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Devi Singh v. District Panchayat Raj Adhikari
Judgment Summary — R.K. Gulati, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner was the Pradhan of Gaon Sabha Nagala Aliya (Post Office Gangchauli, Tahsil Hathras, District Aligarh). Respondents Nos. 5 to 9 submitted an application dated 9-3-1984 giving notice of intention to move a motion of no-confidence against the petitioner. On receipt of that notice the District Raj Panchayat Adhikari (respondent No. 1) fixed 6-4-1984 at 10 A.M. as the date for the Gaon Sabha meeting to be held at Basic Primary Pathshala Nagala Aliya. The District Raj Panchayat Adhikari directed the Vikas Khand Adhikari (respondent No. 2) to enquire into the matter, to give due information about the meeting by affixing notices at conspicuous places and by beat of drums, and to report compliance by 23-3-1984.
The motion was ultimately carried by the requisite majority. By order dated 7-4-1984 respondent No. 1 removed the petitioner from the office of Pradhan and directed that charge be handed over to respondent No. 4 (Up-Pradhan). The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 226 seeking certiorari against the removal order dated 7-4-1984 and, by amendment, sought to quash the resolution dated 6-4-1984 by which the motion was carried out.
The respondents filed counter-affidavits (including from Sri Sugriv Singh, the presiding officer at the 6-4-1984 meeting, and respondent No. 4). The Court heard counsel for the parties and delivered the judgment dismissing the petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under Rule 33-B(2) of the Rules framed under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act (Section 14), a meeting for a no-confidence motion could be convened before the expiry of thirty days from receipt of notice, i.e., whether the phrase "which shall not be later than thirty days" is mandatory or directory.
- Whether a purported change of venue (alleged by the petitioner) during the scheduled meeting and the alleged insufficiency of members present (quorum) invalidated the proceedings held on 6-4-1984.
- Whether the prescribed authority was obliged to investigate and adjudicate allegations that signatures on the notice of no-confidence (125 signatures) were forged before proceeding with the meeting.
- Whether the petitioner required personal/formal notice of the motion against him, or whether the mode of notice under sub-rule (1) of Rule 37 (affixing notices and beat of drum) was sufficient.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The meeting on 6-4-1984 was invalid because it was held before thirty days had elapsed from the date of the notice (notice dated 9-3-1984), contrary to sub-rule (2) of Rule 33-B which provides the meeting "shall not be later than thirty days" from receipt of the motion.
- The notified venue was changed during the meeting (from Basic Primary Pathshala to Bamba Pul) without informing members, and only 66 members turned up out of a total membership of 656, so the quorum was not present and the meeting was invalid.
- The meeting was conducted "on paper" in connivance with respondents Nos. 5 to 9; a disputed note appended to the resolution indicates later manipulation.
- The petitioner alleged forgery of 125 signatures on the notice of no-confidence, made a representation on 21-3-1984 and filed affidavits on 24-3-1984; he contended the complaint was not investigated and he was denied opportunity to produce further affidavits.
- He contended he was not given any personal/formal notice of the motion against him.
Respondents' Arguments
- Relying on sub-rule (2) of Rule 33-B, the respondents asserted the meeting date (6-4-1984) was within thirty days of receipt of the notice and thus valid.
- They denied that any application for change of place was filed by respondents Nos. 5 to 9; they maintained the meeting was held at the scheduled place and that 385 members out of 643 were present, constituting more than one-fifth of total voters and fulfilling the quorum requirement.
- No telegram or registered letter from the petitioner was received by respondent No. 1. Minutes of the meeting were recorded as required by Rule 38; the motion had the support of 334 members, opposed by 39, with 12 votes declared invalid.
- The disputed note appended to the resolution was said to be a later manipulation and inconsistent with the minutes and resolution; the presiding officer (respondent No. 2) filed an affidavit denying the petitioner's allegations.
- As to the forgery allegation, respondents pointed to the direction (order dated 22-3-1984) that the petitioner substantiate his claim by filing affidavits of the allegedly forged signatories; the petitioner did not file the required affidavits and thus had not availed the opportunity to substantiate the allegation.
- Respondents relied on precedents and rule distinctions to argue that personal notice to the petitioner was not necessary under sub-rule (1) of Rule 37 for a Gaon Sabha meeting (affixing notices and beat of drum sufficed).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Hastings v. Nash, 219 S.W.2d 225 (215 Ark. 38) | Interpretation of the phrase "not later than" — cited from Words and Phrases as synonymous with "at any time prior to". | The Court used this authority to construe "which shall not be later than thirty days" in Rule 33-B(2) as indicating an outer terminus (an outer limit) and allowing convening the meeting at any time prior to the expiry of thirty days; accordingly, holding the meeting within thirty days was permissible. |
| Goldman v. Broyles Tax (citation fragment in text) | Definition of the word "By" as indicating a terminal point of time ("not later than as early as"). | Used as supporting authority for interpreting temporal phraseology in Rule 33-B(2) to permit convening before thirty days; the Court cited it alongside Hastings to support its construction. |
| Dayashanker v. District Panchayat Officer, Fatehpur, 1968 A.L.J. 753 | Held that the provision to convene a Gaon Sabha "not later than thirty days" is directory (not mandatory) and substantial compliance suffices; the case had converse facts (meeting convened beyond thirty days). | The Court referred to this judgment to reinforce that the thirty-day provision is not mandatory and that infraction does not automatically nullify proceedings; this supported rejecting the petitioner's contention on timing. |
| Mathura Prasad Tewari v. Assistant District Panchayat Officer (Full Bench) | Held that the prescribed authority was not obliged by law to make an enquiry into the genuineness of signatures appended to a notice of motion. | The Court treated this Full Bench decision as binding and relied upon it to reject the petitioner's argument that respondent No. 1 was required to investigate alleged forged signatures before proceeding with the meeting. |
| Om Prakash v. State of U.P. (Division Bench) | Dealt with whether personal/formal notice was required for meetings and distinguished procedure for notice under sub-rule (1) of Rule 37 (Gaon Sabha) from sub-rule (2) (Gaon Panchayat). | The Court adopted the view in Om Prakash that sub-rule (1) of Rule 37 (affixing notices at conspicuous places and beat of drum) suffices for a Gaon Sabha meeting and that formal personal notice to the Pradhan was not necessary; accordingly, the petitioner's contention on lack of personal notice was rejected. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in a sequence addressing each of the petitioner's principal contentions and applying the statutory provisions, rules, and cited authorities strictly as they appear in the record:
- Interpretation of Rule 33-B(2) ("not later than thirty days"): The Court considered the ordinary meaning of the phrase and authorities cited from Words and Phrases (Hastings v. Nash and Goldman v. Broyles) to conclude that "not later than thirty days" indicates an outer terminus and permits convening the meeting prior to the expiry of thirty days. Because the meeting was held within thirty days of the notice, the Court found nothing improper in convening it.
- Mandatory vs. directory nature of the timing provision: The Court relied on the earlier decision in Dayashanker v. District Panchayat Officer (where the meeting was beyond thirty days) which held the provision to be directory and to require substantial compliance rather than rigid enforcement. The Court applied that principle and rejected the petitioner's challenge to the meeting's timing for this additional reason.
- Alleged change of venue, quorum and the disputed note: The petitioner alleged the meeting place was changed without notice and that only 66 members were present (of 656), so quorum was lacking. Respondents contradicted this in sworn counter-affidavits, stating that no application for change of place was moved, and that 385 members of 643 were present (constituting more than one-fifth) and that minutes were recorded under Rule 38 showing 334 votes in favour, 39 against, and 12 invalid. The Court closely examined the disputed note appended to the resolution relied upon by the petitioner and observed: - The note appeared inconsistent with the minutes and the resolution which stated the meeting was held at the scheduled place. - The petitioner had not pleaded this disputed note properly in the writ petition's relevant paragraphs; during argument no satisfactory explanation was offered for this omission. - The placement and content of the note suggested it could be a later insertion; the presiding officer's affidavit denied the petitioner's account. The Court concluded that the dispute over the note and other factual matters presented highly contested questions of fact that could not be resolved on affidavits in writ proceedings under Article 226 without further evidence. Given the overwhelming majority for the motion (334 out of 385 present and voting), the Court declined to disturb the factual finding.
- Allegation of forged signatures and duty to inquire: The petitioner claimed that signatures of 125 persons on the notice of no-confidence were forged and that he sought investigation. The record shows the petitioner was directed by order dated 22-3-1984 to substantiate his allegation by filing affidavits of the 125 persons; he did not file those affidavits or other evidence. The Court relied on the Full Bench decision in Mathura Prasad Tewari holding that the prescribed authority is not obliged to enquire into the genuineness of signatures appended to the notice. The Court treated this decision, and its subsequent following in Dayashanker, as binding and concluded the petitioner could not succeed on this ground.
- Requirement of personal notice to the petitioner: The Court examined Rule 37 and the distinction between sub-rule (1) (notice for Gaon Sabha meetings — affixing at conspicuous places and beat of drum) and sub-rule (2) (notice to each member for Gaon Panchayat). Relying on Om Prakash v. State of U.P., the Court found that for a Gaon Sabha meeting the procedural requirement was to give notice by affixture and beat of drum and that no formal personal notice to the petitioner was necessary. The Court found that the procedure under sub-rule (1) had been followed in the instant case.
Throughout the analysis the Court emphasized legislative intent behind Section 14 of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act: to provide a method for ascertaining the wishes of the members of the Gaon Sabha regarding a motion of no-confidence. Where a large majority of voting members had supported the motion, the Court regarded the statutory procedure as having been substantially complied with and found no ground to interfere in exercise of writ jurisdiction.
Holding and Implications
Final Holding: The writ petition fails and is DISMISSED with costs.
Direct consequences:
- The order dated 7-4-1984 removing the petitioner from the office of Pradhan and directing handover of charge to the Up-Pradhan (respondent No. 4) stands.
- The resolution dated 6-4-1984 by which the motion of no-confidence was carried is not quashed by this Court.
Broader implications:
- The Court applied established authorities and statutory rule interpretations (including that timing in Rule 33-B(2) is not mandatory but an outer limit, and that prescribed authorities are not obliged to investigate genuineness of signatures) and did not purport to create a new precedent beyond applying those authorities to the facts of this case.
- No additional wider legal rule was announced beyond the application of existing decisions and the interpretation of the procedural rules under the Act and Rules as set out in the opinion.
This summary is based exclusively on the language and content of the provided judgment text; no outside facts or inferences have been introduced.
R.K Gulati, J.:— The petitioner was holding office of Pradhan of Gaon Sabha Nagala Aliya, Post Office Gangchauli, Tahsil Hathras, District Aligarh. A notice of an intention to move a motion of no-confidence against, the petitioner was delivered to District Raj Panchayat Adhikari, the respondent No. 1. This notice was given by the respondents Nos. 5 to 9 by their application dated 9-3-1984. On receipt of the said notice the District Panchayat Raj Adhikari fixed 6-4-1984 as the date for meeting of the Gaon Sabha at 10 A.M at Basic Primary Pathshala Nagala Aliya. He directed the Vikas Khand Adhikari, the respondent No. 2 to enquire into the matter and further that due information be given about the meeting, its place and date by affixing notices at conspicuous places in the area of Gaon Sabha and publicity should also be made by beat of drums. The respondent No. 2 was required to report compliance by 23-3-1984. Ultimately the motion was carried out by the requisite majority. Consequently the respondent No. 1 passed an order dated 7-4-1984 by which he removed the petitioner from the office of Pradhan and directed that charge be handed over to the respondent No. 4 the Up-Pradhan. The petitioner has filed this writ petition seeking a writ of certiorari against the order dated 7-4-1984 and a further relief, by making an amendment application praying that resolution dated 6-4-1984 by which the motion was carried out be also quashed.
2. This writ petition is opposed by the respondents. Once counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 to 3, by Sri Sugriv Singh who was the Presiding Officer in the meeting held on 6-4-1984. Another counter affidavit has also been filed by respondent No. 4. A number of grounds have been raised in this writ petition. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.
3. Provisions relating to the removal of Pradhan are contained in Section 14 of the U.P Panchayat Raj Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). Sub-section (4) of Section 14 says that subject to the provisions of this section, the procedure for the removal of a Pradhan including that to be followed at such meeting, shall be such as may be prescribed. The term “Prescribed” has been defined in Clause (p) of Section 2. According to the definition contained in that clause, it means prescribed by the Act or rules made thereunder. Rules 33-B and 37 of the Rules are relevant for the purposes of this case. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 33-B, so far as relevant for our purposes, reads as under:—
“The prescribed authority shall convene a meeting of the Gaon Sabha, under Section 14 of the Act, on a date to be fixed by him which shall not be later than thirty days from the date of receipt of the motiou.”
4. Relying upon the aforesaid rule and the expression “which shall not be later than thirty days” contained therein the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the motion of no-confidence could not have been carried out unless a period of thirty days had expired from the date when the notice was given, namely, on 9-3-1984. The meeting which was held on 6-4-1984 was illegal and invalid.
5. We are unable to accept this contention. In our opinion the expression “not later than thirty days” suggests an outer terminus, meaning thereby that it should be before thirty days. In “Words and Phrases” Permanent Edition, it is stated “Phrase” not later than “is synonymous with phrase” “at any time prior to”. Hastings v. Nash . 219 S.W 2d 225, 226, 215 Ark. 38.. At another place, it has been defined as “By” as indicating a terminal point of time, means “not later than as early as”. Goldman v. Broyles Tax,2. Since the meeting was held within the period of thirty days from the date of notice there is nothing wrong with it.
6. Rule 33-B(1) had been the subject matter of consideration before this Court in Dayashanker v. District Panchayat Officer, Fatehpur . 1968 A.L.J 753.. The facts in that case were converse to that of the present case. The meeting of Gaon Sabha in that case was convened beyond a period of thirty days from the date of notice. It was contended that the meeting could only be convened within the period of thirty days. This contention was repelled. The view taken was that the provision about convening of the meeting of the Gaon Sabha not later than thirty days from the receipt of the notice is not compulsive or mandatory. It is merely directory. It is to be complied with substantially but its infraction would not nullify the proceedings at the meeting. For this additional reason also, we reject the argument of the learned counsel.
7. The learned counsel then urged that notified venue for the meeting was changed to another place, therefore, there was no meeting in the eye of law which was held on 6-4-1984. The petitioner's allegation is that in the meeting which began at the scheduled time and place till 11.30 A.M only 66 members turned up, out of the total membership of 656. As the quorum was not complete the petitioner alongwith six other members moved an application before the respondent No. 2 to postpone the meeting. At about 12 noon the respondents Nos. 5 to 9 filed an application for change in the place of meeting from Basic Primary Pathshala (the scheduled place) to Bamba Pul on the ground that it was a central place and some voters had gathered there. The place was changed without any information to the members of the Gaon Sabha. That the petitioner informed the respondent No. 1 about this illegality both by telegram and a letter under registered cover. It is further asserted that the meeting was conducted only on paper in connivance with the respondents No. 5 to 9.
8. All these assertions have been stoutly denied in the two counter affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents. Paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 of the counter affidavit, filed on behalf of the respondents Nos. 1 to 3, are very relevant. It is stated that no application for change of place as alleged by the petitioner was ever moved by the respondents Nos. 5 to 9. The meeting was held at the scheduled place in which 385 members of the Gaon Sabha being 643, the members present constituted more than 1/5th of the total number of voters. As such the quorum was complete and in accordance with the provisions of the Act the meeting was declared in order. No telegram or registered letter was received from the petitioner. Further as required by Rule 38 of the Rules framed under the Act, minutes of the meeting were duly recorded which sets out the correct facts, a copy of which is Annexure 14 to the writ petition. The motion was supported by 334 members while it was opposed by 39 members, 12 votes were declared as invalid. As the motion was carried out by a majority of 2/3rd of the persons voting and present, by an order dated 7-4-1984 the petitioner was removed from the office of Pradhan and was directed to hand over the charge to Up-Pradhan.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner drew our attention to a note appended to the resolution. The said note is to the following effect:
10. The claim made by the petitioner before us is strongly resisted by the respondents. Their claim is, it is a later manipulation. We were referred to the relevant Paragraphs of the writ petition where mention of annexure 14 has been made. In these paragraphs there is no averment worth the name about the disputed note relied upon, during the course of argument before us. No valid reason could be given by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner or such an omission particularly when the disputed note could have been a fsheetanchor of petitioner's case. It was pointed out that the note runs contrary to minutes and the resolution by which the motion was carried out. The resolution clearly states that the meeting was held at the scheduled place. On the face of this assertion in the resolution it would be not an imprudent act on the part of any one to append such note except that it is a later insertion. The note finds place at a very innocuous place. It appears at the top left hand margin under the column ordinary course of business such a note could not have been given on the place where it has been given. As stated earlier the meeting was presided over by the respondent No. 2 who has filed his own affidavit controverting the claim of the petitioner. He is a Government Officer and had no personal interest in the matter. We are inclined to accept the case of the respondents, and are not prepared to attach any importance to the said note. That apart there are other reasons which impel us to reject the petitioner's case. The claim set up by the petitioner at best could be treated as a highly disputed question of fact which cannot be resolved on the basis of the affidavits filed in these proceedings. For its proper decision further evidence would be necessary. We do not consider it a fit case in which while exercising our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution we should go into this matter. In taking this view we have in the back of our mind the legislative intent in enacting Section 14 of the Act, namely to provide, primarily a method for obtaining the wishes of the members of the Gaon Sabha in relating to the motion of no-confidence against the Pradhan or Up-pradhan as the case may be. Having regard to the fact that the resolution was carried out by an overwhelming majority i.e out of 385 members present and voting 334 voted in favour of the motion. We accordingly reject this contention.
11. The learned counsel for the petitioner than argued that the petitioner had made a representation on 21-3-1984 to the respondent No. 1 by an application stating that the signatures of 125 persons appended to the notice no confidence were forged. He had also filed three affidavits on 24-3-1984 each jointly sworn by two persons. The petitioner's request to grant further time for filing affidavit of other persons was orally rejected by the respondent No. 1. According to the petitioner his complaint was not investigated therefore he is entitled to relief as claimed in the writ peiition.
12. We are not impressed by this submission. By order dated 22-3-1984 the petitioner was required to substantiate his allegations by filing affidavits of 125 persons whose signatures were alleged to have been forged. No affidavit or any other evidence was filed by the petitioner to support his assertion. The petitioner was allowed ample opportunity to prove his point which he did not avail of. In these circumstances he cannot be heard to say that the respondent No. 1 had failed to scrutinise his complaint and thus the proceedings taken in pursuance of the notice given for no-confidence motion were illegal. In Mathura Prasad Tewari v. Assistant District Panchayat Officer,4 a full Bench of this Court held that the Prescribed Authority was not obliged by law to make an enquiry into the genuineness or otherwise of the signatures appended to the notice. The full Bench decision has been followed by a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Dayashanker v. District Panchayat Officer (supra). We are bound by these decisions. For these reasons also the petitioner cannot succeed.
13. The last contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that he was not given any personal notice of the motion moved against him. In Om Prakash v. State of U.P,5 a division Bench of this Court had an occasion to deal with similar contention. The contention was repelled. The court contrasted the provisions contained in sub-rule (1) of Rule 37 which provide for a notice in respect of the meeting relating to the Gaon Sabha with those contained in sub-rule (2) of Rule 37 which provide for a notice for meetings relating to Gaon Panchayat. The Court observed:
“A bare persual of Rule 37 of the Rules indicates that the rule itself has made a distinction in the procedure to be followed in regard to notice of a meeting of a Gaon Sabha vis-a-vis notice of a meeting of a Gaon Panchayat, whereas sub-rule (2) of Rule 37 of the Rules which deals with the notice of a meeting of the Gaon Panchayat prescribes that notice shall be sent to each member through a chowkidar or a peon at least five days before the meeting no such requirement is to be found in regard to a notice for a meeting of Gaon Sabha in sub-rule (1) of Rule 37 of the rules. In regard to a meeting of a Gaon Sabha the requirements of subrule (1) of Rule 37 is that a notice to attend the meeting of the Gaon Sabha shall be given by affixing it at conspicuous places in the area of Gaon Sabha and by communication of date, time and place of the meeting by beat of drum.”
14. Admittedly the procedure provided under sub-rule (1) of Rule 37 was followed in the instant case. We agree with the view expressed in Om Prakash's case (supra) and hold that it was not necessary to give any formal notice to the petitioner. We accordingly reject the last contention of the petitioner as well.
15. In the result this writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs.
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