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Smt. Priyambada Devi And Another v. The Additional Member, Board Of Revenue, Bihar, Patna & Others
Judgment Summary — S.K. Choudhuri, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This writ application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenged three orders (Annexures 1, 2 and 3): (1) an order dated 19.6.1976 of the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Bhagalpur allowing a pre-emption application under Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area & Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1956 ("the Act"); (2) an appellate order dated 18.4.1978 of the Additional Collector dismissing the petitioners' appeal; and (3) a revisional order dated 11.4.1979 of the Additional Member, Board of Revenue dismissing revision.
Relevant facts (as stated in the opinion): Petitioner No.1 purchased a small parcel of land by sale-deed executed 19.6.1974 (registered 16.7.1974). Respondent No.4 (the pre-emptor) filed an application for pre-emption under Section 16(3) on 7.8.1974, claiming to be an adjacent raiyat. Petitioner No.1, by objection, stated that she had gifted the property to her daughter (petitioner No.2) by a deed of gift executed on 26.7.1974 and registered on 12.10.1974, and further alleged that the pre-emptor was not an adjacent raiyat. The Deputy Collector initially dismissed the pre-emption application on 19.5.1975 for non-joinder of the donee; on appeal the Additional Collector remanded the matter to add the donee as a party (order dated 5.6.1975). Thereafter the Deputy Collector allowed the pre-emption application on 19.6.1976 (Annexure-1), and the appellate and revisional authorities affirmed that decision (Annexures 2 and 3), resulting in the present writ challenge.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act applies to a second transfer that is a deed of gift executed before the filing of a pre-emption application but registered during the pendency of the pre-emption proceeding.
- Whether, in the absence of any allegation that the deed of gift is a sham or farzi transaction, the donee (second transferee) can be added and the pre-emption proceeding maintained under Section 16(3).
- What role (if any) the period of limitation plays where the donee is added to the proceeding beyond the period of limitation counted from the date of registration of the second transfer deed.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments (as presented by Mrs. Gyan Sudha Mishra)
- Section 16(3) of the Act does not apply to a deed of gift executed before the pre-emption application was filed, even if that deed is registered during the pendency of the proceedings.
- There was no allegation that the deed of gift was a sham (farzi) transaction; therefore Section 16(3) could not be invoked against the deed of gift.
- Petitioner No.2 (the donee) was added to the proceeding only after the remand on appeal (Annexure-5 dated 5.6.1975); this addition occurred beyond the period of limitation, and therefore the pre-emption claim should not have been allowed.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any specific arguments advanced by the respondent(s) on the legal issues; only the petitioners' contentions are set out in detail.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Smt. Sudama Devi v. Rajendra Singh, A.I.R. 1973 Patna 199 (1973 P.L.J.R. 534) | Consideration of cases in which second transfer deeds were executed before but registered after the filing of Section 16(3) applications (the "third category"); discussion of whether second sale-deeds alleged to be sham/farzi should permit adding the second transferee as party. | The Court noted that Sudama Devi elaborately discussed Ramchandra Yadav and involved cases of the third category where second transfer deeds were executed before but registered after filing; it was used to support the view that when second transfers are alleged to be sham/farzi, the second transferee must be present for determination. |
| Abdullah Mian v. Jodha Raut (1976 Bihar Bar Council Journal 649 : 1977 PLJR 371) | Illustrates the first category of cases where the second transfer was complete in all respects before the Section 16(3) application was filed, and thus the pre-emptor cannot ignore the second transfer deed. | The Court found Abdullah Mian distinguishable from the present facts because there the second transfer was complete before the pre-emption application; the opinion cites it to contrast categories of cases about timing and effect of second transfers. |
| Ramchandra Yadav v. Anutha Yadav (1971 B.L.J.R. 994) | Classified cases into three categories regarding the timing/status of the second transfer relative to the filing of a Section 16(3) application: (1) second transfer complete before application; (2) second transfer executed/registered after filing (lis pendens); (3) second transfer executed before filing but registered during pendency — with special treatment where sham/farzi is alleged. | The Court relied on Ramchandra Yadav to classify the present case as belonging to the third category and to justify adding a second transferee when the pre-emptor alleges a sham/farzi transfer that requires determination in the presence of the second transferee. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by first situating the present facts within the tripartite classification laid down in Ramchandra Yadav:
- The court identified three categories from Ramchandra Yadav: (a) second transfer complete before the pre-emption application is filed; (b) second transfer executed and registered after filing (hit by lis pendens); and (c) second transfer executed before filing but registered during the pendency of pre-emption proceedings.
- The court examined earlier decisions (including Abdullah Mian and Smt. Sudama Devi) to distinguish factual patterns and to explain how allegations of sham/farzi transfer affect party-joinder and maintainability of a Section 16(3) application.
- Applying those categories to the facts, the court held the present case fell within the third category: the deed of gift was executed before the pre-emption application but registered during the proceedings.
- Crucially, the court noted that the second transfer in this case was a deed of gift and not a sale. It turned to the statutory text: the Explanation to Section 16(1) of the Act expressly excludes "inheritance, bequest or gift" from the definition of "transfer" for the purposes of that section.
- Because the statutory Explanation excludes a deed of gift from the operation of Section 16 (and by implication from Section 16(3)), the court reasoned that a deed of gift executed and registered in conformity with law is not a "transfer" attracting Section 16(3), unless the gift is alleged to be sham or farzi.
- The court observed that, in cases where the pre-emptor does allege sham/farzi, the merits of that allegation must be decided in the presence of the second transferee; hence adding the second transferee as a party may be appropriate in such circumstances. However, in the present case the pre-emptor made no such allegation.
- Given the absence of any sham/farzi allegation, the deed of gift had to be treated as a valid operative instrument from its execution date and thus excluded from Section 16(3) by the statutory Explanation. Consequently, the Deputy Collector's allowance of the pre-emption application (and the appellate and revisional affirmations) was legally unsound.
- The court further held that because Section 16(3) did not apply to the deed of gift, the contention regarding limitation for adding the donee did not arise in this case.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ application is allowed and the orders contained in Annexures 1, 2 and 3 are quashed. (the Annexure orders were quashed).
Implications and immediate consequences:
- The court ruled that Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act has no application to the deed of gift in this case because the Explanation to Section 16(1) excludes gifts from "transfer" for the purposes of Section 16; no sham/farzi allegation having been made, the pre-emption application was not maintainable against the donee.
- The court found it unnecessary to decide the limitation point raised by petitioners because Section 16(3) did not apply to the deed of gift under consideration.
- The court directed that there be no order as to costs.
- This decision operates to set aside the specific administrative orders under challenge; the opinion does not purport to lay down any general new principle beyond applying the statutory Explanation and existing precedents to the facts at hand.
This summary is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond the opinion's text.
S.K Choudhuri, J.:— This writ application has been filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the orders contained in Annexures, 1, 2 and 3.
2. Annexure-1 is the order of the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Bhagalpur (respondent no. 3) dated 19th June, 1976 allowing the application for preemption filed under Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area & Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1956* (hereinafter called ‘the Act’); Annexure-2 is the appellate order dated 18.4.1978 passed by the Additional Collector, Bhagalpur (respondent no. 2) dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioners and Annexure-3 is the order of the Additional Member Board of Revenue dated 11.4.1979 dismissing the revision application. Hence, the present writ application has been filed. For proper appreciation of the points raised in this writ application, it is necessary to state here the relevant facts.
3. Petitioner no. 1 purchased 00.13 decimals of land appertaining to old khata no. 232, khesra no. 509 (new khata no. 1013, plot no. 844) of village Gobrain, police-station Shahkund district Bhagalpur under a sale-deed executed on 19th June, 1974 and registered on 16th July 1974. Respondent no. 4 Jagdish Prasad Sukla filed an application for pre-emption under Section 16(3) of the Act on 7th August, 1974 claiming himself to be an adjacent raiyat. Petitioner no. 1 filed objection disclosing that she had ceased to have any interest in the property in question as she has gifted the property to her daughter (petitioner no. 2). She also alleged that the preemptor was not an adjacent raiyat. It is not disputed that petitioner no. 1 has gifted the property to petitioner no. 2 as disclosed in the objection petition filed by petitioner no. 1. This deed of gift was executed on 26.7.1974 and registered on 12.10.1974
4. The Land Reforms Deputy Collector dismissed the preemption application by his order dated 19th May, 1975 on the ground that the donee had not been made a party and, therefore, the preemption application was not maintainable. He, however, observed that the pre-emptor may file a fresh application after imp leading the donee as a party. There was an appeal against the said order by respondent no. 4 and the Additional Collector remanded the case to the Land Reforms Deputy Collector and directed him to add the donee as a party in the case and thereafter proceed in accordance with law. This order is dated 5.6.1975 as contained in Annexure-5. Thereafter the Land Reforms Deputy Collector passed a fresh order after hearing the parties on 19.6.1976 (Annexure-1). By the fresh order he allowed the preemption application about which I have already stated above and the appellate authority and the revisional authority dismissed the appeal and revision under Annexures 2 and 3, respectively.
5. Mrs. Gyan Sudha Mishra, learned Counsel in support of this application contended that the order contained in Annexure-1 passed by the. Land Reforms Deputy Collector and the appellate and the revisional orders passed by respondents nos. 2 and 1, respectively affirming the same are illegal as Section 16(3) of the Act has no application to a deed of gift executed before the application for preemption was filed and though registered during the pendency of the proceeding under the Act. She further contended that there was no allegation that the gift in question executed by petitioner no. 1 in favour of petitioner no. 2 was a sham and farzi transaction and, therefore, also Section 16(3) has no application. Her further contention was that petitioner no. 2 was added in the proceeding after the appeal from the original order was allowed under Annexure-5 dated 5.6.1975 with a direction to respondent no. 3 to add petitioner no. 2 as a party to the proceeding and decide the case afresh in accordance with law. Thus the addition, according to the learned Counsel, being much beyond the period of limitation, the agitation for preemption should not have been allowed by the authorities under the Act.
6. In support of her contention learned Counsel cited two Bench decisions of this Court in Smt. Sudama Devi v. Rajendra Singh (A.I.R 1973 Patna 199 : 1973 P.L.J.R 534) & Abdullah Mian v. Jodha Raut (1976 Bihar Bar Council Journal 649 : 1977 PLJR 371.
7. In Abdullah Mian's case (supra) the facts were quite distinguishable. It is a case where the second transfer was complete in all respects before an application under Section 16(3) of the Act was filed. Therefore, it is a case which comes within the first category of cases as stated in Ramchandra Yadav v. Anutha Yadav (1971 B.L.J.R 994), which is again a Bench decision of this Court. This later Bench decision has pointed out three categories of cases while dealing with the applicability of section 16(3) of the Act. The first category of cases are the cases where the second transfer deed has become complete in all respects before filing the application under Section 16(3) of the Act. In such a case the pre-emptor could not be permitted to ignore the second transfer deed and file an application for preemption against the first transfer deed. The second category of cases are the cases where the second transfer deed has been executed and registered after, the filing of the application under Section 16(3) of the Act. In that case the second transfer-deed would be hit by the doctrine of lis pendence and the third category of cases are the cases where the execution of the second transfer deed has been made before the filing of an application under Section 16(3) of the Act, but registered thereafter. This decision of Ramchandra Yadav's case (supra) was a case of third category, namely, that the second transfer deed was executed before the application was filed under Section 16(3) of the Act, but registered during the pendency of the preemption proceeding, and the allegation of the pre-emptor was that the second transfer deed was sham and farzi. It is under these circumstances and, in my opinion, rightly the second transferee was allowed to be made a party as the allegation of sham and farzi nature of the second transfer deed can only be decided in presence of the second transferee whom the High Court while deciding the writ application directed him to be added as a party to the pre-emption proceeding and remanded the case to the lowest authority to decide the same afresh, in accordance with law.
8. I may state here that Ramchandra Yadav's case was noticed in a latter Bench decision of this Court in Smt. Sudama Devi's case (A.I.R 1973 Patna 199.) in which there:s elaborate discussion of that case. The two writ applications considered in Smt. Sudama Devi's case (supra) were again the cases of the third category as laid down in Ramchandra Yadav's case (supra) inasmuch as the second transfer deeds though executed before, but registered after the applications under Section 16(3) of the Act were filed. There also the second sale-deeds were alleged to be farzi and sham. It, however, goes without saying that if the authority concerned under the Act decides the allegations of sham and farzi nature of the second sale-deeds as incorrect, then the pre-emption application would fail, as the title under the second transfer-deeds on registration of the documents would relate back to the date of the execution of these documents.
9. A question may still arise as to what would happen in a case where the second transfer is found to be not a sham and farzi transaction and the second transferee, who has been added as a party beyond the period of limitation counted from the date of registration of the second transfer deed, is found to be not an adjacent raiyat or co-sharer, but the pre-emptor establishes that he is an adjacent raiyat and entitled to be pre-empted. It is in such a case that the question of limitation may be relevant to decide as to whether a decision can be given in favour of the pre-emptor or that the application for pre-emption would not succeed because of the bar of limitation. The pre-emptor in such a case would, in my opinion, be entitled to succeed only when the second transferee has been added in the proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation counted from the date of registration of the second transfer deed, and the application for preemption having fulfilled all the conditions laid down in that Act and the Rules made thereunder in relation to the second transfer-deed.
10. In view of the discussions made above, it is manifest that the present case under consideration, in this writ application is a case of the third category as aforesaid.
11. As already stated above the second transfer deed in the present case is not a sale-deed, but a deed of gift and on its registration it would be an operative document from the date of execution, which is a date prior to the filing of the pre-emption application. That being so, the Explanation to Section 16(1) of the Act is attracted. Under it a deed of gift has been excluded and would not amount to ‘transfer’ for the purpose of Section 16 of the Act. The Explanation to Section 16(1) of the Act reads thus:—
“For the purposes of this section ‘transfer’ does not include inheritance, bequest or gift.”
12. In view of this-exclusion under the Explanation aforesaid, a deed of gift is excluded from the preview of Section 16(3) of the Act. If, however, such a deed of gift would have been challenged as a sham and farzi transaction and the authority under the Act would have found the allegation to be correct, then for all practical purposes the said deed of gift would be a document non est in the eye of law and the pre-emption application would in such a case proceed against the original purchaser. But here unfortunately for the pre-emptor he has not alleged the sham and farzi nature of the deed of gift. It has, therefore, to be taken as a fact that the said document if executed and registered in conformity with law would be a valid document and for such a document the legislature has mandated exclusion of the applicability of Section 16(3) of the Act. This conclusion does not require support of any decision as the section itself is clear and explicit. In view of this exclusion it has to be held that the order of the Land Reforms Deputy Collector and the appellate as also the revisional orders are all illegal and liable to be set aside. Those authorities should have held that the deed of gift not having been challenged as a sham and farzi document, the pre-emption application under Section 16(3) of the Act was not maintainable. So far as the point of limitation raised by learned Counsel for the petitioners is concerned, it would not arise in the present case in view of the conclusion arrived at above, namely, that Section 16(3) of the Act has no application to the deed of gift under consideration.
13. In the result, the application is allowed and the orders contained in Annexures 1, 2 and 3 are hereby quashed.
14. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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