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Sunder Singh And Others v. Jiwan Singh And Others

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Nov 21, 1969
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (P.C. Pandit, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

On 20 October 1962 Jai Chand executed a written agreement to sell agricultural land (101 Kanals 7 Marlas) to Jiwan, a minor, for Rs. 4,500. The agreement was executed on behalf of the minor by his father and guardian, Hakam Singh. The sale-deed was originally to be executed by 5 November 1962, but the date of execution was repeatedly extended; on 1 December 1964 it was agreed the deed would be executed by 14 January 1965. When Jai Chand refused to execute the sale-deed, Hakam Singh, as next friend of his minor son Jiwan, filed a suit for specific performance in January 1966.

While the suit was pending, Jai Chand sold the disputed land on 20 May 1966 to Sunder Singh and others, who were impleaded as defendants. At trial the judge found that Jai Chand was a minor when the agreements were made and that the agreements were therefore void; the judge also held that the plaintiff, being a minor, could not sue for specific performance, and dismissed the suit.

On appeal the Additional District Judge (Ferozepur) held that Jai Chand had not been proved to be a minor and that the agreement executed by a major in favour of a minor (through his guardian) was voidable, not void; the ADJ further held that the minor plaintiff could seek specific performance. The ADJ set aside the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for determination of other issues. The vendees (Sunder Singh and others) appealed the remand order.

Before the present court the finding that Jai Chand was a major was not challenged. The sole question agitated was whether the minor plaintiff could seek specific performance of the agreement made in his favour through his guardian. The present court partly allowed the appeal, set aside the ADJ's judgment only on the point that the agreement was enforceable at the instance of the plaintiff, and remanded the case to the trial court to determine enforceability in light of the observations in the opinion. Parties were directed to bear their own costs and to appear before the trial court on 8 December 1969.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a minor (the promisee), in respect of a contract entered into on his behalf by his guardian, can seek specific performance of that contract.
  2. Whether contracts entered into on behalf of a minor by his guardian are enforceable — specifically, whether two conditions must be satisfied before such contracts can be specifically enforced: (a) that it was within the competence of the guardian to enter into the contract so as to bind the minor, and (b) that the contract was for the benefit of the minor.
  3. Whether section 20(4) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (which provides that the Court shall not refuse specific performance merely because the contract is not enforceable at the instance of the other party) eliminates the doctrine of mutuality and thereby allows a minor to obtain specific performance without first establishing that the guardian had competence and the contract was for the minor's benefit.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Vendees') Arguments

  • The agreements were not enforceable because the guardian of a minor could not bind the minor or his estate by a contract for the purchase of immovable property; thus there was no mutuality of obligation and the minor could not obtain specific performance.
  • Under section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, the natural guardian may do acts necessary or proper for the benefit of the minor or the minor's estate, but cannot bind the minor by a personal covenant; therefore a guardian cannot bind a minor by such a purchase contract.
  • Before specific performance could be granted to a minor, it had to be proved (i) that the contract was within the competence of the guardian to enter into so as to bind the minor, and (ii) that the contract was for the benefit of the minor — reliance was placed on the Privy Council decision in Sri Kakulam Subrahmanyam v. Kurra Subha Rao (AIR 1948 PC 95).
  • The Additional District Judge erred in holding that the plaintiff was entitled to specific performance without first making findings on these two mandatory points.

Plaintiff's (Minor) Arguments

  • A minor cannot be a promisor but may be a promisee; a contract can be made in favour of a minor.
  • Where a guardian makes a contract on behalf of a minor, the contract is valid; if it is for the benefit of the minor then the minor's estate is bound, and if it is not for the benefit of the minor the guardian is personally liable. The minor may avoid the contract if it is not for his benefit; the other party however cannot avoid it on the ground that the promisee is a minor.
  • The doctrine of mutuality has been abrogated (or its effect limited) by section 20(4) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which provides that the Court shall not refuse specific performance merely because the contract is not enforceable at the instance of the other party.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sri Kakulam Subrahmanyam v. Kurra Subha Rao, AIR 1948 PC 95 Approved the principle (as stated in Pollock & Mulla) that contracts entered into on behalf of a minor by a guardian can be specifically enforced by or against the minor only if (i) the contract is within the competence of the guardian to enter into so as to bind the minor, and (ii) the contract is for the benefit of the minor; if either condition is lacking the contract cannot be specifically enforced. The court held that the Additional District Judge erred in decreeing enforceability without first determining these two conditions; the Kakulam principle must be applied and the trial court must decide enforceability in light of it.
Mir Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin Mahomed Chowdhuri, ILR 1939 Cal 232 Held that it was not within the competence of the manager of the minor's estate or the guardian to bind the minor or the minor's estate by a contract for the purchase of immovable property; as the minor was not bound, there was no mutuality and the minor could not obtain specific performance. The court observed that, under this authority, the plaintiff's suit would have been dismissed if the same reasoning were applied; the decision demonstrates the principle that lack of competence to bind the minor negates mutuality required for specific performance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court focused on the threshold question whether the agreement in favour of the minor plaintiff was legally valid and enforceable. It reasoned as follows:

  1. The court emphasized that section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and in particular sub-section (4), does not itself validate an otherwise invalid contract; section 20 deals with the court's discretion to decree or refuse specific performance, and that discretion presupposes that the contract is legally valid and capable of enforcement.
  2. The court identified the binding principle from Privy Council authority (Sri Kakulam Subrahmanyam v. Kurra Subha Rao) that contracts entered into by a guardian on behalf of a minor can only be specifically enforced if two conditions are satisfied: (a) the contract is within the competence of the guardian so as to bind the minor, and (b) the contract is for the benefit of the minor. If either condition is lacking, the contract cannot be specifically enforced.
  3. The court noted the provisions of section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, which grant the natural guardian power to do acts necessary or reasonable for the benefit of the minor or for realisation/protection/benefit of the minor's estate, but explicitly provide that the guardian cannot bind the minor by a personal covenant. The court directed attention to sub-section (1) of section 8 as material to deciding competence and benefit.
  4. Applying these legal principles, the court concluded that the Additional District Judge had erred in holding the agreement enforceable solely on the basis of section 20(4) of the Specific Relief Act without first determining whether the two conditions from Kakulam were satisfied. The court stated that the plaintiff could seek specific performance only after a finding that the agreement satisfied those conditions and was therefore enforceable at law.
  5. On this basis the court partially allowed the appeal: it set aside the ADJ's judgment only to the extent that it had held the agreement enforceable at the instance of the minor plaintiff, and directed the trial court (on remand) to determine the enforceability of the agreement in the light of the observations made regarding section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act and the Privy Council authority.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Appeal partly allowed. The present court set aside the judgment of the Additional District Judge only insofar as that judgment held that the agreement was enforceable at the instance of the minor plaintiff; the matter was remanded to the trial court to decide enforceability in light of the principles identified in the opinion.

Implications:

  • The immediate consequence is that the case returns to the trial court for determination of whether the guardian's contract satisfied the two conditions (competence of the guardian to bind the minor and benefit to the minor) required for specific enforcement under the authorities cited and section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956.
  • The court made clear that section 20(4) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, does not dispense with the prerequisite that the contract itself be legally valid and enforceable; section 20 addresses judicial discretion and not the legal validity of contracts entered on behalf of minors.
  • The court did not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond applying and reiterating existing Privy Council and statutory principles; it directed that the trial court make the required factual and legal determinations. In the circumstances the parties were directed to bear their own costs and to appear before the trial court on 8 December 1969.
Show all summary ...

P.C Pandit, J.:— On 20th October, 1962, Jai Chand, by a written deed, agreed to sell agricultural land measuring 101 Kanals 7 Marlas to Jiwan, minor son of Hakam Singh, for Rs. 4500. On behalf of the minor, his father, acting as the guardian, executed the said agreement. The sale-deed had to be executed by 5th November, 1962. It appears that Jai Chand did not do so, but went on getting the date of execution of sale-deed extended. Finally, on 1st December, 1964, it was agreed that the sale-deed would be executed by 14th January, 1965. As he refused to abide by the agreement, Hakam Singh, as the next friend of his minor son Jiwan Singh, brought a suit in January 1966 against Jai Chand for the specific performance of the agreement of sale. During the pendency of the said suit. Jai Chand sold the land in dispute, on 20th May, 1966, to Sunder Singh and others. Those vendees were, subsequently, impleaded as defendants in the suit.

2. The suit was contested mainly by the vendees on a number of pleas, but in the present appeal, we are concerned only with two of them. It was said that Jai Chand was a minor at the time of the original agreement of sale as well as at the time of the subsequent agreements extending the date for the execution of the sale-deed. The said agreements were, therefore, void and could not be enforced. It was further pleaded that the plaintiff was also a minor at the time of the execution of the agreement dated 20th October, 1962, and was still a minor and that being so, he was not entitled to the specific performance of the agreement of sale made in his favour by Jai Chand. The trial Judge came to the conclusion that Jai Chand was a minor at the time of the various agreements made by him with the plaintiff and, therefore, those agreements were void and could not be enforced by the plaintiff. He also held that the plaintiff, being admittedly a minor, could not sue for specific performance of the contrast entered into by Jai Chand with him regarding the sale of the property in question. In view of these findings, the trial Judge did not consider it necessary to decide the other issues arising in the case and dismissed the suit.

3. When the matter went in appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, Ferozepur, he came to the conclusion that Jai Chand had not been proved to be a minor at the time he entered into the agreement of sale with the plaintiff. He held that the agreement executed by a major in favour of a minor through his guardian, was not void but was voidable at the instance of the minor. He also found that the plaintiff, who was a minor, was entitled to seek specific performance of the agreement of sale made by Jai Chand in his favour. On these findings, he came to the conclusion that the suit could not have been dismissed. Consequently, he set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and remanded the case to it for deciding the other issues in the suit in the light of the findings given by him. Against this remand order, the present appeal has been filed by Sunder Singh and others, who are the vendees from Jai Chand.

4. The finding, that Jai Chand was a major on the date when he entered into the agreement of sale with the plaintiff, was not challenged before me. The only question that was agitated was whether the plaintiff, who was admittedly a minor at the time when the agreement of sale was made in his favour through his guardian Hakam Singh, could seek specific performance of the same or not.

5. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellants was that such an agreement was not enforceable at law, because it was not within the competence of the guardian of the minor to bind him or his estate by a contract for the purchase of immovable property and as the minor was not bound by the contract, there was no mutuality and, consequently, the minor could not obtain specific performance of the same. According to him, under section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, the natural guardian of a Hindu minor had power to do acts which were necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor or for the realisation, protection or benefit of the minor's estate, but he could in no case bind the minor by a personal covenant. He also contended that before the contract could be specifically enforced by or against the minor, it had to be proved, firstly, that the said contract was one which it was within the competence of the guardian to enter into on his behalf so as to bind him by it and, secondly, that it was for the benefit of the minor. If either of these two conditions was wanting, the contract could not be specifically enforced at all. For this submission, he placed his reliance on the Privy Council decision in Sri Kakulam Subrahmanyam v. Kurra Subha Rao . AIR 1948 PC 95., According to the learned counsel, the Additional District Judge could not hold that the plaintiff was entitled to specific performance of the contract without first giving findings on the two points envisaged in the Privy Council authority.

6. The argument of the learned counsel for the plaintiff, on the other hand, was that although a minor could not be a promisor under the contract, but he could always be a promisee and a contract could be made in his favour. If a minor was a promisor in a certain contract then that contract would be void. Where a guardian of a minor made a contract, the said contract, according to the learned counsel, was always valid, whether the same was for the benefit of the minor or not. The only condition was that if it was for his benefit, then the minor's estate would be bound. On the other hand, if it was not for his benefit then the guardian was personally liable for the said contract. If the minor was of the opinion that the contract made on his behalf was not for his benefit, he could avoid the contract, because such a contract was voidable at his instance. The other party, however, could not avoid it by pleading that the promisee was a minor. Learned counsel also contended that the doctrine of mutuality had come to an end by the enforcement of section 20(IV) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 according to which, the Court would not refuse to any party specific performance of a contract merely on the ground that the contract was not enforable at the instance of the other party.

7. While dealing with a suit for specific performance by a minor of an agreement for the purchase and sale of immovable property, entered into by his guardian, it was observed by the Privy Council in Mir Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin Mahomed Chowdhuri . ILR 1939 Cal 232..

“In a suit for specific performance by a minor of an agreement for the purchase and sale to him of certain immovable property, entered into by the manager of the minor's estate and his guardian on his behalf:—

Held, by the Judicial Committee, that it was not within the competence, either of the manager of the minor's estate or of the guardian of the minor, to bind the minor or the minor's estate by a contract for the purchase of immovable property: that as the minor was not bound by the contract, there was no mutuality; and that consequently the minor could not obtain specific performance of the contract.”

8. According to this decision, the suit brought by the minor plaintiff, in the instant case, would have been dismissed. Counsel for the plaintiff, however, submitted that the doctrine of mutuality had come to an end by the enactment of section 20(4) in the Specific Relief Act of 1963, which reads—

“The Court shall not refuse to any party specific performance of a contract merely on the ground that the contract is not enfornceable at the instance of the other party.”

9. While making this submission, learned counsel is ignoring one important principal, namely, that before somebody can file a suit for the specific performance of a contract, it has to be established by him that it was valid and enforceable according to law. S. 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, merely deals with the discretion of the Courts to decree or not the suits for specific performance. Section 20(1) says that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary and the Court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the Court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a Court of appeal, sub-section (2) of this section mentions the cases in which the Court may properly exercise discretion not to dercee specific performance. Sub-section (3) then says that the Court may properly exercise discretion to decree specific performance in any case where the plaintiff has done substantial acts or suffered losses in consequence of a concract of specific performance. Then comes sub-section (4) which has already been quoted above.

10. It would thus be seen that in section 20, principles have been enunciated for the guidance of the Courts in exercising their discretion in decreeing or refusing to decree suits for specific performance. But the condition ??? necessarily is that the contract itself must be legally valid and capable of enforcement. If that is not so, the question of the Court's discretion in granting or refusing its specific performance will not arise which agreements made by the guardians of the minors are enforceable at law? This is answered by the Privy Council in Shri Kakulam Subrahamanyam v. Kurra Subba Rao, where their Lordships approved the following passage in Pollock and Mulla's Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts, 7th Edition, Page 71:—

“It is, however, different with regard to contracts entered into on behalf of a minor by his guardian or by a manager of his estate. In such a case it has been held by the High Courts of India, in cases which arose subsequent to the governing decision of the Privy Council, that the contract can be specifically enforced by or against the minor, if the contract is one which it is within the competence of the guardian to enter into on his behalf so as to bind him by it, and, further, if it is for the benefit of the minor. But if either of these two conditions is wanting, the contract cannot be specifically enforced at all.”

11. According to this ruling, therefore, such contracts can be specifically enforced by or against the minors if two conditions are satisfied (i) if the contract is one which it is within the competence of the guardian to enter into on his behalf so as to bind him by it and (ii) if it is for the benefit of the minor. If either of these two conditions is not satisfied, that contract cannot be specifically enforced at all. The powers of a natural guardian are dealt with in section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. Particular attention is invited to the provisions of sub-section (1) of that section, according to which the natural guardian of a Hindu minor has power, subject to the provisions of that section, to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor or for the realisation, protection or benefit of the minor's estate; but the gurdian can in no case bind the minor by a personal covenant. In the present case, the learned Additional District Judge has held that the plaintiff could enforce the agreement and ask for its specific performance merely on the basis of the provisions of section 20(4) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, without determining the abovementioned two conditions laid down by the Privy Council in Sri Kakulam Subrahamanym's case, which would make that agreement valid and enforceable in law. It is only after that finding was given that the plaintiff could seek its specific performance. For giving a finding on these two conditions, the learned Judge would have to bear in mind the provisions of section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956.

12. In view of what I have said above, I would partly accept this appeal and set aside the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge only on the point that the agreement in question was enforceable at the instance of the plaintiff. The trial Court, while deciding the other issues in the case, as ordered by the lower appellate Court, will also determine the question regarding the enforceability of the agreement in the light of the observations made above. In the circumstances of this case, the parties will bear their own costs in this appeal. They have been directed to appear before the trial Court on 8th December, 1969.

13. Appeal partly allowed.