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M/S. Ashok Chitra Private Limited v. The State Of Bihar And Others

Patna High Court
Sep 18, 1991
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Summary of Opinion — Binod Kumar Roy and I.P. Singh, JJ.

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns a plot of land (about 1 bigha 7 kathas; Municipal Survey Plot No. 214, sheet No. 10, Circle No. 6, Holding No. 180/4A, ward No. 2) which was leased by the sons of the late Kanuu Lal Sao to Daya Shankar Sharma by five registered lease deeds dated between 14.10.1947 and 14.1.1949. Those earlier leases were for 25 years with an option to renew for another 25 years and permitted construction of a cinema hall and other structures by the lessee.

The lessee formed a partnership (Ashok Chitra Patna) and later Ashok Chitra Private Limited (the petitioner). The partnership/lessee constructed Ashok Cinema building and appurtenant works and conveyed the cinema building and related assets to the company on 3.12.1949. The lessors continued to receive rent as per the lease terms.

After expiry of the first 25-year term, fresh lease deeds were executed on 10.4.1973. On 16.10.1982, respondents nos. 5 to 20 filed an application before the House Controller, Patna Sadar (Respondent No. 2) under sections 5 and 8 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 seeking enhancement of the rent (B.B.C. Case No. 378 of 1987). The petitioner appeared and objected, arguing among other points that the Act did not apply because what had been leased originally was vacant land, not a "building."

The House Controller conducted an inquiry (report dated 14.3.1988) which, according to the writ petition, stated that only vacant land had been leased and no construction was made by the lessor. Respondents filed objections to that report. By the impugned order dated 16.5.1988 (Annexure-5) the House Controller overruled the petitioner's objection and held the Act applicable.

The petitioner appealed to the Additional Collector, Patna (Respondent No. 4). The appeal was admitted by order dated 26.8.1988 (Annexure-6) but on the condition that the petitioner deposit the entire arrears of rent as fixed by the House Controller within 15 days before further hearing.

The petitioner filed this writ petition seeking to quash both the House Controller's order (Annexure-5) and the appellate order (Annexure-6). No counter-affidavit from the respondents was filed in the writ petition, though the record contained statements filed by respondents in related proceedings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act applies to the premises in question (i.e., whether the leased interest comprises a "building" within the meaning of the Act or merely vacant land).
  2. Whether the impugned order of the House Controller fixing fair rent under the Act (Annexure-5) is without jurisdiction and therefore liable to be quashed.
  3. Whether the appellate authority's condition (Annexure-6) requiring deposit of the entire arrears of rent as a condition precedent to further hearing bars the petitioner from obtaining relief in this Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Mr. Tarakant Jha)

  • The House Controller erred in law by holding that the provisions of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act applied to the land in question; accordingly the impugned order is without jurisdiction.
  • Because the House Controller's order was without jurisdiction, the appellate authority's condition directing the petitioner to deposit the arrears before the appeal could be heard was improper and should not preclude relief from this Court.
  • Reliance was placed on decisions of this Court, including Smt. Jugal Kishori Devi v. Ashok Mills and Foundries (A.I.R. 1961 Patna 330) and Dr. Sachidanand Sinha v. The Collector, Patna (1989 P.L.J.R. 1141).

Respondents' Arguments (Mr. S.S. Asghar Hussan and Mr. Ashok Priyadarshi)

  • The question of applicability of the Act was not raised by the petitioner before the House Controller, and therefore the petitioner cannot raise it for the first time in this Court.
  • The petitioner is not entitled to relief because it failed to comply with the appellate authority's direction (to deposit the fair rent as a condition precedent to further hearing of the appeal).
  • The House Controller correctly interpreted the second lease deed; when read as a whole it negates the petitioner's contention that the Act does not apply. Where there is a conflict between parts of a lease deed, the later part will prevail — reliance placed on Ramkishorelal v. Kamalnarayan (A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 890).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Smt. Jugal Kishori Devi v. Ashok Mills and Foundries, A.I.R. 1961 Patna 330 Authority for the proposition that a lease of vacant land for erecting a building for industrial use is not a "building" within the meaning of the Bihar Buildings Act. The Court cited this decision as part of established authority supporting the conclusion that leases of vacant land do not fall within the Act's definition of "building." The Court relied on this line of authority in holding the Act inapplicable to the leased interest.
Dr. Sachidanand Sinha v. The Collector, Patna, 1989 P.L.J.R. 1141 Cited by the petitioner (specific rule or principle as invoked in the petition: support for the petitioner's contention regarding applicability of statutory control provisions). The precedent was relied upon by the petitioner; the opinion records the reliance but the Court's primary textual reasoning invoked the statutory definition and earlier Patna decisions (see other entries) to reach its conclusion.
Dr. Sudhir Kumar Mukherjee v. Nirsi Dhobin, A.I.R. 1961 Patna 321 Authority indicating that a lease of vacant land for industrial construction is not a "building" under the controlling rent statutes. The Court referred to this decision among earlier Patna decisions to support the principle that a lease of vacant land for erecting industrial buildings does not bring the lease within the scope of the Act.
Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf, 1976 (1) S.C.C. 128 Interpretation of "accommodation" under U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947: the Act embraces leases of a building and not merely the business or industry carried on therein. The Court cited this apex court decision to reinforce the principle that relevant rent-control legislation governs leases of physical buildings (accommodation) and does not extend merely to a business or to leases of vacant land intended for future construction.
Ramkishorelal v. Kamalnarayan, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 890 Rule that where there is a conflict between parts of a lease deed, a later part may prevail over an earlier part; invoked for interpreting lease-deed provisions. Respondents relied on this Supreme Court authority to argue that the later portion of the lease deed should prevail. The Court considered the leases as a whole and found no contradiction between earlier and subsequent parts; the Court did not accept the respondents' contention that the subsequent provisions made the Act applicable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by examining the statutory definition of "building" under section 2(b) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act. The definition expressly refers to any building or part thereof let for residential or non-residential purposes and expressly includes appurtenant gardens, grounds and out-houses and any furniture supplied by the landlord. The Court observed that the definition does not include a vacant piece of land.

The Court examined the historical chain of lease deeds on record. It noted that the earlier five lease deeds (1947–1949) were for 25 years (1 September 1948 to 31 August 1972) with an option to renew for a further 25 years. The parties agreed that the earlier lease deeds related to vacant land and that the covenants were identical across those deeds.

The Court extracted and relied upon specific clauses of the earlier leases:

  • Clause 5(vi) — obliging the lessee, on expiry of the relevant term (and after renewal, on expiry of the 50th year), to surrender the land with all constructions made thereon to the lessor (with certain exceptions for moveable machinery etc.).
  • Clause 6(ii) — obliging the lessor to execute a renewal lease for a further 25 years on request by the lessee, with the rent for the second term to be 25% in excess of the first term.

The Court emphasized the settled principle of document construction that lease instruments must be read as a whole. On reading the earlier leases together with subsequent leases (which were executed pursuant to the option of renewal), the Court concluded:

  • The original lease concerned vacant land; subsequent leases were executed by exercise of the renewal option; the subsequent leases did not evidence that anything more than what was originally leased was leased later (apart from a condition that structures put up by the lessee would eventually belong to the lessor).
  • There was no contradiction between earlier and subsequent parts of the leases; the covenants ran with the land and the renewal provisions were binding.

The Court then surveyed the case law cited. It relied on Patna precedents (Dr. Sudhir Kumar Mukherjee and Smt. Jugal Kishori Devi) and the Supreme Court authority in Dwarka Prasad to underline the legal principle that a lease of vacant land for erecting a building does not fall within the statutory meaning of "building" for the purposes of rent-control legislation. On that basis, the Court held that the Act did not apply to the leased interest.

Addressing the respondents' procedural/contention regarding the appellate condition (deposit of arrears as a precondition for hearing the appeal), the Court held that because the application of the Act itself was misconceived, the appeal (filed under some bona fide advice) could not be allowed to stand in the way of the Court exercising its writ jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court rejected the submission that non-compliance with the appellate condition should bar relief.

Holding and Implications

Holding: In the result, the writ petition was allowed. The Court quashed the impugned orders of the House Controller (Annexure-5) and of the Additional Collector (Annexure-6), and directed that a Writ of Certiorari issue accordingly. The Court ordered that, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, there would be no order as to costs.

Core Ruling: The Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act does not apply to the interest in the subject premises because what was leased was originally vacant land; therefore the orders invoking the Act and fixing fair rent were without jurisdiction and are quashed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The House Controller's order fixing fair rent (Annexure-5) and the appellate authority's conditional order (Annexure-6) are quashed; the petitioner obtains the relief sought in the writ petition.
  • Broader implications: The opinion applies existing authorities and statutory interpretation to the facts; the Court did not purport to lay down a novel legal principle or announce a new precedent beyond its application of earlier decisions to the facts of this case.

This summary is restricted to and faithful to the content and citations contained in the provided opinion. No facts, arguments, or legal authorities beyond those expressly present in the opinion have been added.

Show all summary ...

Binod Kumar Roy and I.P Singh, JJ.:— The petitioner prays to quash the order dated 16.5.1988 passed by the House Controller, Patna Sadar, Patna (Respondent no. 2) in B.B.C Case No. 378 of 1987 (as contained in Annexure-5) fixing fair rent under the provisions of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) of the buildings not constructed by the lessors (respondents nos. 5 to 20) as also an Order dated 26.8.1988 passed by the Additional Collector, Patna (Respondent No. 4) in B.B.C Appeal No. 30/68T of 1988-1989 (as contained in Annexure-6).

2. The Matrix:

3. There is a land measuring about 1 bigha 7 kathas bearing Municipal Survey Plot No. 214, sheet No. 10. Circle No. 6, Holding No. 180/4A, ward No. 2 which was leased out by the sons of Late Kanuu Lal Sao to one Daya Shankar Sharma by five registered lease deeds between 14.10.1947 to 14.1.1949 leasing out for 25 years with an option for renewal for another 25 years their 1/5th share to constructing a cinema hall thereon and for using the same for public entertainment or such other structures as the lessee chooses to construct for other industrial or commercial and/or residential purposes. There was a stipulation in the lease deeds that in case a Company is promoted or a partnership is formed for the purpose of acquiring the assets used by the lessee for business, the lessee will have the right of transfer by sale or otherwise the premises and the structures standing thereon and to do all other acts needful for the purpose aforesaid, subject to the terms and condition mentioned in the deeds. Daya Shankar Sharma, aforesaid, subsequently created a partnership firm Ashok Chitra Patna and constructed a building thareon known as Ashok Cinema building, and out houses, garden, park, passage and private road for the use of the building. This partnership firm was later on converted as Ashok Chitra Private Limited, a Private Limited Joint Stock Company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, who is the petitioner. The cinema building, the out house etc. was made over to the said Company on 3.12.1949 by the said partnership firm and since then the changes were made in the structures of the building by renovating from time to time. The lessors have been receiving rent of the land in accordance with the terms of the lease deeds. A copy of the lease deed has been appended as Annexure-1 to the writ petition. After the expiry of 25 years, as stipulated in the lease deeds, fresh lease deeds were executed on 10.4.1973, a copy of which has been appended as Annexure-2 to this writ application. Respondents nos. 5 to 20 filed an application on 16.10.1982, a copy of which has been appended as Annexure-3 to this writ application, before the House Controller, Sadar, Patna (respondent no. 2) under sections 5 and 8 of the Act for enhancement of the rent of the premises in question. The petitioner after notice entered appearance and raised objections, inter alia that the Act is not applicable to the premises described in Schedule I of the petition Annexure-3 that in the petition the structure built up by it has been wrongly included, and that what was lessed out was the vacant land and not the structures. Respondent no. 2 got the matter enquired into. In the enquiry report dated 14.3.1988 it was stated that only vacant and open land was lessed out a ad that no construction on the same was made by the lessor. It is stated in the writ petition that this report was made on the basis of facts admitted by the respondents concerned. To the said report objection was filed by the respondents trying to make distinctions between the lease deads of 1949 and 1973. By the impugned order, as contained in annexure 5, the House Controller over ruled petitioner's objection in regard to the applicability of the Act. The petitioner went up in appeal against the said order which was admitted by Order as contained in Annexure-6 with a condition that within 15 days it must deposit the entire arrears of rent as fixed by the House Controller and then only the appeal will be heard further.

4. No counter affidavit has been filed to the writ petition by the respondents concerned, though from the record it appears that they have certain statements in the petition filed for vacating the order of stay and rejoinders to the petitioner's counter.

5. The Submissions:—

6. Mr. Tarakant Jha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits as follows:— (i) The House Controller has erred in law in holding that the provisions of the Act were applicable to the land in question. Accordingly, the impugned order of the House Controller is without jurisdiction, (ii) Since the order of the House Controller was without jurisdiction, the petitioner has come up to this Court after it was directed by the appellate authority vide the order as contained in annexure-6 to deposit the entire arrears of rent as fixed by the House Controller by his order as contained in annexure-5. He places reliance on the decisions of this Court in the cases of Smt. Jugal Kishori Devi v. Ashok Mills and Foundries reported in A.I.R 1961, Patna, 330 and Dr. Sachidanand Sinha v. The Collector, Patna reported in 1989 P.L.J.R, 1141.

7. Mr. S.S Asghar Hussan and following him Mr. Ashok Priyadarshi, learned counsel for respondents nos. 5 to 20, in reply, submits as follows:— (i) The question of applicability of the Act was not raised by the petitioner before the House Controller. Accordingly, the petitioner cannot raise it for the first time before this Court; (ii) The petitioner is also not entitled to any relief from this Court in view of the fact that they have filed to comply with the direction made by the appellate authority (as contained in Annexure-6). (iii) The House Controller interpreting the second lease deed has correctly held that it has jurisdiction to enhance the rent civ) the lease deed (anaexure-2), if read as a whole, negatives the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that the provisions of the Act do not apply. It has also been submitted that since there is a conflict between the first part and second part of the lease deed, the second part will prevail on the first part. Reliance in this regard has been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Ramkishorelal v. Kamalnarayan reported in A.I.R 1963 Supreme Court, 890.

8. Mr. Jha in reply took us to paragraphs 6 to 12 of the impugned order passed by the House Controller to show that the question of applicability of the Act in question was raised and that there is no merit in the submissions of the learned counsel of the Respondents as what was leased was a vacant piece of land to which the provisions of the Act are not applicable.

9. Our Findings:—

10. The Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, was initially enacted as a temporary statute. It underwent changes from time to time and took shape of Act in question. The word ‘Building’ has been defined under section 2(b) of the Act which runs as follows:—

“Building” means any building, or hut a part of the building or hut, let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes, and includes

(i) the garden, grounds, and out houses, if any appurtenant to such building or hut or part of such building or hut; and

(ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or hut or part of a building or hut”

“(emphasis added).

11. A bare perusal of the definition shows that the word building as defined above does not include within its ambit any vacant piece of land.

12. On our asking, learned counsel for the petitioner has filed a supplementary affidavit in the midst of judgment enclosing copies of two earlier lease deeds and copies of all the subsequent lease deeds. It is agreed by the learned counsel for the Petitioner as well as learned counsel for the contesting respondents that by the earlier five lease deeds what was leased was only vacant pieces of land and that the terms and conditions mentioned in the five earlier lease deeds were one and the same.

13. The law in regard to interpretations of documents is well settled and hardly needs reiteration.

14. Perusal of the earlier lease deeds, which are on the record, unequivocally show that the lease was for a term of 25 years from the 1st September, 1948 to 31st August, 1972 with an option of renewal for another 25 years.

15. Clause 5(vi) of the earlier lease deed runs as follows:—

“That he will at the expiration of the said term of twenty five years, if no renewal of the lease is taken by the Lessee which he has the option to take and in case the lessee renews the lease for the further period of 25 years, then on expiry of the 50th years peaceably and quietly surrender to the Lessor the said land with all constructions made by him thereon free of all costs and without any hitch or reluctance excepting of course the furniture, fittings, fixtures and machineries and plants etc. and other moveables which the Leasee will be entitled to remove. The buildings with electric wiring and with all their door frames and door leaves etc. will be surrendered intact to the Lessor.”

16. Clause 6(ii) of the earlier lease deed runs as follows:—

“That he shall be bound at the request of the Lessee at the end of term of twenty five years hereby granted to execute in favour of the lessee a new lease of demised lands and premises by way of renewal for a further terms of twenty five years on the same covenants and terms herein contained except that relating to the annual rent reserved. Such renewed term shall not exceed the further period of 25 years and the rent for the second term of 25 years shall be twenty five per cent in excess of the rent payable under the present lease.”

17. The aforesaid covenants ran with the lands leased. We have also perused the other part of the lease deeds as it is well settled principle of construction that the documents have to be read as whole. The aforementioned terms extracted by us read with subsequent leases un-equivocally show that there was an option of renewal with the lessee which if exercised was binding on the lessor. The subsequent leases were executed pursuant to the right of renewal which was exercised by the lessee for further 25 years. The subsequent leases do not show that something more than what was leased earlier has been leased except with a condition that the structures put forth by the lesses shall how belong to the lessors. This position has also been very fairly accepted by the learned counsel for the respondents. We also do not find any contradiction between the earlier part of the leases with their subsequent parts.

18. In Dr. Sudhir Kumar Mukherjee v. Nirsi Dhobin reported in A.I.R 1961 Patna 321 and Smt. Jugal Kishori Devi v. Ashok Mills and Foundries reported in A.I.R 1961 Patna, 330 this Court has repeatedly laid down that a lease of vacant land for erecting building for industrial use is not a building within the meaning of the Act. While interpreting the meaning of the word “accommodation” as defined in U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, the apex Court through a four Judges Division Bench in Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf reported in 1976 (1) S.C.C 128 held that the Act embraces lease of such an “accommodation” must essentially be of a building not a business or industry together with the building in which it is situated.

19. Thus, we are of the view that the Act was not applicable and its provisions were illegally sought to be invoked by the lessors by filing an application for determination of fair rent. We further hold that the reasons given by the House Controller for holding to the contrary are not valid on fact and in law and over rule them.

20. In regard to the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents that we should not exercise our discretion in view of the fact that the petitioner has not complied with the direction of the appellate authority, namely, to deposit the fair rent which is a condition precedent before the hearing of its appeal is taken up, we hold that since the Act was not applicable the appeal, though filed under some advice by the petitioner which is being dubbed as bonafide, was a misconceived one and cannot stand in our way in exercising out jurisdiction. We, therefore, reject this submission made on behalf of the learned counsel for the respondents.

21. In the result, this writ application is allowed. The impugned orders as contained in annexures 5 and 6 are quashed but in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to cost.

22. Let a Writ of Certiorari issue accordingly.