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St. Mary'S Society Cherukole v. Alphonse Alexander And Others

Kerala High Court
Mar 2, 1995
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is a society registered for the welfare of traditional fishermen. To expand its activities by establishing cold storage and fish processing facilities, the society required additional land (8.27 ares) and requested the Government to initiate land acquisition proceedings. A notification under Section 3(1) of the Act was published on 2 October 1973, followed by another notification on 29 March 1981. After litigation, the fifth respondent passed an award on 5 August 1989. Due to a dispute regarding compensation and a claim for enhancement, a reference was made under Sections 18 and 30 of the Act to the sixth respondent (Reference L.A.R No. 275 of 1989).

The sixth respondent, by Ext. P1 judgment dated 30 March 1994, allowed enhancement of land value (Rs. 4,718/- per are with solatium and interest). The petitioner claims that the State adduced no evidence and that the total liability under Ext. P1 exceeds Rs. 100,000, which the petitioner (the beneficiary for whose benefit acquisition was ordered) would have to bear. The petitioner asserts it was not made a party to the reference proceedings and was unaware of the trial and Ext. P1 until receiving a communication dated 3 November 1994 from the fifth respondent directing payment of the enhanced compensation and indicating the State intended to file an appeal.

The petitioner contends it is an interested party and seeks to be heard; it therefore challenged Ext. P1 before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, contending that Ext. P1 is vitiated by an error of law and seeking writs (certiorari or other appropriate writ) to quash Ext. P1 and a writ of prohibition restraining respondents 1–4 from initiating execution of the decree in Ext. P1.

Procedural step: The Court heard counsel for the petitioner and the Government pleader (on whom a copy of the petition was served).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner (a society claiming to be an interested party) can challenge the judgment and decree passed by a civil court on a reference (Ext. P1) by invoking the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
  2. Whether a writ of certiorari lies against a competent civil court in respect of its judgment and decree passed on a reference under the Land Acquisition Act.
  3. Whether the existence of an effective alternate remedy by appeal (under Section 54 of the Act) precludes interference by the High Court under Article 226.
  4. Whether the petitioner’s asserted non-impleadment and inability to adduce evidence before the civil court justify the exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction instead of pursuing the appellate remedy.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner (society) is an interested party in the land acquisition proceedings and therefore entitled to be heard in proceedings that affect the compensation and award.
  • Counsel relied on Neyvely Lignite Corporation Ltd. v. Special Tahsildar ((1995) 1 SCC 221) to support the contention that an interested beneficiary may challenge certain decisions in writ proceedings and thus that Ext. P1 can be challenged under Article 226 even though an appeal under Section 54 is available.
  • The petitioner argued that an appeal under Section 54 would be ineffective because it would not permit the petitioner to adduce the necessary evidence against enhancement; therefore, equitable interference under Article 226 was sought to quash Ext. P1 and restrain execution.

Respondents' Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments; it only records that the Government pleader was served and heard.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Neyvely Lignite Corporation Ltd. v. Special Tahsildar ((1995) 1 SCC 221) Recognised that when an award under Section 11 of the Collector is vitiated by fraud, collusion or corruption, the beneficiary may challenge it by writ petition in addition to other remedies. The petitioner relied on this decision to argue entitlement to writ relief. The Court accepted that Neyvely allows writ challenge where fraud/collusion/corruption is shown, but found the petitioner did not allege those vitiating factors; therefore Neyvely did not justify relief under Article 226 in this case.
Nalla Koya v. Administrator (1968 KLT 60) Authority stating that a writ of certiorari cannot be issued to a civil court (as cited by the Court). The Court referred to this decision as part of a line of authority supporting the principle that certiorari cannot be issued to a civil court.
Kathir Pareed v. Special Deputy Collector (1973 KLT 996) Decision holding that writ of certiorari cannot be issued to a civil court (as cited by the Court). The Court cited it to reinforce the principle that civil court judgments passed on references are not subject to certiorari under Article 226.
Union of India v. Vijaya Mohini Mills (1992 (1) KLT 404 DB) Decision holding that a writ of certiorari cannot be issued to a civil court (as cited by the Court). Used by the Court as supporting authority for the proposition that judgment/decree of a civil court on a reference cannot be quashed under Article 226.
Mathew v. Kuruvilla (1992 (2) KLT SN 34, case No. 48) Decision holding that writ of certiorari cannot be issued to a civil court (as cited by the Court). Cited by the Court among state decisions affirming the rule against issuing certiorari to civil courts.
Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1967 SC 1) Constitution Bench majority held that writ of certiorari would not lie against a competent civil court. The Court relied on this Supreme Court Constitution Bench authority to support the proposition that certiorari cannot be issued to civil courts.
Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaquim ((1983) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1984 SC 38) Considered scope of interference with judgment and decree of a civil court under Article 227; found such interference in supervisory jurisdiction cannot be invoked to quash civil court judgments as a matter of routine. The Court referred to this decision to show that interference with civil court judgments under Article 227 is limited and that supervisory writs are not a substitute for an appeal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the petition by focusing on jurisdictional principles and the availability of an effective alternate remedy:

  1. Nature of Ext. P1: Ext. P1 was a judgment and decree passed by the Subordinate Judge, Mavelikkara, on a reference made under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. A reference to a civil court clothed that court with jurisdiction to pass a binding judgment and decree.
  2. Competence of Writ Jurisdiction: The Court held that a writ of certiorari cannot be issued to a civil court. It relied on a line of authority (including the Constitution Bench in Naresh Mirajkar and subsequent decisions) establishing that the High Court cannot, in exercise of Article 226, quash or interfere with a civil court's judgment and decree passed on a reference.
  3. Role of Article 227: The Court noted that Supreme Court authority (Mohd. Yunus) limits interference under Article 227 with civil court judgments and decrees; supervisory jurisdiction is not a substitute for an appeal or reappreciation of evidence.
  4. Availability of Appellate Remedy: The Court emphasized that the legality, correctness and propriety of a civil court judgment and decree can be questioned by appeal under Section 54 of the Act. Where such an effective alternate remedy exists, extraordinary writ relief is not appropriate.
  5. Petitioner's Failure to Justify Non-Availing of Appeal: The petitioner failed to provide a sustainable legal ground for not resorting to the remedy of appeal under Section 54. The petition stated a concern that adequate relief would not be available in appeal because the petitioner could not adduce evidence there; the Court found this reason unsustainable because, on appeal, the petitioner could seek leave to adduce fresh evidence before the competent civil court.
  6. No Allegation of Fraud/Collusion: The Court considered the Neyvely decision which permits writ challenges where awards are vitiated by fraud, collusion or corruption. The petitioner did not allege fraud, collusion or corruption in the award, so Neyvely did not assist the petitioner.
  7. Evidence in Writ Proceedings: The Court pointed out that in writ proceedings under Article 226 the petitioner could not adduce the evidence necessary to disprove the claim made before the land acquisition court; such evidence would properly be adduced in an appeal under Section 54.

On the basis of these points, the Court concluded there was no justification to interfere with Ext. P1 by way of writ under Article 226.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The original petition is dismissed. In the language of the opinion: the petition has no merit and is dismissed.

Direct effect on the parties:

  • The petitioner’s application to quash Ext. P1 and to restrain execution by writ under Article 226 is refused.
  • The petitioner remains free to pursue the effective alternate remedy of appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act; the Court made clear that the dismissal does not stand in the way of the petitioner filing a proper appeal against Ext. P1 before this Court with leave under Section 54.

Broader implications:

The opinion applies established authority that a writ of certiorari will not lie against a competent civil court judgment and emphasizes the availability of appellate remedy under the statute; the Court did not purport to create a new precedent beyond restating and applying those principles.

Show all summary ...

1. The petitioner is a society registered for the welfare of the traditional fishermen, with a view to expand the activities of the society by establishing a cold storage and processing of fish, they required additional land, to the extent of 8.27 Ares. For that purpose, they made a request to the Government to initiate land acquisition proceedings. Pursuant to that, a notification under Section 3(1) of the Act was published on 2.10.1973, followed by another notification dated 29.3.1981 After series of litigation, the fifth respondent passed an award on 5.8.1989 Since there was dispute between the parties regarding the compensation to be shared and enhancement was claimed, a reference was made under Sections 18 and 30 of the Act to the sixth respondent. The said reference was numbered as L.A.R No. 275 of 1989. The sixth respondent, by Ext. P1 judgment dated 30.3.1994, allowed enhancement of the land value at Rs. 4,718/- per are with solatium and interest. It is the case of the petitioner that no evidence was adduced on the side of the State of Kerala and the total liability as per Ext. P1 judgment is more than Rs. 1,00,000/- which has to be borne by the petitioner, for whose benefit the acquisition was ordered. According to the petitioner, the society was not aware of the reference made to the land acquisition court, trial of the case and passing of Ext. P1 judgment till a communication was received by the petitioner issued by the fifth respondent directing them to make available the enhanced compensation as per Ext. P1 judgment. The communication is dated 3.11.1994 It is revealed from the said communication that the State intends to file an appeal against the judgment and decree. It is the further case of the petitioner that they were not informed about the reference since they were not made parties in the said proceedings. According to the petitioner, they are interested in the land acquisition proceedings and in the matter of passing of the award. According to them, they are proper and necessary parties to be heard in the matter. Even though the petitioner is entitled to file an appeal against Ext. P1 judgment and decree and got itself impleaded when the appeal is pending, adequate reliefs may not be available to them in the absence of evidence against the enhancement of compensation. Hence the petitioner challenges the validity of Ext. P1 judgment and decree before this court in this proceeding, under Article 226 of the Constitution. According to the petitioner, Ext. P1 is vitiated by error of law and hence liable to be interfered with by this court. The petitioner, therefore, seeks for the issuance of a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writ quashing Ext. P1 and also for a writ of prohibition restraining respondents 1 to 4 from initiating execution proceedings for realisation of the amount due under the decree in Ext. P1.

2. I heard counsel for the petitioner as well as the Government pleader, on whom a copy of the original petition was served.

3. Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision reported in Neyvely Lignite Corporation Ltd. v. Special Tahsildar ((1995) 1 SCC 221) to substantiate the contention that the petitioner society is interested in the proceedings and, therefore, they are entitled to be heard in the matter. According to counsel for the petitioner, Ext. P1 can be successfully challenged in this proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, even though they may have the right to appeal under Section 54 of the Act. According to counsel, the relief by way of appeal is not effective and hence, he seeks interference with Ext. P1 in this proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution.

4. I am afraid whether the petitioner would be justified in challenging Ext. P1 judgment and decree passed by a competent civil court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. A write of certiorari cannot be issued to a civil court. The judgment or order of a civil court cannot be interfered with or quashed under Article 226 of the Constitution. Even if the decision of the civil court is wrong, a party cannot approach the High Court on the ground that it has supervisory jurisdiction over civil courts and it has ample powers to interfere with the order of the civil court. As the High Court cannot act as an appellate court and re-appreciate the evidence or other circumstances emerging from the case, it would not be possible for this Court to affirm the findings of the civil court or disagree with it on analysis of the factual data. In the decisions reported in Nalla Koya v. Administrator (1968 KLT 60), Kathir Pareed v. Special Deputy Collector, (1973) KLT 996), Union of India v. Vijaya Mohini Mills (1992 (1) KLT 404 DB) and Mathew v. Kuruvilla (1992 (2) KLT SN 34 case No. 48), this Court categorically held that a writ of certiorari cannot be issued to a civil court. This Court also placed reliance on the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court reported in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1967 SC 1), wherein it was held by majority that a writ of certiorari would not he against a competent civil court. The Supreme Court also considered the scope of interference with the judgment and decree of a civil court under Article 227 of the Constitution, in the decision reported in Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaquim ((1983) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1984 SC 38) and found that such interference against the judgment and decree of a civil court in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot be invoked. Admittedly, Ext. P1 was passed by the Subordinate Judge, Mavelikkara on a reference made to that court under Section 18 of the Act. A reference under Section 18 of the Act to a civil court would clothe the civil court to pass a judgment and decree and the said judgment and decree will be binding on the parties. Such judgment and decree cannot be interfered with by this Court in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, especially when effective alternate remedy by way of appeal is available to the parties to the said judgment and decree.

5. The legality, correctness and propriety of the judgment and decree passed by the, civil court can be successfully questioned by an aggrieved party in appeal provided under Section 54 of the Act. The petitioner has not stated any sustainable legal ground for not resorting to that remedy available under Section 54 of the Act. On the contrary, what the petitioner has stated in paragraph 5 of the original petition is that even though the petitioner-society is entitled to file an appeal against Ext. P1 judgment and decree or to get itself impleaded when the appeal is pending, adequate relief may not be available in the absence of evidence against the enhancement of compensation. In this proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, no evidence could be adduced and what the petitioner is entitled to get is leave to adduce fresh evidence before the competent civil court. Such a request can be effectively made by the petitioner if an appeal is filed against the judgment and decree passed by the civil court, under Section 54 of the Act before a competent civil court. Therefore, the reason stated by the petitioner for not preferring the appeal is unsustainabale.

6. Even in this proceeding, the petitioner has not produced or sought permission to adduce fresh evidence. The petitioner can successfully challenge the validity of Ext. P1 judgment and decree before this Court by way of filing an appeal under Section 54 of the Act if they have not been made parties before the land acquisition court, Admittedly the petitioner is aggrieved by Ext. P1 judgment and decree. Therefore, it can file an appeal before this Court under Section 54 of the Act. In the said appeal, it will be perfectly open for the petitioner to adduce evidence and produce documents to disprove the claim made by the claimants in the reference application. As stated, the petitioner cannot adduce evidence before this Court in this proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, to disprove the claim made by the application to interfere with Ext. P1 judgment and decree passed by the civil court in this proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution at the instance of the petitioner, who has an effective alternate remedy by way of appeal before this Court against the said judgment and decree.

7. The reasons stated by the petitioner for not preferring an appeal are unconvincing and, therefore, I see no justification to interfere with Ext. P1 judgment and decree in this proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. Ext. P1 is dated 30.3.1994 and the petitioner has sufficient time to file an appeal before this court with leave of this Court.

8. Based on the observations made by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in (1995) 1 SCC 221, counsel for the petitioner justifies the action of the petitioner in moving this court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the above decision, the Supreme Court had stated that when the award made under Section 11 of the Collector is vitiated by fraud, collusion or corruption, the beneficiary is entitled to challenge it in writ petition apart from the settled law that the conduct of the Collector or Civil Judge is amenable to disciplinary enquiry and appropriate action. Therefore, according to counsel for the petitioner, the original petition is maintainable. Even going by the observation of the Supreme Court, the petitioner has no case in this petition that the award passed by the Collector is vitiated by fraud, collusion or corruption. On the other hand, the grievance voiced in this petition is that being an aggrieved party, the petitioner-society was not made a party by the Collector and thereafter before the reference court. In that case, the application filed by the person for whose behalf the land were acquired, for impleadment was dismissed on the ground that he was not an interested person. The said finding of the civil court was upheld by the High Court. The prayer of the beneficiary to get itself impleaded in the appeal filed by the State under Section 54 was also rejected by the High Court stating that they are not persons interested. Thereafter, the person interested had filed writ petition before the High Court challenging the validity of the judgment and decree and the High Court dismissed the said writ petition holding that the writ petitioner was not a person interested in the matter of acquisition. It was in that context, the Supreme Court had held that the interested person can take up the matter in appeal before competent civil court and also before the High Court in writ proceedings in case the High Court found that they were not interested in the subject matter of acquisition. Even in the case relied on by counsel for the petitioner, the Supreme Court had set aside the order passed by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and directed to treat them as appeals properly filed under section 54 of the Act and deal along with the appeal filed by the State before the High Court. In the said decision, the Supreme Court had no occasion to consider the question whether a writ of certiorari would lie against the judgment and decree passed by a civil court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. But, in the light of the various decisions of the Supreme Court and the Division bench of this Court referred to earlier, it has to be held that the petitioner is not entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution questioning the validity of the judgment and decree passed by the Subordinate Judge, evidenced by Ext. P1.

9. There is no merit in the original petition and hence, the same is dismissed. But I make it clear that the dismissal of this original petition shall not stand in the way of the petitioner, if so advised, in filing a proper appeal against Ext. P1 Judgment and decree before this Court with leave, under Section 54 of the Act.