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Union Of India And Another v. Shantaben And Others

Gujarat High Court
Jan 23, 1984
Smart Summary (Beta)

Judgment Summary — M.B. Shah, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Respondents instituted Workmen's Compensation Case No. 12 of 1978 before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation and Civil Judge (S.D.), Mehsana, claiming compensation for the death of Vithaldas Gobardas Patel. The deceased was employed as Sub-postmaster at Vijapur Post Office and was murdered on 1.4.1978 at about 8:00–8:30 p.m. while at the post office. His monthly salary was Rs. 750. Notice of the accident and claim was served on the Appellants on 26.7.1978; the Appellants neither complied with nor replied to the notice. The Respondents sought Rs. 24,000 by way of compensation.

The Appellants resisted the claim, arguing that (a) the deceased was not a "workman" within Section 2(1)(n) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, inasmuch as a Sub-postmaster is not included in Schedule II; and (b) the murder by unknown persons could not be treated as an "accident arising out of and in the course of employment." The learned Commissioner awarded Rs. 24,000 in compensation but did not award penalty or interest under Section 4-A of the Act.

The Appellants appealed the Commissioner's order to the court before M.B. Shah, J. The Respondents filed cross-objections seeking penalty and interest under Section 4-A.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the death of the deceased, being a murder by unknown person(s) while he was on duty at the post office, constituted an "accident arising out of and in the course of employment" under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.
  2. Whether a Sub-postmaster (the deceased) qualifies as a "workman" within the meaning of Section 2(1)(n) of the Act and the relevant entries in Schedule II.
  3. Whether penalty and/or simple interest under Section 4-A(3) of the Act should have been awarded for the employer's failure to deposit the compensation within the statutory period.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The murder of the deceased cannot be said to be an "accident arising out of and in the course of employment" because there is no evidence that the murder was caused by duties which the deceased had to perform; the killing may have arisen from personal animosity unconnected with employment.
  • The deceased, being a Sub-postmaster, is not included in Schedule II of the Workmen's Compensation Act and therefore cannot be treated as a "workman" under Section 2(1)(n) of the Act.

Respondents' Contentions

  • The Respondents maintained the claim for compensation (Rs. 24,000) on the basis that the deceased was performing duties at the post office at the relevant time and that his presence there was by reason of employment, creating the requisite nexus.
  • In cross-objections the Respondents contended that penalty and interest should have been awarded under Section 4-A(3) because the employer failed to deposit the compensation within one month of it becoming due; they sought at least simple interest at 6% per annum.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abida Khatun v. General Manager, Diesel Locomotive, Varanasi (1972 ACJ 489, Allahabad) Full Bench view that where a workman was murdered, no liability arises under the Act unless a nexus between employment and the murder is established; absence of evidence as to who caused the murder or motive meant compensation could not be fastened. The Appellants relied on this decision; the court considered it but found it of no substance in the present case because binding decisions of the Bombay High Court to the contrary applied to the facts before the court.
Bhagubai v. General Manager, Central Railway (AIR 1955 Bom 105) Where an employee is at a particular place by reason of employment and faces a peril there, a causal connection between employment and the accident is established; sharing the peril with the public is irrelevant provided the peril is incidental to employment and not self-inflicted. The court relied on this Division Bench decision as binding authority to hold that the deceased, being at the telegraph room by reason of employment and encountering peril there, fell within the Act.
Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Yamunabai (AIR 1952 Bom 382) The explosion of a bomb placed by an unknown person near a workman's place of employment was held to be an accident arising out of employment. Relied upon (via Bhagubai) to illustrate that injuries caused by unknown third parties can still arise out of employment when the employee is placed in the zone of danger by reasons of his work.
General Manager, G.I.P. Rly. v. Godrej Navroji Unwala (F.A. No. 527 of 1948) (unreported Division Bench) Workman returning from duty set upon by soldiers and thrown on the railway lines sustained injuries that were held to arise out of employment. Referred to by the Division Bench in similar authorities and relied upon to support the view that third-party violence causing death/injury can be compensable when connected to employment.
Thorn / Simpson v. Sinclair (1917 AC 127) English authority construing "arising out of the employment" as applying to the nature, conditions, obligations and incidents of employment; if by reason of these a worker is brought within a zone of special danger and is injured, the statute applies. Quoted in Bhagubai and relied upon to support the integrated concept of time, place and purpose in assessing whether an injury "arose out of the employment."
Plumb v. Coliden Flour Mills Co. (1914 AC 62) and Barnes v. Nunnery Colliery Co. (1912 AC 44) Illustrations where peril was self-inflicted or produced by the worker's own act, excluding compensation under the statute. These cases were cited in Simpson as contrasts to cases where the peril was incidental to employment; the court referenced them only to note the distinction that a worker must not have added to the peril.
Nisbet v. Rayne & Burn (1910) 2 KB 689 Authority accepting that a murder could be an "accident" from the standpoint of the victim when the employment involved more than ordinary risk. Used by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Satiya; that decision was cited by the present court to support the proposition that murder may amount to an accident under the Act in appropriate circumstances.
Satiya v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Public Works Department (1974 ACJ 431, MP) Held that the murder of a chowkidar in the PWD office could be construed as an accident under the Workmen's Compensation Act relying on Nisbet. Relied upon by this court as an authority supporting the proposition that murder can amount to an accident under the Act where employment exposes the employee to greater-than-ordinary risk.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the admitted and proved facts before addressing the Appellants' contentions. Relevant factual findings relied upon by the court included:

  • The deceased was serving as Sub-postmaster at Vijapur Post Office and was in the Telegraph Room at about 8:00 p.m.
  • The Sub-postmaster was provided rent-free residential accommodation on the first floor; a telegram was lying on the table in the telegraph room; the log book and the deceased's spectacles were found in reversed position.
  • Post-mortem evidence established two horizontal ligature marks on the neck and that cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation with ligature.
  • Evidence (Exh. 36) described Sub-postmaster duties after office hours, including attending to telegrams and telephone work; the employer provided free quarters because the Sub-postmaster was required to be available for such duties.

Applying legal principles drawn from binding precedents (primarily Division Bench decisions of the Bombay High Court), the court adopted the integrated approach that determines compensability by reference to time, place and purpose: if the workman was at the place of occurrence during his employment and for the purpose of his employment, and by reason of being there met with an accident, a causal nexus is established. The court emphasized:

  • Because the deceased was at the telegraph room at 8:00 p.m. by reason of his duties (telegram awaiting attention, requirement to attend to telegraph/telephone outside normal hours), he was in the place of occurrence by employment.
  • There was no evidence that the deceased added to the peril, or that the murder was motivated by a personal enmity specifically targeting him; nor was there evidence that he would have been murdered regardless of being on duty.
  • Therefore, the connection between employment and the accidental event (murder) was established on the facts of the case, bringing the death within the scope of "arising out of and in the course of employment."
  • On the question of status, evidence showed the Sub-postmaster performed signalling/telegraphist duties and was provided free quarters for after-hours duties; accordingly the deceased fell under Schedule II(xiii) (telegraphist/postal signaller) and qualified as a "workman" under Section 2(1)(n).

On the cross-objections under Section 4-A(3) (penalty/interest for default in payment), the court reviewed the statutory position and the parties' submissions. Although the learned Commissioner had not awarded penalty or interest, the court found that once compensation was due and not paid within one month, the Commissioner was bound to direct payment of arrears with simple interest at 6% per annum. The Appellants' plea that entitlement to compensation was a disputed question did not justify withholding simple interest under the statutory provision.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is dismissed and the cross-objections are partly allowed.

Consequences and direct effects on the parties:

  • The Commissioner's award of Rs. 24,000 in compensation to the Respondents (heirs of the deceased) is upheld by the court.
  • The Appellants (employer) are directed to pay simple interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the amount of compensation from the date of the application until the date of deposit; the court made no order for additional costs in relation to the cross-objections, but the main appeal was dismissed with costs.
  • No penalty beyond the simple interest was ordered; the cross-objections were only partly allowed on the question of interest.

The opinion applies settled principles from earlier authorities (notably Division Bench decisions of the Bombay High Court) to the established facts and did not purport to announce any new legal principle beyond applying those precedents to the facts before the court.

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JUDGMENT

M.B. Shah, J.

1. The Respondents had filed Workmen's Compensation Case No. 12 of 1978 before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation and Civil Judge (S.D.), Mehsana, stating that Vithaldas Gobardas Patel, husband of Respondent No. 1 and father of Respondent Nos. 2 to 4, was serving at Vijapur Post Office as Sub-postmaster. In the course of his employment when he was working at the post office at Vijapur on 1.4.1978 he was murdered by somebody at about 8.00 to 8.30 p.m. The deceased was getting Rs. 750/- per month by way of his salary. The notice of the accident and for compensation was served by them to the Appellants on 26.7.1978. The Appellants have neither complied with, nor replied to, the said notice. Therefore, they have claimed Rs. 24,000/- by way of compensation.

2. This application was resisted by the Appellants and before the Commissioner it was vehemently contended by them that the deceased Vithaldas Patel cannot be said to be a 'workman' within the meaning of Section 2(1)(n) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. It was further contended that as the deceased was murdered by some unknown persons, it cannot be said that the deceased died by accident arising out of and in course of his employment. After considering the contentions raised by the Appellants in detail, the learned Commissioner held that the Respondents were entitled to have compensation of Rs. 24,000/- . He has not awarded penalty and interest under Section 4-A of the Act.

3. Against the said judgment and order the Appellants have preferred this appeal and the Respondents have also filed cross-objections wherein they have prayed that the learned Judge ought to have awarded penalty and interest as provided under Section 4-A of the Act.

4. At the time of hearing of this appeal, the learned standing counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants raised the following contentions:

(1) As the deceased Vithaldas was murdered and as there is no evidence on record that the said murder was caused because of duties which were required to be performed by the deceased, the Workmen's Compensation Act would not be applicable and the Respondents are not entitled to have any compensation under the Act.

(2) He further submitted that as the Petitioner was a Sub-postmaster and as Schedule II of the Act does not include the Sub-postmaster, therefore also he cannot be termed to be a 'workman' within the definition of Section 2(1)(n) of the Act.

5. With regard to the first contention that as the deceased was murdered and as there is no evidence on record to show that cause of murder arose out of the employment or the work which was required to be performed by the deceased, it would be proper to consider few admitted facts on record before discussing the said contention. It is an admitted fact that the Petitioner was working as a Sub-postmaster at Vijapur Post Office where postal and telegraphic work is being done. It is further admitted that the deceased was at 8.00 p.m. in Telegraph Room of Vijapur Post Office and that he was allowed rent-free quarter on upstairs by the Appellants. It is further a proved fact that in the said room one telegram was lying on the table. The Log Book and the spectacle were found in reverse position. As per the evidence of Dr. Bhanukumar Shivlal Patel Exh. 21, two horizontal ligature marks on the neck were found along with other injuries and cause of death was due to asphyxia following strangulation with ligature around the neck. As per the evidence of Gokalbhai Mohanlal Patel Exh. 36, as a Sub-postmaster a person is required to work on signalling. He has also referred to certain rules provided in Post and Telegraph Manual. It is his say that Post and Telegraph office at Vijapur is joint. The Sub-postmaster is provided a residential accommodation on the first floor of the post office. If some person wants to send a telegram after office hours, then the said work is required to be performed by the Sub-postmaster to whom free quarter is allotted. If the Postmaster performs the said duties, then he is termed as Signaller. After duty hours the Sub-postmaster is not required to do any postal work but is required to attend to the work for telegram or telephone. In cross-examination it was suggested to him that this work which is carried out by the Sub-postmaster would be voluntary work as per the rules. It was further suggested to him that if a person from the public comes for sending telegram, he is not required to enter the post office.

6. In view of the aforesaid facts it is established that the deceased was performing the work of a Sub-postmaster in the office in Telegraph Room at about 8.00 p.m. At that time while in the course of employment he found himself in a spot where he was assaulted and strangulated. He was in the place where he was murdered by reason of his employment. But for the fact that he had to perform the said duty, he would have been safely either at his residential place or gone outside. Therefore, the connection between the employment and accident is established. There is no evidence on record in this case that the deceased in any way added to the peril. There is not an iota of evidence in this case that the deceased was done to death because someone was interested in murdering him. Nor is there any evidence that the employee was bound to be murdered whether he was on the spot in the course of his employment or anywhere else.

7. The learned advocate for the Appellant submitted that there is no evidence on record that injury to the deceased was caused by accident arising Out of and in course of his employment. He submitted that there was no evidence to connect the death of the workman with his employment. He might have been killed by a person out of personal animosity wholly unconnected with his employment. In support of this submission he relied upon the Full Bench decision of Allahabad High Court in the case of Abida Khatun v. General Manager, Diesel Locomotive, Varanasi : 1972 ACJ 489 (Allahabad). In the aforesaid case Mohammad Ayub Khan, the deceased, was employed as Works Supervisor in the Diesel Locomotive Works Project, Varanasi. On 4th June, 1967 it was his rest day but owing to some work the Senior Civil Engineer ordered him to report for duty on that day. In pursuance of this order he started from his house at about 6.30 in the morning. On the way, he was assaulted by some unknown persons and he died due to the injuries. His widow had instituted an application for compensation under the Act. The two learned Judges in the said case arrived at the conclusion that where the workman was murdered, no liability for compensation can be fastened on the employer unless some nexus can be established between the employment as such and the act of murder. It was further observed that there was no evidence on record to show who caused the murder and what was the motive behind it. It was also not known that there was any risk which was ordinarily inherent in the discharge of the duties of the deceased. It was also not established that the workman was exposed to some special risk at the place where the accident took place. Two learned Judges held that it was not possible to attribute the accident to any such risk and to hold that the accident arose out of the employment. In fact there was no evidence to connect the death of the workman with his employment. This view of the court was dissented by learned third Judge and the learned Judge relied on and followed the judgment in the case of Bhagubai v. General Manager, Central Railway : AIR 1955 Bom 105. The learned Judge in his differing judgment has held in paragraph 41 as under:

In my opinion, the phrase 'in the course of and arising out of denotes an integrated idea involving the concept of time, place as well as purpose. As explained above, if these factors are established, i.e., the workman is at the place of the occurrence during his employment and for the purpose of his employment, the employer can get out of the Act only if it is proved that the occurrence was designed by the workman (as in the case of a suicide) or was due to his wilful misconduct (as in a case of personal enmity). If these facts are proved, the case, in my opinion, goes out side the Act because then it ceases to be an 'accident' as known to the section. An event proved to be designed or expected by the workman is not an 'accident'. In the present case, there is no evidence of suicide or personal enmity. The employer remains liable.

The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Bhagubai v. General Manager, Central Railway AIR 1955 Bombay 105, has in terms held that if the employee in the course of his employment has to be in a particular place and by reason of his being in that particular place he has to face a peril and the accident is caused by reason of that peril which he has to face, then a causal connection is established between the accident and the employment. The court further held as under:

It is now well settled that the fact that the employee shares that peril with other members of the public is an irrelevant consideration. It is true that the peril which he faces must not be something personal to him; the peril must be incidental to his employment. It is also clear that he must not by his own act add to the peril or extend the peril. But if the peril which he faces has nothing to do with his own action or his own conduct, but it is a peril which would have been faced by any other employee or any other member of the public, then if the accident arises out of such peril, a causal connection is established between the employment and the accident.

(Emphasis added).

Thereafter the court has relied upon the judgment in the case of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Yamunabai : AIR 1952 Bom 382. In that case a workman was employed as a carpenter in a workshop along with other workmen and he was killed as a result of injuries received by him by the explosion of a bomb which was placed by an unknown person near the place where the workman was doing his work. There the Division Bench had held that the workman had received personal injury as a result of an accident arising out of his employment. The court has further relied upon an unreported decision of a Division Bench in General Manager, G.I.P. Rly. V.T. Bombay v. Godrej Navroji Unwala F.A. No. 527 of 1948, where it was held that the workman who was serving as an Assistant Engine Driver in the G.I.P. Railway Company and who was returning after completing his duty at Kalyan by the Kalyan Local Railway and was set upon by some soldiers and thrown on the railway lines and received injuries, that the injuries arose out of the employment and he was entitled to compensation. The Division Bench further relied upon the following paragraph from the leading English case reported in Thorn or Simpson v. Sinclair 1917 AC 127:

... In short, my view of the statute is that the expression 'arising out of the employment' is not confined to the mere 'nature of the employment'. The expression, in my opinion, applies to the employment as such--to its nature, its conditions, its obligations and its incidents. If by reason of any of these the workman is brought within the zone of special danger and so injured or killed, it appears to me that the broad words of the statute 'arising out of the employment' apply. If the peril which he encountered was not an added peril produced by the workman himself, as in the cases of Plumb v. Coliden Flour Mills Company 1914 AC 62 and Barnes v. Nunnery Colliery Company 1912 AC 44 in this House, then a case for compensation under the statute appears to arise.

In paragraph 5 of the judgment, the court negatived the contention raised by the Appellant that there is always a motive for murder and therefore it could not be said that the risk which the employee ran was a risk which would have been run by any other employee or a member of the public. The court held as under:

According to Mr. Desai, in the case of a murder the person murdered alone runs the risk because the murder is motivated by a particular person being done to death. In our opinion there is not an iota of evidence in this case that the employee was done to death because some one was interested in murdering him. Nor is there any evidence that the employee was bound to be murdered, whether he was on the spot in the course of his employment or anywhere else.

The court has further held:

In our opinion, once the Applicant has established that the deceased was at a particular place and he was there because he had to be there by reason of his employment and he further establishes that because he was there he met with an accident, he has discharged the burden which the law places upon him. The law does not place an additional burden upon the Applicant to prove that the peril which the employee faced and the accident which arose because of that peril was not personal to him but was shared by all the employees or the members of the public.

8. In view of this clear binding decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, the submission made by the learned advocate that in view of the majority judgment of the Allahabad High Court I should arrive at a conclusion that as the Applicants have failed to prove the nexus between the employment and the act of murder I should dismiss the application filed by the heirs of the deceased is of no substance. As stated above, it is a proved fact that the deceased who was a Sub-postmaster was performing his duties in a Telegraph Room at about 8.00 p.m. The telegram was lying on the table and there is no other evidence on record in this case to establish that the deceased was done to death because someone was interested in murdering him. In view of the settled law it is not open to me to take any contrary view.

9. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Satiya v. Sub-Divisional Officer Public Works Department : 1974 ACJ 431 (MP), has held that murder of a chowkidar in the office of Public Works Department could be construed as an accident from the point of view of the Workmen's Compensation Act by relying upon Nisbet v. Rayne and Burn (1910) 2 KB 689. There a cashier, while travelling in a railway carriage to a colliery with a large sum of money for the payment of his employers' workmen, was robbed and murdered. The Court of Appeal held that the murder was an 'accident' from the standpoint of the person who suffered from it and that it arose 'out of an employment which involved more than the ordinary risk and consequently that the widow was entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The court negatived the contention that there was no 'accident' at all because death resulted from the intentional act of the murderer and intention excludes any idea of accident. Hence there cannot be any doubt that the murder of the deceased was an 'accident' arising out of and in course of his employment within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

10. With regard to the second contention of the learned advocate for the Appellant that the deceased cannot be termed as a 'workman' within the meaning of the Act as Sub-postmaster is not included in Schedule 11 under Section 2(1)(n) of the Act, in my opinion the learned Judge has rightly held that under Schedule 11 (xiii).as the deceased was working as a Telegraphist or as a Postal Signaller, he would be covered under the said clause. This view of the learned Judge is also supported by the evidence of Gokalbhai Mohanlal Patel who was working as a Sub-postmaster at Vijapur at the relevant time. It is his say that Sub-postmaster is required to perform duties as a Signaller after office hours. For this purpose the Postal Department is giving free quarters to the concerned officer. In view of this evidence, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the deceased cannot be said to be a 'workman'. The appeal, therefore, deserves to be dismissed.

11. The Respondents have filed cross-objections contending that the learned Commissioner ought to have awarded penalty as well as interest under section 4-a(3) of the Act because the employer has failed to deposit the compensation due under the Act within one month from the date it fell due. At the time of hearing, the learned advocate for the Respondents had not pressed his contention for payment of penalty under section 4-a(3). He submitted that under section 4-a(3) simple interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum ought to have been granted by the learned Commissioner as the amount was not deposited by the employer. The learned advocate for the Appellants submitted that whether the workman was entitled to claim compensation under the Act was a disputed question. Therefore, the learned Commissioner was right in not awarding penalty and also simple interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum. In my opinion, the contention of the learned advocate for the Respondents is well-founded because under section 4-a(3) the learned Commissioner was bound to direct that as the employer has defaulted in paying the compensation due under the Act within one month from the date it fell due, the employer in addition to the amount of arrears was required to pay the said amount with simple interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum. There is no justification for not granting the simple interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum. The cross-objections, therefore, deserve to be partly allowed.

12. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs.

13. The cross-objections are partly allowed. The Appellants are directed to pay simple interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum on the amount of compensation from the date of the application till the date of the deposit. There will be no order as to costs.