution of the Senate which requires the sanction of the Government to become a regulation; and

(10) that the resolution in question in substance merely recorded the sanction accorded by the Senate under Regulation 96(iii) and that it does not require any sanction of the Government but was within the competence of the Senate under the old and new Universities Acts.

Before dealing with these objections it is necessary to consider the provisions of the Universities Acts of 1857 and 1904 in so far as they relate to the matters in controversy. The Universities Act of 1857 constituted the Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and the Fellows of the University a Body Corporate “for the better encouragement of Her Majesty's subjects of all classes and denominations within the Presidency of Fort St. George and other parts of India in the pursuit of a regular and liberal course of education and the University was established for the purpose of ascertaining by means of examinations, the parsons who have acquired proficiency in different branches of Literature, Science and Art, and rewarding them by academical degrees as evidence of their respective attainments and marks of honour proportioned thereto.” Section 8 of the Act vested in the Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and Fellows the entire management of, and superintendence over, the affairs, concerns and property of the University and authorized them to act in such manner as appeared to them best calculated to promote the purposes intended by the University. The Universities Act of 1904 increased the scope and functions of the Old University but restricted its freedom of action by bringing it under the control of the Government in respect of several important mutters. Under section 3 of the Act of 1904 the University was deemed to have been incorporated for the purpose inter alia of making provision for the instruction of students with power to appoint University Professors and Lecturers. Section 15 of the Act vests the executive Government of the University in the Vice-Chancellor, the Director of Public Instruction, and not less than seven or more than fifteen Fellows elected in manner provided by the regulations. Section 25 of the Act enables the Senate with the sanction of the Government to make regulations consistent with the present Act and Act of Incorporation (as amended by the present Act) to provide for all matters relating to the University. The section goes on to state a number of matters as to which regulations could be made but this is without prejudice to the generality of the powers given by section 25. In pursuance of section 25, regulations were made and sanctioned which deal with various matters concerning the internal management of the University. Regulation 64 provides that any member intending to protest against a resolution of the Senate should give notice in writing of his intention to the Registrar within forty-eight hours from the date of the meeting at which the resolution was passed and within one week from such date lodge his protest with the Registrar. The Syndicate is thereupon directed to cause the protest to be printed and circulated to each member who was present at the meeting with a request that he will record a vote for three members of the Senate to form a committee to prepare a memorandum in support of the resolution and the Syndicate has to submit the protest and memorandum together with a copy of the resolution for the consideration and orders of the Governor in Council. Regulations 87 to 98 relate to the powers and duties of the Syndicate. It is only necessary for the purpose of this application to refer to Regulation 96, clauses (iii), (viii) and (ix). Clause (iii) gives the Syndicate power to nominate University Professors and Lecturers, to define their duties and fix their remuneration, and to report any such proposed arrangements to the Senate for its sanction. Clause (viii) empowers the Syndicate to draft such regulations as may from time to time be necessary and to submit them to the Senate for approval and clause (ix) empowers it to make its own Standing Orders and, subject to the regulations of the University, to regulate the disposal of its own business.

It will thus be seen that the scheme of the Act is to vest in the Senate powers to make rules dealing with general matters and to leave it to the Syndicate to apply the general rules framed by the Senate to the facts and exigencies of each particular case. In some matters, however, Regulations 95 and 96 give the Syndicate exclusive powers uncontrolled by the Fellows.

The first objection taken by the Advocate-General relates to the form of the application. It is contended that the Syndicate is not a body Corporate although the Senate is one and that the petitioner should have proceeded if at all against the Senate. It is also contended that if he has any remedy against the Syndicate he must proceed against each of the members composing the Syndicate individually and serve them individually and not through the Registrar of the University. As I have already pointed out section 15 of the Universities Act vests the executive Government in a body of persons called the Syndicate. The whole body is to act under Regulation 64. Though in respect of a great many matters the Syndicate can only act under the orders or with the sanction of the Senate there are other matters in which they have independent powers or the sole right of initiative. Regulation 64 directs the duties to be done by the Syndicate and gives the Senate no powers. It cannot be said that as regards the latter class of cases the Syndicate is the agent of the Senate nor is there any cause of action against the Senate no a body for the simple reason that it has no duty to perform under Regulation 64. There is, so far as I can see, nothing to prevent a mandamus being directed to the Syndicate as the executive body constituted by the Act. The practice in English Courts seems to be that where the application is to compel some public officer or body to perform a public duty the persons are not named but are proceeded against under their official title. For example, writs of mandamus have been issued to Justice of a county, inhabitants of a parish, churchwardens, overseers, inhabitants, and bailiffs of a town, the keepers of the common seal of a University, the assessment committee of a borough, the Registrar of the British Pharmaceutical Society, etc. There has been, so far as I can see, no objection taken in any of the reported cases on the ground that except in the case of corporations all other public bodies or officers should be proceeded against in the individual names of the members composing them.

In the case of public duties to be performed by persons holding public offices it is clear that the mandamus will bind and can be served on the successor in office of the person who refused to perform his duties and I am of opinion that where persons holding the office are a statutory body fluctuating from time to time and who bear an official designation given to them by statute the proper course is for the proceedings to be instituted against the body in its official designation and not against each of such persons individually. So far as the authorities in India go, there are a number of cases where proceedings have been taken against a statutory body in its official name when the body was proceeded against by way of mandamus: see In the matter of Rudra Narain Roy, In the matter of Purno Chunder Dutt and In re Provas Chandra Roy. The rule in the above cases was obtained against the members of the Board of Examiners of the Pleadersbip and Muktyarship and Attorney's examinations. In the present case appearance has been entered by the members of the Syndicate and it is not suggested that there has been any hardship or prejudice. The objection is purely technical and can, if necessary, be easily cured by a formal amendment. I do not think that the objection is fatal to the application.

It is next contended that the members of the Syndicate of the Madras University are not “persons holding public office” within the meaning of section 45 of the Specific Relief Act and that the remedy, if any, is against the Senate. Although the word “public servant” has been defined in some Acts (for example, the Civil Procedure Code and the Indian Penal Code) there is no definition of the word in the General Clauses Act. “Public Office,” I take it, means any office created by the legislative or other lawful authority for the purpose of discharging functions which affect the public generally or any particular section thereof. The Universities Act created a public body to carry out certain defined public objects. It created a corporation vested with powers to carry out various objects for which the University was created. As part of the machinery and for the better carrying out of the public objects contemplated by the statute it has by section 15 constituted a body of persons called the Syndicate in whom is vested the executive Government of the University. I find it difficult to see why the members of a statutory body so constituted are not persons holding a public office. The word “person” in the General Clauses Act of 1868 which was in force at the date of the passing of the Specific Relief Act is defined as “including any company or association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not;” so that the words “person holding public office” in section 45 would also include a body of persons holding that office even though that body has not been incorporated or constituted a Body Corporate.

It is argued by the Advocate-General that the definition in the Civil Procedure Code affords a valuable guide in construing section 45 of the Specific Relief Act and that one important test would be whether the person holding a public office receives any emoluments. Reference was also made to Henley v. The Mayor of Lyme, where Best, C.J, was of opinion that every one who was appointed to discharge a public duty and received compensation in whatever shape whether from the Crown or otherwise was a public officer. This definition is not exhaustive. Courts in England have issued a mandamus against poor law guardians, town councillors, churchwardens and other purely honorary public officers. There is, so far as I can see, nothing to prevent a person from undertaking public duties without receipt of emoluments. The test is not whether a man receives any emoluments, but the nature of the acts to perform which he is appointed or which he is legally liable to perform. Neither the Civil Procedure Code nor the Indian Penal Code are in pari materia with the Specific Relief Act and I do not thick the definitions there given for certain specific purposes in connection wish the provisions of those Codes can be taken as a general and authoritative definition of the term “public servant.”

As regards the argument that the Senate should be proceeded against and not the Syndicate, it is clear from Regulation 64 that it is the Syndicate and not the Senate which is to perform the functions specified in the regulation. When a smaller body is constituted from out of the members of a larger body and certain specific functions are allotted to it either by statute or by regulations having the force of law a party aggrieved by any act of the smaller body which act is within its special competence cannot proceed against the larger body: Bholaram Chowdhry v. The Corporation of Calcutta.

The next contention is that the present application is only to enforce a duty imposed by Regulation 61 and that the duty is not one under “any law for the time being in force,” as required by section 45 of the Specific Relief Act. The question is whether the regulations framed under the Universities Act can be said to be “laws for the time being in force” within the meaning of section 45 of the Specific Relief Act. Universities Act provides for regulations being made as to matters not specifically dealt with by the Act. It sets out the objects for which the body corporate has been established by the legislature and section 25 empowers the Senate with the sanction of the Government to make regulations consistent with the Acts of 1857 and 1904, to provide for all matters relating to the University. It is not disputed that regulations were duly made and sanctioned by the Governor in Council as required by Universities Act of 1904. I am of opinion that the regulations must be read as supplementing the Act, being of the nature of what has been called subordinate or delegated legislation. The effect of the regulations made in pursuance of the powers conferred by the Acts of legislature has been considered in numerous cases and the result of the authorities is, in my opinion, to give the rules or regulations made under statutory power the same validity and binding force as the sections of the principal enactment. In Hopkins v. The Mayor, etc. of Swansea, the question arose as to the validity of certain by laws made by the corporation. Lord Abinger, C.B, was of opinion that the by law has the same effect within its limits and with respect to the persons upon whom it lawfully operates as an Act of Parliament has upon the subjects at large. In Willingale v. Norris, the binding force of regulations made under a statute was considered and discussed and it was held that where a statute enables an authority to make regulations a breach of the regulations so made under the Act becomes for the purpose of obedience or disobedience a provision of the Act. Lord Alverstone, C.J, observed: “If it be said that a regulation is not a provision of an Act, I am of opinion that Rex v. Walker is an authority against the proposition. I should certainly have been prepared to hold apart from authority that where a statute enables an authority to make regulations, a regulation made under the Act becomes for the purpose of obedience or disobedience a provision of the Act.” Bingham and Walton, JJ., were of opinion that to break a regulation made under the authority of a statute is to break the statute itself. In Re Langlois v. Biden, Lord Esher considered that the rules made as to costs in county Courts under the provisions of the County Courts Act, 51 & 52 Vict., cap. 43, had statutory force and that the Act and the rules should be considered as one enactment. In Kruse v. Johnstone Lord Russel was of opinion that by-laws if validly made have the force of law within the there of their legitimate operation. So far as the Indian authorities go, there is ample ground for holding that by-laws or regulations can be enforced by a writ of mandamus. In Narendra Nath Basu v. H.L Stephenson the object of the mandamus was to enforce rules made under the Medical Registration Act. In In the matter of Rudra Naram Roy, In the matter of Purno Chunder Dutt, and In re Provas Chandra Roy, the object of the mandamus was to enforce rules made under the Legal Practitioners Act as to the examination and admission of muktyars. I can find no authority for limiting the moaning of the words “law for the time being in force” to Acts passed by the legislature so as to exclude rules and regulations or by-laws made under powers specially reserved in legislative enactments.

As regards the contention that the protest of Mr. Natesan was only a protest against the ruling of the Vice-Chancellor and that the Syndicate had a discretion to withhold the protest or direct amendments, I am of opinion that the protest which has been set out in detail is both in form and substance a protest against the resolution of the Senate. Mr. Natesan no doubt calls in question the ruling of the Vice-Chancellor but the arguments by which the seeks to strengthen his contention cannot alter the nature of the document. He begins by stating that the document which he sands was a protest against the passing of the resolution and there can be little doubt that he was acting under the provisions of Regulation 64, his object being not to get a reversal of the ruling of the Vice-Chancellor from the Government but to prevent the resolution of the Senate from receiving its sanction and thereby becoming a valid regulation. I find it difficult to see how the protest can be said to be a mere protest against the ruling of the Vice-Chancellor.

It has been argued that it is not open to any member who Protests against a resolution of the Senate to strengthen his case by venturing to dissent from the ruling of the Chairman, even though such ruling might have materially affected the discussion of the matter in hand by withdrawing relevant and material questions from the consideration of the meeting. It is no doubt true that under Regulation 60 the Chairman was to be the sole judge on any point of order, and that under the general law rulings of the Chairman are binding and conclusive so far as the meeting over which he presides is concerned. I can find no authority for the proposition that a resolution passed at a previous meeting cannot be set aside by the General Body which composed it in subsequent meeting, on the ground that the ruling of the Chairman of the previous meeting was erroneous. Henderson v. The Bank of Australasia is against the contention raised. Where sanction of the executive Government is necessary for the purpose of giving validity to resolutions passed by a corporation, it is certainly competent to the Government to consider the allegations made by the dissenting members of the public body as to what took place at the meeting and to withhold assent if it should think that an erroneous decision was arrived at by the majority in consequence of relevant and material amendments being ruled out by the Chairman.

As regards the discretion of the Syndicate to withhold the protest or to demand its amendment, I am of opinion that Regulation 64 gives no such discretion. Regulation 64 gives an absolute right to every Fellow of the Senate to protest against any resolution passed by the Senate. The duties of the Syndicate in the matter are purely executive. It is only a body which has to forward the protest to the Government with the memorandum representing the opposite point of view. Regulation 64 neither constitutes it a judicial nor a quasi-judicial body and it is difficult to see what right the Syndicate has to dictate to any fallow what his protest should contain or what it should omit. There is no discretion vested by Regulation 61 in the Syndicate.

It is argued by the Advocate General that the Syndicate has the inherent power of refusing to Bend up protests which contain blasphemous, scandalous or highly defamatory matter. As there is not a scintilla of a suggestion in the present case that the protest sent in by Mr. Natesan contain any such matter, it is unnecessary to consider whether under Regulation 64 the Syndicate has even that power Very probably it has. As regards the argument that the Syndicate may lay itself open to an action for defamation, all I can say is that there will be ample privilege if a statutory body acting in obedience to a statute does something which might otherwise be actionable. It is no doubt true that where a public body has a discretion which it exercises bonâ fide the Court in an application for mandamus would not constitute itself an appellate authority and go into nice questions as to the soundness or otherwise of the exercise of the discretion by the public body complained against. The case is, however, different where public body erroneously assumes that the has a direction which it does not possess in law and than seeks so defend an application for mandamus on the ground that in has exercised a discretion which Courts ought not to review. I am of opinion that so far as the facts of the present case go, the Syndicate had no power to require Mr. Natesan to omit or add anything to his protest and that their duty was to have received the protest and proceeded under Regulation 64 and forwarded it and the memorandum, drawn up by three members elected by the Senate, in favour of the proposition to the Government for their orders.

As regards the contention that Mr. Natesan has got other adequate legal remedy, I find it difficult to see what other adequate leal remedy he has. It is wall settled by a series of decisions that where a corporation or public body has a statutory duty of a public nature towards another person a mandamus will lie to compel its performance at the suit of any person aggrieved by the refusal to perform the duty unless there is another remedy “equally convenient, speedy, beneficial and effectual” as the mandamus and that by remedy is meant not a remedy by act of the party but remedium, juris or” some specific legal remedy for a legal right.” I need only refer to Re Barlow, Rex. v. The Archbishop of Counterbury, R. v. Leicester Union, The Queen v. Price, The Queen v. Thomas and In re Natham.

In the present case the alternative remedies suggested are: (1) a petition to the Government direct, (2) a motion in the Senate to annul the decision of the Syndicate complained of or to ??? or modify the original resolution, or (3) an action to set aside the resolution if it were ultra vires.

As regards petitioning the Government direct, it is difficult to see how it can afford any adequate remedy. Reference was made by the Advocate General to the remedy by way of petition of right as affording an analogy. It has no doubt been held in England that Courts will not issue a mandamus in cases where the party could submit a petition of right but there is no analogy between a petition of right in England and a petition which every subject in India is, under the rules framed by the Government, permitted to present. The fiat on a petition of right is granted “as a matter of invariable grace by the Grown whenever there is a shadow of claim, it being the constitutional duty of the Attorney-General not to advise a refusal of the fiat unless the claim is frivolous”: In re Natham. The procedure is governed by the Petition of Right Act of 1860 (23 & 24 Vict., cap. 34).

A motion in the Senate will not carry with it the necessary consequences of a reversal of the Syndicate's order as it is open to the majority of the Senate to resolve not to act in the matter. The remedies are not legal remedies and no authority has been cited for the proposition that a monamus will not lie because it is open to the public body to change its mind on a petition by a party or in another meeting. As the resolution of the Senate is not ultra vires no suit will lie to set it aside.

With regard to the objection in paragraph 7 of the counter-affidavit it is difficult to see how the fact that the Senate has power to overrule or modify Regulation 64 can have any bearing on the present case. Every statute or rule is capable of modification but that contingency is no ground for refusing relief to a person under a statute or rule is force on the date of the application and trial.

As regards the objection that Mr. Natesan has no personal interest which has been injured by the omission complained of, I am of opinion that Regulation 64 which confers on every member of the Senate a right of appeal against resolutions passed by the Senate confers on the member seeking to exercise the right, a special right which be can enforce. I doubt very much whether it is open to any other member of the Senate to insist on the protest of Mr. Natasan being sent up should Mr. Natesan resolve not to proceed with the matter any further. The rule of law that no person can institute proceedings in respect of wrongful acts of a public nature which do not specially affect himself does not apply to cases where there is a distinct private injury separable from the wrong to the public.

I shall now deal with the objection that Regulation 64, though in terms applicable to all resolutions, should be confined only to the resolutions of the Senate which require the sanction of the Government to become valid regulations and that as the resolutions in question in substance merely record the sanction of the Senate under Regulation 96(iii) the arrangements proposed by the Syndicate do not require the sanction of the Government and so do not coma within Regulation 64.

Section 25 provides that the Senate may, with the sanction of the Government, make regulations consistent with the Act of Incorporation and with the Act of 1904 to provide for all matters relating to the University. It is clear from the section that whenever a new regulation has to be made or an existing regulation has to be altered, the sanction of the Government is a condition precedent to its validity. The approval of the regulations by the Governor in Council would not give them validity if not otherwise legal. Their validity has to be determined by Courts when they are properly brought before them: Kruse v. Johnstone. Other cases are provided for by the Act where the sanction of the Government has to be obtained, for example, affiliation or disaffiliation of colleges. There is nothing in the Act which requires the sanction of the Government except in cases where sanction is specially stated as being required. In matters falling outside the scope of the provisions requiring sanction, the Senate is an autonomous body having full powers of action so long as it confines itself within the scope indicated by the Act. Section 8 of the Act of 1857 vests in the Chancellor, Vice Chancellor and Fellows the entire management of, and superintendence over, the affairs and concerns of the University and except where specific limitations are imposed they are empowered to act in such manner as may appear to them bast, calculated to promote the purposes intended by the University. Section 4 of the Act of 1904 provides that all the duties and liabilities imposed upon the University and the powers conferred by the Act of 1857 upon the Senate shall be vested in and exercised by the Senate constituted by the Act of 1904. Although under the principal Act the Governor in Council has power of interference only in contain matters, Regulation 64 framed under the Act give the Governor in Council power to pass orders in respect of every resolution of the Senate where any Fellow protests against the resolution. I am of opinion that Regulation 64, in so far as it purports to vest any power in the Government regarding resolutions of the Senate not amounting to regulations under section 25 of the Act or any resolution of the Senate over which a special power of interference is not conferred by the Act, is ultra vires. No doubt section 25 of the Act gives power to the Senate to make regulations in respect of all matters relating to the University so long as the regulations are not inconsistent with the Act. It is argued that there is no inconsistency with the Act where the Senate with the concurrence of the Government resolves that in cases where there is a single dissentient member on any resolution of the Senate the right of ultimate decision shall vest not in the Senate but in the Government and that there is nothing in the Act to render Regulation 64 illegal. I am of opinion that where a statute expressly or by implication leaves the determination of certain matters to the body corporate created by it, it has no power to delegate its authority on matters within its competence to a third person.

The next question is whether the proceedings of the Senate complained against by Mr. Natesan are regulations which require the sanction of the Government. It is conceded in this case that, if any one of the matters dealt with by the resolution of the Senate protested against is a resolution or a matter for which the sanction of the Government is necessary, Regulation 64 would in terms apply to it. The word “Regulation” has not been defined either in the Universities Act or the General Clauses Act or so far as I can see in any of the Acts of the Indian legislature. The word is defined in the Century Dictionary as ‘a rule or order prescribed by a superior or competent authority as to the action of those under its control;’ and also as ‘a rule prescribed by municipality, corporation or society for the conduct of third persons dealing with it.’ It is defined in Murray's Dictionary as ‘a rule prescribed for the management of some matter or for the regulating of conduct; a governing precept or direction; a standing rule.’ The scheme of the Act seems to be that general rules framed as to matters within the competence of the University are to be made by the Senate with the concurrence of the Government and that the Syndicate's powers are purely executive and limited to the application of those rules to the facts and exigencies of particular cases as they may arise. It is only in the application of the general rules made by the Senate to particular cases that no sanction of the Government is necessary. Under the regulations framed by the Universities Act it is open to the Syndicate to bring forward new regulations or amend the old ones. Regulation 96(viii) empowers the Syndicate to draft such regulations as may, from time to time, be necessary and to submit them to the Senate for approval. The Syndicate is also empowered under clause (iii) to nominate University Professors and Lecturers, to define their duties and fix their remuneration, and to report any such proposed arrangements to the Senate for its sanction. Clause (ix) empowers the Syndicate to make its own Standing Orders and, subject to the regulations of the University, to regulate the disposal of its own business. In the case of clause (ix) no sanction of the Senate is necessary as in the case of clauses (iii) and (viii). Where the Syndicate purports to act under clause (iii) or (viii) and the Senate gives its sanction to the Syndicate's proposals the real test for the purpose of seeing whether Regulation 64 is applicable is whether the act done in foot amounts to the taking of a regulation irrespective of the form in which the sanction of the Senate is sought to be obtained. If, in substance and in effect what is actually done is the miking of rules of general applicability and not the mere application of such rules to any given set of facts, I am of opinion that Regulation 64 would apply as the Senate would be setting their approval to a matter in which the Government has a voice. In the present case the Syndicate made certain rules set out in appendix A to the agenda paper. They were called Standing Orders and were submitted to the Senate for approval under Regulation 96(iii). Item 4 of the agenda paper runs as follows “The Syndicate presents to the Senate for sanction under Regulation 96(iii) the Standing Orders printed as appendix A relating to the appointment and duties of University Professors.

Mr. Hunter will move that the sanction of the Senate be accorded to the arrangements embodied in these Standing Orders.

Mr. K.B Ramanathan has given notice of the following amendment “…”.

Appendix A is headed “Standing Orders adopted by the Syndicate in connection with University Professors and their duties.” It is divided into two parts “General” and “Special” and I have little doubt that some of the Standing Orders proposed are really general rules framed and are in effect regulations. For example rule I of Appendix A provides that “University Professors shall be appointed by the Syndicate subject to the confirmation of the Senate, and His Excellency the Governor in Council.” So far as the Universities Act is concerned, section 25(e) vests in the Senate the duty of making regulations regarding the appointment of University Professors and Lecturers and the fixing of their duties 16 is clear, from the Act that not only as regards the appointments but as regards the making of general rules fixing their duties the power is vested not in the Syndicate but in the Senate, Having regard to section 25(e) it would appear that University Professors and Lecturers are not officers or servants of the University like the Registrar and other officers and servants. All that section 15 of the Act says is that the executive government of the University shall be vested in the Syndicate or in other words the duty of the Syndicate is simply to carry out the rules and regulations framed by the Senate. It is no doubt open to the Senate to ask the Syndicate to submit the names of persons who, in the opinion of the Syndicate, are qualified to be University Professors; but the function is solely advisory. Regulation 96(iii), if it is not to be treated as ultra vires, only gives the Syndicate the power to nominate University Professors and Lecturers and to propose what the particular Professor nominated ought to do. The power to define their duties and to fix their remuneration can only refer to the particular persons nominated. It cannot give the Syndicate general power to appoint University Professors or to make general rules fixing their qualifications, duties and remuneration generally in respect of all future appointments without confining itself to the particular appointments in question. Rule (1) of Appendix A which reverses the order of procedure and which vests the power of appointment on all future occasions in the Syndicate and only leaves to the Senate the power to confirm the appointment or not and which further introduces the new condition of Government's sanction is, in my opinion, a regulation. The power of appointment being sought to be vested in the Syndicate, it will not be open to the Senate to appoint a person and its power will be limited simply to confirming or refusing to confirm the appointments made by the Syndicate.

In construing rules or by-laws of public representative bodies constituted by the legislature for essentially public purposes Courts have always given a benevolent interpretation and have been slow to condemn them as invalid or ultra vires [Galloway v. Mayor of London and Kruse v. Johnstone] and in considering clause (iii) of Regulation 96 and section 25 and the other provisions of the Act I think the only way to reconcile the various provisions and to treat clause (iii) as intra vires is to adopt the construction I have indicated. Rule 3 of the General Rules gives the Syndicate the absolute power of dismissal which is nowhere conferred on it by the Act. The power of dismissal is incidental to the power of appointment and goes with that power so that the power of dismissal cannot be in the Syndicate and any general rule giving that power would be a regulation. There are other rules in Appendix A which are regulations, but it is unnecessary to go into each of them in detail as I am of opinion that Regulation 64 would apply if any one or more of the resolutions of the Senate are regulations requiring Government's sanction.

The main contention of the Advocate-General was that because the Syndicate put them forward under Regulation 96(iii) as their proposals and not as regulations and the Senate adopted them as such they cannot be called “regulations” whatever their effect may be. It was suggested that because the agenda paper stated that the proposals were under Regulation 96(iii) the Senate had no power to pass them as regulation under 96(viii) and that, if what the Senate did amount to passing of regulations, they are ultra vires and no mandamus should be granted in respect of such resolution. Reference was made to cases where resolutions of companies were set aside or declared ultra vires, when the notice convening the meeting did not specify that a particular resolution would be proposed at the meeting or where the resolution as actually passed was entirely different from the one notified to be proposed at the mealing or where, owing to a ruling of the chairman, the corporation was misled into believing that they were doing something totally different from what they, intended to do or had met for the purposes of doing. I do not think that these cases have any bearing on the facts of the present case. With the correctness of the ruling of the chairman, we have no concern. This is a matter for the consideration of the Government when it considers whether sanction ought or ought not to be accorded. The ruling of the chairman that proposals which are not regulations are regulations, would not, if they were pissed, empower the Government to interfere and the converse is equally true. It will be soon that, both under Regulations 96(iii) and 96(viii), what is brought forward by the Syndicate are only proposals that have to be sanctioned. Regulation 96(viii) requires the Syndicate “to report any such propose arrangements to the Senate for its sanction” and Regulation 96(viii) requires the Syndicate to submit the draft regulations to the Senate for approval.” If the Syndicate wants to amend the regulations in force or drift any new regulations, it has to submit its proposals to the Senate. If it has to nominate University Professors and Lecturers and define their duties, it has also to report its proposals to the Senate. If, while purporting to act under Regulation 96(iii), the proposals of the Syndicate amount to either new regulations or modifications of the old ones and the Senate accepts them, I find it difficult to see why such acceptance does not amount to the passing of regulations especially as there is nothing to prevent the Syndicate sanding up the resolution to Government for sanction. If sanction is accorded by the Government, can it be contended that the form in which the matter was brought up before the Senate is to override the substance of what the Senate did and that the regulation is invalid? What we have to see is the substance and not the form, for neither the Senate nor the Syndicate can, by a change of or in or procedure, affect the right of Government to veto rules which amount to regulations or deprive a fellow of his right to protest under Regulation 64. Appendix A purports to be Standing Orders adopted by the Syndicate in connection with University Professors. If they are only Standing Orders and intended to be nothing but Standing Orders simply, framed by the Syndicate to regulate its own affairs, they do not require any sanction by the Senate as they are covered by Regulation 96(viii) and it is difficult to see why they were sent up to the Senate at all. The Syndicate obviously intended that the Senate by passing the proposed rules, should, in effect, frame rules binding on the Senate in all future cases. No explanation has been given why they were called. Standing Orders in the Appendix if they were to be presented under Regulation 96(iii). Where a series of proposals relating to a subject are submitted by the Syndicate to the Senate some of which are in affect regulations and some of which are mere matters of routine or applications of regulations to particular cases, the mere fact that the agenda paper says that they were submitted under one or other of the clauses of Regulation 96 would not affect the right of Government to veto the proposals that are regulations or deprive a follow of the right to protest under Regulation 64. Though in the Agenda paper it is stated that sanction would be sought under Regulation 96(iii), it appears from the Minutes that no reference was made by Regulation 96(iii) as the clause under which the proposition was actually moved, but it was generally put as a proposition to which sanction was to be accorded by the Senate and this would also cover such of the proposals as were regulations and had to be moved under Regulation 96(viii). The motion before the Senate was simply “that the sanction of the Senate be accorded to the arrangements embodied in the Standing Orders.” That they are not Standing Orders within the meaning of Regulation 96(ix), is clear on the face of the proposals and it is unlikely that any Fellow of the University would have been misled by the use of the term “Standing Orders” into believing that the Syndicate was merely making rules for the regulation and disposal of its own business with which the Senate had no concern under the regulations. I have little doubt that the members of the Senate, if they had read the agenda, would have known that the Syndicate was really proposing a few new regulations for which it sought the approval of the Senate although it called them Standing Orders. The bellows of the University when they got notice of meeting must, like other members of a corporation or company, be presumed to know the Acts of the legislature creating them members of a Body Corporate and the rules, regulations and by-laws made thereunder and must be taken to have read the notice of meeting and the agenda in the light of Act and regulations Campbell's Case and Oakbank Oil Co. v. Crum. It appears from the agenda that the view that some of the Fellows took was that the Syndicate was proposing regulations for acceptance; for we find that formal amendments were proposed to the proposals of the Syndicate and each proposal was treated in the same manner as the proposed regulations under the agenda. There is nothing in the affidavit of the Registrar to show that any member of the Senate was misled into believing that, because they were put forward under Regulation 96, clause (iii), the acceptance of the recommendations of the Syndicate would not in effect be the passing of regulations. Nor would the resolutions of the Senate be had for want of proper notice. Where notice of the meeting and of the business to be transacted, at the meeting have been given and where the agenda sets out what is proposed to be done, it is no answer to say that the Fallows of the University did not read through the whole of the agenda, but stopped at page 5 and assumed that what was set out in appendix A would only be Standing Orders. On the agenda paper the word “Appendix A” is printed in big letters and the number of the page also is given presumably with the object of drawing the attention of the members of the Senate to the proposals printed in extenso in the appendix. It is no answer to the validity of the resolution to say that a person who had ample means of knowing what was going to be done did not choose to inform himself by turning over a few pages and seeing what was to be done, I need only refer to Parker v. South Eastern Railway Company and Richardson Spence & Co. and Lord Gough Steamship Company v. Rawntree.

In dealing with the validity or otherwise of the resolutions passed by companies or corporations all that the law requires is that each member should receive due notice of the meeting and should have a fair waning of what was to be submitted to the meeting: Hessen v. Henderson When this is done a resolution passed at the meeting will be valid even though it is not in the identical terms of the resolution specified in the notice of meeting if it is in substance covered by the notice, unless the law prescribes that the notice should be in a certain form or should expressly contain certain particulars. In Torbock v. Lord Westbury, it was held that a special resolution need not follow the exact terms of the notice given but may be amended at the first meeting. It was a case under section 51 of the Companies Act. Notice was given of a resolution altering the remuneration of the directors in a certain manner and at the meeting the resolution was amended. It was contended that the amendment of the special resolution required fresh notice under section 51 of the Companies Act as the object of the notice was to inform the shareholders of the exact resolution to be proposed. Mr. Justice Swinfen Eady in overruling the objection held that it was not necessary that the resolution passed at the meeting should be in identical terms with the resolution specified in the notice if proper and sufficient notice of the intention to propose such resolution had been given. McConnell v. E. Prill & Co., Ltd. in no way shakes the authority of Torbook v. Lord Westbury, or introduces any new rule. It was a case under section 69 of the Companies Consolidation Act of 1908 which expressly provides that where an extraordinary resolution is proposed to be passed at a general meeting the notice must specify the intention to propose the resolution as an extraordinary resolution. Mr. Justice Sargant was of opinion that, though under the Companies Act of 1862 any notice was good which sufficiently informed the shareholders of the intention to act by way of extraordinary resolution, the wording of section 69 was imperative. In the present case there is nothing in the Universities Act or the regulations which prescribes any particular form so as to bring it within the ruling in MeConnell v. E. Prill & Co., Ltd.,. I am of opinion that the resolution of the Senate was not ultra vires or invalid. Mr. Natesan has therefore the right under Regulation 64 to protest against the resolution in question as the sanction of the Senate was given to proposals which, if approved of by Government, would be valid regulations. The last point for determination is whether this is a case where the Court should exercise its discretion and grant a mandamus. Though the granting of a writ of mandamus is at the discretion of the Court, the discretion is not arbitrary but has to be guided by fixed legal principles. Where a person has a legal right to the performance of a public duty and having do other effective means of enforcing that right comes to the Court bonâ fide within a reasonable time after performance of the duty has been refused, Courts have always issued a mandamus. I can find no grounds, for refusing relief in the present case. All that the Advocate-General was able to state on this part of the case was that the matter in dispute was not of sufficient importance and that the granting of mandamus would encourage frivolous applications. The questions in issue in this case are, in my opinion, of considerable public importance and I do not think that the Fellows of the Madras University will be tempted to come to Court oftener than is necessary should a mandamus in the present case be granted.

I agree that the rule should be made absolute with taxed costs.

In the matter of K.B Ramanatha Ayyar, an Ordinary Fellow of the University of Madras.

JUDGMENT

This is an application by Mr. K.B Ramanatha Ayyar for the issue of a mandamus to the Syndicate of the Madras University directing them to forward his protest to the Government under Regulation 64 of the Regulations passed under the Universities Act of 1904. This application was heard along with that of Mr. G.A Natesan for similar relief. The points in controversy are the same. There in, however, this additional fact that the protest of Mr. Ramanatha Ayyar was not only against Resolution IV but also Resolution X of the agenda which relates to the recommendations of the Syndicate as regards the alterations made in Regulations 195, 196, 207 and 208.

For the reasons given in my judgment regarding the matter of Mr. G.A Natesan I am of opinion that the rule should be made absolute with taxed costs.

N.R