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Joshi Ratansi Gopaji v. The Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation And Another
Judgment Summary — J.B. Mehta, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
Defendant No. 1 was the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation and Defendant No. 2 was the driver of Gujarat State Road Transport Bus No. 1718. On 26.5.1963 the bus collided with the Plaintiff's car at Mandvi in Kutch, causing injuries to the Plaintiff and family members. The Plaintiff filed a suit for compensation in the Senior Division Civil Court, Bhuj, Kutch on 9.6.1964, claiming Rs. 10,097.82 comprising: Rs. 6,955.82 for damage to the car, Rs. 142 for medical expenses, and Rs. 3,000 for loss of earnings and mental/physical injuries.
A contention was raised that the civil Court had no jurisdiction because a Claims Tribunal for the area had been constituted on 4.7.1963 under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (the Act), and that the claim should be presented before that Tribunal. The trial Court accepted that contention, held that the civil Court lacked jurisdiction, and ordered the plaint to be returned for presentation before the Claims Tribunal. The Plaintiff filed the present appeal against that order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the civil Court's jurisdiction was excluded by reason of the constitution of the Claims Tribunal even though the accident occurred before the Tribunal was constituted.
- Whether the Claims Tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicate the Plaintiff's claim for damage to his car (Rs. 6,955.82), or whether such a claim remained within the jurisdiction of the civil Court.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Mr. Mankad)
- Since the accident occurred on 26.5.1963 before the Claims Tribunal was constituted (4.7.1963), the civil Court's jurisdiction to try the suit was not excluded.
- Even if the Claims Tribunal had jurisdiction generally, the claim for compensation for damage to the car (Rs. 6,955.82) could not be adjudicated by the Claims Tribunal; therefore the civil Court retained jurisdiction over that portion of the claim.
Arguments relied upon by Mr. Shah
- Mr. Shah relied upon the Division Bench decision in Om Prakash Mishra v. National Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. (A.I.R. 1962 Mad 19) which articulated propositions concerning the scope of Sections 110, 110A and 110F of the Act, including that composite claims involving personal injury and property damage are triable by the Claims Tribunal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Natverlal Bhikhalal v. Thakarda Khodaji and Ors., 1967 A.C.J. 397 : I.L.R. 1967 Guj 495 (Bhagwati J.) | Held that Sections 110 to 110F form a complete self-contained machinery for adjudicating claims for compensation for death or bodily injury arising out of motor vehicle use; the Claims Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain applications even for accidents which occurred prior to the Tribunal's constitution. | The court followed this decision to reject the Appellant's first point and to hold that the existence of a Claims Tribunal for the area excludes civil Court jurisdiction in respect of claims which the Tribunal can adjudicate, irrespective of when the accident occurred. |
| Anant Gopal Sheorey v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 915 | Established the principle that no person has a vested right in any course of procedure; the law in force at the time of institution of the action governs the procedure, and changes in statutory procedure apply to pending rights subject to the law in force when action is instituted. | The court relied on this Supreme Court principle (as applied in Natverlal Bhikhalal) to support the conclusion that the Tribunal's constitution and the statutory procedure under the Act governed the procedural forum, notwithstanding the date of the accident. |
| Om Prakash Mishra v. National Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd., A.I.R. 1962 Mad 19 | Set out four propositions: (1) where no death or personal injury results, property-only claims are not tenable before a Claims Tribunal; (2) where death or personal injury results, claims for losses (including property loss) go to the Claims Tribunal; (3) property loss claims by persons not entitled under Section 110A must be pursued in civil Court; (4) composite claims (personal injury/death together with property loss by the injured person or legal representative) are triable by the Claims Tribunal. | The court expressly agreed with and applied these propositions, particularly to hold that when an accident involves personal injury, all claims arising out of that accident (including property damage sustained by the injured person) fall within the Claims Tribunal's jurisdiction. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court addressed the two points raised by the Appellant in sequence.
First point (date of accident vs. tribunal constitution): The court accepted the earlier decision of Bhagwati J. in Natverlal Bhikhalal, which followed the Supreme Court's principle in Anant Gopal Sheorey that the procedure in force at the time of institution governs. Because the Claims Tribunal had been constituted for the area by notification under Section 110(1) before the suit was filed, Section 110 (and Section 110F which bars civil Court jurisdiction where a Claims Tribunal exists) excluded the civil Court's jurisdiction in respect of claims the Tribunal could adjudicate, even though the accident itself pre-dated the Tribunal's constitution. Consequently, the Appellant's contention that the civil Court retained jurisdiction because the accident occurred before the Tribunal was constituted failed.
Second point (scope of Claims Tribunal jurisdiction as to property damage): The court examined Sections 110, 110A and 110F. It identified the conditions in Section 110(1) that define the Tribunal's jurisdiction:
- The claim must be in respect of an accident;
- The accident must involve death or bodily injury to a person;
- It must arise out of the use of motor vehicles.
The court interpreted the phrase "involving death of or bodily injury to" as limitative of the nature of the accident, not limitative of the kinds of compensation claims that can follow from such an accident. On plain grammatical construction, once the accident is shown to involve death or bodily injury arising out of the use of motor vehicles, "all kinds of claims for compensation in respect of such an accident can be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal." Section 110A was characterized as a procedural provision specifying who may apply (the injured person, legal representatives in case of death, or an authorised agent) and did not narrow the substantive scope of claims that the Tribunal could entertain.
The court rejected the Appellant's proposed reading that the Tribunal could only adjudicate claims for death or bodily injury while property damage claims must remain in civil Court. The court found that such a construction would produce absurd consequences (forcing claimants to split actions between Tribunal and civil Court, multiplicity of proceedings, conflicting decisions) and therefore must be avoided. The court agreed with the Division Bench in Om Prakash Mishra, particularly its fourth proposition that composite claims (involving personal injury/death together with property loss suffered by the injured person or legal representative) are triable by the Claims Tribunal.
Applying these principles to the present case, where the Plaintiff himself was the injured person and sought compensation for both bodily injury and damage to his car, the court concluded that the entire claim fell within the Tribunal's jurisdiction and that Section 110F excluded the civil Court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court dismissed the appeal. The core ruling is emphasized as follows:
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The civil Court was correctly held to lack jurisdiction to entertain the Plaintiff's entire claim arising out of the accident; the plaint was properly ordered to be returned for presentation before the Claims Tribunal constituted for the area.
- The decision follows and applies existing authorities (Natverlal Bhikhalal and Anant Gopal Sheorey regarding procedural law and the effect of Tribunal constitution; Om Prakash Mishra regarding the scope of claims triable by the Tribunal) rather than announcing a novel principle. No broader or novel precedent is claimed to have been created by this short judgment; it applies established constructions of Sections 110, 110A and 110F of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 to the facts of the case.
Result: Appeal dismissed. No order as to costs.
JUDGMENT
J.B. Mehta, J.
1. This appeal is filed by the Plaintiff as the trial Court has held that the civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit and has ordered the plaint to be returned for presentation before the Claims Tribunal.
2. The short facts which have given rise to this appeal are as under:
Defendant No. 1 is the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation while defendant No. 2 was the driver at the relevant time in service of Defendant No. 1 of the Gujarat State Road Transport Bus No. 1718. On 26.5.63 the bus in question dashed with the Plaintiff's car and this accident had occurred at Mandvi in Kutch which resulted in injuries to the Plaintiff and his family members. The Plaintiff, therefore, filed the present suit for compensation as a result of the said accident in the civil Court, Senior Division, Bhuj, Kutch. The compensation amount of Rs. 10097. 82 P. was claimed for damages as follows:(1) Rs. 6955.82 for damages to the car of the Plaintiff; (2) Rs. 142/- for medical expenses for the bodily injuries suffered by the Plaintiff, and (3) Rs. 3000/- by way of loss of earning and for the mental and physical injuries suffered by him and his family members. This suit was filed on 9.6.64, while the Claims Tribunal was already constituted for this area on 4.7.63. A contention was, therefore, raised that the civil Court had no jurisdiction as the claim could be adjudicated by the Claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'. The said contention having been accepted by the trial Court, the Plaintiff has filed the present appeal.
3. Mr. Mankad for the Appellant had raised two points before me:
(1) That as the accident had taken place on 26.5.63 before even the Claims Tribunal was constituted, the civil Court's jurisdiction was not excluded, and
(2) that in any event, the claim for compensation for damage to the car to the tune of Rs. 6,955.82 P. could not be adjudicated by the Claims Tribunal and, therefore the civil Courts jurisdiction to that extent was not excluded.
4. So far as the first question is concerned, the point is already concluded by a decision of my learned brother Bhagwati J. (as he then was) in Natverlal Bhikhalal v. Thakarda. Khodaji and Ors. 1967 A.C.J. 397 : I.L.R. 1967 Guj 495 where my learned brother in terms held that Sections 110 to 110F provide a complete self-contained machinery for adjudication of claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, and the Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 110(1) of the Act has jurisdiction to entertain an application for compensation in respect of accidents which took place even prior to the constitution of the Claims Tribunal. My learned brother has followed the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Anant Gopal Sheorey v. State Of Bombay A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 915 which laid down a settled principle that no person had a vested right in any course of procedure. He had only the right of the time being, and if by an Act of Parliament, the mode of procedure is altered he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode. Therefore, the law in force at the time of the institution of the action governs the procedure. Therefore, Section 110 of the Act bars the jurisdiction of a civil Court, as a Claims Tribunal was already constituted for the area in question, in respect of the claims of compensation which could be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal, irrespective of the fact as to when the accident took place. In view of the aforesaid decision, with which I am in complete agreement, the first point raised by Mr. Mankad does not survive.
5. The second question which Mr. Mankad has raised is on a combined reading of Sections 110 and 110A of the Act. Section 110 provides that a State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (hereinafter referred to as Claims Tribunal) for such area as may be specified in the notification, for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to, persons, arising out of the use of motor vehicles. Section 110-A runs as under:
110A. Application for compensation. (1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 110 may be made--
(a) by the person who has sustained the injury, or
b) where death has resulted from the accident, by the legal representatives of the deceased ; or
(c) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be....
Section 110-F provides that where any Claims Tribunal has been constituted for any area, no civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal for that area. Section 110F, therefore, excludes the jurisdiction of the civil Court only to entertain any question relating to any claim of compensation, which would be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal in the area concerned. Thus, the civil Court's jurisdiction is excluded only to the extent that the question relating to the claim for compensation can be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal. The jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal is specified in Section 110(1). The said section contemplates the existence of the following conditions for determining claims of compensation:
(1) the claim for compensation must be in respect of an accident;
(2) the accident must be one involving death or bodily injury to a person ;
(3) it must arise out of the use of motor vehicles.
Thus, the words, "involving death of or bodily injury to" are limitative of the accident and they do not limit the claim of' compensation. Therefore, on a plain grammatical constructions once accident is shown to be one involving death of or bodily injury to a person which arises out of the use of motor vehicles, all kinds of claims, for compensation in respect of such an accident can be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal. The section is, therefore, of the widest amplitude in so far as a claim of compensation is concerned without any kind of limitation. The limitative words in the section are only as regards the nature of the accident which must be one involving death of or bodily injury to a person and arising out of the use of motor vehicles. Once the accident is of such a nature, all kinds of claims of compensation in respect of such accident would go before the Claims Tribunal and to that extent the jurisdiction of the civil Court would be ousted under Section 110F of the Act. When the Legislature has used such words of the widest amplitude so that the Claims Tribunals can entertain all kinds of claims in respect of the accidents of the nature specified in Section 110(1), it would not be proper to introduce any limitation on the claim of compensation by confining it only in respect of death or bodily injury. That would be reading those words as limitative not of the accidents but of all the claims for compensation and there would be no warrant for such a construction. Mr. Mankad, however, argued that Section 110A would require such a construction being adopted for arriving at a harmonious construction by looking to the context of the scheme of these sections. Section 110A(1) is only a procedural section it does not deal actually with the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal; it specifically mentions that the application shall be for compensation arising out of the accident of the nature specified in Section 110(1). The only limitation is that such a claim of compensation must be-made either by a person who sustained the injury or in case of an accident resulting in death, by his legal representatives or by a duly authorised agent of such a person injured. In the present case, there is no dispute that the claim was by the Plaintiff who was himself the person injured. We are not dealing with a case where a passenger in a vehicle is injured so that the person injured as a result of the accident is different from the owner of the vehicle who claims compensation for the accident. Therefore, prima facie, there is nothing in Section 110(1) which would make it repugnant in the context or which would by compelling necessity require us to add words of limitation in section 110(1)to the effect that the Claims Tribunal could entertain claims of compensation in respect of death or bodily injury alone and no other claims of compensation, even if they are in respect of the accident specified in Section 110(1). In fact the construction urged by Mr. Mankad would lead to a startling result that the person who files a claim for compensation or in case of death, his legal representative would be bound to split up the claim, so that for the claims in respect of death or bodily injury he would have to go to the Claims Tribunal while for the claim in respect of the damage to the vehicle of the same person, He would have to go to the civil court.
6. This would result not only in the multiplicity of proceedings but would lead to undesirable consequences and a conflict of decisions with none to reconcile this conflict. Such a construction leading to such an absurd result must be avoided. Mr. Mankad argued that we must look to the intention of the Legislature which confined jurisdiction of the Tribunal to accidents involving death or bodily injury. It is a settled rule of construction that intention of the Legislature has to be gathered from the words used and we cannot modify the language of the section unless it leads to absurdity. The expression "involving death of or bodily injury to" has been deliberately used by the Legislature and is descriptive of the accidents alone and if the Legislature intended to introduce this limitation on the nature of the claim of compensation, it would have transposed those words by using them as words of limitation to the claim of compensation it self. Mr. Shah in this connection relied upon the decision in Om Prakash Mishra v. National Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. A.I.R. 1962 Mad 19 (20,21), where the Division Bench consisting of Golvarker and Bhargava JJ. has also taken the same view of Sections 110, 110A and 110F of the Act laying down four propositions as under:
(1) If no death or personal injury results, in an accident arising out of the use of motor vehicles, the claim for compensation for loss suffered in property alone is not tenable before a Claims Tribunal. Such a claim is to be made in a civil Court.
(2) If death or personal injury results in an accident arising out of the use of motor vehicles, on the basis of express wordings used in these sections, the claim for compensation for such loss suffered has to be made before the Claims Tribunal and it cannot be tried in a civil Court.
(3) Loss or damage of property may be suffered by a person who has not been given a right to make an application under the provisions of Section 110A of the Act to the Claims Tribunal. In such a case, obviously no application lies to the Claims Tribunal and the only remedy will be in a civil Court.
(4) Lastly, there may be cases of composite injuries in which, in the accident arising out of the use of motor vehicles death or personal injury may have resulted and at the same time, there may be loss or damage suffered in the property by the person who has suffered personal injury or where death has resulted from the accident, loss may be sustained by the deceased or by his legal representative. If the claim is for compensation of such a composite nature for the injuries suffered bodily or on account of death together with the claim for compensation for loss or damage suffered in property, in our view it is triable by the Claims Tribunal.
I am in complete agreement with the reasoning in the aforesaid decision. Therefore, the second point raised by Mr. Mankad must also fail and the learned trial Judge was right in holding that in the present case the entire claim for compensation arising out of the accident which took place on 26.5.63 could be adjudicated by the Claims Tribunal and therefore, section HOP excluded jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain such a claim.
7. In that view of the matter this appeal must fail. In the result, this appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs in the circumstances of the case.
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