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Ved Prakash Sethi v. M/S. Musafir Transport Co. Ltd., Mansa And Others

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Mar 9, 1972
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Pritam Singh Pattar, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The judgment disposes of appeals arising from an award dated 25th July, 1968 by M. Gurbachan Singh Bajwa, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Punjab, which awarded Rs. 20,000 under section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act in favour of Ved Parkash against Musafir Transport Company (Mansa), Ram Singh (driver of the bus) and the New India Assurance Company Limited (insurer of the bus).

Brief factual matrix: On 14th September, 1965 at about 7.15/7.30 P.M., Ved Parkash was driving his Ambassador car (No. DLI-12) from Mansa to Budhlada on the left side of the road. When he crossed a college under construction on the Sirsa-Barnala road, a bus (No. PNB-6019) driven by Ram Singh allegedly came from the opposite direction at high speed, was not under control and struck the front right side of the car while Ved Parkash had taken the car to the extreme left onto the katcha portion to avoid the bus. Ved Parkash and his co-traveller Savinder (Shavinder) Singh sustained injuries.

Ved Parkash filed an application under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act claiming Rs. 65,250 for injuries, treatment expenses, damage to property and for pain and suffering. The respondents denied rash and negligent driving by the bus, raised the defence that lights were prohibited due to the Indo-Pak War and alleged that the petitioner was driving without lights and rashly. Messrs Asa Ram and Brothers, Finance Corporation, Bhatinda were alleged to be co-insurers and were joined as respondents. The Tribunal framed the following issues:

  1. Has this Tribunal no jurisdiction to entertain this application or to grant relief regarding damage to the Car?
  2. Was the accident due to any negligence on the part of the driver of the bus involved or that of the applicant himself or that of both and to what effect?
  3. What is the quantum of compensation due, if any, and from whom?
  4. Is the Insurance Co. or respondent No. 4 not liable for the payment of any Compensation?
  5. Relief.

The Tribunal held it had no jurisdiction to entertain claims for damage to the car (issue No.1). On issue No.2 it found both drivers negligent but fixed the bus driver's fault at fifty percent more than that of the car driver. The Tribunal assessed total compensation at Rs. 40,000 but, applying apportioned responsibility, awarded Rs. 20,000 against the respondents and held the New India Assurance Company liable to pay that amount (with statutory interest if delayed).

Feeling dissatisfied, the insurer, driver Ram Singh and Musafir Transport Company filed an appeal (referred to in the text as F.A.O No. 114 of 1969). Ved Parkash filed F.A.O No. 78 of 1969 seeking enhancement of compensation to Rs. 40,000 and an additional Rs. 15,250 for damage to the car. A principal procedural contest in the High Court concerned whether Ved Parkash's appeal (F.A.O. 78/1969) was barred by limitation, in light of a deficiency in court-fee stamping on the copy of the award attached to the memorandum of appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether F.A.O No. 78 of 1969 (the petitioner's appeal for enhancement) was time-barred under section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act because the memorandum of appeal was initially filed with a deficiency in court-fee stamps and the deficiency was made up only after the period of limitation had expired.
  2. Whether the Claims Tribunal correctly held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain claims for damage to the car under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act.
  3. Whether the accident resulted from negligence of the bus driver, the car driver, or both (i.e., whether the Tribunal's finding of contributory negligence was correct).
  4. What the proper quantum of compensation should be in the light of the medical and other evidence.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants in F.A.O No. 114 of 1969 (Musafir Transport Company, Ram Singh, New India Assurance Company)

  • Contended that the decision of the Tribunal was wrong and should be set aside and that the petitioner's application should be dismissed.
  • At the High Court (through Mr. L.M. Suri) argued that Ved Parkash's appeal (F.A.O No. 78 of 1969) was barred by limitation — specifically pointing to a deficiency in court-fee stamping on the copy of the award attached to the memorandum of appeal.
  • At trial the respondents had contended that, during the Indo-Pak War, vehicles were ordered to run without lights, it was dark, and the petitioner had been driving without lights and rashly; therefore the accident was due to the car driver's negligence.

Appellant in F.A.O No. 78 of 1969 (Ved Parkash)

  • Sought enhancement of the Tribunal's award from Rs. 20,000 to Rs. 40,000 and additional Rs. 15,250 for damage to the car.
  • Maintained that the accident was caused by rash and negligent driving of the bus driver, produced eyewitnesses, photographic evidence and medical records to establish injuries and permanent disability.
  • Explained procedural facts: application for copy of the award filed on 5th August, 1968; copy ready 19th February, 1969; delivered 12th March, 1969; memorandum of appeal filed 28th May, 1969 but returned 29th May, 1969 for insufficient stamping; refiled with corrected stamping on 13th June, 1969; later applied for condonation of delay on 18th July, 1969 alleging bona fide and unintentional mistake regarding stamping.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Custodian Evacuee Property Punjab v. Prabhu Dayal Chhajan Lal, AIR 1960 Punj. 298 Duty of counsel to ensure that all documents requiring stamp are properly stamped; where trial court's judgment is not properly stamped it cannot be deemed filed and cannot be stamped after the period of limitation for filing appeal has expired. Applied to hold that F.A.O No. 78 of 1969 was filed after the expiry of the period of limitation because the memorandum of appeal initially had a deficiency of Rs. 0.60 in court-fee; appeal dismissed on this ground.
Jai Bhagwan v. Om Parkash Cited as authority consistent with the principle regarding stamping and limitation (as stated in the opinion). Relied upon as supporting authority for dismissing the time-barred appeal where insufficiency of stamp was not an adequate ground for condonation.
Mehar Chand Bandari v. Secretary of State, AIR 1935 Lah. 124 Cited as authority reiterating the same legal position on stamping and limitation. Referred to as another supporting precedent for the Court's conclusion that the appeal could not be admitted after the limitation period had expired.
Shahadat v. Hukam Singh, AIR 1924 Lah. 401 Cited as consistent authority on the stamping/limitation principle. Used with other authorities to demonstrate settled law that stamping deficiencies do not justify extension of limitation when corrected after the period has expired.
Shrimati Amrit Kaur v. Iqbal Singh, 1971 P.L.R. 82 Cited as further supporting authority on the subject of limitation and stamping requirements. Relied on collectively with the other cases to support dismissal of the late-filed appeal.
B.S Nat v. Bachan Singh Held that Claims Tribunal under section 110-A has no jurisdiction to award compensation for loss or damages to property; only bodily injury or death claims are within Tribunal's jurisdiction. Court accepted this authority and therefore accepted the Tribunal's ruling that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim for damage to the car (issue No.1).
Kumari Swarna Lata Kapoor v. Jogendrapal Ramrakha Punjabi Where an omnibus leaves the road and an accident occurs on the off side, res ipsa loquitur applies: negligence is presumed unless the defendant rebuts it by showing a specific non-negligent cause or that all reasonable care was taken. Applied to this case to support the conclusion that the bus driver's conduct (taking bus onto wrong side and striking the car) attracted the presumption of negligence; the defendant failed to rebut the presumption.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in logical stages addressing both procedural and substantive matters:

  1. Procedural/Limitation question (F.A.O No. 78 of 1969):
    • The Tribunal's award was dated 25th July, 1968. The appellant filed the appeal on 28th May, 1969 after receiving the copy on 12th March, 1969. The memorandum of appeal was returned on 29th May, 1969 on the ground that the copy of the award attached had insufficient stamp duty (stamped with Rs. 5.25 but required Rs. 5.85 — deficiency of Rs. 0.60).
    • The memorandum was refiled after making up the deficiency on 13th June, 1969; the limitation period for appeals under section 110-D had expired before that date.
    • The Court applied the Custodian Evacuee Property Punjab decision and other cited authorities holding that counsel must ensure documents are properly stamped when filing appeals and that a judgment not properly stamped cannot be treated as filed for limitation purposes; correcting a stamping deficiency after the limitation period does not validate an otherwise out-of-time appeal.
    • The application for condonation filed on 18th July, 1969 asserting a bona fide unintentional mistake and that the stamping insufficiency was removed immediately was rejected as not constituting sufficient cause for condonation.
    • Accordingly, F.A.O No. 78 of 1969 was held to be barred by limitation and dismissed on this short ground.
  2. Jurisdictional issue (issue No.1):
    • The Court noted that the Tribunal's decision that it had no jurisdiction to award compensation for loss or damage to the car (under section 110-A) was not challenged before the High Court and no argument was addressed on that point.
    • The Court cited the Division Bench authority in B.S Nat v. Bachan Singh that a Claims Tribunal under section 110-A cannot award compensation for loss or damage to property; only bodily injury and death claims fall within its jurisdiction. In view of that authority the Tribunal's decision on issue No.1 was accepted.
  3. Merits — negligence and contributory negligence (issue No.2):
    • The Court reviewed evidence: petitioner Ved Parkash and his co-traveller (Shavinder Singh) testified that the bus was coming at high speed from the opposite direction and the petitioner had taken the car to the katcha side; the bus struck the car.
    • Passengers in the bus (including Sham Lal) testified that the bus was being driven fast and that at impact the bus was on the wrong side; Sham Lal also said the car's parking lights were on. Several respondents' witnesses admitted factual matters (for example, that the car stopped on the left katcha side and that the bus stood with one wheel on the katcha when the accident occurred).
    • Photographs taken the next day (admitted into evidence) showed the accident occurred on the left side of the road where the car was going and supported the petitioner's case.
    • The Court applied the principle in Kumari Swarna Lata Kapoor (res ipsa loquitur where an omnibus leaves the road and an off-side accident occurs) to attract a presumption of negligence against the bus driver. The Court concluded the bus driver had taken the bus on the wrong side and was guilty of rash and negligent driving.
    • The Court criticized the Tribunal's general observation that both drivers were guilty because of running without lights during blackout: the Court found those observations were not based on evidence but on the Tribunal's personal views. On the evidence the Tribunal's finding of contributory negligence by the petitioner was set aside and issue No.2 was decided in the petitioner's favour.
  4. Quantum of compensation:
    • The Court accepted the Tribunal's uncontested factual finding on the petitioner's age (31 at the time, life expectancy to age 60). It reviewed the medical evidence (reports of multiple treating doctors) showing multiple operations, malunion/non-union, permanent disability: left leg 90% disability and right leg 20% disability as assessed by Dr. Karam Singh Grewal.
    • The Tribunal had allowed Rs. 3,000 for treatment-related transport expenses (the petitioner produced receipts totalling Rs. 2,062.50 but the Tribunal allowed Rs.3,000) and Rs. 2,000 for pain and suffering; these allowances were accepted as reasonable by the High Court.
    • The Tribunal's overall assessment was Rs. 40,000 for total compensation (including Rs. 26,000 for disability at Rs.75 per month for 29 years, Rs.9,000 for loss of enjoyment of life, etc.), but it awarded only Rs.20,000 because it apportioned contributory negligence. The High Court found the contributory negligence finding unsustainable on the evidence and modified that part of the Tribunal's reasoning in favour of the petitioner. However, the petitioner's appeal seeking enhancement to Rs.40,000 was dismissed as time-barred (procedural limitation), preventing any enhancement being granted.
  5. Final disposition consideration:
    • Because F.A.O No. 78 was dismissed on limitation grounds, the petitioner could not obtain enhancement despite the substantive finding in his favour on negligence. The Court then considered F.A.O No. 114 (appeal by the transport company and others) and found no substance in it, dismissing that appeal as well.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court concluded as follows:

Both appeals (Nos. 78 and 114 of 1969) are DISMISSED.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The Tribunal's award of Rs. 20,000 in favour of Ved Parkash (dated 25th July, 1968) remains in force: F.A.O No. 114, filed by the transport company, driver and insurer, was dismissed and thus the respondents' challenge to reduce or set aside that award failed.
  • Although the High Court, on the merits, modified the Tribunal's finding on contributory negligence (deciding issue No.2 in favour of the petitioner and finding the bus driver negligent), the petitioner's appeal for enhancement to Rs. 40,000 (F.A.O No. 78 of 1969) was held to be barred by limitation and therefore dismissed; in consequence the Tribunal's monetary award as made (Rs. 20,000) stands.
  • The Court made no order as to costs.

The opinion does not discuss broader doctrinal consequences beyond the direct effect on the parties; it applies established authorities on stamping/limitation, jurisdiction of Claims Tribunals under section 110-A, and the res ipsa loquitur principle to the facts of this case rather than announcing new law.

Show all summary ...

Pritam Singh Pattar, J.:— By this judgment I shall dispose of F.A.O 78 of 1969 and F.A.O 144 of 1969 which are directed against the order dated 25th July, 1968 of M. Gurbachan Singh Bajwa Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Punjab, by which he awarded Rs. 20,000/- as compensation under section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act in favour of Ved Parkesh against Musafir Transport Company, Mansa, Ram Singh driver of the bus involved in the accident and the New India Assurance Company Limited with whom the bus was insured.

2. Briefly stated the facts of this case are that Ved Parkash on 14th September, 1965 at about 7.15/7.30 P.M was driving his Ambassador Car No. DLI-12 from Mansa to Budhlada on the left side of the road and when he crossed the Gandhi College under construction on the Sirsa Barnala road, a bus No. PNB-6019 driven rashly and negligently at high speed by Ram Singh driver of the bus came from the opposite direction and was not under his control. He took his car towards the extreme left on the katcha portion of the road to save himself from the bus. However, the bus which was driven rashly and negligently struck against his car on the front right side and pushed it back resulting in very serious injuries to both the legs and other parts of the body of Ved Prakash. Savinder Singh P.W was also travelling with him in the car and he also received injuries. Ved Prakash, therefore, filed application under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act against the above respondents for the recovery of Rs. 65,250/- alleging that the occurrence took place due to rash and negligent driving of the bus by Ram Singh driver and he suffered serious injuries and spent lot of money on his treatment and incurred damages in the management of the property. He also claimed damages for physical and mental pain suffered by him. The respodent denied that the bus was driven rashly and negligently by Ram Singh. They alleged that due to Indo-Pak War during those days vehicles were prohibited from showing lights. That it was dark at the time of the occurrence and the petitioner himself was driving the car without lights, rashly at a high speed and the accident took place as a result of his own rash and negligent driving. They denied all the allegations of the petitioner. It was alleged that Messrs Asa Ram and Brothers, Finance Corporation, Bhatinda were also one of the insured of the bus and they were also joined as respondents. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain the claim application for compensation for damages to the car was questioned. On these pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed by the Tribunal:—

1. Has this Tribunal no jurisdiction to entertain this application or to grant relief regading damage to the Car?

2. Was the accident due to any negligence on the part of the driver of the bus involved or that of the applicant himself or that of both and to what effect?

3. What is the quantum of compensation due, if any, and from whom?

4. Is the Insurance Co. or respondent No. 4 not liable for the payment of any Compensation?

5. Relief”.

3. The learned Tribunal held that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim for damages, to the car or any other property caused in a motor accident and decided issue No. 1 accordingly in favour of the respondents. It also held that the accident took place as a result of rash and negligent driving of the car and the bus and it, therefore, fixed the fault of the driver of the bus fifty percent more than that of the driver of the car and decided issue No. 2 accordingly. He assessed the total compensation due to the petitioner at Rs. 40,000/-. But since the driver of the bus was responsible for fifty per cent more than the fault of the driver of the car it fixed the responsibility of the respondents at Rs. 20,000/-. On issue No. 4 it was held that the Insurance Company was responsible to pay compensation to the extent of Rs. 20,000/- only as mentioned in the insurance policy. As a result it gave an award of Rs. 20,000/- in favour of Ved Parkash petitioner against the respondent with costs. It was directed that the entire amount will be payable by the New India Assurance Company as insurer within a period of two months from the date of the award, failing which it will carry interest at the rate of six percent per annum.

4. Feeling dissatisfied the Insurance company, Ram Singh, driver of the bus and the Musafir Transport Company filed F.A.O No. 114 of 1969 alleging that the decision of the Tribunal was wrong and incorrect and it may be set aside and the application of the petitioner may be dismissed.

5. Ved Parkash filed F.A.O No. 78 of 1969 for enhancement of the compensation amount to Rs. 40,000/-. He also claimed compensation amounting to Rs. 15,250/- for the damages caused to the car in the accident. The learned course for the appellants in F.A.O No. 114 of 1969, Mr. L.M Suri contended that F.A.O No. 78 of 1969 filed by Ved Parkash was barred by limitation and it may be dismissed. According to section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act any person aggrived by an award of a Claims Tribunal may within 90 days from the date of the award prefer an appeal to the High Court provided that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of this period, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time.

6. In this case the award of the Tribunal is dated 25th July, 1968. The appeal (F.A.O 78/1969) was filed by Ved Parkash on 28th May, 1969. The application to get the copy of the award was filed on 5th August, 1968. Copy was ready for delivery on 19th February, 1969 and it was delivered to the appellant on 12th March, 1969. The appeal was filed on 28th May, 1969. However, it was returned to the appellant on 29th May, 1969 with the objection that the copy of the order attached to the grounds of appeal was insufficiently stamped. The appeal was filed after making up the deficiency of the stamp on 13th June, 1969. It was held in Custodian Evacuee Property Punjab v. Prabhu Dayal Chhajan Lal . AIR 1960 Punj. 298.

“It is the duty of the counsel when filing an appeal to see that all the documents requiring stamp are properly stamped. He cannot shelter himself behind his clerk, and if his clerk has been guilty of any carelessness, he in responsible for that. A valuable right accrues to the respondent by reason of the period of limitation for filing the appeal having elapsed, and it would not be fair to him to admit the appeal. Thus, where the trial court's judgment is not stamped, it cannot be deemed to have been filed at all and it cannot be allowed to be stamped after the period of limitation for filing appeal has expired”.

7. To the same effect was the law laid down in Jai Bhagwan v. Om Parkash,2 Mehar Chand Bandari v. Secretary of State . AIR 1935 Lah. 124. Shahadat v. Hukam Singh . AIR 1924 Lah. 401. and Shrimati Amrit Kaur v. Iqbal Singh . 1971 P.L.R 82..

8. This law laid down in these authorities fully applied to this case. The copy of the award attached to the memorandum of appeal was stamped with a Court-fee of Rs. 5.25, but it required court fee of Rs. 5.85 and thus there was a deficiency of Rs. 0.60 The limitation for filing this appeal expired before 13th June, 1969, that is, before the refiling of the memorandum of appeal after making up the deficiency of the court-fee stamps. Consequently there was no proper appeal and this F.A.O 78 of 1969 must be dismissed on this ground alone. The appellant had made an application on 18th July, 1969 for condonation of the delay alleging that there was a bonafide and unintentional mistake and there was no negligence. It was simply mentioned that insufficiency in the stamp was removed immediately. This is no ground for condonation of delay. I, therefore, hold that in view of the law laid down in the aforesaid authorities, F.A.O No. 78 of 1969 was filed after the expiry of the period of limitation and it must be dismissed on this short ground.

9. The decision of the trial court on issue No. 1 was not contested before me by either party to the appeal and no argument was addressed on this issue. It was laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in B.S Nat v. Bachan Singh that the Claims Tribunal has no jurisdiction to award compensation for loss or damages to property in an application filed under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, and that the only claim for compensation in respect of a bodily injury or death sustained in a Motor Accident is within the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal. In view of this authority the decision of the Tribunal on issue No. 1 was not contested by the learned counsel for Ved Parkash, appellant.

10. To prove issue No. 2 the petitioner examined himself and other witnesses. Ved Parkash petitioner as A.W-10 testified that on 14th September, 1965 at about 7.00 or 7.15 P.M he was going in his own car from Mansa to Budhlada on the correct side of the road along with Shavinder Singh when he passed Nehru Memorial College he saw bus coming from the opposite direction at a high speed without blowing horn. He gave horn but the driver of the bus did not leave any side on the road, and therefore, he took his car on the katcha side on the left and even then the bus struck against his car violently smashing the same and he received serious injuries. He was taken out of the car and was placed on the road. In the meantime a car belonging to S. Nardev Singh Advocate came and then he was taken in it to Mansa Hospital. Due to Indo-Pak war in those days the drivers of the vehicles were running without their lights on, under the orders of the Government.

11. To the same effect is the statement of Shavinder Singh (A.W 1), who is a resident of Mansa and on that day he was travelling in the car with Ved Parkash. He testified that he was selling lottery tickets at the bus stand and he wanted to go to Budhlada and at his request Ved Parkash took him in the car. He was sitting on the front seat of the car. He fully corroborates the statement of Ved Parkash, Petitioner (A.W 10).

12. Sham Lal (A.W 2) on that day was sitting as a passenger in Bus No. PNB-6019 involved in the accident. On that day he had gone to Bhatinda for getting some parts of his lathe repaired. The bus according to him started at 5.30 P.M from Bhatinda and was coming at a fast spead. He testified that the bus was driven at a fast speed and they requested the driver not to drive the bus at a fast speed, but he did not listen to them. According to him the parking lights of the car of Ved Parkash were on at that time. The speed of the bus at that time was 40 miles per hour and the bus went to the wrong side and struck against the car on the front side. The accident, according to him, took place on the katcha portion on the left side of the road. The passengers of the bus took out the occupants of the car and made them lie on the ground. The allegations of the petitioners are proved from the sworn testimony of these witnesses. There is nothing on the file to shake their testimony and I have no reason to disbelieve them.

13. As against this Wazir Singh (R.W 1) testified that he was travelling as a passenger in the bus. He stated that the small parking lights of the bus were on and that the accident took place little before Nehru College at Mansa after the crossing on the main road. According to him the bus was going slow at a speed of 10.15 miles per hour on its left side and the car came from the opposite side and struck against the bus. Similar are the statements of the other witnesses of the respondents.

14. Sukhdev Singh (R.W 2) did not make any statement and he was simply tendered for cross-examination. Ram Singh (R.W 4) is the driver of the bus and he simply stated that he was driving the bus slow and the accident took place due to the negligence of the car driver and there was no visibility and that he was challaned by the police, but was acqitted by the criminal Court.

15. Similar is the statement of Jagjeet Singh (R.W 3) who was the conductor of the bus Gurcharan Singh (R.W 7) was simply tendered in evidence. Balbir Singh (R.W…) corroborated the statement of Wazir Singh (R.W 1). However, it was admitted by Jagjeet Singh (R.W 3) in cross-examination that after the accident the car stopped on the left katcha side. To the same effect was the admission made by Sukhdev Singh (R.W 2) in his cross-examination. He admitted that the bus was standing on the pacca road with one wheel on the katcha, when the accident took place. The admissions made by these witnesses fully corroborate the allegations of the petitioner that the car was driven on the left side of the road and that the accident took place on the katcha portion of the road on the left side, of the road. The car was damaged and, therefore, it could not be removed from that place. All these witnesses of the respondents never appeared before the police or the Magistrate to give evidence. It is thus obvious that the car was driven on the correct side of the road at the time of the accident and the accident took place when the bus went on the wrong side of the road, and struck against the car.

16. Khushbakat Rai (A.W 3) was the photographer who prepared the photo-graphs exhibits A.W 3/1 to A.W 3/7 and their negatives are A.W 3/8 to A.W 3/13. He took the photographs which were prepared on the next day. It is clear from these photographs that the accident took place on the left side of the road where the car was going and the bus was taken on the wrong side when it struck against the car. In Kumari Swarna Lata Kapoor v. Jogendrapal Ramrakha Punjabi. It was held—

“Where an omnibus leaves the road and an accident takes place on the off side and this is proved without more, then the principle of res ipsa loquitur is at once attracted. Negligence will be presumed as the cause of the event. Unless the defendant rebuts this presumption, the plaintiff succeeds. To merely point out what the immediate cause of the bus leaving the road was, e.g, there was a tyre burst or that it went into a skid is by itself no rebuttal of the presumption. To displace the presumption the defendant must prove, or must show from the evidence, either that the immediate cause was due to a specific cause, which does not connote negligence on his part but points to its absence as more probable, or he must show that all reasonable care in and about the management of the vehicle was taken. The burden, in the first instance is on the defendant to disprove his liability.”

17. The observations made in this authority apply to this case. The lights of the car and the bus were off at the time of the accident. According to the statements of the witnesses the parking lights of the car were on. The driver of the bus took the bus on the wrong side of road and, therefore he is obviously guilty of rash and negligent driving as a result of which the accident took place. The reason given by the Tribunal in the judgment that both the drivers were guilty of negligence in driving the vehicles rashly and negligently are not correct. He simply stated that both the vehicles were running without their lights on at a time when it became dark. That it was a single road whose width is 11 feet and no driver of the vehicle would like to take his vehicle off the road under such circumstances. According to him any body taking his vehicle on the road at such a time when the black out had been ordered did so at a great personal risk as well as risk to the safety of other users of the road. These observations are not based on any evidence, but are the personal views of the Tribunal. From the positive evidence of Ved Parkash petitioner and his witnesses it is cogently and convincingly proved that the accident took place due to the negligence of Ram Singh driver of the bus and I decide issue No. 2 in favour of the petitioner. The decision of the Tribunal, to the contrary, is modified.

18. Ved Parkash petitioner was 31 years of age on the date of accident. The finding of the Tribunal that he would live up to the age of 60 years was not contested before me by either party to the appeal. No arguments were addressed on this point. This finding of the Tribunal is, therefore, accepted.

19. Dr. Inderjit Singh, Senior Medical officer, Civil Hospital, Mansa, (A.W 4) stated that on 14th September, 1965 at 8.00 P.M Ved Parkash was brought to Civil Hospital Mansa. He examined him and the copy of his report is Exhibit A.W 4/1. He found eight injuries on his person which are detailed in Exhibit A.W 4/1. According to him injuries Nos. 1 and 3 were grievous and injuries Nos. 4, 5 and 6 were simple. He advised X-ray of the remaining three injuries Nos. 2, 7 and 8.

20. Dr. D.D Sharma (A.W 5) Medical Officer, Incharge Civil Hospital, Hissar stated that on 27th December, 1965 Ved Parkash was admitted in General Hospital, Chandigarh with a history of accident about three months back. Prior to that he was admitted to Rajindra Hospital, Patiala where he had multiple operations after the accident. Removal of right Patla was done, fracture setting of left leg was done and intra madullary nailing was done of the left femur at Patiala. When this doctor examined him he had non-union of the operated left femur. There was also malunion of the left leg and stiffness in the right knee. He testified that Ved Parkash was again X-rayed on 9th February, 1966 when angulation at the site of operation was seen and he was subjected to another operation known as wedging of the Plaster. Again he was called after three months and another X-ray was taken on 6th May, 1966. This also indicated absolute non-union and after removal of plaster the fragments were moving like fresh facture. He then referred him to Dr. Karam Singh Grewal, Professor of Orthopedic, Medical College, Amritsar, where he was operated upon. He further testified that left knee of Ved Parkash is absolutely fixed and the right knee is also not fully functioning. The nail which was put in last at Amritsar was yet inside his left femur. The muscles of his left thigh were adhearent. In his opinion his left leg is completely disabled after the accident. He had cent per cent disability of his right leg also for a period of six months.

21. Dr. Karam Singh Grewal (A.W 6) Orthopedic Surgeon, V.J Hospital, Amritsar testified that he examined Ved Parkash Applicant and he had mal united fracture of the left leg bones and he also operated the mal united fracture of the left thigh bone. He had a shortening of 3½ of his left lower limb compared to the right. The limb is externally operated as a whole. His hip and knee are stiff. According to him he cannot lift his right leg straight. The leg bones are mal united. He testified that the thigh bone was ineffectively fixed in previous X-ray. But later on it was fixed by a Munchar Nail. The bone, however, had still mal union. According to him, the disability of his left leg is permanent and he assessed the same at 90 per cent. The disability of his right leg is also permanent and he assessed the same at 20 per cent. He testified that Ved Parkash is mentally depressed on account of various operations and he passed through terrible sufferings and pains and there is no chance of his improvement.

22. Ved Parkash petitioner as A.W 10 testified that he was removed to Rajindra Hospital, Patiala, where he remained as indoor patient for 1½ months after the accident. His both legs were broken and he also received many other injuries on his body. He was put in plaster of paris upto neck as ribs had also broken. He used to go to Rajindra Hospital for about one month. The plaster was removed. As no improvement was there he was again put in plaster of paris and it remained for one month. After the removal of the plaster he did not feel any improvement and then he got himself examined by Dr. D.D Sharma, who was then working in the General Hospital Chandigarh, where he was told that the previous operation was not successful and the bond were not properly united and he did fresh operation. He remained in private ward in General Hospital, Sector 16, Chandigarh from the end of December, 1965 to 18/19th January, 1966. After six months he was told that the operation was not so successful. He was then referred to Dr. Karam Singh Grewal, V.J Hospital, Amritsar, where he was also operated upon. He got himself X-rayed for a number of times and the doctors told him that no further improvement was possible.

23. He produced receipts exhibits A-14 to A-19 regarding amounts he paid to taxi owners and others when he was taken to various hospitals as he was unable to move. The total amount incurred by him as shown in all these receipts comes to Rs. 2062.50 However the Tribunal allowed Rs. 3,000/- on account of the amount spent by him on his treatment in transport to go to the various hospitals for a period of more than six months. The petitioner has not been able to produce the documentary evidence regarding the amount spent by him on diet, medicines etc. However, I am of the opinion that the amount of Rs. 3,000/- allowed by the Tribunal is quite reasonable and proper and I allow the same.

24. The Tribunal has allowed Rs. 2,000/- as compensation to the petitioner for pain and suffering and this sum was not contested before me by the learned counsel for the appellants. The petitioner stated that he owned land and his income from the land was from Rs. 7,000/- to Rs. 8,000/- per mensem. He was doing private service in a firm at Chandigarh and was getting Rs. 200/- per month. According to the medical evidence discussed above the permanent disability of his left is 90 per cent and that of right leg is 20 per cent. Therefore in this state of health he can neither do any service nor can attend to his land and also cannot do any business or profession. His movement for the rest of his remaining life has become difficult on account of the permanent disability of his leg. The Tribunal assessed compensation at the rate of Rs. 75/- per month for his physical disability and this amount, in my opinion, is not excessive at all for a full period of 29 years for which he has to live upto the age of 60 years. The total amount of compensation comes to Rs. 26,000/-The Tribunal also granted him compensation amounting to Rs. 9,000/- for loss of enjoyment of life. Thus the total compensation due to the petitioner on account of this, accident was assessed at Rs. 40,000/-. But he allowed him Rs. 20,000/- because the driver of the bus and the petitioner were alleged to be guilty of contributory negligence. This finding regarding contributory negligence has been set aside under issue No. 2 above.

25. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of this case the amount of compensation of Rs. 40,000/- is quite reasonable as the petitioner has become disabled for whole of his life. However F.A.O No. 78 of 1969 of the petitioner regarding enhancement of compensation to Rs. 40,000/- has been held to be barred by limitation. I, therefore, hold that there is no substance in F.A.O No. 114 of 1969 of Musafir Transport Company and it must fail. As a result both the appeals, Nos. 78 and 114 of 1969 are dismissed -In the circumstances I make no order as to costs.