1. Feeling aggrieved by a decree of ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation in respect of building under the tenancy of the petitioner which had been passed by the Judge Small Causes Court in S.C Suit No. 2 of 1988 the petitioner-defendant challenged the same in a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act which was disposed of vide the judgment and order dated 20-1-93 whereunder the decree passed by the trial Court was upheld subject to a modification in the decree for recovery of pendente-linte and future damages which was reduced to an amount at the rate of Rs. 175/- per month at which rate the accommodation had been let out. The petitioner tenant has now approached this Court for redress seeking the reveral of the decree praying for the quashing thereof.

2. The facts, shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of this case lie in a narrow compass. The suit giving rise to this writ petition was filed in the month of January, 1988. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant was a defaulter in payment of rent which was not paid since 1-1-87 whereupon on 23-11-87 a notice terminating the tenancy and requiring him to clear off the arrears of rent was issued in accordance with Section 106, Transfer of Property Act which was duly served on 28-11-87 but the defendant did not comply with the same and neither vacated the premises in dispute nor paid off the rent. The plaintiff claimed pendente-lite and future damages at the rate of Rs. 7/- per day. The plaintiff-respondent had asserted in the plaint of the suit referred to above that the building in dispute had been newly constructed and fell outside the purview of U.P Act No. 13 of 1972. The defendant-petitioner felt this assertion to be quite vague and moved an application seeking better particulars to be furnished which was allowed. Consequently the plaintiff-respondent made a statement under Order X, Rule 2, C.P.C on 3-11-88 stating that the construction of the building in question had been completed in the month of June, 1980. It was also stated that the site of the building was previously occupied by a temporary tin-shed and the building in question had been raised/constructed in its place. It was further stated that this building was assessed for the first time by Nagar Palika in the year 1987.

3. It appears that when the aforesaid particulars were supplied, the defendant petitioner filed his written statement denying the plaint allegations and asserted that the building in dispute was a pre 1974 construction and fell within the purview of the U.P Act No. 13 of 1972 on the date when the suit had been filed. The maintainability of the suit was accordingly challenged on this ground. It was also asserted that the defendant had deposited the requisite amount contemplated under Section 20(4) of the U.P Act No. 13 of 1972.

4. The trial Court after an appraisal of the evidence on the record came to the conclusion that the tenancy of the defendant had been terminated in accordance with law. It also came to the conclusion that the building in dispute had been constructed in the year 1980 and had been assessed for the first time by the local authority, Nagar Palika in the year 1987. Consequently, the trial Court upheld the claim of the petitioner that on the date of filing of the suit the building in question could not be deemed to be within the purview of the U.P Act No. 13 of 1972. In this view of the matter, the defendant was held to be not entitled to the benefits available under Section 20(4) of the said Act. The suit was accordingly decreed as prayed.

5. The revisional Court affirmed the decision of the trial Court on the question relating to the applicability of the provisions of U.P Act No. 13 of 1972 to the building in dispute and negatived the claim of the tenant-petitioner regarding his entitlement to the protection envisaged therein. However, the decree in regard to the recovery of pendente-lite and future damages at the rate of Rs. 7/- per day was set aside and substituted by a decree for recovery of the damages for the aforesaid period at the rate of rent.

6. Both the Courts below have proceeded to compute the period of exemption en-visaged under Section 2(2) of the U.P Act No. 13 of 1972 taking the starting point for this purpose the date of first assessment of the, building which was proved to be 1-4-87. The trial Court had noticed that according to the defendant himself he had for the first time occupied the premises in dispute in the year 1980. The trial Court had further refused to draw any inference regarding the existence of the building in dispute prior to the year 1974 on the basis of the existence of the same electricity connection in this building which connection was said to be utilised by the plaintiff in the year 1974. The trial Court appears to have accepted the claim of the plaintiff that since the building had been constructed in place of old tin-sheet, there was nothing unusual in having the old electricity connection being continued in the new building. However, it appears that neither the trial Court nor the revisional Court gave any importance or attached any significance to the question about the existence of the building prior to the year 1980 as in their view the date of occupation disclosed by the petitioner-defendant taking into consideration the availability of the date of first assessment of the building in dispute in the absence of the date of reporting of the completion of the construction of the building or recording of such date by the local authority, made the enquiry into the question of the existence of the building prior to the year 1980 wholly irrelevant and immaterial. A perusal of the impugned judgment discloses that it is in this view of the matter that there is no detailed consideration of the question relating to the claim of the petitioner abaut the existence of the building during the period 1974-1979.

7. It may be noticed that the defendant-petitioner had never challenged the genuineness of the documentary evidence brought on record establishing that the building in question had been assessed for the first time in the year 1987. It is, however, not disputed that even according to the local authority, the Nagar Palika as is apparent from the letter dated 19-5-88 issued by the office Superintendent which is on record, the building in question had not been assessed prior to the year 1987. The defendant himself could not have any personal knowledge of the actual completion of the construction of the building. It is in this view of the matter, as noticed by the trial Court, in the deposition of Raj Kumar the defendant and bis witness Behari Lal it was stated that the building was available for being let out in the year 1976. The defendant, thus, tried to draw an inference from the above and the existence of the electricity connection that the construction of the building in question was complete at least in the year 1976.

8. I have heard Sri R.N Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Rajesh Tandon, learned counsel representing the landlord respondents at some length and have carefully perused the record.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the assessment of the building in the proceedings under Section 141 of the Municipalities Act relied upon by the plaintiff is liable to be ignored and cannot be deemed to furnish the starting point for computing the period envisaged under Section 2(2) of the Act inasmuch as according to the own showing of the plaintiff there did exist a building in the year 1974 and if during the period elapsing between 1974-1986 in spite of the completed building in existence the local authority did not assess the same in the proceedings under Sections 141 to 144 of the U.P Municipalities Act, this omission could not enure to the benefit of the landlord and it was incumbent upon the Courts below to find out the actual date of the completion of the construction of the building and determine the period of exemption available in respect of the building in question taking the starting point for computing this period from the date of its actual occupation as envisaged under the second part of the Explanation I of Section 2(2) specially when according to the plaintiff the completion of the building had neither been reported or otherwise recorded by the local authority during this period of 1974 to 1986.

10. The learned counsel for the petitioner heavily relied upon in this connection on a decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Hirday Narain Singh v. Mallo Lal Srivastava; reported in 1986 (1) ARC page 74 : (1986 All LJ 689) wherein the learned single Judge appears to have accepted the submission of the learned counsel made in that case that when actual date of completion is admitted the Court will not give any consideration to the fiction and that the fiction will not override reality. In the aforesaid case it was further observed that the dominant purpose of the Act was to protect the interest of the tenants and the whole Act is, to be interpreted bearing this purpose in mind. The learned single Judge went on to observe in the said decision that when the Legislature intended to protect the tenants then it will be preposterous to think that the Legislature would give an overriding effect to the fiction to the detriment of the tenants.

11. The learned counsel for the respondent has on the other hand contended that the provisions of U.P Act No. 13 of 1972 protect the interest of the landlords as well. He has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in the case of Ganpat Roy (deceased) through his heirs and legal representatives v. Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies)/Rent Control and Eviction Officer; reported in 1992 (2) ARC 494 wherein it has been observed that while it is no doubt true that the Rent Control Act is essentially meant for the benefit of the tenants at the same time it also seeks to safeguard the legitimate interests of the landlords and that it was indeed in the nature of social welfare legislation intended to protect tenants against harassment and exploitation by landlords safeguarding at the same time the legitimate interests of the landlords. It was further observed that the Rent Control Act in question seeks to preserve the social harmony and promote social justice by safeguarding the interests of tenants mainly and at the same time protecting the legitimate interest of the landlords.

12. Learned counsel for the respondents has further contended that the Explanation I to Section 2(2) of the Act provides for a statutory fiction providing for a starting point statutorily for computing the period of exemption envisaged under Section 2(2) of the Act which has to prevail over any date on which actually the construction of the building may be said to have been completed. According to the learned counsel for the respondent this statutory fiction has been provided to secure a benefit in favour of a landlord providing exemption from the rigors of the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act which impose restrictions on the eviction of a tenant from building falling within the purview of the Act by filing a suit seeking recovery of possession of the building under tenancy by eviction of the tenant. The relevant portion of Section 2(2) of the U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 is to the following effect:—

“2(2) (Except as provided in sub-section (5) of Section 12, sub-section (1-A) of Section 21, sub-section (2) of Section 24, Sections 24A, 24B, 24C or sub-section (3) of Section 29, nothing in this Act shall apply to a building during a period often years from the date on which its construction is completed) provided……………………………………(Provided further that where construction of a building is completed on or after April 26, 1985 then the reference in this sub-section to the period of ten years shall be deemed to be a reference to a period of twenty years from the date on which its construction is completed).

13. Explanation I (For the purpose of this section) (a) The construction of a building shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which the completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction, and in the case of a building subject to assessment, the date on which the first assessment thereof comes into effect, and where the said dates are different, the earliest of the said dates, and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment the date on which it is actually occupied (not including occupation merely for the purpose of supervising the construction or guarding the building under construction) for the first time;

14. Provided that there may be different dates of completion of construction in respect of different parts of a building which are either designed as separate units or are occupied separately by the landlord and one or more tenants or by different tenant;

(b) “Construction”, includes any new construction in place of an existing building which has been wholly or substantially demolished;

(c) Where such substantial addition is made to an existing building that the existing building becomes only a minor part thereof the whole of the building including the existing building shall be deemed to be constructed on the date of completion of the said addition.”

15. As will be noticed from the above, for the purposes of Section 2(2) of the Act the construction of a building ‘shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which the completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction, and in the case of a building subject to assessment, the date on which the first assessment thereof comes into effect and where the said dates are different, earliest of the said dates. The word ‘deemed’ is normally used to create a statutory fiction. While interpreting a provision creating a legal fiction it has to be ascertained as to for what purpose a fiction is created and it is only after ascertaining this all those facts and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries to the giving effect to the fiction have to be assumed. As clearly pointed out by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Commissioner Of Income Tax, Delhi v. S. Teja Singh , reported in AIR 1959 SC 352, ‘it is well settled that in construeing the scope of legal fiction it would be proper and even necessary to assume all those facts on which alone the fiction can operate. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in that case quoted with approval the observation of Lord Asquith in East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsburg Borough Council, 1952 AC 109’ which are to the following effect:

“If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed must inevitably have flowed from or ac companied it the statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs.”

16. It may usefully be noticed at this stage’ that the Privy Council in its decision in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay Presidency v. Bombay Trust Corporation; reported in AIR 1930 PC 54, had observed that what is implicit in the words must rule whatever may be the general consideration as to what” the Legislature was minded or was likely to do. The Privy Council was very much emphatic in the aforesaid decision when it observed that when a person is ‘deemed to be’ sometime the only meaning possible is that whereas he is not in reality that something the Act of Parliament requires him to be treated as if he were.

17. The aforesaid observation occurred in a judgment of the Privy Council given in an Indian Appeal which had come to us for its the decision before the jurisdiction of the Privy Council was abolished under the Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949. Taking into consideration the provisions contained in Section 8 of the Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949 read with Article 374(2) of the Constitution it is apparent that the decision in the aforesaid case has the effect as if it were an order made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and, therefore, binding under Article 141 of the Constitution.

18. It is, therefore, obvious that ordinarily while using the word ‘deemed’ the object normally is to render certain that which might otherwise be uncertain. This word is apt to include the obvious the uncertain and the impossible. Further it is not permissible to contradict the statutory fiction as in that case the very purpose for which the fiction is created may stand defeated. Thus, where a deeming provision is made in a statute the state of things will have to be assumed, though such things do not exist and the rights of the parties will have to be determined on such imaginary things.

19. It can, however, not be lost sight of as pointed out by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of State of Travancore-Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashewnut Factory, reported in AIR 1953 SC 333 at page 342 that when a statutory provision creats a fiction it is first necessary to find out the purpose for which it was created in order to understand the scope and the implications of the fiction. In this case the Hon'ble Supreme Court had quoted with approval the following principle form In re Coal Economising Gas Company, (1975) 1 Ch D 182 (H), “where the Legislature provides that something is to be deemed other than it is we must be careful and see within what points and for what purpose it is to be so deemed.

20. The question involved in the present case is to be determined the background of aforesaid position in law. The provisions contained in Section 2(2) of the U.P Act No. 13 of 1972 clearly indicate the legislative policy of allowing exemption from the restrictive provisions of the Act to all the building for specified period to be computed from the date of the completion Of their construction. Such an exemption was felt necessary in order to give incentive to persons desirous to construct new buildings. The Legislature has expressly recognised the need for encouraging the construction of new buildings by granting exemption to all such building which had not completed ten years from the completion of their construction computed in accordance with the provisions contained in the explanation to Section 2(2) of the Act. This period of exemption was raised from then years to twenty years by an Ordinance and to forty years as provided for by the U.P Act No. 11 of 1988. In the statement of objects and reasons of the said Act it has been clearly indicated that the second proviso to subsection (2) of Section 2 of the Act provided that the buildings constructed on or after April 26, 1985 shall be exempted from the operation of the said Act for a period of twenty years from the date on which the construction was completed. In order to encourage the construction of new buildings in the State it had been decided to extend the period of said exemption from twenty years to forty years. It is, therefore, obvious that the provision of exemption envisaged under Section 2(2) of the U.P Act No. 13 of 1972 had been made specifically for the benefit of the landlords and consequently in order to secure the benefit to be provided to the landlords the explanation has to be interpreted in a manner so as to ensure that the protection and its benefit gets extended to the landlords. As observed by the Supreme Court in its decision in the case of Administrator Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur v. Datta-traya Dahankar, reported in 1991 (4) JT 500 : ((1992) 1 SCC 361 : AIR 1992 SC 1846) a mechanical approach to construction is altogether out of step with modern positive approach. The modern positive approach, it was indicated, is to have a purposeful construction that is to effectuate the object and purpose of the Act. Further in determining either the general object of the legislature or the meaning of its language in any particular passage it is obvious that the intention which appears to be most in accord with convenience, reason, justice and legal principle should in all cases of doubtful significance be presumed to be the true one.’

21. If the language used in explanation I to Section 2(2) of the Act is examined in the light of the principles indicated above it will be apparent that the statutory fiction employed therein read with the use of the words. ‘in the absence of any such report, record of assessment’ contained therein leave no manner of doubt that in the presence of an assessment of a.building subject to assessment, it is this date alone which has to be taken to be the date which furnishes the starting point for computing the period of exemption and the other factors such as the date of occupation etc. lose all significance. As a matter of fact the effect of the words ‘in the absence of as used in explanation 1 to Section 2(2) was noticed by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Om Prakash Gupta v. Digvijendra Singh; reported in (1982) 2 SCC 61 : AIR 1982 SC 1230(2) : (1982 All LJ 376) which was the case decided by a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court. In that case the building in question was shown to have been occupied on 16-6-67, however, it was assessed for the first time on 1-4-68. The question which had come for consideration was as to whether in the presence of the assessment dated 1-4-68 the date of occupation of the building i.e 16-6-67 could be taken to be the date providing the starting point for computing the period of exemption. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while interpreting the explanation to Section 2(2) of the Act observed that primarily the language employed is the determining factor of the intention of the Legislature. It was further observed that the first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. The Apex Court found that the language of subsection (2) of Section 2 of the Act was implicit and unambiguous and further that it was not capable of two interpretations. Having come to the aforesaid conclusion, the Apex Court observed that the date of occupation could be taken to be the date of completion of the construction only when there was no report or record of the completion of the construction or no assessment thereof. Since in that case the assessment was there it was held that the date of the first assessment was to be deemed to be the date of completion of the construction. It is obvious from a perusal of the aforesaid decision that in the presence of the first assessment the date of occupation of the building during the period anterior to the first assessment was held to be of no significance whatsoever.

22. It may be usefully noticed here that in its decision in the case of Ram Saroop Rai v. Smt. Lilawati reported in 1980 ARC page 466 : (1980 All LJ 651) the Apex Court had observed that the statute made it clear that the reliance upon the municipal records rather than on the lips of witnesses, is indicated to determine the date of completion and the nature of the construction. In the circumstances, therefore, it is not possible to hold that a statutory fiction cannot override reality.

23. This Court had an occasion to consider the implications arising under the deeming clause contained in the explanation to Section 2(2) of the U.P Act No. 13 of 1972 in its decision in the case of Smt. Samundri Devi v. Nand Kishore Marwah, reported in 1982 (2) All Rent Cases page 428 : (1987 All LJ 255). It was observed in that case that the Legislature having regard to the fact that the building was to be kept out of the purview of the provisions of the Act for a specific period from the date of completion of its construction wished to ensure that the said date should be known with definiteness and, in order to achieve this it engrafted a legal fiction in respect of the said date. Relying upon an earlier decision of this Court in the case of Tilak Raj v. Sardar Devendra Singh, reported in 1976 (2) All Law Reports 721 : (AIR 1977 (NOC) 184) it was observed that a building is to be deemed to be constructed if it is subjected to assessment on the date with effect from which the first assessment is made and that it is immaterial whether the building is constructed actually prior to that date or it has come into occupation prior to that date. Further relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Hirday Ram v. H.S Kochar, reported in 1977 ARC 323 : (AIR 1977 (NOC) 357) it was noted that when law has interposed to lay down a fiction, it is not open to fall back on the reality of the factual aspect of the matter. It was observed that if the actual aspect of the matter were to be considered then that course will be in the teeth of the deeming provision. The learned single Judge in the aforesaid case drew ample support from the several other decisions of this Court wherein it was said that the very essence of a legal fiction is assumed existence of something that does not actually exist and that even though the date of actual completion of construction of the building may be different, yet the law does not take notice of such dates unless it is followed by the fulfilment of one of the conditions mentioned in the explanation. This Court has clearly held in the decision referred to above that the provision in question was a legislative device for assuming something which in reality it was not and that the mere fact that the deeming provision is expressed to be an explanation will not alter its basic character nor limit it to a mere explanation of substantive provision. It was noticed that a substantive provision may bear a nomenclature of an explanation. In support of his view, the learned single Judge had placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Bombay v. Pandurang Vinayak, reported in AIR 1953 SC 244 : (1953 Cri LJ 1094); D.G Mahajan v. The State of Maharashtra; reported in (1977) 2 SCC 548 : AIR 1977 SC 915 and in the case of S. Sundaram Pillai etc. v. V.R Patt-briaman; reported in (1985) 1 SCC 591 : AIR 1985 SC 582; Ganpat Ladha v. Sashikant Vishnu Shinde; reported in (1978) 2 SCC 573 : AIR 1978 SC 955 and Mrinalini B. Shah v. Bapalal Mohanlal Shah; reported in (1980) 4 SCC 251 : AIR 1980 SC 954 and various other decisions. The decision of this Court in the case of Smt. Samundri Devi (supra) was not disapproved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the appeal filed against this judgment was dismissed vide the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Nand Kishore Marwah v. Smt. Samundri Devi, reported in (1987) 4 SCC 382 : AIR 1987 SC 2284.

24. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, placed reliance upon adecision of a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Ram Sanehi v. III Additional District Judge, Etah, reported in 1992 (2) ARC page 653 and has tried to draw support from the observation occurring in that decision indicating that in a situation where a building was constructed on a date when it was not within the purview of the local authority before which the completion of the building is required to be recorded or reported, explanation 1(a) to sub-section (2) of Section 2 will have no application and the actual date of construction will have to be determined on the basis of the evidence of the parties.

25. It appears that the decision of the Privy Council and the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the implications arising thereunder to which a reference has been made above were not brought to the notice of the learned single Judge while deciding the cases of Ram Sanehi and Hirday Narain Singh (supra) which decisions are binding under Article 141 of the Constitution. In its decision in the case of State of U.P v. Ram Chandra reported in (1976) 4 SCC 52 : AIR 1976 SC 2547 : (1976 Lab IC 1647) the Apex Court has observed thus at page 2556; of AIR:

“It is also to be borne in mind that even in cases where a High Court finds any conflict between the views expressed by larger and smaller Benches of this Court the proper course as observed by this Court in Union of India v. K.S Subra-maniam, Civil Appeal No. 212 of 1975, decided on 30-7-76: reported in (1976) 3 SCC 677 : AIR 1976 SC 2433 : (1976 Lab IC 1551) is to try to find out and follow the opinion expressed by larger benches of this Court in preference to those expressed by Smaller Benches of this Court which practise hardend as it has into a rule of law is followed by this Court itself.”

26. Further the implications arising under the decision of this Court in the case of Hirday Narain (supra) were analysed in quite detail in the case of Smt. Samundri Devi (supra) decided by this Court and it was held that the question which is now being raised did not arise for consideration in that case. The observations occurring in the decision of’ this Court in the case of Hirday Narain which are heavily relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are really in the nature of obiter.

27. Taking into consideration the ratio of the decision in the case of Kailash Chandra v. Ram Naresh; reported in 1982 ACJ 608 ‘the decisions in the cases of Hirday Narain Singh and Ram Sanehi (supra) are obviously per incuriam. I am bound to follow the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its decisions to which a reference has already been made hereinbefore. It may further be noted that the decision in the case of Om Prakash Gupta (supra) is adecision of a larger Bench. The ratio of this decision is clearly applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Morever the ambit and the scope as well as the effect of the statutory fiction provided for in the explanation I to Section 2(2) of the Act has not at all been considered in the aforesaid two cases decided by the learned single Judge of this Court in the light of the decision of the Apex Court and that of the Privy Council which continue to have their binding force in the circumstances indicated hereinbefore but have been ignored.

28. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further placed reliance upon a decision of this Court in the case of Jagdish Saran Gupta v. II Additional District Judge, Moradabad, reported in 1993 Addl. Civil Journal 222. In this case there was no occasion to decide the implications arising under the statutory fiction provided for in the explanation I to Section 2(2) of U.P Act No. 13 of 1982 which is attached to a first assessment of the building inasmuch as no such assessment had been produced during the trial of the suit or in the revisional proceedings. Further, the Court was not called upon to consider the effect of the words ‘in the absence of as used in the aforesaid explanation. As observed by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Shekhar Misra, reported in AIR 1968 SC page 647 a decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence of a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. It has further been observed in that case that it is not a profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from a judgment and to build upon it. In the circumstances of the case the petitioner cannot derive any advantage out of the aforesaid decision in which the controversy as is involved in the present did not arise for consideration at all.

29. Tt is thus, obvious that in the presence of the unimpeachable documentary evidence establishing that the building in question had been assessed for the first time in the year 1987 it was not at all necessary for the Courts below to hold an enquiry into the existence or otherwise of the building in dispute during the period 1974-1979.1 respectfully agree with the view expressed in the case of Smt. Samundri Devi (supra) decided by this Court wherein it has been clearly observed that where irrespective of the reality, the Legislature has unmistakably provided for assumption of the date of completion of the construction of a building in Explanation I to Section 2(2) of the Act, it is immaterial whether the landlord admits or avers to a date of completion of construction of the building different from the one contemplated by the fiction. Normally an admission may be binding upon the person making it except where he is able to explain it away. But that principle will be wholly inapplicable to a case in which the Legislature, acting within its competence, mandates through a legal fiction assumption of a fact different from the reality.

30. In this connection it may further be stated that so far as regards the efficiency and policy, and for that the Legislature is the only Judge; they are responsible to a Court of justice for the lawfulness of what they do and for that the Court is the only Judge. Further what persuaded the Legislature to give such an overriding effect to the statutory fiction attached to the first assessment of a building as envisaged under the explanation I to Section 2(2) of the U.P Act No. 13 of 1972, is a matter of legislative policy the wisdom whereof cannot be scanned by this Court.

31. It is well settled by a series of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that if the building was outside the purview of the Act on the date of the institution of the suit the fact that it came within the purview of the said Act during the pendency of the litigation is wholly irrelevant. (See Shiv Kumar v. Jawa-har Lal, 1988 (2) ARC 465 : (1988 All LJ 1296). In the present case the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below clearly indicates that the building in question could not be deemed to be a building to which the provisions of the U.P Act No. 13 of 1972 were applicable on the date when the suit had been filed and further finding that the tenancy of the defendant has been terminated in accordance with law there could be no impediment in the grant of the decree for his eviction as prayed for.

32. In view of what has been stated above there does not appear to be any escape from the conclusion that in the present case, Courts below were not in error when they took the date of first assessment of the building in question in the year 1987 as the date, furnishing the starting point for computing the period of exemption contemplated under Section 2(2) of the Act. The submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner made in this respect have no merit and are not acceptable.

33. I have examined both the impugned judgments with care and am inclined to agree with the revisional Court. I am of the considered opinion that in case the matter if viewed from the angle indicated herein before, that being the only view possible, I find no difficulty whatever in approving the decision of the revisional Court impugned in this writ petition.

34. In view of my conclusions indicated hereinbefore, I do not find any such error much less manifest error of law which may justify any interference in the impugned order in the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the result, the writ petition being devoid of merits, is hereby dismissed.

35. However, there shall be no order as to costs.

Order accordingly.