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Sarup Chand And Others v. The State Of Haryana And Others
Judgment Summary — R.N. Mittal, J. (Civil Writ Petition Nos. 1691 & 2663 of 1975)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioners were owners of certain plots in Civil Lines, Jagadhri (all except petitioner No. 1 had constructed houses). The Jagadhri Improvement Trust (the Trust, respondent No. 2) resolved on October 12, 1970 to frame a development scheme for about 21 acres in Civil Lines under section 24 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922, and directed framing of the scheme under section 24 read with various sub‑sections of section 38. Notices under section 36 were published (copies annexed as Annexure 'P‑3') on October 11 and November 3, 1970, and notices under section 38 (Annexure 'P‑4') were served on the petitioners. The petitioners filed objections on January 15, 1971 (specimen Annexure 'P‑5'). After disposing of objections, the Trust applied to the State Government, which sanctioned and notified the scheme on October 10, 1973 (notification Annexure 'P‑6'). The petitioners challenged the notices (Annexures 'P‑3' and 'P‑4') and raised multiple objections to the framing, publication and sanctioning process; the writ petitions were contested by respondents. The Court heard counsel, considered statutory provisions and authorities, and ultimately dismissed the writ petitions on their merits, making no order as to costs.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a development scheme must be validly and fully framed (including specified details such as layout, purposes for portions of locality, street alignment and building lines) before the publication of notice under section 36 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922.
- Whether failure to comply with pre‑publication formalities (e.g., absence of a feasibility certificate, non‑availability of the scheme in the Trust office, or incomplete forwarding of required documents to the State Government with the application under section 40) renders the Trust's resolution and the State Government's sanction void or without jurisdiction.
- Whether notices under section 38 and the process of hearing and disposal of objections complied with the requirements of the Act (specifically whether petitioners were given a hearing and whether objections were considered in accordance with law).
- What is the legal effect of a notification under section 42(2) of the Act that states the notification is "conclusive evidence that the scheme has been duly framed and sanctioned" — i.e., whether objections as to formal defects can be raised after such notification.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- Before publication under section 36 there must be in existence a development scheme duly and validly framed; no such scheme (including required details like layout, uses, street alignments and building lines as mentioned in section 28) was framed before publication.
- The resolution under section 40 to apply to the State Government for sanction was meaningless if the requirements of section 36 were not complied with; consequently the State sanction was illegal and void and without jurisdiction.
- Notices under section 38 were a mere formality: no hearing had been given and objections were not considered or disposed of in accordance with law.
- Specific alleged failures included: absence of feasibility certificate before the Trust's resolution of October 12, 1970; no development scheme available in the Trust office when the notice was published; and that requisite documents were not sent to the State Government with the application under section 40 (reference to letter dated February 17, 1973 — Annexure 'P‑11').
Respondents' Arguments
- All required formalities had been completed by the Trust; any alleged omissions were either incorrect or controverted.
- Even if some formalities were imperfectly completed by the Trust, the State Government had sanctioned and notified the scheme and, under section 42(2) of the Act, publication of the notification is conclusive evidence that the scheme had been duly framed and sanctioned.
- The Trust has denied the petitioners' factual allegations: it stated that a feasibility certificate is not required under the Act but was obtained as a matter of government instructions; that the Divisional Town Planner and Executive Engineer had considered and approved layout details prior to publication; and that the petitioners were given a hearing and their objections were considered and found without substance.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Berar Swadeshi Vanaspathi v. Municipal Committee, Shegaon (C.P. & Berar Municipalities Act authority cited) | Notification in the Gazette was held to be conclusive evidence that a tax had been imposed in accordance with the Act and could not be challenged on the ground that necessary steps had not been taken. | The Court relied on this as an analogous example of legislative intent to give finality to actions once notified; used to support the view that objections to procedural formalities cannot be raised after final notification under the relevant statute. |
| Laxmichand v. Indore Improvement Trust, Indore, 1975 1 SCC 565 | Provision (section 52(2) of Madhya Pradesh Town Improvement Act) that publication of a notification is conclusive evidence that the scheme had been duly framed and sanctioned; omission of formal recitals may not matter where factual satisfaction is evident. | The Court treated the Madhya Pradesh provision as pari materia with section 42(2) of the Punjab Act and relied on the Supreme Court's observations (quoted in the judgment) to hold that section 42(2) puts a final seal on a scheme after publication of sanction by the Government. |
| S. Harcharn Singh v. Shri Shashpal Singh, 1966 Cur. LJ Pb. 352 | Where there was no valid scheme (on the facts of that case the Trust had no jurisdiction to frame the development scheme for areas outside the municipality), the scheme could be challenged under Article 226. | The Court considered the decision but found it distinguishable on its facts and not helpful to the petitioners because the present case did not involve the Trust acting beyond jurisdiction in the way that case did. |
| Amritsar Improvement Trust v. Baldev Inder Singh, 1972 1 SCC 165 | Authority regarding the limits of a Trust's jurisdiction (as applied in the Harcharn Singh context in the judgment). | The Court observed that the facts in that case were distinguishable (there the Trust had no jurisdiction to frame the scheme for areas outside the municipality) and therefore the petitioners could not derive assistance from that authority. |
| Naruta Ram v. The State of Punjab, 1975 PLJ 185 | Case where acquisition of land was made without sanctioning the full scheme and the notification for acquisition was struck down on that ground. | The Court found that the facts of that case differed from the present matter and that its observations were not of assistance to the petitioners here. |
| Munshi Singh v. Union of India, 1973 2 SCC 337 | Decision under the Land Acquisition Act dealing with different interpretive matters specific to that statute. | The Court held that the observations in Munshi Singh do not apply to the present case under the Punjab Town Improvement Act because the issues and statutory context were different. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first set out the statutory scheme in Chapter IV of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 (sections 22 to 44), explaining the multi‑step procedure prescribed by the Act: framing a scheme (sections 22–28), publication and supply of documents (section 36), transmission of objections (section 37), notice of proposed acquisition (section 38), disposal or application to the Government (section 40), and sanction and notification by the Government (sections 41–42).
The Court noted the petitioners' principal complaints: (a) feasibility certificate not received by the Trust before the resolution of October 12, 1970; (b) no development scheme was in the Trust's office when notice under section 36 was published; (c) no hearing was given and objections were not properly considered; and (d) requisite documents were not sent to the State Government with the application under section 40 (reference to a disputed letter of February 17, 1973).
The Court examined the objections in light of the record:
- The petitioners had in fact filed objections on January 15, 1971 (Annexure 'P‑5'); a review of that objection petition showed that the particular complaints about missing feasibility certificates, absence of scheme in the Trust office prior to publication, and lack of hearing were not raised in the objection petition itself — instead, the main objection then asserted was that the colony had already been sanctioned by the Municipal Committee and that the Trust intended to acquire property at nominal price and sell at higher prices.
- The respondents controverted the petitioners' specific factual allegations. The Trust stated that (i) a feasibility certificate was not a statutory requirement but was obtained due to Government instructions; (ii) a meeting on September 21, 1970 with the Divisional Town Planner and Executive Engineer had considered and fixed boundaries and approved suitability; (iii) a feasibility certificate was obtained in writing on October 16, 1970; and (iv) the development scheme existed when the notice under section 36 was republished in the Haryana Government Gazette on November 10, 1970.
- On the complaint that requisite documents were not sent with the application to the State, the respondents asserted (with reference to a July 11, 1972 letter from the Divisional Town Planner) that the approved layout plan had been forwarded to the Trust; the facts were disputed and the Court emphasized its reluctance to decide controversial questions of fact in writ proceedings.
The Court stressed procedural and substantive principles:
- If a complainant believed that formalities had not been completed prior to the objection stage, the proper course was to raise those matters in the objections so the Trust could rectify them; raising such formal objections after final notification is too late.
- Section 42(2) of the Act provides that a notification of sanction is "conclusive evidence that the scheme has been duly framed and sanctioned." The Court interpreted this provision as reflecting legislative intent to give finality to government sanction so that procedural formalities cannot be reopened after notification; otherwise, the Trust would be unable to carry out finally-sanctioned schemes due to perpetual objections.
- The Court relied upon analogous authority (including the Berar case and Laxmichand v. Indore Improvement Trust) where publication of notification under similar statutory provisions was held to put a final imprimatur on the sanctioned scheme and to render objections as to procedural formalities largely ineffective once notification is issued.
- Where disputed facts exist as to whether particular procedural steps were taken, those are contentious factual matters generally unsuitable for resolution in writ proceedings; further, if documents were missing at the time of submission to the Government, it was the Government's prerogative to raise objections or reject the proposal before sanctioning the scheme.
On the contention that the Trust acted in a quasi‑judicial manner and therefore was obliged to issue a speaking order, the Court declined to decide that procedural/characterization question because, in any event, section 42(2) barred raising such objections after sanction and notification.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petitions fail and are dismissed. The Court made no order as to costs. (Final line of judgment: "Petition dismissed.")
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The petitioners' challenge to the notices, alleged pre‑publication defects and alleged procedural omissions was rejected; the sanctioned development scheme and the Government's notification under section 42(2) remain effective and operative.
- Legal consequence emphasized by the Court: A notification under section 42(2) of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922, is conclusive evidence that a scheme has been duly framed and sanctioned; therefore objections as to certain pre‑sanction formal defects cannot be entertained after such notification is published.
- The Court indicated that it was not setting a novel precedent but applying the statutory provision and existing authorities; it dismissed the petitions on their merits and did not make a costs order.
This summary is strictly confined to the content of the provided opinion and does not include any information beyond the text of that opinion.
R.N Mittal, J.:— This judgment will dispose of Civil Writ Petition Nos. 1691 and 2663 of 1975, which involve common questions of law and fact. In this judgment the facts are being given from Civil Writ No. 1691 of 1975.
2. The case of the petitioners is that they were the owners of certain plots to Civil Lines, Jagadhri. All of them, except petitioner No. 1, have constructed houses on those plots. The Jagadhri Improvement Trust (hereinafter referred to as the Trust, respondent No. 2, thought of framing a development scheme under section 24 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), for an area measuring about 21 Acres of land situated in Civil Lines, Jagadhri, including the above said plots of the petitioners. On October 12, 1970, the Trust passed a resolution (copy Annexure ‘P-2’ to the petition) to develop that piece of land and directed the framing of a development scheme, in the Trust Office, under section 24, read with sections 38(2)(i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x) and (xi) of the Act. It published notice dated October 19, 1970 (copy Annexure ‘P-3’) on October 11, 1970 and November 3, 1970, respectively, under section 36 of the Act and also served notices under section 38 (Annexure ‘P-4’) on the petitioners. They filed objections against the scheme. The Trust, after disposing of the objections, applied to the State Government for sanctioning the scheme, which the Government sanctioned on October 10, 1973, and published in the Gazette on the same day under section 42 of the Act. A copy of the notification is Annexure ‘P-6’ to the petition. The petitioners have challenged the notices Annexures ‘P-3’ and “P-4’. The writ petition has been contested by the respondents. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that before the publication of a notice under section 36 of the Act, it is obligatory that there must be in existence a development scheme validly framed. A development scheme has to provide inter alia for the lay out of the locality to be developed, the purposes for which particular portions of such locality am to be utilised, the prescribed street alignment, the building line on each side of the streets proposed in such locality, etc. No scheme including the aforesaid requirements or the requirements mentioned in section 28 was ever framed by the Trust before the publication of the notice under section 36. It is further contended by the learned counsel that without complying with the provisions of section 36, the resolution under section 40 for applying to the State Government to sanction the alleged scheme is meaningless and the sanction of the scheme by the State is illegal and void and without jurisdiction. It is also contended that the issuance of notices to the petitioners under section 38 was only a formality in as much as no hearing had been given to them and their objections had not been considered and disposed of in accordance with law. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently argued that all the formalities had been completed by the Trust and in case some of them had not been done, the State Government had sanctioned and notified the scheme. According to him, if the scheme had been sanctioned and notified by the Government, it was the conclusive evidence that the same had been duly framed and sanctioned under section 42(2) of the Act.
3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have given thoughtful consideration to the matter. The controversy raised by Mr. Saini is that certain formalities which were required to be completed before forwarding the scheme for sanction and approval of the Government, were not done. I shall first refer to the relevant provisions of the Act.
4. Chapter IV of the Act relates to the schemes under it. It starts with section 22 and ends with section 44. Sections 22 to 28 deal with different types of schemes. Section 24 relates to development schemes; section 28, to matters which may be provided for in the scheme; section 35, to matters to be considered when framing improvement schemes; section 36, to preparation, publication and transmission of notice as to improvement schemes and supply of documents to applicants; section 37, to transmission of objections by Committee as to the scheme to the Trust; section 38, to notice of proposed acquisition of land; section 40, to abandonment of scheme, or application to the State Government to sanction it: section 41, to power of the Government to sanction, reject or return the scheme and section 42, to notification of sanction of scheme. A perusal of the sections shows that a procedure has been prescribed for framing, publishing and finalising the schemes. After a scheme has been framed under the Act, it is to be published in accordance with the provisions of section 36. Its notice is required to be served on the Municipal Committee, the Medical Officer of Health and every person who is owner of any immoveable property which is to be acquired for the execution of the scheme. The Municipal Committee, the Medical Officer of Health and the parsons concerned can file objections regarding it within a specified period. The Trust, after examining the objections, can abandon it or apply to the State Government for sanctioning it with such modifications as it deems necessary. The State Government has the power to sanction, reject or return the scheme. If the State Government accepts the scheme, it shall notify it under section 42 of the Act. From the above provisions, it is sufficiently clear that the scheme is passed after giving every opportunity to the persons concerned to raise objections. In case some formality before filing the objections is not completed, it should be brought to the notice of the Trust by the concerned persons. If they fail to do so, they cannot be allowed to raise objections when the scheme has been finalised and published under section 42 of the Act.
5. Now I advert to the facts of this case, the main objections of the learned counsel for the petitioners are that feasibility certificate relating to the development scheme was not received by the Trust before passing the resolution on October 12, 1970, that no development scheme was available in the office of the Trust, that no hearing was given to the petitioners regarding objections, and that all the requisite documents were not sent to the State Government along with the application under section 40 of the Act. The first three objections relate to the time before filing the objections by the petitioners under section 38 of the Act. The notices under the aforesaid section were duly served upon them and they filed objections on January 15, 1971. A specimen copy of the objections is annexed with the petition as Annexure ‘P-5’. A careful perusal of the objection petition shows that no such objections as have been referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioners, above, were taken in it. The main objection taken by them in the objection petition was that the colony was and had been sanctioned and approved by the Municipal Committee, Jagadhri, and there was no necessity of making any further development in it. They further stated that the intention of the Trust was to acquire the property at nominal price and to sell the same at fancy price. The objections were disposed of by the Trust under section 40 of the Act after hearing the petitioners. In case the petitioners were feeling handicapped in any way by non-performance of the aforesaid acts by the Trust, they should have taken an objection in the objection petition so that the Trust could have performed the necessary formalities at that stage. After the scheme has been sanctioned, it is too late to raise such Objections. The Trust, in the return, has also denied the aforesaid allegations of the petitioners. It states that feasibility certificate is not required under the Act. It is by reason of Government instructions dated June 24, 1966, that such a certificate is obtained from the Divisional Town Planner. It is further stated that in the meeting held on September 21, 1970, by the Chairmen of the Trust with the Divisional Town Planner and Executive Engineer, Public Health Branch, Ambala, the development scheme in question was considered. The Town Planner and the Executive Engineer were taken round the area in respect of which the development scheme was contemplated. Thereafter final boundary line of the scheme in red pencil was fixed on the survey plan by them. According to them, the feasibility/suitability of the area for the purpose of development scheme had been approved by the Divisional Town Planner in the said meeting held on September 21, 1970. It is further alleged that the feasibility certificate was also obtained in writing by the Divisional Town Planner on October 16, 1970. Regarding the second objection, it has been stated that the development scheme was in existence when the notice under section 36 of the Act was published for the second time in the Haryana Government Gazette on November 10, 1970. On the third objection, it is stated that the petitioners were given a hearing before deciding their objections and note of them produced any evidence. It is further stated that the objections were considered and were found without any substance. It is an established principle of law that this Court is loath to decide controversial questions of fact. The objections taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner's are controversial questions of fact. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, I do not find any substance in the said objections.
6. Another objection that has been taken by the petitioners is that all the requisite documents were not sent to the State Government along with the application under section 50 of the Act. He has especially referred to letter dated February 17, 1973, from the Divisional Town Planner, Ambala Division, to the Chairman, Town Improvement Trust, Jagadhri (Annexure ‘P-11’), stating that the approved layout plan from the Senior Town Planner was being sent to him for further action. The respondent, in his reply, has deposed that the layout plan finally prepared by the Divisional Town Planner, with the approval of the Senior Town Planner, was sent to the Trust by the Divisional Town Planner with his letter dated July 11, 1972 (copy Annexure ‘P-3’). In the aforesaid letter it is stated that the layout of Development Scheme No. 11, in duplicate, is enclosed for further necessary action. Again there is dispute about the facts on this matter. As already observed above this Court is reluctant to go into controversial facts in writ proceedings. If there is controversy regarding the facts, the petition may be dismissed or that ground. Even if it is assumed that certain documents were not sent by the Trust to the State Government along with its application under section 40, it was for the State Government to raise objections regarding that. In case even after such objection the Trust failed to comply with the request of the Government, it could reject the proposal of the Trust. In my view the petitioners have no locus standi to raise such an objection and especially when a notification under section 42(2) of the Act has been published by the Government. I shall deal with the matter as to what is the effect of the notification under the said section in the following paragraphs. I, therefore, also do not find any substance in this objection.
7. At this stage I may refer to some other formal objections raked by the learned counsel. He has argued that it was not specifically stated in the resolution of the Trust for what purpose the particular portion of the locality was to be used, that the scheme did not contain the prescribed street alignment, the building line on each side of the streets proposed in such locality etc. in a nutshell, the argument is that some formalities of providing details in the scheme were not complied with. All the facts are controverted by the respondents. In any way, even if the formalities are not observed, the matter cannot be agitated after the notification under section 42(2) his been published.
8. Now I shall deal with section 42(2) of the Act. In the said section, it is stated that notification in respect of any scheme under section 42(1) shall be conclusive evidence that the scheme had been duly framed and sanctioned. Section 42 is as follows:—
“42. (1) The State Government shall notify the sanction of every scheme under this Act, and the Trust shall forthwith proceed to execute such scheme, provided that it is not a deferred street scheme, development scheme, or expansion scheme and provided further that the requirements of section 27 have been fulfilled.
(2) A notification under sub-section (1) in respect of any scheme shall be conclusive evidence that the scheme has been duly framed and sanctioned.”
9. From the reading of section 42, it is evident that the Legislature wanted to give finality to the scheme sanctioned by the Government so that I thereafter objections regarding the non-fulfilment of certain formalities I may not be raised. The purpose in enacting this section appears to be that if the landowners, etc., go on filing objections even after notification, the Trust may not be able to carry out the scheme which are finally sanctioned by the Government. Such provisions in other Acts have been judicially interpreted. In the C.P and Berar Municipalities Act, a provision was made to the effect that if any proposal for taxation had been sanctioned the Provincial Government may, by notification, direct the imposition of the tax. It was further provided that a notification of the imposition of tax under this section would be conclusive evidence that the tax had been imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Octroi was imposed by the Municipal Committee, Shegaon and notification was issued thereafter by the State Government. The notification was challenged on the ground that the provisions of the Act had not been complied with and, therefore, the same was illegal. The matter came up before the Supreme Court in Berar Swadeshi Vanaspathi v. Municipal Committee Shegaon,1 and it was observed by their Lordships that the imposition of octroi having been notified in the Gazette, was conclusive evidence of the tax having been imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and it could not be challenged on the ground that all the necessary steps had not been taken A similar matter under the Madhya Pradesh Town Improvement Trust Act also came up before the Supreme Court in Laxmichand v. Indore Imporvement Trust, Indore . 1975 1 SCC 565. The provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Town Improvement Act are pari materia with the provisions of the Act. Section 52, inter alia provides that the publication of a notification under sub-section (1) in respect of any scheme shall be a conclusive evidence that the scheme had been duly framed and sanctioned. In that case also certain objections were taken to the effect that certain formalities which were essential had not been complied with Goswami, J., while speaking for the Court, observed as follows:—
“Section 45 requires certain matters specified in (a) to (c) therein to be considered when framing an improvement scheme. The specified matters touch on the inherent utility, efficiency and adequacy of the scheme and the objections and representations of the persons effected will be directed to negative such assumptions.
Indeed without actually Staking into cons deration the various matters specified in section 45 it may not possible to frame a scheme and finally to obtain sanction of the Government in the teeth of objections and representations against the same. Where factual satisfaction is evident formal recitals being omitted may nor matter. At any rate section 52(2) puts a final seal of imprimatur on the scheme after publication of the sanction of the Government.”
10. It is cleat from the aforesaid observations that after the publication of the notification, objections regarding certain formalities are meaning less and the schemes cannot be quashed on that ground.
11. The learned counsel for the petitioners has made a reference to S. Harcharn Singh v. Shri Shashpal Singh . 1966 Cur. LJ Pb. 352. wherein a development scheme had been framed for certain areas which were outside the Municipal Committee. The scheme was challenged on the ground that the improvement Trust could not frame a development scheme under section 24 of the Act regarding such area. It was contended that it could frame an expansion scheme for that area under the aforesaid section. It was observed by a Division Bench of this Court that as there was no valid scheme, the same could be challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is further contended by the learned counsel that the view was aforesaid affirmed by the Supreme Court in The Amritsar Improvement Trust etc. v. Baldev Inder Singh . 1972 1 SCC 165. A perusal of the facts shows that the said case was distinguishable on facts Under Section 24, the Trust had no jurisdiction to frame a development scheme for the areas situated outside the municipality. The act of the Trust was without jurisdiction. In my view, the petitioners cannot derive any benefit from the aforesaid decisions Reference has also been made by him to Naruta Ram v. The State of Punjab . 1975 PLJ 185.. In that case the acquisition of land was being made without sanctioning of the full scheme. The notification for acquisition was struck down on that ground. The facts of the said case are also different from those of the present case and the observations therein will not be of any assistance to the learned counsel for the petitioners.
12. The learned counsel has further referred to Munshi Singh v. Union of India . 1973 2 SCC 337. That case is under the Land Acquisition Act. The matter for interpretation before their Lordships was different. The observations in the said case do not apply to this case.
13. The learned counsel for the petitioners then sought to argue that the objections filed by the petitioners were not dealt with by the Trust in a quasi judicial manner. He says that a speaking order should have been passed by the Trust as it was acting as a quasi-judicial Tribunal. The Trust has denied that it was acting as a quasi judicial Tribunal. I need not go into this matter as to whether the Tribunal acts in a quasi-judicial manner and is required to write a speaking order. It is sufficient to say that in view of section 42(2) of the Act, such objections cannot be raised after the scheme has been sanctioned are notified under the said section.
14. In all fairness to the learned counsel for the respondents, it may be mentioned that he has raised a preliminary objection that the writ petition is highly belated and is liable to be dismissed on this ground. It is not necessary to go into this matter as I am dismissing the writ petition on merits. No other point was raised in both the writ petitions.
15. For the reasons recorded above, these writ petitions fail and the same are dismissed. In the circumstances of these cases I, however, make no order as to costs.
16. Petition dismissed.
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