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Messrs Great Arts Private Ltd. v. Shri Har Gopal Kapur .

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Nov 21, 1962
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Mahajan, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petition for revision arises from a commercial dispute between Messrs Great Arts (Private) Limited (petitioners), who acquired distribution rights for the film "Anpadh" from Kiran Productions for the territories of Delhi and Uttar Pradesh, and Messrs Kapur and Company (respondents), with whom the petitioners entered into an agreement dated 1 February 1961 to raise funds for payment to the producers.

The respondents assert they paid amounts contemplated under the agreement to the banks and petitioners; the petitioners contend that only Rs. 10,000 was paid and the entire amount due under the agreement was not paid. The film was released from the bank and exhibited. The petitioners filed a suit on 20 August 1962 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge 2nd Class for a declaration of distribution rights and for a permanent injunction restraining respondent interference; the suit was valued for jurisdictional purposes at Rs. 400.

While that suit was pending, an application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act was filed (no order on that application is recorded in this opinion). The respondents then filed an application under section 41 of the Arbitration Act seeking an injunction. An ex parte injunction was granted (valid until 15 September 1962) on the basis that opposing counsel agreed the film would not be exhibited until that date. On 16 September 1962 the parties entered into a compromise in which the petitioners agreed to pay Rs. 10,000 and another sum of Rs. 9,350 by 31 October 1962; Rs. 10,000 was paid on 17 September 1962 and the court passed an order that the injunction would not be operative. The Rs. 9,350 was not paid on the due date, the injunction was granted again, and the petitioners filed the present revision against that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Subordinate Judge of the 2nd Class had jurisdiction to entertain an application under section 41 of the Arbitration Act where the subject-matter of the reference (as asserted in the application) was Rs. 19,350, an amount exceeding his pecuniary jurisdiction.
  2. Whether section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act can cure or validate jurisdictional defects arising where a matter correctly valued has been presented in a court that lacks pecuniary jurisdiction.
  3. Whether an application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, made to the Subordinate Judge 2nd Class, converts or makes that court exclusively competent under section 31 of the Arbitration Act to deal with subsequent applications concerning the arbitration agreement or disputes to be settled by arbitration.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The Subordinate Judge 2nd Class lacked jurisdiction to entertain the application under section 41 of the Arbitration Act because the subject-matter of the arbitration (stated as Rs. 19,350) exceeded his pecuniary jurisdiction; paragraph 6 of the respondents' section 41 application itself asserted the claim amount.
  • Because the claim was not over- or under-valued, section 31 of the Arbitration Act indicates only a Subordinate Judge of the 1st Class could hear the section 41 application.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents argued that section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act cured the jurisdictional defect and therefore the Subordinate Judge 2nd Class could validly entertain the application.
  • Alternatively, respondents contended that because an application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act had been made to the Subordinate Judge 2nd Class (by reason of section 31 of the Arbitration Act), that Court alone could deal with any application arising out of or concerning the arbitration agreement or disputes to be settled by arbitration.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 340 Principle that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity; discussion of the effect and limits of section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act on jurisdictional objections. The court relied on the decision to explain that a defect of jurisdiction (pecuniary or territorial) normally renders a decree null and to show that section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act cannot be used to validate a court's exercise of jurisdiction where that court plainly lacked jurisdiction unless the conditions of section 11 are met.
V. Ramaswami Iyer v. Veeraravan Raja, A.I.R. 1941 Mad. 711 Authority cited for the proposition that section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is limited to cases of over-valuation or under-valuation. The court cited this case among others to support the view that section 11 does not apply where a suit is correctly valued but presented in a court which on the face of it has no pecuniary jurisdiction.
Sitanam Singh v. Tika Ram Singh, A.I.R. 1942 Oudh. 421 Authority cited for the limiting scope of section 11 to over-valuation/under-valuation situations. Used as supporting authority to show that section 11 cannot cure cases where the plaint has been correctly valued but filed in a court lacking the necessary pecuniary jurisdiction.
Mt. Sunder v. Kandhavia Lal, A.I.R. 1946 All. 456 Another authority for the proposition that section 11 is confined to valuation defects (over/under) and not to suits correctly valued but filed in a court lacking jurisdiction. Cited to reinforce the distinction between curable valuation defects and incurable jurisdictional defects where the suit was correctly valued but filed in an incompetent forum.
Ghotevlal Shamlal v. Cooch Behar Oil Mills, I.L.R. 1954 1 Cal. 419 Held that an application under section 34 cannot be treated as an application under the Arbitration Act for purposes of section 31. The court cited and expressly agreed with this Calcutta High Court decision to reject the respondents' contention that a prior section 34 application to the Subordinate Judge 2nd Class made that court exclusively competent under section 31 to deal with subsequent arbitration-related applications.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court approached the question primarily as one of jurisdiction determined by statutory provisions in the Arbitration Act and the Suits Valuation Act. The analysis proceeded in the following steps:

  1. The court examined paragraph 6 of the respondents' application under section 41 which, on its face, identified the amount in dispute in the arbitration as Rs. 19,350. The court treated that assertion as establishing that the subject-matter of the arbitration exceeded the pecuniary jurisdiction of a Subordinate Judge 2nd Class.
  2. The definition of "Court" in section 2(c) of the Arbitration Act and the jurisdictional prescription in section 31 were invoked to conclude that only a Subordinate Judge of the 1st Class could have entertained the section 41 application where the amount in dispute was Rs. 19,350. Consequently, a Subordinate Judge 2nd Class would have no jurisdiction to entertain the matter.
  3. The court considered whether section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act could cure the jurisdictional defect. It relied on Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan and other authorities to interpret section 11, observing that section 11 is directed exclusively to cases of over-valuation or under-valuation of suits or appeals. Section 11 operates where a suit, as valued, would normally be within the jurisdiction of the court in which it was filed but the valuation turned out to be incorrect; in that limited context the defect can be cured if the statutory conditions are met.
  4. The court drew a clear distinction between (a) valuation defects (over- or under-valuation) which section 11 addresses, and (b) cases where a plaint is correctly valued but filed in a court which on its face has no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain it. In the latter situation, section 11 does not apply because the suit was never properly before the court that purported to decide it. The court cited V. Ramaswami Iyer, Sitanam Singh and Mt. Sunder to support this interpretation.
  5. Applying the foregoing, the court concluded that because the petitioner's statement (and paragraph 6 of the respondents' own application) established the claim at Rs. 19,350, there was no question of over- or under-valuation; therefore section 11 could not be invoked to cure the Subordinate Judge 2nd Class's lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. The respondents' reliance on section 11 was rejected.
  6. The court also addressed the respondents' contention that a prior application under section 34, made to the Subordinate Judge 2nd Class, made that Court exclusively competent under section 31 to deal with subsequent arbitration-related applications. The court found this contention unattractive and without substance, and it relied on the Calcutta High Court decision in Ghotevlal Shamlal v. Cooch Behar Oil Mills, agreeing with that decision's holding that a section 34 application cannot be treated as an application under the Arbitration Act for the purposes of section 31. Therefore, this contention also failed.
  7. On the basis of the statutory interpretation and precedents, the court held the orders passed by the Subordinate Judge 2nd Class on the section 41 petition to be without jurisdiction and therefore subject to being set aside.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The petition is allowed. The court set aside the orders passed by the Subordinate Judge 2nd Class on the petition under section 41 of the Arbitration Act and directed that the petition be returned to the petitioner for presentation to the proper Court.

Implications:

  • The direct effect on the parties is that the orders made by the Subordinate Judge 2nd Class under section 41 are set aside and the petition must be presented to the court that has the appropriate pecuniary jurisdiction (a Subordinate Judge of the 1st Class, in light of the stated amount in dispute).
  • The court rejected the respondents' contention that section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act validated the exercise of jurisdiction in the present circumstances because the dispute was not a case of over-valuation or under-valuation; rather the suit (or petition) was correctly valued but filed in a court lacking pecuniary jurisdiction.
  • The court also rejected the contention that a prior section 34 application to the Subordinate Judge 2nd Class made that court exclusively competent under section 31 to deal with subsequent arbitration-related applications, following the reasoning in Ghotevlal Shamlal v. Cooch Behar Oil Mills.
  • No costs were awarded due to the difficult nature of the question involved (the opinion records "there will be no order as to costs").
  • The opinion does not state any broader declaratory precedent beyond these specific conclusions about the limits of section 11 and the appropriate forum for a section 41 application; the decision's immediate consequence is the remittal of the petition to the proper court for presentation.

Disposition: Petition allowed.

Show all summary ...

Mahajan, J.:— This petition for revision arises out of the following facts. Messrs Great Arts (Private) Limited, the petitioners, are a concern which distribute films by acquiring rights from the producers. In the present case the film in question is ‘Anpadh’. It was produced by Messrs Kiran Productions and the distribution rights were acquired by the petitioner for the territory of Delhi and Uttar Pradesh. For this purpose they had to pay certain amounts to the producers and in order to raise these funds the petitioners entered into an agreement with Messrs Kapur and Company, the respondents, on the 1st of February, 1961. According to the respondents they paid to the Banks and the petitioners the amounts contemplated under the agreement while according to the petitioners the entire amount due under the agreement was not paid and only a sum of Rs. 10,000/- was paid. The film was got released from the Bank and was exhibited, A suit was filed by the petitioners on the 20th of August, 1962 against the respondents for a declaration that the petitioners are the distributors of the film and that the respondent? had no right, title and interest in the same and for a permanent injunction restraining the respondents not to interfere with the exhibition of the film. This suit was filed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge 2nd Class and was valued for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 400/-. When this suit was pending an application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act was filed on the basis that the matter between the parties was the subject-matter of reference by one Des Raj Mahajan. I am told that no orders have been passed on this section 34 application. In the mean time the respondents made an application under section 41 of the Arbitration Act and prayed for an injunction against the petitioners. Reply to this application was filed by the petitioners on the 2nd November, 1962, but in the meantime when the application was filed on the 10th September, 1962, the opposite party's counsel appeared in Court and agreed that the film will not be exhibited tip to the 15th September, 1.62 On the basis of this stand an ex-parte injunction was granted valid up to the 15th September, 1962. On the 16th September, 1982, the parties entered into a compromise whereby the petitioners agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/- and another sum of Rs. 9,350/- by the 31st of October, 1962, the sum of Rs. 10,000/- was paid on the 17th September, 1962. On the 17th September, 1962, the Court passed an order that the injunction would not be operative. However, the amount of Rs. 9,350/- was not paid on the due date with the result that the injunction was granted and it is against this order that the present revision has been filed in this Court.

2. The contention of counsel for the petitioners is that the Subordinate Judge 2nd Class could not entertain the application under section 41 of the Arbitration Act because the value of the subject-matter of reference was more than Rs. 6,000/-, that is, more than his pecuniary jurisdiction. For that purpose he relied on paragraph 6 of the application under section 41 of the Arbitration Act. Paragraph 6 is in these terms:—

“That the claims made by the respondent in the aforesaid suit are, on the face of it, untenable in law and the sole object of the suit is to deprive the petitioner of his rights to enforce his charge against the picture ‘Anpadh’ to the extent of Rs. 19,350/-, the amount advanced by the petitioner to the respondent under the said agreement plus interest there on and the liquidated damages amounting to Rs. 10,000/- which is the subject matter of the reference.”

At this stage it will be useful to refer to section 2(c) of the Arbitration Act which defines ‘Court’ in the following terms:—

“2.(c) ‘Court’ means a civil Court having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the reference if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not, except for the purpose of arbitration proceedings under section 21, include a Small Cause Court;”

It will also be useful to refer to section 31 of the Arbitration Act which determines the jurisdiction of the Court with regard to matters in that Act. It would, therefore, be obvious that according to paragraph 6 referred to above, the subject matter of dispute in the arbitration proceedings was above Rs. 5,000/- and that being so, the application under section 41 of the Arbitration Act was only entertainable by a Subordinate Judge of the 1st Class, and not by a Subordinate Judge of the 2nd Class, Therefore, a Subordinate Judge of the 2nd class would have no jurisdiction to entertain the same. In this connection reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan . A.I.R 1954 S.C 340., where at page 342 the following observations were made by their Lordships;

“The answer to these contentions must depend on what the position in law is when a Court entertains a suit or an appeal over which it has no jurisdiction, and what the effect of section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is on that position. It is a fundamental principle well-established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction whether it is pecuniary or territorial or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties. If the question now under consideration fell to be determined only on the application of general principles governing the matter, there can be no doubt that the District Court of Monghyr was ‘coram non judice’ and that its judgment and decree would be nullities. The question is what is the effect of section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act on this position.

With reference to objections relating to territorial jurisdiction, section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code enacts that no objection to the place of suing should be allowed by an appellate or revisional Court, unless there was a consequent failure of justice. It is the same principle that has been adopted in section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act with reference to pecuniary jurisdiction. The policy underlying section 21 and 99, Code of Civil Procedure and section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a Court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate Court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits. The contention of the appellants, therefore, that the decree and judgment of the District Court, Monghyr, should be treated as a nullity cannot be sustained under section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act.”

Therefore, it would be obvious that unless section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is applicable, to the present case the proceedings in section 41 application before the Subordinate Judge 2nd Class would be wholly without jurisdiction. section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is in, these terms:—

“11.(1) Notwithstanding anything in section 578 (now section 99 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1908) of the Code of Civil Procedure, an objection that by reason of the over-valuation or under-valuation of a suit or appeal a Court of first instance or lower appellate Court which had no jurisdiction with respect to the suit or appeal exercised jurisdiction with respect thereto shall not be entertained by an Appellate Court unless:—

(a) the objection was taken in the Court of first instance at or before the hearing at which issues were first framed and recorded, or in the lower appellate Court in the memorandum of appeal to that Court, or

(b) the Appellate Court is satisfied for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, that the suit or appeal was over-valued or under-valued, and that the over-valuation or under valuation thereof has pre-judicially affected the disposal of the suit or appeal on its merits.

(2) If the objection was taken in the manner mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (1) but the Appellate Court is not satisfied as to both the matters mention-d in clause (b) of that sub-section and has before it the materials necessary for the determination of the other grounds of appeal to itself, it shall dispose of the appeal as if there had been no defect of jurisdiction in the Court of first instance or lower Appellate Court.

(3) If the objection was taken in that manner and the Appellate Court is satisfied as to both those matters and has not those materials before it, it shall proceed to deal with the appeal under the rules applicable to the Court with respect to the hearing of appeals: but if it remands the suit or appeal, or frames and refers issues for trial, or requires additional evidence to be taken, it shall direct its order to a Court competent to entertain the suit or appeal.

(4) The provisions of this section with respect to an Appellate Court shall so for as they can be made applicable apply to a Court exercising re visional jurisdiction under section 622 (now section 115) of the Code of Civil Procedure or other enactment for the time being inforce.

(5) ****”

It would be apparent from the plain language of this provision that it only deals with cases of over-valuation or under-valuation, that is, the suit as valued has been filed in a proper Court, that is, in a Court which according to the value indicated is competent to entertain it, but in fact the value indicated is either more or less than it should in fact and in law be. The section does not deal with suits which have been correctly valued if no question of over-valuation or under-valuation arises and the suit was framed is correctly valued, but has been filed in a Court not competent to entertain it because it does not possess the pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain it, it is obvious that the suit has been filed in a Court not competent to entertain the same. The distinction in the cases of over-valuation and under-valuation and cases where the valuation has been correctly fixed is obvious. In the former type of cases, the provision of section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act do cure the defect because if objection to jurisdiction on the basis of over-valuation and under valuation had been taken at the very outset the correct value would have been fixed and the case would have been tried by a Court competent to try it. If on the other hand, no objection is raised and the case has been determined on merits for on the valuation indicated it would be within the jurisdiction of that Court to determine it, section 11 steps in and forbids the matter of valuation to be reopened. The reason seems to be that when the suit was filed on the face of it, it was competent and could be tried by the Court in which it had been filed. But this would not be the case when the suit as valued has been filed in a Court not competent to entertain it. It would be a case where a suit has been filed in a Court which has no jurisdiction to deal with the same and, therefore, the case would not fall within the scope and ambit of section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act. This distinction is clearly pointed out in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kiran Singh's case. It is almost axiomatic to state that parties by their consent or waiver cannot confer jurisdiction on a Court which has none. There is ample authority for the proposition that section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is limited to cases of under-valuation or over-valuation and is not applicable to cases where the suit has been properly valued and then the plaint is presented in a Court which on the face of it has no jurisdiction to proceed with the suit. See in this connection the decisions in V. Ramaswami Iyer v. Veeraravan Raja . A.I.R 1941 Mad. 711., Sitanam Singh v. Tika Ram Singh . A.I.R 1942 Oudh. 421. and Mt. Sunder v. Kandhavia Lal . A.I.R 1946 All. 456.. No case to the contrary has been brought to my notice wherein it has been held that where a suit has been correctly valued and the plaint has been presented in a Court which has no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain it and has determined the suit, the decision will be of a Court with jurisdiction and the defect would be curable by recourse to section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act.

3. So far as the present case is concerned, there was no question of the claim in arbitration being either over-valued or under-valued. The petitioner in his application clearly stated that he was due an amount of Rs. 19,350./-, which was the subject-matter of reference. Therefore, only a Subordinate Judge of the 1st Class could have entertained the application under section 41 of the Arbitration Act in view of the clear provisions of section 31 in that Act. The argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act cured the defect is of no consequence and must be repelled.

4. Faced with this situation, the learned counsel for the respondents contended that as the application under section ??? of the Arbitration Act had been made to the Subordinate Judge 2nd Class by reason of section 31 of the Arbitration Act, it was that Court alone which could deal with any application arising or concerning the arbitration agreement or the disputes which have to be settled by arbitration. This argument though attractive is without substance. In a similar case before the Calcutta High Court, namely, Ghotevlal Shamlal v. Cooch Behar Oil Mills . I.L.R 1954 1 Cal. 419., it was held that an application under section 34 cannot be treated as an application under the Arbitration Act for purposes of section 31. I am in respectful agreement with the observations made by the learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court. That being so, this contention also fails.

5. I would accordingly set aside the orders passed by the Court below on the petition under section 41 and direct that the petition be returned to the petitioner for presentation to the proper Court. In view of the difficult nature of the question involved there will be no order as to costs.

Petition allowed.