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Vijendra Vijai v. State Of U.P.

Allahabad High Court
Apr 29, 1986
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision under Section 397 Cr. P.C. challenges an order dated 4 September 1985 of the V Additional Sessions Judge, Hardoi (Sri Pratap Singh) made under Section 228 Cr. P.C., which transferred to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hardoi the case against the applicant for trial under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act.

Facts as stated in the opinion: One Sheo Nath Singh lodged an FIR alleging that three known persons and one unknown person had committed the murders of Sukhendra Singh and Sunil Kumar Singh on 18 August 1983 and had also robbed the rifle (No. 8042) belonging to deceased Sukhendra Singh. That rifle was said to have been recovered from the unlawful possession of the applicant Vijendra Vijai, who had no licence for the rifle. Consequently, a case under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act was registered against the applicant. The Investigating Officer also considered the applicant implicated in the murders and included him in the chargesheet for murder while separately chargesheeting him for illicit possession of the rifle.

Procedurally, the murder case was committed to the Sessions Court under Section 209 (for offences triable exclusively by Sessions). The Magistrate also committed the Arms Act offence under Section 323 Cr.P.C., concluding that the recovery of the rifle from the applicant was an issue bound to affect the murder and robbery case and therefore ought to be tried by the Sessions Court. The Additional Sessions Judge took up both Sessions trials but concluded that the Arms Act offence under Section 3/25 had no connection with the offences under Sections 302 and 394 IPC and, exercising power under Section 228 Cr.P.C., transferred the Arms Act case to the Chief Judicial Magistrate for trial. The present revision challenges that transfer.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Sessions Court, in exercise of its powers under Section 228 Cr.P.C., can transfer a case back to the Magistrate for trial when the Magistrate had earlier committed that case to the Sessions Court under Section 323 Cr.P.C.
  2. Whether the offence under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act is so connected with the offences under Sections 302/394 IPC (murder and robbery) that separate trials by different courts would produce prejudice, conflicting findings or operate to create issue estoppel.
  3. Whether the Additional Sessions Judge's transfer order was a proper and sound exercise of discretion under Section 228 Cr.P.C., such that interference under Section 397 Cr.P.C. is warranted.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments (Sri Imtiaz Murtaza, counsel)

  • The committal of the Arms Act case was made under Section 323 Cr.P.C., and the Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to interfere with that committal by exercising powers under Section 228 Cr.P.C.
  • Any acquittal or conviction in the Arms Act case would affect the result in the murder/robbery trial; separate trials by two courts could cause conflicting findings and injustice, so the transfer to the Chief Judicial Magistrate was improper.

First Informant / Prosecution Arguments (Sri R.N. Gupta, assisted by Addl. Government Advocate)

  • The offence under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act has nothing to do with the alleged murders and robbery; therefore, there was no illegality in the Additional Sessions Judge's order transferring the Arms Act case to the Chief Judicial Magistrate under Section 228 Cr.P.C.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Khusbi Ram (Supreme Court) Where a Magistrate competent to try a case commits it to the Court of Sessions, the committal order is not a nullity and the Sessions Court's jurisdiction to try the case is not affected. The Court relied on this authority to acknowledge that the Sessions Court was competent to try an offence under Section 3/25 Arms Act even though it had been committed by the Magistrate; the central question remained whether the Additional Sessions Judge exercised his discretion under Section 228 properly.
Mahinder Singh v. State of Punjab (Supreme Court) The discovery of a weapon at the instance of the accused and expert ballistic evidence can serve as valuable corroborative evidence in a murder trial; such discoveries and identifications may create interdependence between separate trials (doctrine of issue estoppel). The Court invoked this decision to demonstrate that recovery/discovery evidence in an Arms Act case can materially affect the murder/robbery trial. This supported the conclusion that separate trials could give rise to issue estoppel or conflicting findings, justifying a joint resolution by the Sessions Court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeded through the following analytical steps, based only on the material contained in the opinion:

  1. Statutory framework — distinction between Sections 209 and 323 Cr.P.C.:
    • Section 209 Cr.P.C. governs commitment of cases exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions; Section 323 Cr.P.C. applies to offences which are not exclusively triable by Sessions but which the Magistrate considers "ought to be tried by the Court of Sessions."
    • The court observed that if the expression "ought to be tried" were confined only to offences exclusively triable by Sessions, Section 323 would be redundant; therefore Section 323 has a broader ambit covering cases which are not exclusively triable by Sessions but which in the Magistrate's view ought to be tried there.
  2. Competence of the Sessions Court and effect of committal:
    • Relying on the Supreme Court decision in State of U.P. v. Khusbi Ram, the court noted that committal by a Magistrate does not render a case non-justiciable before the Sessions Court and does not nullify Sessions Court jurisdiction where it is competent to try the offence.
    • The question was framed as one of discretionary exercise under Section 228 Cr.P.C.: whether the Additional Sessions Judge's decision to transfer the Arms Act case back to the Magistrate was a sound exercise of discretion.
  3. Scope and discretionary nature of Section 228 Cr.P.C.:
    • Section 228(1)(a) gives the Sessions Judge discretion ("he may") to frame charge and transfer a case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate in cases not exclusively triable by Sessions.
    • The court emphasized that this was discretionary and required a sound exercise of judgment in light of the facts and the material available at the time.
  4. Relevance and interconnectedness of evidence — the recovery of the rifle:
    • The court rejected the complainant's contention that the Arms Act offence had "nothing to do" with the murder/robbery offences. It noted that the Magistrate had expressly found that the recovery of the rifle from the applicant was an issue likely to affect the murder and robbery trial.
    • The court reiterated that admissibility or relevancy of evidence is a question of law and cannot be settled by mere concession; thus the complainant's counsel could not, by assertion, exclude the relevance of the recovery evidence to the murder trial.
  5. Issue estoppel and corroborative value — reliance on Mahinder Singh:
    • The court noted the Supreme Court's decision in Mahinder Singh, where discovery of a weapon by the accused and ballistic evidence played a corroborative role in the murder trial. Such circumstances show how findings in one trial (possession/recovery) can materially affect another trial for the substantive offence (murder/robbery).
    • Applying that reasoning, the court concluded that separate trials carried a significant risk of issue estoppel or conflicting findings: a conviction or acquittal in the Arms Act trial could operate to the prejudice of one or other proceeding.
  6. Conclusion on discretions and prejudice:
    • The court found that the Magistrate's committal of the Arms Act case under Section 323 Cr.P.C. was a fair and proper exercise of his powers given the interconnection of issues.
    • The Additional Sessions Judge's transfer of the Arms Act case back to the Chief Judicial Magistrate would likely produce prejudice and injustice in one way or another, and therefore the transfer order was an unsound exercise of discretion.
  7. Remedial and procedural observations:
    • The court observed that the main Sessions trial on the offences under Sections 302/394 IPC had concluded evidence and was at the stage of judgment, making it necessary to conclude the Arms Act trial promptly so judgments could be delivered together.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The application is allowed. The impugned order dated 4 September 1985 of the V Additional Sessions Judge, Hardoi, transferring the case under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act to the Chief Judicial Magistrate for trial, is set aside.

Directions and immediate effect:

  • The Additional Sessions Judge (Sri Pratap Singh) is directed to proceed with Sessions Trial No. 78 of 1984 under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act expeditiously and to deliver judgment in that case along with the judgment in the Sessions Trial for the offences under Sections 302/394 IPC.
  • The applicant shall appear, or be produced as the case may be, before the learned Additional Sessions Judge on 12 May 1986 for purposes of trial; the prosecution evidence shall be called and the case shall, so far as possible, proceed day to day.
  • The office is directed to send a copy of this order immediately to the court of the Additional Sessions Judge for compliance.

Implications:

The practical consequence is that the Arms Act trial will be re-consolidated before the Sessions Court for prompt disposal alongside the murder/robbery Sessions trial to avoid prejudice and possible conflicting findings arising from separate trials. The opinion does not record a statement that a new legal precedent is being laid; rather, it applies established principles (including the cited Supreme Court authorities) to the facts to justify setting aside the transfer order and directing joint resolution.

Show all summary ...

K. Nath, J.:— This revision under Section 397 Cr. P.C is directed against an order dated September 4, 1985 of the V. Addl. Sessions Judge, Hardoi (Sri Pratap Singh) under Section 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973 transferring a case against the applicant under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hardoi for the applicant's trial.

2. It appears that one Sheo Nath Singh had lodged a first information report against the 3 known persons and one unknown person for committing murder of Sukhendra Singh and Sunil Kumar Singh on August 18, 1983 at about 8 A.M and in the same transaction for committing robbery of rifle No. 8042 of deceased Sukhendra Singh. The looted rifle is said to have been recovered from the unlawful possession of the applicant Vijendra Vijai on (sic)…..of murder and robbery. The applicant obviously did not carry any licence for the rifle and consequently a case under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act was registered against him. He was also considered by the Investigating Officer to have been involved in the murder of Sukhendra Singh and Sunil Kumar Singh and consequently the applicant was not only included as an accused in the chargesheet for the said murders but was also separately chargesheeted for illicit possession of the rifle of one of the deceased. The case of murder was obviously friable exclusively by the court of Sessions and consequently all the accused including the applicant were committed to the court of Sessions under Section 209 of he Code of Criminal Procedure. It is stated in para 4 of this application that in the matter of the offence under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act, the Magistrate came to the conclusion that because the recovered rifle was alleged to have been robbed in the transaction of murder of its owner, the recovery of the rifle from the possession of the applicant was an issue which was bound to affect the case of murder and robbery also and for that reason the Magistrate committed the case under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act also to me court of Sessions for trial.

3. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge took up the 2 Sessions Trials. He observed that the offence under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act had no connection with the offence under Section 302 and 394 I.P.C He observed that the case under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act was exclusively triable by the Magistrate, hence, in exercise of powers under Section 228 of the Code he transfered the case to the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate for disposal according to law.

4. Sri Imtiaz Murtaza, the learned counsel for the applicant has urged that the committal of the case under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act was made under Section 323 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to interfere with that committal in exercise of the powers under Section 228 of the Code. It was next urged that the acquittal or conviction of the applicant in the case under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act was bound to effect the result of the case under Section 302/394 I.P.C and there could be a conflict of findings if the 2 cases were to be tried separately by 2 courts; hence, in any case, the order transferring the case under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act to the Chief Judicial Magistrate for trial was not proper and was likely to cause injustice.

5. At the time of hearing of this revision Sri. R.N Gupta Advocate appeared on behalf of the First Informant and assisted the Addl. Government Advocate to oppose this revision. His contention is that the offence allegedly committed by the applicant under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act has nothing to do with the offence of murder and robbery allegedly committed by the applicant alongwith others and therefore there is no illegality in the order of the Additional Sessions Judge directing the case to be transferred under Section 228 of the Code.

6. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that a case which is committed to the court of Sessions under Section 323 of Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be ordered to be returned to the court of the Magistrate under Section 228 of the Code, cannot be accepted. There is no doubt that under Section 209 of the Code only those cases are committed to the court of Sessions where the offence is triable exclusively by it and that the power under Section 323 Cr. P.C extends to offence which are not so exclusively triable. The power to commit a case to the court of Sessions under Section 323 is stated to relate to such cases “which ought to be tried by the court cl Sessions”. The expression “ought to be tried” obviously cannot be confirmed to the cases exclusively triable by the court of Sessions, if that was so, Section 323 Cr. P.C would be redundant and the power to commit a case treated initially to be not triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions but subsequently found to be so triable could still be committed to the court of Sessions under Section 209 of the Code. Section 323 Cr. P.C therefore would apply to all those cases which are not exclusively triable by the court of Sessions but in the opinion of the Magistrate “ought to be tried by the Court of Sessions”.

7. It is not possible to record any exhaustive proposition in construction of the expression “ought to be tried”. The scope of the expression would depend upon the nature of each case on its own features. I would revert to that question shortly, at the present stage I would notice that the power of the court of Sessions under Section 228(1)(a) of the Code extends to all cases which are “not exclusively triable by the court of Sessions”. Those are the cases contemplated by Section 323 of (sic) under Section 209 Cr. P.C if the Sessions Court so finds in the material before him at the time when he frames the charge. I would not agree with the learned counsel for the applicant therefore that the learned Addl. Sessions Judge was not competent to direct the cases to be transferred to the Chief Judicial Magistrate under Section 228 of the Code because the commitment of the case was made under Section 323 of the Code.

8. Even so the power of the court of sessions under Section 228(1)(a) of the Code is a discretionary power. The words used are “he may frame a charge against an accused and by order transfer the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate….” It is not disputed that a court of Sessions is competent to try an offence punishable under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act. A perusal of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State Of Uttar Pradesh v. Khusbi Ram (1) would show that where Magistrate, who is competent to try a case, commits it to the court of sessions, neither the order of committal is a nullity nor the jurisdiction of the court of sessions to try the case is affected. The question is where the order of transfer passed by the Addl. Sessions Judge was in exercise of sound discretion and whether this Court should interfere with the exercise of that discretion under Section 397 of the Cr. P.C

9. It is not possible to accept the contention of Sri R.N Gupta, the learned counsel for the complainant that the offence under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act has nothing to do with the offence under Section 302 and 394 I.P.C in this case. This extreme proposition could be of some with if the learned counsel could also concede that the evidence of recovery of rifle from the possession of the petitioner was not relevant or admissible for the purposes of the trial of the applicant for the offence under Section 302/394 I.P.C Even if he had conceded it, the concession could be of no legal validity because the (sic) admissibility or relevancy of evidence is a question of law and cannot be governed by admissions. It is the clear statement in para 4 of this petition that the Magistrate had come to the conclusion that the recovery of the rifle from the possession of the applicant was an issue which was bound to affect the case of murder and robbery; there is no specific denial of the view taken by the Magistrate.

10. Linked with this question is the question of issue estoppel and I should think that the decision in the case of Mahinder Singh v. State of Punjab(2) by the Supreme Court deserves to be noticed. According to the facts of that case, Mahinder Singh had committed murder on April 12, 1960 with a country made pistol. After being arrested, Mahinder Singh made a discovery of the country made pistol on April 26, 1960 under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The Ballistic Expert had given an opinion that the spent cartridges which were found near the dead bodies immediately after the murder, had been fired by the same pistol. Mahinder Singh was tried separately for the offences of murder punishable under Section 302 I.P.C and of possessing illicit arm punishable under Section 19(1)(f) of the Old Arms Act. The evidence of discovery of the country made pistol at the instance of Mahinder Singh was treated to be a valuable corroborative evidence for his trial in the case of murder. In para 9 of the report, the Supreme Court observed as follows:—

“The evidence of the eye witnesses is further fortified by the discovery on the statement of the accused of the pistol and the 2 cartridges in cloth bag described by him and the identity of the weapon in relation to the empty 8 cartridges found at the scene of the occurrence and which were responsible for the death of Dula Singh and the injuries to the others.”

11. Likewise, in the present case on a finding of the robbery of the rifle punishable under Section 394 of the I.P.C, as also on a finding of its recovery from illicit possession of the applicant, punishable under the Arms Act in the 2 trials, the doctrine of issue estoppel is likely to operate one way or the other in one case or the other. In this situation, the commitment of the case under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act to the Court of Sessions for trial was a fair and proper exercise of his powers under Section 323 of the Code by the Magistrate. The order of the Addl. Sessions Judge transferring the case to the Chief Judicial Magistrate for trial is bound to result in prejudice and unjustice in one way or the other. The discretion exercised by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge therefore was not sound and must be remedied by this Court. I am informed that in the trial of the offence under Section 302/394 I.P.C the evidence has been concluded and the case is at the stage of judgment. It is absolutely necessary therefore that the trial of the case for the offence under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act must be concluded promptly.

12. The application is allowed. The impugned order dated September 4, 1985 of the V Addl. Sessions Judge, Hardoi is set aside and he (Sri Pratap Singh) is directed to proceed with the trial of Sessions Trial No. 78 of 1984 under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act expeditiously and to deliver the judgment in that case alongwith the judgment in the Sessions Trial for the offence under Section 302/394 I.P.C The applicant shall appear or shall be produced (as the case may be) before the learned Addl. Sessions Judge on May 12, 1986 for purposes of trial for which date the prosecution evidence from (sic) and the case shall proceed so far as possible day to day. A copy of this order shall be sent immediately by the office to the court of the Addl. Sessions Judge referred to above for compliance.