S.H Sheth, J.:— This appeal is directed against the award made by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Nizamabad in O.P 132 of 1973. The facts of the case briefly stated are as under

2. On 8.8.1973 a stage-carriage bus A.P.J 502 ran over S. Narasinga Rao a 19 years old student studying in senior intermediate class. The victim was killed. It was a private stage carriage bus which belonged to the first respondent and which was insured with the second respondent United India Fire and General Insurance Company, Nizamabad. The mother of the deceased filed this claim petition and claimed a compensation of Rs. 40,000/-. The Tribunal made an award in her favour for Rs. 20,000/-. It is that award which is challenged by the Insurance Company in this appeal. The claimant has not challenged the award on the ground that the compensation awarded is less than what should have been awarded nor has the owner of the stage-carriage bus-first respondent challenged the award. The insurance company has directed its challenge against the quantum of compensation awarded. According to J.V Suryanarayana Rao who appears on behalf of the Insurance Company the Tribunal was in error in arriving at the conclusion that the deceased, if he had lived, would have contributed a sum of Rs. 100/- per month to the mother. Secondly he has contended that the Tribunal was in error in awarding compensation on the assumption that the claimant-mother would have received monetary benefit from the deceased for the next 20 years, which according to the Tribunal would be her remaining period of life. Thirdly he has also contended that the Tribunal should have taken into account the other pecuniary benefits which the death of the deceased would bring to her and ought to have reduced the amount of compensation by them.

3. Before we deal with the merits of the case we would like to observe that under section 1-A of Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 a claim can be made interalia for both the parents. There is no dispute about the fact that the father of the deceased is alive. However probably relying upon the Hindu Succession Act the claim has been made by the mother alone because the deceased being un-married the mother, has succeeded to his estate. We wish the claim was made by both the parents.

4. In order to appreciate the first two contentions which Mr. Suryanarayana Rao has raised before us and which can be conveniently dealt with together, it is necessary to refer to the evidence. The evidence of the claimant—P.W 3—shows that the deceased was a brilliant student and was her eldest son. He was studying in the senior intermediate college at Armoor. The petitioner has also examined P.W 2 Narasimha Chari, the teacher of the deceased. According to him the deceased was moderately brilliant and had good conduct. This part of the evidence of these two witnesses has not been challenged in their cross-examination. Therefore the least which can be said in regard to the academic career of the deceased is that he was a moderately brilliant boy studying in senior intermediate class. We are therefore justified in assuming that if his life was not cut short during his boyhood he would have atleast graduated and started earning something. It is rightly said that determination of compensation in such a case is interlinked with conjectures and prophesies. Now if the boy would have graduated what would he have earned during his life and what monthly contribution would he have made towards the maintenance of his parents? When a person who has been earning a definite income meets with an accidental death we have atleast definite data of his income available on the strength of which we can compute the amount of compensation payable to his parents or dependants. But when a young boy during his academic life meets with an accidental death before he starts an earning career the problem which the court of law faces is slightly more difficult.

5. The Tribunal while determining the compensation which the deceased would have made towards the maintenance of his parents at Rs. 100/- has not adopted any scientific basis for arriving at that figure. To that extent the attack made by Mr. J.V Suryanarayana Rao on the award made by the Tribunal is justified. In a case of this type we ourselves have to look at the social conditions and find out what in normal course the deceased would have earned. It is common knowledge that graduates who take up service in a bank or some such company even during their probation period do not get less than Rs. 500/- per month. This is not a stationary income. A new entrant to a private service of a company or a public service rises in status and in salary in course of time. He earns promotions and increments in salary and in course of time he is supposed to fare much better. Indeed while computing the compensation payable in respect of accidental death of a young student we cannot be influenced by the aforesaid rosy circumstances alone. We have also to take into account the fact that in course of time he would have married and would have been required to spend something on his wife. Again after marriage in course of time his family would have multiplied and his liability would have increased. We have therefore to take into account the probable income which he would have earned in course of time as well as the estimate of his liability which he would have incurred towards the members of his family after marriage. If a young graduate starts his service career with four or five hundred rupees per month, enjoying the prospects of future increments and promotions what would he contribute towards the maintenance of his parents? Taking these imponderables, as they are called, into account we think that the Tribunal fell into error in determining a sum of Rs. 100/- per month as his contribution towards the maintenance of his parents. After all is said and done and after all imponderables have been taken into account the reasonable figure of his contribution towards his parents' maintenance, which should be taken into account, must be fixed at Rs. 250/- per month. We are aware of the fact that if any award is made on this basis it would be unfair to the Insurance Company because the Insurance Company would be required to pay to the claimant at-a-time what the claimant would have got in small sums spread over several years. In order to avoid the fallacy or error of granting more than what should be granted we think that this figure would be reduced to Rs. 200/- per month.

6. The next question which arises is slightly different from the one which arises in other cases. Ordinarily in such cases we try to find out the appropriate multiplier by estimating how long would the deceased have lived? That question does not arise in this case because the parents alone can claim compensation in this case as the deceased was un-married and the parents in normal course would not have survived the deceased. Therefore the question which arises is how long in normal course the parents would survive and how long would the deceased, from that point of view, have been required to make contribution towards their maintenance? The evidence shows that the claimant-mother is a woman of 40 years of age. The father of the deceased also appears to be practically of the same age. It is safe to think that these young parents would in normal course survive for 20 years to 25 years more. There is nothing in evidence to show that they are weak in their health and that there is probability of their surviving for a higher period. The deceased would have made contribution towards the maintenance of his parents at the aforesaid rate for a period of 20 or 25 years. But that multiplier cannot be applied because the parents should be getting it in lumpsum, with all the benefits of income accruing therefrom what they otherwise get over a period of years. The multiplier has therefore got to be reduced. Therefore the reasonable multiplier in our opinion would be 12. In order to avoid the error of over-estimate we shall apply the multiplier of 12 years purchase factor to the net contribution of Rs. 150/- per month. It would work out at Rs. 21,600/.

7. The death of deceased produced pain and suffering for the parents or claimants. Some monetary benefit to compensate this pain and suffering must necessarily be added to this figure of compensation. Generally we add Rs. 3,000/-. Thus the total amount works out at Rs. 24,600/-. The Tribunal has awarded to the claimant a sum of Rs. 20,000/-. We are therefore, of the opinion that the Tribunal has leaned on a conservative side. We therefore, see no reason to upset the award made by the Tribunal.

8. While computing this figure we are aware of the principle that over a period of years the corpus must be exhausted. On the sum of Rs. 21,600/- the interest which would accrue to the claimants at 9% per annum would be Rs. 1,944/-. It would work out at Rs. 162/- per month. As we have already observed the deceased would have contributed, if he had survived, a sum of Rs. 250/- per month to his parents. Now every month the claimant would get Rs. 162/-. Therefore, there would be a shortfall of Rs. 88/- per month. It would amount to Rs. 1056/- per year. The corpus of Rs. 21,600/- would be exhausted in such a case within a period of about 20 years. We are therefore of the opinion that the method by which we have computed the compensation is a just and sound method.

9. It has been argued that we must reduce the amount of compensation by pecuniary value of the acceleration of the interest of the claimant-mother in the estate of the deceased to which she succeeds as a result of his death. In case of a Hindu male dying without wife and children mother succeeds to his estate. This is the effect of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It has been pointed out to us from the evidence that the family has got seven acres of wet and twenty acres of Regadi land and that the deceased had a share therein. There is nothing in evidence to show that it is the joint family property of the father of the deceased in which the deceased had acquired interest by birth. A mere statement in evidence that it is the family property leads no where because family property in ordinary parlance means a property out of the income of which the family is maintained by its head. A stray statement in evidence that it is family property therefore cannot lead us to the conclusion that it is joint family property in which the deceased had acquired share by birth. If the insurance company wanted to plead this fact they should have expressly pleaded that there is joint family property in which the deceased had a share and that the amount of compensation which might be determined to be payable to the claimant-mother should be reduced by the pecuniary value of the acceleration of her interest in the joint family property by virtue of the death of the deceased. If such a pleading was raised by the Insurance Company the Tribunal would have raised an issue and the attention of the parties would have been focussed to it. Only in such a situation the foundation for the argument raised by Mr. Suryanarayana Rao could have been laid. There were no such pleadings in the instant case. No such issue was also raised. We are unable therefore to permit him to raise this contention before us for the first time in appeal. It is necessary to note in this context that if the property described as family property is the self-acquired property of the father of the deceased, he would not get an interest by birth and his premature death during the life time of his father would not accelerate the interest of his mother in any such estate.

10. However, attention has been invited to two decisions of the Supreme Court and to one decision of this court, in Gobald Motor Service Ltd. v. Veluswami A.I.R 1962 S.C 1 the principle laid down is this: “The expectation of life has to be estimated having regard to his age, bodily health and the possibility of premature determination of his life by later accidents; secondly the amount required for the future provision of his wife shall be estimated having regard to the amounts he used to spend on her during his lifetime and other circumstances; thirdly, the estimated annual sum is multiplied by the number of years of the man's estimated span of life, and the said amount must be discounted so as to arrive at the equivalent in the form of lumpsum payable on his death; fourthly, further deductions must be made for the benefit accruing to the widow from the acceleration of her interest in his estate; fifthly, further amounts have to be deducted for the possibility of the wife dying earlier if the husband had lived the full span of life; and it should also be taken into account that there is the possibility of the widow remarrying. This mode of estimation raises many imponderables. Therefore the actual extent of pecuniary loss would depend upon data which cannot be ascertained accurately but must necessarily be an estimate or partly a conjecture. Thereafter the conclusion which has been stated is that the general principle is that the pecuniary loss can be ascertained only by balancing on the one hand the loss to the claimant of the future pecuniary benefit and on the other any pecuniary advantage which from whatever source come to them by reason of the death. The balancing of amounts should, again dependent upon the death of the victim, thus be ascertained.” Reliance has been placed upon the expression “the pecuniary loss can be ascertained only by balancing on the one hand the loss to the claimants of the future pecuniary benefit and on the other any pecuniary advantage which from whatever source comes to them by reason of the death.”

11. In Sheikhupura Transport Co. v. N.I.T Insurance Co. 1971 A.C.J 206 the same principle has been re-affirmed by the Supreme Court. The pertinent observation made in paragraph 6 of the Judgment is as follows:

“The general principle is that the pecuniary loss can be ascertained only by balancing on the one hand the loss to the claimants of the future pecuniary benefit and on the other any pecuniary advantage which from whatever sources come to them by reason of the death that is, the balance of loss and gain to a dependent by the death must be ascertained”

12. In H.I Insurance Co. Ltd. v. P. Ankaiah 1969 A.C.J 60 a Bench of this court has reiterated the Same principle and followed it. The question which has therefore been raised before us is whether the acceleration of the interest of the claimant in the estate of the deceased is required to be taken into account for the purpose of determining the fair compensation payable to the claimant. Indeed the decisions to which we have referred have used very wide language which may possibly include such benefits. However in none of these decisions it has been expressly stated that the pecuniary value of such an interest must be taken into account so as to reduce the amount of compensation payable to the claimant. We are therefore of the opinion that the pecuniary clause of the acceleration of certain interest cannot be taken into account for reducing the amount of compensation because a wrong-doer, as the accident maker is, cannot be heard to say that even though he committed the wrong and killed a person, the amount of compensation should be reduced because the claimant's interest somewhere has been accelerated by the death of the deceased. No wrong-doer in our opinion can claim such a benefit and ask us to place premium on his mis-deed. To permit a wrong-doer to raise this contention, in a given case, is to permit him to escape with impugnery without rendering himself liable to pay any compensation to the aggrieved dependants of the deceased. What the claimant would get by way of, what is called acceleration of interest, by virtue of the death of the deceased cannot be allowed to be enjoyed by the wrong-doer after he has committed, the wrong doer to commit such to the family is in our opinion contrary to all canons of common-sense and against social interest. We are aware of the fact that in view of the finding which we have recorded that there is no evidence to show that what is described as family property is joint family property in which the deceased had acquired interest by brith, it is not strictly necessary for us to deal with the last contention which we have dealt with. However since Mr. J.V Suryanarayana Rao has very strenuously argued before us this proposition we have expressed our opinion indeed with the object of provoking some fresh thinking on the subject. In the result we find no substance in the appeal. We therefore confirm the award and dismiss the appeal with no costs.

13. Since we have finally decided the appeal this C.M.P 8838/76 does not survive and it is accordingly dismissed.