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The State Of U.P And Another v. Dayavati Khanna
Factual and Procedural Background
The writ petitioner, Dayavati Khanna, who held the post of Joint Director of Education, was given additional charge of the work of the Additional Director of Education on March 20, 1991. She continued to perform these duties thereafter. In her writ petition, she sought the payment of salary corresponding to the post of Additional Director of Education effective from March 20, 1991.
At the interlocutory stage, the learned Single Judge granted interim relief by ordering payment of salary as Additional Director from the specified date, and further directed issuance of a regular appointment order, despite no such prayer or claim being made in the writ petition. Subsequent orders reiterated the direction to pay salary as Additional Director.
The present appeal challenges these interim orders, particularly the grant of the main relief at the interlocutory stage and the issuance of an appointment order not sought in the writ petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether relief sought and available at the final disposal stage of writ proceedings can be granted as interim relief at the interlocutory stage without special reasons.
- Whether a Single Judge has jurisdiction to grant main relief and issue appointment orders at the interlocutory stage in writ petitions cognizable by a Division Bench.
- Whether a special appeal lies against an interim order passed by a Single Judge in writ petitions cognizable by a Division Bench.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Dayavati Khanna)
- The counsel for Dayavati Khanna could not indicate any special reason justifying the grant of main relief at the interlocutory stage.
- It was contended that no special appeal lies against the impugned order passed by the Single Judge in a writ petition cognizable by a Division Bench, as special appeals are only competent from Single Judge orders in writ petitions heard by a Single Judge.
Respondent's Arguments
- The contention that no special appeal lies was unsupported by any rule or precedent and lacked any reason or principle.
- The Single Judge’s jurisdiction to grant interim relief in writ petitions cognizable by a Division Bench does not bar a special appeal against such orders.
- Rule 5 of Chapter-VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1962 does not bar appeals against Single Judge orders in such cases.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Committee of Management v. Sushil Kumar Sharma, 1993, 2 UPLBEC-1263 | Rule that relief asked for and available at final disposal stage is not to be granted at interlocutory stage except for special reasons. | Used to emphasize the impropriety of granting main relief and appointment order at interlocutory stage without special reasons. |
| U.P Junior Doctor's Action Committee v. Dr. B. Sheetal Nandwani | Established the settled rule of practice that interlocutory relief should not grant main relief unless special reasons are shown. | Reinforced the principle that interlocutory relief is not a substitute for final relief and must be cautiously granted. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court reaffirmed the established rule of practice that relief sought and available at the final hearing stage should not be granted as interim relief at the interlocutory stage unless special reasons are clearly indicated. The learned Single Judge erred by granting the main relief of salary payment and further ordering issuance of an appointment letter, which was not prayed for or claimed. The court found no special reasons presented by the petitioner to justify this departure from settled practice.
Regarding the jurisdictional issue, the court clarified that Single Judges are empowered by the Chief Justice to deal with interim reliefs in writ petitions cognizable by a Division Bench, but this does not convert their interim orders into orders of the Division Bench. Consequently, such interim orders are appealable by way of special appeal.
The court examined Rule 5 of Chapter-VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1962, and found no language barring appeals against Single Judge interim orders in Division Bench matters. Thus, the special appeal was held to be competent.
On these grounds, the court set aside the impugned interim orders granting the appointment letter and salary payments as Additional Director, and allowed the special appeal. The writ petition was directed to be listed for final hearing within a year, considering the petitioner's impending retirement.
Holding and Implications
The special appeal is accepted, and the impugned interim orders granting the main relief and appointment letter are set aside.
This decision underscores that main relief sought in writ petitions should not be granted at the interlocutory stage except for special reasons, reinforcing procedural discipline. It clarifies that Single Judge interim orders in Division Bench matters are appealable by special appeal, preventing any misconception about jurisdictional limits. The direct consequence is that the petitioner’s claim for salary and appointment will be adjudicated at the final hearing, which is to be scheduled within a year. No new precedent beyond these procedural clarifications is established.
S.S Sodhi, J.:— There is a settled and well established rule of practice which, by convention and long usage has almost hardened into a rule of law, namely, that relief asked for and available at the stage of final disposal of writ proceedings, is not, except for special reasons, to be granted as interim relief at the interlocutory stage. Blatant disregard of this rule is revealed here.
2. To give the relevant factual background, the writ petitioner Dayavati Khanna while holding the post of Joint Director of Education was on March 20, 1991 given additional charge of looking after the work also of the Additional Director of Education, which she has been doing ever since. In the writ petition, the prayer of Dayavati Khanna was “pay salary to the petitioner of the post of Additional Director of Education with effect from 20th March, 1991.”
3. When the matter came up before the learned Single Judge for interim relief, by his order of April 29, 1993 the learned Single Judge directed that Dayavati Khanna be paid salary as Additional Director with effect from March 20, 1991 namely, the main relief in the writ petition. Not only this, the learned Single Judge went further and directed the issuance of a regular appointment order to Dayavati Khanna for the post of Additional Director. It deserves to be pointed out here that there was no such prayer in the writ petition nor was it the case of Dayavati Khanna that she had been regularly appointed to the post of Additional Director or was by seniority or selection entitled, to be appointed as such.
4. When the matter next came up before the learned Single Judge on October 13, 1993 the order shows that a direction was issued for the payment of salary as Additional Director to Dayavati Khanna.
5. There is then the order of January 20, 1994 whereby the learned Single Judge directed compliance with his earlier order of April 29, 1993, namely, payment of salary as Additional Director to Dayavati Khanna with effect from 20th March, 1991. This order was directed to be complied with within two weeks.
6. In dealing with this matter, it would be relevant to refer here to the Judgment of Division Bench in Committee of Management v. Sushil Kumar Sharma . 1993, 2 UPLBEC-1263. where in a writ petition seeking the issue of an appointment letter to the post of Director and for payment of salary for that post with effect from the date specified therein, the learned Single Judge had, while disposing of the stay application, passed an order granting precisely these-two reliefs. Following the Judgment of the Supreme Court in U.P Junior Doctor's Action Committee v. Dr. B. Sheetal Nandwani,2 it was held “it is a well known rule of practice and procedure that at interlocutory stage a relief which is asked for and is available at the disposal of the matter is not granted unless there is any special reason to be indicated in clear term.”
7. Before proceeding further, it deserves mention that counsel for Dayavati Khanna was unable to point to any special reason to justify Dayavati Khanna being granted, at the interlocutory stage, the main relief sought in the writ petition and in fact even more the issuance of an appointment letter to her for the post of Additional Director, a relief as mentioned earlier, not even asked for in the writ petition.
8. Faced with this situation, Mr. L.P Naithani Counsel for Dayavati Khanna, sought to put-forth the wholly untenable contention, that no special appeal lay against the impugned order. The argument being that special appeal would be competent only from an order passed in a writ petition which is required to be heard by a Single judge but not when an order is passed by a Single Judge in a writ petition cognizable by a Division Bench. In other words, in a writ petition coqnizable by a Division Bench no special appeal lies against an order passed by a Single Judge while dealing with interim matters. Counsel could, however, point no rule or judicial precedent to support this contention which on the face of it, has no reason or principle to support it.
9. As is well known, it is in the exercise of powers vested in the Chief Justice that the Single Judges have been conferred jurisdiction to deal with matters pertaining to interim relief, in writ petitions, cognizable by a Division Bench. While dealing with such a matter the Single Judge does not function as a delegatee of the Division Bench nor there is any warrant for deeming an interim order passed by the Single Judge in a matter cognizable by the Division Bench, as being that of the Division Bench so as to bar a special appeal against it.
10. Further, there is nothing in the language of Rule 5 of Chapter-VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules 1962 to lend itself to any such interpretation, namely, barring an appeal from an order passed by the Single Judge in such matters, rather a reading of it would show that an appeal against the order of the Single Judge is in no way barred. There is thus no ground to hold that the present Special appeal was not competent.
11. Keeping in view the matters as has been discussed, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the learned Single Judge clearly fell in error in granting to Dayavati Khanna the relief of issuance of an appointment order for the post of Additional Director and for the payment to her salary as such. The impugned orders of the learned Single Judge, in this behalf, are consequently, hereby set-aside and this Special appeal is thus accepted. As we are informed that Dayavati Khanna is likely to retire from service this year we direct that her writ petition be listed for final hearing within a year.
12. Appeal Accepted.
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